Balance of convenience
129 As I have set out above, there are some matters which are against the applicant's arguments, and there are some matters which are finally balanced. It is not possible to say the applicant has a strong prima facie case. This is a matter which will very much depend on how the evidence falls out, including expert evidence. It will also turn to some extent on the legal arguments about the interpretation of the Code.
130 At this stage of the proceeding the Court is entitled to place considerable reliance on the contents of the conservation advice issued for the purpose of the Minister's decision to list the Greater Glider as a threatened species under the EPBC Act. It appears the Minister accepted the contents of the advice since he decided to list the Greater Glider as recommended. This advice is the foundation of the Minister's decision under the same legislative scheme which establishes the protection regime in Pt 3, and governs the operation of the exemptions in Pt 4, including s 38(1). I accept that at trial much of what is in the conservation advice may be the subject of competing expert evidence, and that at trial the evidence may well justify a quite different analysis. However, for the purpose of the interlocutory application, the contents of the conservation advice to the federal Minister should be considered reliable, and VicForests did not submit otherwise.
131 The conservation advice emphasises a number of matters, to which I have given weight in my decision, including:
(a) The level of threat to the Greater Glider posed by forestry operations, especially clear felling.
(b) The fact it has a small home range, and an inability to disperse between fragments of habitat through cleared areas.
(c) The research demonstrating mortality rates in the months after logging.
(d) The adverse consequences of habitat fragmentation for the Greater Glider. Fragmentation is, as I understand the conservation advice, another way of describing the removal of connectivity of the forest canopy.
(e) There is no positive evidence before the Court about the effectiveness of habitat tree retention in logged coupes as a conservation measure for the Greater Glider. There is some suggestion in the conservation advice it is not effective. Unless a measure is established to have at least some effectiveness, it is difficult to see how as a matter of simple logic it can be relied on as a protective measure in a biodiversity conservation context.
132 To this should be added the obvious, but important, point that the status of the Greater Glider as a species, as assessed by the federal Minister, is that it faces a high risk of extinction in the wild in the medium-term future.
133 I give little weight to the evidence from Mr Paul that in some of the four coupes there is "modelled Leadbeater's Possum habitat" that will be excluded from timber harvesting. VicForests appeared to suggest this could give the Court some comfort that such habitat would be of benefit to the Greater Glider. On the evidence highlighted on the interlocutory application, I do not see how that can be the case. The evidence discloses the species have quite different habitat requirements. Further, the Leadbeater's Possum habitat is only "modelled" and it is unknown on the evidence whether Greater Glider are, in fact, using such habitat in these coupes, or in any other coupes.
134 Both the Code and the Management Standards and Procedures were published in 2014, prior to the listing of the Greater Glider as a threatened species. Mr Paul's evidence reveals that decision making around how best to protect the Greater Glider is still a work in progress at state level. He could give the Court no certainty in his evidence about any timing around the promulgation of an action statement, nor whether even if promulgated, measures in the action statement would be given effect in the Code or Management Procedures. This makes a precautionary approach all the more important.
135 Protection of threatened species is not a matter for theory. Protection is ultimately a practical matter, to be implemented in real environmental situations. Protection will always need to be implemented "on the ground" in ways which are established, throughout scientific evidence or experience, or a combination of both, to be effective.
136 The evidence on the interlocutory application about the detections of Greater Glider establishes where members of the listed threatened species in fact are. There are numbers - not insignificant and as yet not completely ascertained - of Greater Glider in and around each of the coupes. The fact that some detections are close to or on the boundary of a coupe rather than in the centre of a coupe is not as significant as VicForests submitted, given the Greater Glider home range is 1-4 hectares. A detection locates an animal at a particular point in time, but the animal must hunt and forage, it must move for safety and for other reasons: it is not a statue. Reasonable assumptions must be made about the use of the forest by Greater Glider around the detection sites, generally within their known range of 1-4 hectares.
137 The aim of a listing under the EPBC Act (and under State legislation) is to protect the species, which means protecting sufficient numbers of individual members of the species, and sufficient habitat, to eventually facilitate the recovery of the species. Protection or preservation of habitat is of little assistance if individual members of a species do not use, or are not able to use, that habitat. The habitat is protected to advance and facilitate the protection of the species, not as an end in itself.
138 In my opinion, at this stage of the proceeding, and given the risks for the Greater Glider population in Victoria, and in the Central Highlands in particular, from forestry operations (as revealed in the Conservation Advice), the balance of convenience weighs strongly in favour of preventing further forestry operations in coupes where there is evidence that reasonable numbers of Greater Glider are in fact using that habitat.
