Conclusion and findings
42My first task is to determine whether the provisions of Clause 2(1)(a) of Part 1 of Schedule 2 and the front fence controls in Clause 60(2)(a) of the LEP are development standards. If they are then consent cannot be granted as the application is not accompanied by a written objection to those development standards.
43Development standards is defined in Section 4(1) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EPA Act) as follows:
development standards means provisions of an environmental planning instrument or the regulations in relation to the carrying out of development, being provisions by or under which requirements are specified or standards are fixed in respect of any aspect of that development, including, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, requirements or standards in respect of:
(a) the area, shape or frontage of any land, the dimensions of any land, buildings or works, or the distance of any land, building or work from any specified point,
(b) the proportion or percentage of the area of a site which a building or work may occupy,
(c) the character, location, siting, bulk, scale, shape, size, height, density, design or external appearance of a building or work,
(d) the cubic content or floor space of a building,
(e) the intensity or density of the use of any land, building or work,
(f) the provision of public access, open space, landscaped space, tree planting or other treatment for the conservation, protection or enhancement of the environment,
(g) the provision of facilities for the standing, movement, parking, servicing, manoeuvring, loading or unloading of vehicles,
(h) the volume, nature and type of traffic generated by the development,
(i) road patterns,
(j) drainage,
(k) the carrying out of earthworks,
(l) the effects of development on patterns of wind, sunlight, daylight or shadows,
(m) the provision of services, facilities and amenities demanded by development,
(n) the emission of pollution and means for its prevention or control or mitigation, and
(o) such other matters as may be prescribed.
44Clause 26(1)(b) of the EPA Act provides that an environmental planning instrument may make provision for controlling (whether by the imposing of development standards or otherwise) development. Guidance in this issue is provided by Giles JA in Strathfield Municipal Council v Poynting [2001] NSWCA 270 where, at [96] - [99] he states:
96 The matters in the construction of the definition discussed by Mahoney JA in North Sydney Municipal Council v P D Mayoh Pty Ltd (No 2) mean that, in order that a provision fall within the definition as a development standard, there must be a development in respect of an aspect of which the provision specifies a requirement or fixes a standard. A provision prohibiting the development in question (the use of land, subdivision of land, erection of a building etc, see the definition of "development" in the Act) under any circumstances will be a provision controlling development, but it will not be a development standard. The availability of SEPP No 1 will fail at the first step.
97 Beyond this, the debate should be over the second step, whether the provision specifies a requirement or fixes a standard in relation to an aspect of the (non-prohibited) development. I consider one can profitably return to the observations of McHugh JA in Woollahra Municipal Council v Carr, to his Honour's reminder of the need to define the development and its aspects before it can be determined whether the provision in question is a development standard. Referring again to the definition of 'development standards', there must be a provision in relation to the carrying out of development, and then the provision must specify a requirement or fix a standard in respect of an aspect of that development. Having identified the development in relation to which there is the provision, the aspects of that development must be considered in order to say whether the provision specifies a requirement or fixes a standard in respect of an aspect of the development.
98 If the provision does not prohibit the development in question under any circumstances, and the development is permissible in circumstances expressed in the provision (whether positively or negatively, see the forms of provision earlier stated), in most instances the provision will specify a requirement or fix a standard in respect of an aspect of the development. In the absence of control, and subject for example to the private law of nuisance, a landowner may develop his land as he sees fit. Control by complete prohibition on the development in question will not leave room for requirements or standards. But anything less than complete prohibition means that there can be the development in question, and provided a relevant aspect of the development is identified the control will be by imposition of a development standard.
99 In the debate over the second step, whether the provision specifies a requirement or fixes a standard in relation to an aspect of the (non-prohibited) development, the key will be identification of a relevant aspect of the development. The list of aspects in paragraphs (a) to (n) of the definition of "development standards" in s 4(1) of the Act shows that a broad view of what is an aspect of a development should be taken. North Sydney Municipal Council v P D Mayoh Pty Ltd (No 2) must be regarded as a case in which the majority considered that the provision in substance prohibited the development under any circumstances, not because of something in the definition of the development (see Clarke JA's comments on the observations of McHugh JA in Woollahra Municipal Council v Carr) but because, as part of the environmental planning instrument as a whole, in the prohibition on erection of a residential flat building the governing characteristic was land with adjoining high buildings, so there was relevantly a prohibition on development in any circumstances.
45This two-step approach asks two questions, the first, Is the development proposed in respect of the site prohibited in any circumstances by the provisions of either clause construed in the context of the LEP as a whole? The second, if it is not so prohibited do the provisions relevantly specify a requirement in respect of any aspect of the proposed development.
