The provision in question
8 The provision of the non-studio lease that Fox seeks to have rectified is the clause dealing with "turnover rent" which is one component of the overall rent payable. The other component - "minimum rent" - is a stated sum subject to periodic adjustment by reference to market value and inflation in a way that is not unusual in commercial leases extending beyond a relatively short term. In conceptual terms, "turnover rent" is rent additional to the quantified "minimum rent" and is calculated under the provisions of the lease by reference to the revenues derived by the tenant from operations conducted on the demised premises. As included in the new and separate non-studio document executed on 27 June 2002 in conformity with the parties' contract dated 7 March 2002, the provision with respect to turnover rent is as follows:
"3.5 (b) In addition to the Minimum Rent, the Lessee must pay to the Lessor in respect of each Relevant Period rent equal to the amount (if any) by which 5% of the Revenue for the Relevant Period exceeds the Minimum Rent for the Relevant Period provided that the total amount of the Minimum Rent and Turnover Rent payable under this Clause in respect of any Relevant shall not exceed and is limited to 133% of the aggregate of:
(i) the minimum rent for the Relevant Period under the Studio Lease; and
(ii) the Minimum Rent for the Relevant Period,
provided that for the purposes of clause 3.5(b)(i):
(A) the minimum rent under the Studio Lease must be calculated in accordance with clauses 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 of the Studio Lease as those clauses existed on the date of execution of the Non-Studio MCI Agreement (provided that, if clause 3.2(d) of the Studio Lease applies, the amount will be the lesser of the minimum rent which may be agreed under the clause and the amount of minimum rent which could have been reached by the application of the formula in clause 3.2(c)(ii) of the Studio Lease as the clause existed on the date of execution of the Non-Studio MCI Agreement);
(B) the Lessor must provide the Lessee with sufficient information in relation to the minimum rent under the Studio Lease to enable the Lessee to calculate that minimum rent and must procure the consent of the lessee under the Studio Lease to disclosure of that information; and
(C) if at any time during the Term the Studio Lease is terminated, then the amount to be inserted in this clause 3.5(b) is the amount of the minimum rent which would have been payable under the Studio Lease as at the date of termination of the Studio Lease, adjusted in respect of each Rent Period after the date of termination of the Studio Lease in accordance with the provisions of clause 3.2(c) or, if applicable, clause 3.2(d) (disregarding in each case the references to odd or even numbered Rent Periods) of the Studio Lease."
9 The rectified form of this provision for which Fox contends is set out in paragraph 33 of the further amended statement of claim filed on 10 February 2004. It is as follows (the underlining shows the changes Fox says should be made):
"3.5 (b) In addition to the Minimum Rent, the Lessee must pay to the Lessor in respect of each Relevant Period rent equal to the amount (if any) by which 5% of the Revenue for the Relevant Period exceeds the aggregate of the Minimum Rent for the Relevant Period and the minimum rent for the Relevant Period under the Studio Lease, provided that the total amount of the Minimum Rent and Turnover Rent payable under this Clause in respect of any Relevant Period and the minimum rent for the Relevant Period payable under the Studio Lease shall not exceed and is limited to 133% of the aggregate of:
(iii) the minimum rent for the Relevant Period under the Studio Lease; and
(iv) the Minimum Rent for the Relevant Period,
provided that for the purposes of this clause 3.5(b) (i) :
(A) the minimum rent under the Studio Lease must be calculated in accordance with clauses 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 of the Studio Lease as those clauses existed on the date of execution of the Non-Studio MCI Agreement (provided that, if clause 3.2(d) of the Studio Lease applies, the amount will be the lesser of the minimum rent which may be agreed under the clause and the amount of minimum rent which could have been reached by the application of the formula in clause 3.2(c)(ii) of the Studio Lease as the clause existed on the date of execution of the Non-Studio MCI Agreement);
(B) the Lessor must provide the Lessee with sufficient information in relation to the minimum rent under the Studio Lease to enable the Lessee to calculate that minimum rent and must procure the consent of the lessee under the Studio Lease to disclosure of that information; and
(C) if at any time during the Term the Studio Lease is terminated, then the amount to be inserted in this clause 3.5(b) is the amount of the minimum rent which would have been payable under the Studio Lease as at the date of termination of the Studio Lease, adjusted in respect of each Rent Period after the date of termination of the Studio Lease in accordance with the provisions of clause 3.2(c) or, if applicable, clause 3.2(d) (disregarding in each case the references to odd or even numbered Rent Periods) of the Studio Lease."
