Public Interest Immunity
39 The applicant only advanced the claim of public interest immunity in relation to paragraph 4 of the Notice to Produce.
40 The applicant noted that Interpol was an international organisation established pursuant to a Constitution which was adopted by its General Assembly at its 25th session in Vienna in 1956. Australia was a State party to the adoption of that Constitution.
41 Article 5 of the Constitution provides for various organs by which Interpol operates, including the Commission for the Control of Files (Commission). It provides:
The International Criminal Police Organization - INTERPOL shall comprise:
• The General Assembly
• The Executive Committee
• The General Secretariat
• The National Central Bureaus
• The Advisers
• The Commission for the Control of Files
42 Articles 36 and 37 provide for the operation of the Commission:
THE COMMISSION FOR THE CONTROL OF FILES
Article 36
The Commission for the Control of Files is an independent body which shall ensure that the processing of personal information by the Organization is in compliance with the regulations the Organization establishes in this matter.
The Commission for the Control of Files shall provide the Organization with advice about any project, operation, set of rules or other matter involving the processing of personal information.
The Commission for the Control of Files shall process requests concerning the information contained in the Organization's files.
Article 37
The members of the Commission for the Control of Files shall possess the expertise required for it to accomplish its functions. Its composition and its functioning shall be subject to specific rules to be laid down by the General Assembly.
43 Interpol conducts its relationships with member States through National Central Bureaus as contemplated by Article 5 and Articles 31 and 32:
NATIONAL CENTRAL BUREAUS
Article 31
In order to further its aims, the Organization needs the constant and active co-operation of its Members, who should do all within their power which is compatible with the legislations of their countries to participate diligently in its activities.
Article 32
In order to ensure the above cooperation, each country shall appoint a body which will serve as the National Central Bureau. It shall ensure liaison with:
(a) The various departments in the country;
(b) Those bodies in other countries serving as National Central Bureaus;
(c) The Organization's General Secretariat.
44 The applicant referred to two sets of regulations that Interpol had established concerning the processing of personal information:
(1) Interpol's Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD); and
(2) Statute of the Commission for the Control of Interpol's Files (Statute).
45 Article 6 of the RPD provides for each member State's National Central Bureau to have direct access to the Interpol information systems. It provides:
Article 6: Access to the INTERPOL Information System
(1) National Central Bureaus are entitled to direct access to the System in the performance of their functions pursuant to the Constitution. This access shall include:
(a) the recording, updating, and deletion of data directly in the Organization's police databases, as well as the creation of links between data;
(b) direct consultation of the Organization's police databases, subject to specific conditions determined for each database and to restrictions and confidentiality rules laid down by their sources;
(c) use of lNTERPOL's notices and diffusions allowing the transmission of requests for cooperation and international alerts;
(d) following up on positive query results;
(e) transmission of messages.
(2) Access by national entities and international entities to the INTERPOL Information System is subject to authorization, and to the conditions provided for in Articles 21 and 27, respectively, of the present Rules.
46 Article 21 of the RPD contemplates that National Central Bureaus can authorise institutions of their countries to access the Interpol information system, and determine the extent of their access and processing rights. That article includes:
Article 21: Granting authorizations to directly access the INTERPOL Information System at the national level
(1) The National Central Bureaus alone shall be entitled to authorize the institutions of their countries to access the INTERPOL Information System and determine the extent of their access and processing rights. The National Central Bureaus shall take, to the extent possible, all the necessary measures to allow the criminal investigation authorities involved in international police cooperation in their countries to have access to the INTERPOL Information System.
(2) Prior to granting authorizations for direct access, the National Central Bureaus must ensure that:
(a) the institution to which it intends to grant direct access to the INTERPOL Information System is an entity legally authorized to fulfil the role of a public institution in enforcing the criminal law;
(b) the nature of the activities and tasks of this institution do not violate the aims or the neutrality of the Organization;
(c) the national laws do not prohibit such access by this institution;
(d) the institution will be able to observe the present Rules;
(e) the access and processing rights it intends to grant are directly connected with the activities and tasks of this institution.
47 Article 18 of the RPD is concerned with rights of access, correction and deletion of data. It includes:
Article 18: Rights of access, correction and deletion of data
(1) Any person or entity shall be entitled to submit directly to the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files a request for access to, or correction and/or deletion of data processed in the INTERPOL Information System concerning that person or entity.