139 I consider this the most important aspect, and the one to which I have given the most weight.
140 In Tegra at [34]-[35], Preston J discusses the factor of preserving the status quo and how that may be considered in determining where the balance of convenience lies in a particular case. His Honour describes the status quo as "the state of affairs in the period immediately before the issue of proceedings seeking a permanent injunction". Preston J continues:
The basis for the grant of an interlocutory injunction is the need to preserve the status quo so that if, at the final hearing, the applicant obtains a judgment in its favour, the respondent will have been prevented from acting in the meantime in such a way as to make that judgment ineffectual: Preston v Luck (1884) 27 Ch D 497 at 505 and Heavener v Loomes (1924) 34 CLR 306 at 326.
141 It is clear from the nature of the case brought by the applicant that if the forest in each of the coupes identified in the amended statement of claim is removed through forestry operations, a significant (perhaps the significant) plank of the relief sought by the applicant in this proceeding is rendered nugatory. Although the applicant does seek relief in the form of remediation and mitigation orders (pursuant to s 475(3) of the EPBC Act) in relation to past forestry operations and alleged past contraventions of s 18 of the EPBC Act, the principal relief sought by the applicant is injunctive relief to prevent any further forestry operations in the identified coupes, presumably pending assessment by the Minister under Pt 8 of the EPBC Act if the Minister or VicForests refers the action. More clearly, the underlying premise of the applicant's proceeding is that the non-logged coupes identified in the amended statement of claim, now excluding the Camberwell Junction coupe and Dry Creek Hill roadside coupe, which have been logged, provide important habitat for, and indeed are occupied by, populations of either the Leadbeater's Possum or the Greater Glider, or both, and that the removal of this forest through forestry operations will, or is likely to, have a significant impact on the Leadbeater's Possum or the Greater Glider, or both.
142 Therefore, if the "status quo" (as I have identified it above) is altered prior to trial in relation to all of the coupes, the applicant's case for final injunctive relief may fail. If less than all the coupes have been logged, this would still be capable of having a serious effect on the likelihood of the applicant proving its case (recalling it must establish significant impact from the forestry operations on the species), and on securing injunctive relief. On the present application, the alteration to the status quo is to five out of 40 remaining coupes scheduled to be subject to forestry operations, so it is considerably less than a total alteration to the status quo. All 40 of the coupes are alleged to provide habitat for the Greater Glider, and approximately 29 out of the 40 are alleged to provide habitat for the Leadbeater's Possum. Nevertheless, for these five coupes, where there are reasonable numbers of individual Greater Glider present and using the coupes, such an alteration to the status quo could materially contribute to any judgment obtained by the applicant being ineffectual.
143 Although VicForests did not refer the Court to any cases about this matter, it is well accepted that, in considering the balance of convenience, the Court can consider whether hardship might be inflicted by the grant of any injunction on any third parties, or on the public: see Tegra at [51]. Some of VicForests' evidence on balance of convenience raises, for example, evidence about the potential financial impact on contractors retained by VicForests to carry out the forestry operations in the five coupes.
144 Significantly, VicForests' evidence does not go to any particular hardship likely to be suffered by VicForests. There is a general contention by Mr McGuire (at [47] of his affidavit) that if harvesting were delayed beyond the 2018/2019 financial year (that is, beyond 30 June 2019) there would be an "incremental" increase to the risk:
that VicForests might not meet its contractual volumes and combined with the natural risks associated with timber harvesting (for example, wet weather) removes a viable coupe from VicForests planned harvesting operations.
145 At the moment that risk is at a speculative level. As I explain below the injunctive relief granted should be revisited at trial: namely in March 2019. Further, there was no more than a general contention in Mr McGuire's evidence, and this matter was not developed in written or oral submissions by VicForests.
146 VicForests' evidence did not dispute that there were alternative coupes which could be logged: rather, what Mr McGuire's evidence suggested was that there would be some financial impacts for VicForests' contractors if they were not able to log the scheduled coupes.
147 I accept that is likely to be the case, although some of the expenses incurred (such as construction of log landings) may not necessarily be wasted depending on the outcome of the trial. However, this situation arises because VicForests decided not to take any action on being notified, as early as November 2017, of detections of Greater Glider in these coupes. While there may be financial impacts on contractors, relative to the potential impacts on the Greater Glider as a listed threatened species, I do not consider the evidence demonstrates those impacts are so serious, or irreversible, as to outweigh the matters I have set out about the consequences for the Greater Glider from continued forestry operations where it is established there are reasonable numbers of Greater Glider actually using the habitat in these coupes.
148 Finally, I note that VicForests agreed to give an undertaking not to engage in forestry operations in any of the coupes in this proceeding for the purpose of the hearing and determination of the separate question. While the Court has recognised that was a responsible course to take, the proffering of that undertaking - which extended over approximately three months - also suggests that some substantial interruptions, and alterations, to harvesting schedules can be accommodated. Of course, the current interruption is substantially longer than three months, and is at least 9 months. Nevertheless, this is not a case where a respondent has adopted a position that the risks and costs are such that there can be no interruption to its continuing conduct.