4 On the hearing of the motion, it also became evident that there are other reasons why the applicant would wish for the hearing date to be vacated. These relate to the applicant's failure to comply with directions made by the Court on 16 April 2010, at which time the Court also fixed the matter for hearing on 23 and 24 June 2010. These non-compliances relate to the filing and service of lay affidavit evidence and of the applicant's written submissions.
5 The applicant intends to rely upon the evidence of Mr Plunkett, a director of the applicant company. This evidence is relevant to the applicant's contention in paragraph 41 of its statement of facts and contentions that the respondent is estopped from enforcing the order. It is possible, but I do not decide, that the evidence may also provide some factual basis for the applicant's contention in paragraph 39 of the statement of facts and contentions that the order is invalid for a variety of reasons.
6 The applicant says that the evidence of Mr Plunkett has been prepared although has not been sworn, however this could be done within a day. No satisfactory explanation has been given as to why that evidence was not filed and served by the date directed of 7 May 2010.
7 The applicant was also required to file and serve written submissions by 4 June 2010. Although it would be difficult to prepare written submissions relating to the contentions in paragraph 40 of the statement of facts and contentions which are dependent on Dr Taylor's evidence, there is no reason why the applicant could not have prepared its written submissions in relation to the legal questions raised in paragraphs 39 and 41 of its statement of facts and contentions.
8 The respondent opposes the vacation of the hearing date. It relied on affidavit evidence of the respondent's solicitor which chronicled the history of the matter, the various directions and the defaults by the applicant. The respondent put forward seven reasons in support of its opposition to vacation of the hearing date.
9 First, the applicant's expert, Dr Taylor, on the evidence before the Court, booked his overseas trip after he had been advised that the Court had fixed the hearing of this matter for 23 and 24 June 2010. The applicant delayed in advising the respondent after it found out that Dr Taylor would be unavailable for the hearing. The applicant also delayed in bringing this notice of motion to vacate the hearing date until last week.
10 Secondly, the applicant has been guilty of serious neglect and default over the history of this matter. The current defaults are part of a pattern.
11 Thirdly, the absence overseas of Dr Taylor is but one reason for the applicant being not ready to proceed at the hearing tomorrow. The applicant is also in default in relation to the filing and serving of its lay affidavit evidence and its submissions.
12 Fourthly, the applicant has the benefit of a stay of the order for the removal of the dam in question. Having the benefit of that stay, the applicant was under an obligation to prosecute its appeal in this Court without delay. However, the applicant has not done so and should not be allowed to delay the matter further.
13 Fifthly, the respondent has made arrangements for counsel and its expert to be available to run the hearing tomorrow and the next day but they would be inconvenienced if the hearing were to be vacated.
14 Sixthly, the respondent has been diligent in complying with the Court directions to be ready for the hearing and indeed has taken other steps to try to ensure that the matter would be ready for hearing.
15 Seventhly, the Court should consider not only the prejudice to the respondent but also to other parties in the Court and also to the Court's resources and the proper management of the Court's lists, referring to the High Court decision in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175.