Consideration
39 I am of opinion that the authorities that have discussed the nature of the Minister's discretion under s 501(2) and (3) and the construction of those provisions are of considerable assistance in construing s 501A(2). Of course, the discretion in s 501(2) is wider because it does not require (unlike ss 501(3)(d) and 501A(2)(e)) that a condition for its exercise is that the Minister be satisfied that cancellation is in the national interest.
40 Ordinarily, where a statute confers a discretion, which is in its terms unconfined, a decision-maker is, similarly, not confined in the factors which he, she or it may take into account in exercising the discretion except to the extent that the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute may imply some limitation on the factors to which the decision-maker lawfully may have regard: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 40 per Mason J. And, as his Honour explained, analogously, the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute can also give rise to an implication that the decision-maker is bound to take into account a particular factor when exercising the discretion.
41 The criterion prescribed by s 501A(2)(e), that the Minister be satisfied that the cancellation is "in the national interest", involved him personally forming a state of mind, namely "satisfaction", on what is "largely a political question", as French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ held in Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 254 CLR 28 at 46 [40]. The Minister must give his reasons for a decision to cancel a visa under s 501A(2) to the person affected (s 501G(1)(e)).
42 Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ explained the operation of s 501(3), which conferred a similar power of cancellation to that in s 501A(2), in Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 347 ALR 350 at 363-364 [57], as follows:
The suspicion of the Minister necessary to fulfil the first condition of s 501(3) and the satisfaction of the Minister necessary to fulfil the second condition of s 501(3) and the relevant condition of s 501C(4) must each be formed by the Minister reasonably and on a correct understanding of the law. The concept of the national interest, the Minister's satisfaction as to which is the subject of the second condition of s 501(3), although broad and evaluative, is not unbounded. And the statutory discretion enlivened on fulfilment of those statutory conditions must in each case be exercised by the Minister "according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion; according to law, and not humour, and within those limits within which an honest man, competent to discharge the duties of his office, ought to confine himself". (R v Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 177 at 189; [1965] ALR 1067, citing Sharp v Wakefield [1891] AC 173 at 179. See Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1; 329 ALR 491; [2016] FCAFC 11; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158; [2016] FCAFC 28) (emphasis added)
43 Their Honours held that the Minister had to evaluate the material to which he had regard reasonably in forming his state of satisfaction as to the national interest in exercising his discretion under s 501(3): Graham 347 ALR at 364 [59].
44 In considering whether to exercise his discretion to cancel the applicant's visa under s 501(2), the Minister had an obligation to take into account the legal consequences of his decision by reason of his knowledge that Australia had currently existing non-refoulement obligations in respect of him: cf: NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1 at 6 [17] per Allsop CJ and Katzmann J and see too at 39 [177] per Buchanan J; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Le (2016) 244 FCR 56 at 66 [46], 70-71 [60]-[61] per Allsop CJ, Griffiths and Wigney JJ. In addition, as the Full Court explained in Le 244 FCR at 70 [60], if at the time that the Minister is considering the exercise of personal powers under s 501(2), there is any material before him or her relevant as to the likelihood of exercising another power personal to the Minister in relation to the non-citizen under provisions such as ss 48B, 195A or 197AB, he or she must also take that material into account. That is because, if the Minister cancels a visa under s 501(2), and Australia currently has non-refoulement obligations in respect of the holder of that visa, the effect of s 197C is that those obligations are irrelevant to the duty of officers to remove the person, as an unlawful non-citizen, from Australia as soon as reasonably practicable. As Allsop CJ, Griffths and Wigney JJ said in Le 244 FCR at 70 [60]: "Necessarily, therefore, to the extent that that issue is material it must be addressed at an earlier stage in the decision-making process". Their Honours explained (244 FCR at 60-71 [61]):
All these factors have a bearing upon the issue whether Australia's non-refoulement obligations and the prospect of indefinite detention are mandatory considerations at the time when consideration is being given to the exercise of the powers in s 501(1) or s 501(2). Given the inherent complexity of the matter, it would be unwise to be overly prescriptive in summarising the relevant legal principles, however, the Full Court decisions referred to above support the following non-exhaustive summary of some of the relevant principles:
(a) in determining whether or not to exercise the powers in s 501(1) or s 501(2) of the Migration Act, the decision-maker must take into account the legal consequences of the decision made under either of those provisions;
(b) those legal consequences may include the prospect of the affected person being held in indefinite detention because of the operation of ss 189, 196 and 198 of the Migration Act;
(c) the test is whether, on the basis of all the material which is before the decision-maker at the time of considering whether or not to exercise the powers in s 501(1) or s 501(2), there is at least a real possibility that the person's removal from Australia would not be reasonably practicable with the consequence that the person faces the prospect of indefinite detention by operation of ss 189, 196 and 198 of the Migration Act;
(d) the factual circumstances which can give rise to the prospect of indefinite detention can vary considerably - for example, that real possibility may exist because Australia owes the person protection obligations and there is no other country to which the person can be removed consistently with Australia's non-refoulement obligations. Or there may be some other reason which is personal to the individual concerned as to why that real possibility exists, such as the state of the person's health, which affects the duty under s 198(6) to remove the person as soon as reasonably practicable;
(e) in determining whether or not to exercise the powers in s 501(1) or s 501(2) of the Migration Act, Australia's non-refoulement obligations and the prospect of indefinite detention are not mandatory considerations in circumstances where it is open to the person whose visa has been refused or cancelled on character grounds to apply in Australia for a protection visa or some other visa (which visa application the decision-maker is legally bound to consider and determine) and the consideration of the visa application must involve regard being paid to the prospect of indefinite detention if the visa is refused;
(f) this position is generally unaffected by the presence in the Migration Act of various provisions which confer personal powers on the Minister to "lift the bar" (such as s 48B) or to grant a visa to a detainee which would have the effect of changing the detainee's status from being an unlawful non-citizen (such as s 195A). There is no legal duty on the Minister to consider whether to exercise such a personal power, whether he or she is requested to do so by any person or in any other circumstances (see, for example, ss 48B(6) and 195A(4)). Hence there is no assurance that the Minister will even consider whether or not to exercise such a personal power, with the consequence that there is no assurance that any consideration will subsequently be given in a relevant case to Australia's non-refoulement obligations or the prospect of indefinite detention. This difficulty may be overcome in a case where, at the time consideration is being given to the exercise of the powers under s 501(1) or s 501(2), there is some material which indicates the real possibility of the Minister exercising his or her personal powers in favour of the affected person; and
(g) the position is also different where, in a case such as NBMZ or NBNB [v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 44], the person whose visa application has been refused or whose visa has been cancelled under s 501(1) or s 501(2) respectively is prevented by the Migration Act from applying in Australia for a protection visa. In such a case, the Minister's obligation to consider the legal consequences of a decision in the circumstances under either of those provisions will include consideration of Australia's non-refoulement obligations and the prospect of indefinite detention, where those matters are relevant to the person's particular circumstances. (emphasis added)
45 Although their Honours discussed this issue using the expression "mandatory consideration", they did not do so because the Migration Act made it obligatory for the Minister to have regard to the most recent known material relevant to whether there was a likelihood of the visa holder becoming subject to indefinite detention or refoulement if the visa were revoked. Rather, the Minister's obligation to have regard to these matters arose because this consequence was the most up to date material before him relevant to his consideration of the detriment to the applicant from the exercise of his power to cancel the visa under s 501(2): Peko-Wallsend 162 CLR at 44-45 per Mason J with whom Gibbs CJ at 30 and Dawson J at 71 agreed on this issue; which I applied in SZJTQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 172 FCR 563 at 571-574 [27]-[42] in a manner approved by Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431 at 452-453 [75]-[77]; and see too S156/2013 254 CLR at 46-47 [39]-[43] per French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ.
46 I am of opinion that the above considerations also apply to s 501A(2). The nature of the issues relevant to the Minister exercising his or her personal power under ss 501(1), (2), or (3) or 501A(2) to cancel a visa and the consequences for the individual concerned are materially similar, save that in the cases of ss 501(3) and 501A(2), the Minister must also be satisfied that the cancellation is in the national interest.
