The parties' submissions summarised
18 The applicant submitted that native title was extinguished by way of the easement created by the Crown in favour of a road access to the neighbouring property and that the easement was a burden on the Land. It submitted that the building of the road and services pursuant to the easement required the applicant to give its consent to the neighbour's development application, but there is a statutory prohibition on it from executing dealings other than in accordance with s 42(1) of the ALR Act. It submitted that native title can otherwise only be extinguished by a determination pursuant to s 225 of the NT Act, citing Badimia. It submitted that even if the relevant part of the Land affected by the easement was not an extinguishment, the applicant is entitled to obtain authority over the entirety of the Land by an application under s 225.
19 The applicant relied upon the following eleven steps, tests or considerations in Badimia as being satisfied in this case. First, the determination area is the entirety of Land as defined in the application, and no other claims or joinders have been made by any group over the Land.
20 Secondly, the Court should grant the applicant having regard to the evidence before it regarding occupation and connection.
21 Thirdly, the Court should grant the remedies sought, relying on s 22 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
22 Fourthly, there is no relevant distinction between a positive or negative determination.
23 Fifthly, there is no different process involved between a claimant and non-claimant application.
24 Sixthly, the notification requirements have been satisfied in this case.
25 Seventhly, s 225 of the NT Act does not oblige the Court to give detailed reasons for any determination or describe the nature and extent of any native titled determined.
26 Eighthly, a determination need not involve mediation.
27 Ninthly, the Court is in a position to make a final determination because it should be satisfied that the relevant statutory notices and processes have been met.
28 Tenthly, significance should attach to the fact that the applicant would be the most likely claimant for recognition of native title or interest and its views as to the existence or non-existence of traditional and custom is relevant.
29 Eleventhly, the Court is not required to go behind the actions of the claim group and to search out contradictors.
30 The submissions of the State Attorney-General on Badimia may be summarised as follows. First, he submitted that the Court has power to make a determination that native title does not exist when resolving a non-claimant application, including in a case where the application is uncontested. An uncontested application may raise questions of utility, which may warrant discretionary refusal of the relief sought. It was acknowledged, however, that questions of utility do not appear to arise where the proceedings are brought by a Local Aboriginal Land Council in order to satisfy s 42 of the ALR Act.
31 The Attorney-General acknowledged that the plurality in Badimia (North, Mansfield, Jagot and Mortimer JJ) found that the Court did have power to make a determination that native title does not exist in a claimant application. Particular attention was drawn to [39] of their Honours' reasons for judgment.
32 Secondly, only Reeves J gave detailed consideration to the Court's powers in relation to non-claimant applications. Justice Reeves agreed with the plurality that the Court had power to make a negative determination in a claimant application, however, in obiter dicta, Reeves J disagreed with the view of the plurality that a non-claimant application is not an application which "necessarily claims" that native title does not exist. At [105] of Badimia, Reeves J said (emphasis added):
… where an area gains s 24FA protection, it is not easy to identify what is to be gained by the applicant thereafter moving the Court to make a determination that no native title exists in that area. Indeed, because of the necessity for a non-claimant application to remain extant (see at [96] above), such a determination would have the paradoxical effect of finalising the non-claimant application and thereby removing the s 24FA protection. Moreover, given that one of the main effects of s 24FA protection is that any native title that exists in the area concerned is extinguished and replaced by a right to compensation, at least in the case of a non-government non-claimant application, a determination that no native title exists in that area will be pointless. Whether a State government could take such a step either directly by its own government non-claimant application, or through the agency of a non-government non-claimant application, in order to rid itself of the obligation to pay compensation for the extinguishment effected by s 24FA(1)(b) is a difficult question (see below at [109]). Putting that question aside, in my view, these two factors strongly reinforce the conclusion that a non-claimant application cannot be characterised as an application that seeks a determination that native title does not exist on an area.
33 Thirdly, it was submitted that Reeves J should be understood as addressing the issue of utility, rather than power, and that an analogy exists with the notion that declaratory relief must be directed to determining a concrete legal controversy, as opposed to a hypothetical question. Furthermore, it was submitted that Reeves J accepted that the Court had power to make a determination in a non-claimant application, at least where the determination did not lack utility.
34 Fourthly, it was submitted that it is significant that the applicant has not suggested that there has been a future act, validated by the "procedural processes" set out in Pt 2, Div 3, Subdiv F of the NT Act, which has extinguished any native title.
35 NTSCORP supported Reeves J's judgment in Badimia and, in particular, the general proposition that the Court should not determine non-claimant applications once land is subject to s 24FA protection. However, in circumstances where the ALR Act requires a determination of the existence or non-existence of native title before Aboriginal Land Councils can deal with land, it submitted that the Court has the power to determine the non-claimant application in the particular circumstances of this case. Reference was made to Perram J's decision in Lightning Ridge Local Aboriginal Land Council v Premier of New South Wales in his capacity as the State Minister pursuant to the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) [2012] FCA 792 (Lightning Ridge). That proceeding also involved an unopposed non-claimant application by a Local Aboriginal Land Council for a determination that no native title existed over four parcels of freehold land. Justice Perram determined that native title had been extinguished in each of the four parcels as a result of four previous exclusive possession acts as defined in s 23B of the NT Act. Although describing the requirements of s 42(1) of the ALR Act as "unsatisfactory" Perram J made the requested non-claimant application. Similarly, a determination that native title did not exist in land was made by Bennett J in a non-claimant application in Worimi Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister for Lands for the State of New South Wales (No 2) [2008] FCA 1929; 181 FCR 300 (Worimi No 2).
36 Whilst submitting that it is not logical for the Court to determine a non-claimant application in respect of land which is subject to s 24FA protection (consistently with the view expressed by Reeves J), NTSCORP submitted that this did not deny either the necessity or the power of the Court to determine a non-claimant application having regard to the requirements of s 42 of the ALR Act.