46In relation to the first question, dual occupancy development is not prohibited in any circumstances by the provisions of either clause. In relation to the second question, I find that these provisions are separately defined controls to be imposed on permitted development, that is, a dual occupancy development must be erected on a setback determined under the clause and a fence can only be erected along the street frontage of a lot if its height does not exceed one metre. Accordingly, both provisions are development standards.
47In this case, that is not the end of the questioning in regard to the setback control or the fencing control as I must determine whether the default setback of 8m applies to the site and whether the fence is required for noise attenuation because other measures are not available.
48The building setback subclause is in two parts, the first applies in circumstances where the setback is calculated having regard to the average setback of dwellings on adjoining lots in established areas. The second applies to circumstances where there is no established pattern of residential setback.
49The site is within an established area. Dwellings are constructed on adjoining allotments and along the entire length of Chapman Parade on its southern side. Those setbacks vary considerably as detailed in the evidence. The fact that the setbacks are not regular or the same does not mean that there is no established pattern. The pattern is irregular. It is however interesting to note that the irregular pattern does in fact form a curved patter as evidence in the aerial photo included on page 9 of Exhibit C. Application of the clause must have some planning purpose and that purpose is to provide for that irregular situation and flexibility in terms of its application and has the effect of continuing that irregular setback outcome.
50In my opinion, the second part of the clause would apply to circumstances such as a new subdivision where no buildings had been erected so no pattern of setbacks had been established. The 8m default setback would apply in those circumstances.
51There is no evidence before the Court that the proposed fence is required for noise attenuation and that no other measures have been considered to address noise impacts if in fact the noise levels exceed acceptable criteria. Accordingly, I find that the provisions of Clause 60(2)(a) are not met.
52Compliance with the development standards of Clause 2(1)(a) of Part 1 of Schedule 2 and Clause 60(2)(a) of the LEP is a precondition to consent. As the application does not comply with those development standards it must fail and consent cannot be granted.
53If I am wrong in the conclusion that I have reached on the jurisdictional test arising from my findings that the provisions are development standards, I should proceed to a merit assessment so that, if there were to be a successful appeal on my jurisdictional assessment, the parties could consider the outcome of that merit assessment to assist in ensuring that there could be a just, quick and cheap resolution of the matters as might arise on the remitter so as to facilitate achievement of the objectives of s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005.
54The provisions of S79C of the EPA Act prescribe those matters that must be taken into consideration in determining the application. The LEP is one of those matters and, pursuant to clause 9, requires that I am satisfied that the development is consistent with the aim of the LEP, the principles and practices of ecologically sustainable development (ESD) and complies with the principal objectives of the plan as relevant, the locality management provisions within Part 2 that apply to the land and the assessment requirements and provisions in Part 3 relevant to the development, and the relevant development provisions within Part 4. Further, as prescribed in clause 15, consent shall not be granted unless the development has been assessed in accordance with the provisions that apply to the land specified within Part 1 of Schedule 2 and complies with those provisions.
55I am satisfied that the development would be consistent with the aim of the LEP and the principles and practices of ESD and would comply with its principle objectives.
56I am not satisfied that the development is consistent with objective (c) of the Living General Zone. That is because, having regard to the evidence and the submissions of the applicant, I am not satisfied that the proposal will improve the character of the area in a manner that minimises impacts on the existing amenity and environmental qualities of the area. Mr Frith placed great emphasis on the presence of plant species in the locality that the council has, in its DCP, identified as weed species. They include species such as Chinese Tallow, Cootamundra Wattle, Jacaranda, NZ Pittosporum, Golden Wreath Wattle and Cotoneaster. Whilst I accept that the planting of these trees should not be encouraged because of the threat that they impose to the natural environment in the Blue Mountains, where these are planted in the vicinity of the development, they contribute to its landscaped character. That character, in some instances, takes the form of a more natural bushland setting and on other properties, a much more formal setting. Both contribute to the amenity of the area.
57Having regard to the provisions of clause 60 of the LEP, I am not satisfied that the development is consistent with the established character and streetscape with regard to the location of the building on the allotment and the siting of the proposed fence and private open space forward of the dwelling. Nor does it minimise the visible bulk, integrate the development with the existing character of the street or, based on the landscape plans proposed, promote a landscape setting for residential development by establishing vegetation as an integral part of the development. That landscape plan does not achieve the objectives of clause 65 of the LEP.
58For these reasons, the application does not merit consent.
59The Orders of the Court are:
(1)The appeal is dismissed.
(2)Development Application X/827/2013 for the construction a two storey dwelling house to create a detached dual occupancy at No 21 Chapman Parade, Faulconbridge is refused consent.
(3)The exhibits, other than exhibits, B, C and 2, can be returned.
Sue Morris
Commissioner of the Court