47 I reject the Minister's argument that the majority decision in Nystrom 228 CLR 566 was that the Minister did not have to consider factors personal to the visa holder when exercising his or her power to cancel a visa under s 501(2) or, as the Minister's submission went, under s 501A(2). The position in 2006 when Nystrom 228 CLR 566 was decided was different because s 197C had not been enacted. (The endnotes to the Act state, accurately if curiously, the history of s 197C, namely that a section so numbered was inserted and repealed by Act No 85 of 2001 (the Migration Legislation Amendment (Immigration Detainees) Act 2001 (Cth)) and later the present s 197C was inserted by Act No 135 of 2014 (the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)). The 2001 amendment temporarily applied Ch 2 of the Criminal Code in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) to all offences against the Division in the Migration Act in which the previous s 197C was. The current s 197C was inserted into the Act only in 2014).
48 The issue in Nystrom 228 CLR 566 concerned whether, in cancelling a visa under s 501(2) of the Act as it was at that time, the Minister had also to consider the consequence of the automatic cancellation, by force of s 501F, of any other visa that the person held. As Gummow and Hayne JJ (228 CLR at 583 [41]) and Heydon and Crennan JJ (at 605-606 [124]-[125]) held, the primary purpose of s 501F was to ensure that a person who failed the character test was liable to be removed from Australia notwithstanding any other visa that he or she may have held concurrently with the visa cancelled under s 501(2).
49 In the applicant's case, the Minister's reasons revealed what he understood that he was deciding and why he had decided to delay considering how Australia's non-refoulement obligations could be addressed. However wide the scope of the Minister's discretion to consider what is in the national interest, the question whether to make a decision that would have the prima facie effect of putting Australia in breach of its non-refoulement obligations owed in public law to other nations party to treaties with Australia whence those obligations derive, suggests that this factor must be considered (and not put to one side) by the Minister in exercising the power under s 501A(2) (cf: Graham 347 ALR at 363-364 [57], [59]).
50 Moreover, the presence of s 197C made it necessary for the Minister to consider the existence and impact of Australia's non-refoulement obligations in relation to the applicant at the time the Minister was considering the cancellation of the applicant's visa under s 501A(2). The Minister was bound to have regard to Australia's non-refoulement obligations because of the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the discretion that s 501A(2) confers on the Minister to cancel a visa. That is because, if the decision is adverse for the visa holder, the exercise of the discretion will cause that person detriment. The Minister was bound to evaluate the existing non-refoulement obligations reasonably in deciding whether to cancel the applicant's partner visa, including if it would be possible to meet those obligations in the way he suggested in [106] of his reasons, in light of a finding that any risk of the applicant reoffending required the cancellation of his visa.
51 No reasonable person in the Minister's position could have found any potential for using his discretion to grant another visa under s 195A or his other non-compellable powers as an "alternative management option" to meet Australia's non-refoulement obligations would remain available to him if, as he found, the national interest required cancellation of the partner visa because of the risk of a mere possibility that the applicant would reoffend: Graham 347 ALR at 363-364 [57], [59].
52 As the Minister's reasons demonstrated at [86], [132] and [134]-[135], he regarded as determinative, the existence of the likelihood, however remote, of the applicant reoffending if the visa were not cancelled. He found (at [132]) that "I could not rule out the possibility of further offending by [the applicant]. The Australian community should not tolerate any further risk of harm" (emphasis added). Although the Minister asserted that he had considered Australia's non-refoulement obligations in respect of the applicant (at [133]) he found that these, and other factors favouring the status quo, did not outweigh the national interest considerations based on the risk that the applicant posed to the Australian community by the mere possibility that he might reoffend if the visa were not cancelled. The "consideration" in [106] was perfunctory and not carried out with any reasoning or analysis, given the Minister's conclusion about the applicant's risk of reoffending.
53 It is as clear as burning daylight that the Minister had closed his mind to the possibility of granting the applicant a visa in the future, or at least within any reasonable time after he cancelled the partner visa. That is because the Minister's reasons explained pellucidly that the mere possibility, however low the risk, that the applicant would reoffend was unacceptable and necessitated the cancellation of the visa (see eg at [86], [132] and [134]). In that context, the Minister's assertion of his awareness of "the potential for using s 195A in order to meet Australia's non-refoulement obligations is pertinent to [the applicant's] case and this potential is encompassed in my consideration of alternative management options" (at [106]) was a man of straw.