The alleged defect in the provision
10 Central to Fox's case is a proposition to the general effect that there existed at all material times an intention that the two new leases entered into in 2002, taken together, should not entail any departure from the basis of rent computation reflected in the lease of the parcel as a whole entered into in 1996 - or, more precisely, that there should be no departure except as expressly agreed to deal with certain specific matters identified and negotiated in the context of the 2002 restructure. Since Fox thus contends that the 1996 lease was the source of a bargain as to rent to be carried over into the two new leases with unaltered effect (or altered only in particularly identified respects), it is necessary to set out the 1996 provision with respect to turnover rent:
"In addition to the Minimum Rent, the Lessee must pay to the Lessor in respect of each Relevant Period, rent equal to the amount (if any) by which 5% of the Revenue for the Relevant Period exceeds the Minimum Rent for the Relevant Period provided that the amount payable under this Clause in respect of any Rent Period shall not exceed and is limited to 133% of the Minimum Rent for the Relevant Period."
11 The general thrust of this 1996 provision with respect to turnover rent is, I think, intelligible enough without access to the detailed definitions of the terms starting with capital letters, although it is relevant to note that "Revenue" was defined as the aggregate of moneys received from the sale of goods and services to the public in the non-studio area (for things such as food and drink, cinema and other entry tickets and merchandise), the sale of tickets to members of the public for tours of the studio area and car parking fees. The "Revenue" concept thus reflected an assumption - perfectly valid under the 1996 arrangements - that both the studio and the FEC would generate receipts which formed part of the overall revenue by reference to which the "turnover rent" component of the total rent under the single lease would be calculated.
12 The restructure that involved the closing of most of the studio area to the public and the substitution of two new leases for the 1996 lease had the consequence that, for the future, nothing relevant to "Revenue" would be produced by the area that became the subject of the separate lease of the reduced studio. All components of such "Revenue" would come solely from the area the subject of the new non-studio lease. Any maintenance of the pre-existing rental basis under the two new leases therefore involved something more than mere reproduction of the original turnover rent provision in each of the new leases. For one thing, the concept was meaningless in relation to the reduced studio area that would cease to be revenue generating. Second, the 1996 provision referred, in two aspects of the turnover rent calculation, to its minimum rent (being the minimum rent for the whole parcel), whereas unadorned and unqualified references to minimum rent in the new and separate non-studio lease would be references only to the minimum rent for the part of the whole parcel the subject of that separate lease. I should explain, in the latter connection, that the minimum rent under the 1996 lease, in respect of the period of four years commencing 1 January 1999, was $2,500,000 per annum and that the minimum rents under the new studio lease and the new non-studio lease were $559,441 and $1,940,559 respectively. Those two represented a split of the original $2,500,000.
13 It is the contention of Fox that two mistakes occurred in the preparation of the non-studio lease. The first mistake arose because the formula for calculating turnover rent under the non-studio lease was the same as under the 1996 lease, that is, 5% of revenue minus the minimum rent for the relevant period. This failed to recognise that the reference to "Minimum Rent" in the new non-studio lease was a reference to the minimum rent provided for therein ($1,940,559) as distinct from the minimum rent of $2,500,000 for the whole parcel. Bearing in mind that, under the new system, all revenue was derived from the area covered by the non-studio lease and none arose from the studio, the "Revenue" referred to in the non-studio lease represented the totality of the revenue generated by the parcel as a whole, yet the deduction from it was the minimum rent of $1,940,559 under the new non-studio lease, rather than the minimum rent of $2,500,000 applicable to the parcel as a whole under the 1996 lease.