(2) These rights of access to, or correction and deletion of data shall be guaranteed by the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files and be governed by separate rules. Unless otherwise specified in those rules, requests for access to, or correction and/or deletion of data may not be processed in the INTERPOL Information System.
48 The Commission has authority to make binding decisions on requests for correction and deletion of data processed in the Interpol information system: Article 3 of the Statute. The Commission has two chambers: a "Supervisory and Advisory Chamber" and a "Requests Chamber": Article 6(1) of the Statute. The function of making final and binding determinations on requests for correction or deletion of data is performed by the Requests Chamber: Article 6 and 3(1)(c) of the Statute. Sessions of the Commission, including the Requests Chamber, occur in camera, generally only with members of the Commission and its Secretariat in attendance: Article 16 of the Statute.
49 Article 20 of the Statute provides for confidentiality of the Commission's files and requests to the Commission. Article 21 of the Statute provides for consultation by the Commission with General Secretariat, sources of data or other entities with access to the Interpol Information System. Chapter 4 of the Statute deals with the Requests Chamber. Sub-Chapter 1 deals with the institution of proceedings to access, correct and delete data held by the Commission. Communication after the submission of a request is dealt with in Article 31 of the Statute. Article 32 provides that the Requests Chamber shall examine the admissibility of each request.
50 Sub-Chapter 2 is entitled "Procedure after a request has been declared admissible". It comprises Articles 33 to 37. Article 33 deals with the scope of the Requests Chamber's examination of requests. Article 34 permits consultation, including in accordance with Article 21.
51 The applicant's public interest immunity claim centred on Article 35(3) of the Statute. It is necessary to set out the whole of the Article:
Article 35: Communication of information
(1) Information connected with a request shall be accessible to the applicant and the source of the data, subject to the restrictions, conditions and procedures set out in this article.
(2) Prior to disclosing information, the Requests Chamber shall consult the owner of that information, namely the applicant or source of the data.
(3) The communication of information may be restricted at the decision of the Requests Chamber, on its own initiative or at the request of the source of data, the General Secretariat or the applicant, for one or more of the following reasons:
(a) To protect public or national security or to prevent crime;
(b) To protect the confidentiality of an investigation or prosecution;
(c) To protect the rights and freedoms of the applicant or third parties;
(d) To enable the Commission or the Organization to properly discharge their duties.
(4) Any restriction on the disclosure of information must be justified and must specify whether some information, such as summaries, may be provided. The absence of justification alone will not lead to the disclosure of the content of the information but may be taken into consideration by the Requests Chamber in assessing and deciding on a request.
(5) Where deemed appropriate, and provided that this does not compromise the confidentiality of the case, the Requests Chamber may direct the applicant to contact the competent authorities of the source(s) of data.
52 The applicant submitted that Article 35 (read in the context of the whole of the legal framework under which Interpol operates) was to be construed as preventing communication of any information connected with a request and that, in seeking production under the Notice to Produce, the Minister would breach or cause a breach of Article 35. Based on that proposition, the applicant then submitted that Australia would damage its international relations in seeking production under the Notice to Produce. That submission is rejected.
53 As mentioned, Article 35 is also found in "Sub-Chapter 2: Procedure after a request has been declared admissible". Article 35(1) provides that information connected with a request shall be accessible to the applicant and the source of the data, subject to any restrictions set out in Article 35.
54 Article 35(3) provides for the restriction which the terms of Article 35(1) anticipated. Article 35(3) provides that the communication of information may be restricted at the request of the applicant, or the source of the data, or the General Secretariat, or by the Requests Chamber of its own initiative for one or more of the limited reasons identified in paragraphs (a) to (d). Article 35(3) does not contain a general prohibition on the communication of information connected with a request. It permits a restriction of communication to those who would be otherwise entitled to access under Article 35(1), namely the applicant and the source of the data.
55 Article 35(3) does not touch upon whether a litigant in Australia, including the Minister, might use ordinary domestic processes to obtain documents from a person under compulsion.
56 In any event, even if the applicant's construction were correct, there was no evidence that there was a restriction made under Article 35(3) at any person's request or by the Requests Chamber of its own motion.
57 The applicant submitted that it would be injurious to the public interest to require production because it would cause "damage to international relations". The applicant submitted (footnotes omitted):
43. An effect of allowing the Notice to stand is to deny to individuals and entities of foreign States protections afforded to them by the Interpol regulatory framework and thereby restrict their ability to participate freely and confidentially in Interpol processes.