54 A person's immigration detention will be lawful while the Minister considers whether he or she will exercise a non-compellable power, such as are found in ss 48B, 195A and 197AB: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180 at 205 [76]-[78] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ applying Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319 at 353 [76]-[77]. There, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said (at [77]):
The right of a claimant to liberty from restraint at the behest of the Australian Executive is directly affected. The claimant is detained for the purposes of permitting the Minister to be informed of matters that the Minister has required to be examined as bearing upon whether the power will be exercised. (emphasis added)
55 Section 197C precludes an officer from having regard to Australia's non-refoulement obligations in complying with his or her duty to remove an unlawful non-citizen (as the applicant would become were the Minister to cancel his visa) as soon as reasonably practicable in accordance with s 198(2A). Thus, the only basis open to the Minister to meet Australia's non-refoulement obligations would be for him to grant the applicant a new visa or make a residence determination despite the continued existence of the risk of reoffending that was determinative in the exercise of the cancellation power under s 501A(2).
56 A decision-maker exercising a statutory power that may adversely affect a person's legal rights or interests, and in particular, an individual's life or liberty, ordinarily (unless the statute provides otherwise) must give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the case: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164 at 174-176 [26]-[30] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ.
57 Once the Minister cancelled the applicant's visa, s 197C would entail that the applicant be removed to Pakistan as soon as reasonably practicable. That removal would occur unless the Minister continued the applicant's detention solely for the purpose of considering the exercise of his non-compellable powers to grant other visas or to make a residence determination under ss 48B, 195A or 197AB. All of those powers could only be exercised if the Minister found that it was in the public interest to do so. The Minister had already concluded that any possibility or risk of the applicant reoffending meant that he could not be permitted to be at liberty in the community on his existing visa. It follows there was no likelihood that the Minister would use the "alternative management options" to grant a visa to, or make a residence determination for, the applicant.
58 The Minister stated in [106] that, after cancellation of the partner visa, he still would have "alternative management options in relation to" the applicant. However, that statement could not amount to proper, genuine or realistic consideration of whether it would be in the national interest to exercise the power in s 501A(2) to cancel the applicant's visa. Because the Minister had formed the view that the possibility of the applicant reoffending in the future was unacceptable, the grant of another visa or residence determination was out of the question because the risk of the applicant reoffending would be unchanged. Accordingly, any future "consideration" of the exercise of the Minister's personal non-compellable powers to grant another visa or make a residence determination would necessarily result in a negative decision. Once that occurred, ss 197C and 198(2A) would entail the applicant's removal from Australia as soon as reasonably practicable. Nor could the Minister continue to hold the applicant in immigration detention in the hope that the reason (the real change of persecution of Christians in the applicant's situation in Pakistan) for existence of the non-refoulement obligations might cease to exist at some indefinite further time: M61/2010E 243 CLR at 353 [76]-[77].
59 In the present context, once the Minister decides to cancel a visa under s 501A(2), s 197C makes irrelevant the existence of non-refoulement obligations to the duty of an officer to remove the person from Australia. Accordingly, having regard to the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act, a decision to cancel under s 501A(2) may cause Australia to be in breach of its international non-refoulement obligations under treaties that this country has entered into so as to make it necessary to take this into account as a relevant consideration in the determination of what is or is not in the national interest.
60 I agree with the analysis of Moshinsky J in AQM18 [2018] FCA 944 at [80]-[89] that, in a similar case to this, the Minister, in substance, had misunderstood, and therefore failed to take into account the legal consequences of his decision. That was because he had not considered how, in light of the cancellation of the visa and ss 197C and 198, any "alternative management option" could lead to an outcome other than refoulement by force of ss 197C and 198: see too DMH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 253 FCR 576 at 581 [26]. In the applicant's case here, after cancelling the visa the Minister circled that he wished to discuss the alternative management options. This reinforces the conclusion that the Minister did not think through, indeed even consider, how, if at all, these could be engaged to enable Australia to comply with its international non-refoulement obligations.