14 The second mistake in the new non-studio lease, according to Fox, occurred in the "cap" provision contained in the proviso. As incorporated into the non-studio lease, the proviso limited total rent for the area the subject of that lease - that is, minimum rent and turnover rent together under the non-studio lease - to 133% of the aggregate of the minimum rent for that period under the non-studio lease and the minimum rent for that period under the studio lease. Fox says that the thing subjected to this limit represented by 133% of the combined minimum rents under both leases should have been the aggregate of three things rather than two, the three being the minimum rent under the public area lease, turnover rent under the public area lease and minimum rent (being the only rent) under the studio lease. The third, it is said, was omitted by mistake.
15 The effect of the two mistakes Fox says were made in the preparation of the non-studio lease may be illustrated by an example. Assume that, in respect of a particular period, the initial minimum rent figures under the two new leases apply. These, as I have said, are $559,441 per annum for the studio lease and $1,940,559 per annum for the non-studio lease, representing a simple split, as between the two areas, of the minimum rent of $2,500,000 under the 1996 lease. Assume also that annual revenue in respect of the period in question is $70,000,000. Had the 1996 lease continued, the first step in calculating turnover rent in accordance with the provision of that lease set out at paragraph [10] above would have been to calculate 5% of revenue. The result would have been $3,500,000. The excess of that $3,500,000 over the minimum rent under the 1996 lease ($2,500,000), being an excess of $1,000,000, would have been the turnover rent payable in addition to the minimum rent, subject to the limitation in the proviso. The proviso limited the additional rent element represented by turnover rent to 33% of the minimum rent, that is, 33% of $2,5000,000, being $825,000. Applying the proviso, the $1,000,000 that was the turnover rent without regard to the proviso would have been reduced to equate with the proviso sum of $825,000. Total rent, on that basis, would have been the minimum rent of $2,500,000 plus the turnover rent of $825,000 as limited by the proviso, that is, an overall sum of $3,325,000.
16 This may be contrasted with the position under the two new leases. Under the non-studio lease as executed, the first step in the calculation of turnover rent is to determine the amount by which 5% of revenue (again, $3,500,000) exceeds the minimum rent under the non-studio lease itself (being $1,940,559). That excess is $1,559,441 and, subject to the effect of the proviso, that is the amount of the turnover rent. The proviso in the non-studio lease imposes a cap upon the aggregate of minimum rent and turnover rent payable under that lease. The cap is 133% of the aggregate of the minimum rent under the studio lease ($559,441) and the minimum rent under the non-studio lease itself ($1,940,559) - that is 133% of $2,500,000 which is $3,325,000. This cap limits the aggregate of the minimum rent under the non-studio lease ($1,940,559) and the prima facie turnover rent under that lease, which has already been calculated at $1,559,441 - that aggregate being $3,500,000. Because the aggregate of $3,500,000 to be capped is greater than the cap of $3,325,000, the cap applies to make the non-studio lease's minimum rent plus turnover rent the equivalent of the cap, that is, $3,325,000. Because the minimum rent is $1,940,559 and the capped aggregate of minimum rent and turnover rent is $3,325,000, the turnover rent alone is seen to represent the difference of $1,384,441. But, of course, the landlord receives separately under the studio lease the minimum rent reserved by that lease, being $599,441. In the aggregate, therefore, the total rent for the site is minimum rent of $1,940,559 under the non-studio lease, turnover rent of $1,384,441 under the non-studio lease and minimum (indeed only) rent under the studio lease of $559,441. The overall return is therefore $3,884,441.