44. To compromise Interpol's ability to give individual's [sic] affected by its processing of data the entitlement to challenge that processing confidentially through an independent quasi-judicial Commmision [sic] damages a foundational element of Interpol's architecture. As the Constitution shows, the functioning of the independent Commission is an important support for the integrity, and international confidence in the integrity, of the Interpol system.
45. Another effect of allowing the Notice to stand will be to give to the Court and the respondent, each being an organ of the Australian state, access to information to which they are not entitled under the rules, other than with the prior consent of Vietnam.
46. Further, if the Court were to require production of the documents it would, as an organ of the Australian State, be requiring the production of Interpol data for a purpose wholly unrelated to the enforcement of the criminal law and would be doing so outside the Interpol regulatory framework which depends upon the supervision and accountability by the Australian National Central Bureau for all access to and use of Interpol data by Australian governmental entities.
47. In each of those ways the Court would cut across Australia's commitments and obligations pursuant to the Interpol Constitution, rules and Statute. Those commitments and obligations are owed primarily to other member States and to Interpol as an international organization; and are owed for the benefit of state parties and the individuals affected by Interpol's processing of data. By cutting across those commitments and obligations the Court would damage Australia's international relations.
58 In S v Boulton (2006) 151 FCR 364 at [160] to [161], Jacobson J observed:
[160] Public interest immunity is not a residual category of privilege in which courts can limit access to information upon the basis of weighing the public interest in disclosure against any competing factor that can be described as public interest; R v Young [(1999) 46 NSWLR 681] at [55].
[161] In R v Young, Spigelman CJ at [55]-[56] clearly explained that D v National Society [(1978) AC 171] is not to be seen as a charter for the unlimited creation of new classes of public interest immunity. It is only where new classes of documents emerge that are important to the working of government that the categories may be extended.
59 In Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 38, Gibbs ACJ referred to Lord Reid in Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 at 940, who had stated that "[t]here is a public interest that harm shall not be done to the nation or the public service by disclosure of certain documents". Acting Chief Justice Gibbs went on to say at 39 (footnotes omitted):
An objection may be made to the production of a document because it would be against the public interest to disclose its contents, or because it belongs to a class of documents which in the public interest ought not to be produced, whether or not it would be harmful to disclose the contents of the particular document. In the present case no suggestion has been made that the contents of any particular documents are such that their disclosure would harm the national interest. The claim is to withhold the documents because of the class to which they belong. Speaking generally, such a claim will be upheld only if it is really necessary for the proper functioning of the public service to withhold documents of that class from production. However it has been repeatedly asserted that there are certain documents which by their nature fall in a class which ought not to be disclosed no matter what the documents individually contain; in other words that the law recognizes that there is a class of documents which in the public interest should be immune from disclosure. The class includes cabinet minutes and minutes of discussions between heads of departments (Conway v. Rimmer; Reg. v. Lewes Justices; Ex parte Home Secretary; Australian National Airlines Commission v. The Commonwealth), papers brought into existence for the purpose of preparing a submission to cabinet (Lanyon Pty. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth), and indeed any documents which relate to the framing of government policy at a high level (cf. In re Grosvenor Hotel, London [No. 2]). According to Lord Reid, the class would extend to "all documents concerned with policy making within departments including, it may be, minutes and the like by quite junior officials and correspondence with outside bodies": Conway v Rimmer.
60 There is no direct evidence that Australia's interests would be adversely affected by requiring production of the documents sought under the Notice to Produce. There was no evidence to suggest that production would damage Australia's relations with Vietnam or Interpol or otherwise. There was no evidence of any opposition to production by any person apart from the applicant. The mere fact that Australia might not have been able to gain access to the documents directly from Interpol is not sufficient to draw the conclusion that access to the documents in Court proceedings using compulsory processes would cause damage to Australia's interests. It is an ordinary feature of litigation that the parties can, through the use of Court procedures, obtain access to material which they otherwise would not have been able to access. I do not accept that requiring production of the documents would cause a breach of Article 35 of the Statute, or of Australia's obligations more generally.
61 Also telling against the claim for public interest immunity is Article 44 of the Statute, which provides:
Article 44: Publication of decisions, recommendations and opinions
Subject to the confidentiality requirements, restrictions and other conditions set forth in the present Statute, the Commission shall endeavour to make its decisions, opinions, recommendations and reports public in all working languages of the Organization.
62 The claim for public interest immunity is rejected.