17 As these examples show, the annual rent for the whole parcel in respect of the hypothetical period under examination would be $3,884,441 under the two new leases, compared with $3,325,000 under the 1996 lease. The new leases, reflecting what Fox says are the two errors in the preparation of one of them, thus involve, on the figures used for the purposes of the above examples, a financial disadvantage to Fox to the extent of $559,441.
18 Fox contends that such disparity and disadvantage to it were unintended and were the product of the two errors in the non-studio lease. Its thesis is that the two new leases were drafted without an appreciation of the full implications for the turnover rent provisions of the substitution of two leases for a single lease. To set matters right, according to Fox, the non-studio lease needs to be corrected in two ways: first, the figure to be subtracted from 5% of revenue to determine the prima facie turnover rent (that is, the turnover rent unaffected by the cap imposed by the proviso) should, as in the 1996 lease, be the minimum rent for the whole parcel (that is, the minimum rent under the non-studio lease plus the minimum rent under the studio lease); and, second, the proviso which is the source of the cap should refer to 133% of the minimum rent for the whole parcel (again, the minimum rent under the non-studio lease plus the minimum rent under the studio lease).
19 Fox's claims based on mistake are a claim that, by common mistake, Fox and the Trust failed to give effect to their true intentions in the non-studio lease and, in the alternative, a claim that Fox alone was under a mistake when it entered into the non-studio lease, that the trust knew (or must have known) about that mistake and that the Trust allowed Fox to enter into the non-studio lease knowing that it was labouring under the mistake. It is appropriate to deal with these clams before considering the alternative based on the "further assurance" clause.
The legal principles
20 To succeed in its claim for rectification on the basis of common mistake, Fox must show that Fox and the Trust shared a continuing common intention as to the operation of the rent calculation provisions. Success for Fox on the alternative basis of unilateral mistake entails, of necessity, a finding that Fox and the Trust did not share a common intention. In advancing the alternative cases, Fox thus embarks upon the task of making good mutually exclusive propositions. The Trust seeks this as entailing a task of enormous difficulty for Fox, but I must say that I do not see the difficulty as particularly acute. It is true that Fox sets out to establish, on the one body of evidence, two different conclusions. But it seeks to establish the second (as to unilateral mistake) only if it fails in establishing the first (as to common mistake). In the end, the evidence will be seen to support the first conclusion, the second conclusion or neither of them and the case will, as to Fox's mistake contentions, be decided accordingly.
21 In advancing a rectification claim based on alleged common mistake, Fox undertakes an exacting task. It must show the existence of a common intention of the parties that was at odds with the instrument to which they committed themselves; and it must be so by "clear and convincing proof". Authoritative guidance as to the correct approach to a rectification claim of this kind is provided by members of the High Court in Pukallus v Cameron (1982) 150 CLR 447. Wilson J said (at p 452):
"The case raises no issue as to the principles which govern the rectification of a contract. Those principles are not in dispute. There need not be a concluded antecedent contract, but there must be an intention common to both parties at the time of contract to include in their bargain a term which by mutual mistake is omitted therefrom: Crane v Hegeman-Harris Co Inc [1939] 1 All ER 662 at p.664; Slee v Warke (1949) 86 CLR 271 at p.280; Joscelyne v Nissen [1970] 2 QB 86, at p.98; Maralinga Pty Ltd v Major Enterprises Pty Ltd (1973) 128 CLR 336, at p.350. So long as there is a continuing common intention of the parties, it may not be necessary to show that the accord found outward expression, notwithstanding the views expressed to the contrary in Joscelyne at p.98, and Maralinga at p.350. The opposing view is argued by Mr Bromley QC in an article in the Law Quarterly Review vol 887 (1987) p.532. It is unnecessary to pursue the distinction in the present case because the representation of the respondent and its acceptance by the appellants plainly established such an accord.
The second principle governing the rectification of a contract which is material to this case is that which requires the plaintiff to advance 'convincing proof' that the written contract does not embody the final intention of the parties. The omitted ingredient must be capable of such proof in clear and precise terms. The Court must not assume for itself the task of making the contract for the parties."