GOOD FAITH AND THE STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS AT THE TIME OF THE S 35 APPLICATION
18 PKKP strenuously (and correctly) emphasises the beneficial nature of the rights conferred on native title parties under the Act. Correctly, PKKP argue that the right to negotiate regime is an element of the protection of native title which is one of the main objects of the Act and that it is not to be narrowly construed (Smith on behalf of the Gnaala Karla Booja People v State of Western Australia (2001) 108 FCR 442 at [23]). In light of the importance of that factor, the need genuinely to negotiate in relation to a prospective agreement was critical. It was contended that such negotiations must be more than simply 'introductory'. That this was the appropriate construction to be given to s 31 of the Act was clear from the beneficial nature of the rights given to native title parties under the Act. PKKP argues that every reasonable effort must be made to secure agreement through those special rights afforded to native title parties by statute.
19 The expression 'negotiate in good faith' is to be construed in its natural and ordinary meaning and in the context of the Act as a whole: Strickland v Minister for Lands for Western Australia (1998) 85 FCR 303at 319. Accordingly, the act of lodging an application under s 35, taken alone, cannot be relied upon in order to establish bad faith in the negotiating process (Strickland at 322). If negotiations reach a standoff, notwithstanding attempts in good faith to negotiate within the relevant six month period, there are no further obligations after the completion of the six month period on a party which wishes to lodge a notice under s 35 of the Act. There is no need, for example, to give further warning of the intention to do so.
20 It has been repeatedly recognised that the requirement for good faith is directed to the quality of a party's conduct. It is to be assessed by reference to what a party has done or failed to do in the course of negotiations and is directed to and is concerned with a party's state of mind as manifested by its conduct in the negotiations: see, for example, Brownley v Western Australia (No 1) (1999) 95 FCR 152 at [24]-[25] per Lee J, Strickland 85 FCR 303 at 319-320 and Western Australia/Thomas on behalf of the Walgen People/Anaconda Nickel Ltd [1998] NNTTA 8 at [7]-[18].
21 The scheme of the relevant provisions of the Act recognises Parliament's intention that there must be a good faith period of negotiation in relation to the future act before there is any arbitral determination in relation to the future act. The period of six months provided for in s 35 of the Act ensures that there is reasonable time to enable those negotiations to be conducted. At the same time it permits the matter to be taken forward at the end of the six month period by way of an arbitral determination if the negotiations do not result in agreement. The ongoing protection provided for 'negotiation parties' as defined by s 30A of the Act is that if any such party satisfies the arbitral body, in this case the Tribunal, that another negotiation party (other than the native title party) did not negotiate in good faith, the arbitral body must not make the determination on the application: s 36(2).
22 There are two obligations, therefore, spelt out in the statutory scheme. The first is that the negotiations which are directed to reaching an agreement are to be carried out in good faith and the second is that a period of not less than six months has passed since the date on which the s 29 notice is given.
23 The Tribunal concluded, as PKKP asserted, that there cannot be negotiation for the purpose of s 31(1)(b) of the Act if the negotiations are only embryonic. We do not agree that there is a requirement for negotiations to have reached a certain stage. The Act makes no reference to the parties reaching any particular stage in their negotiations. The interpretation adopted by the Tribunal and contended for by PKKP is an additional requirement which is not to be found in the Act. It puts a gloss on the statutory provisions and places a fetter on a negotiation party's entitlement to make an application under s 35 in order to obtain an arbitral determination.
24 It may be accepted, as contended by PKKP, that it is not sufficient for good faith negotiations to merely 'go through the motions' with a closed mind or a rigid or predetermined position but there is no suggestion at all on the Tribunal's findings that that was the attitude taken by FMG. To the contrary, the Tribunal concluded that FMG approached its negotiations with both native title parties with an open mind. It did initiate communications, did make proposals and did punctually respond to communications. It organised and attended meetings, facilitated and engaged in discussions, made counter-proposals, sent properly authorised negotiators and did not adopt a rigid non-negotiable position ([91]). The Tribunal concluded that FMG had from the outset a genuine desire to reach accord with the native title parties ([75]).
25 Significantly, the conclusions the Tribunal drew were against the background of a contention by PKKP that FMG had 'engaged in disingenuous conduct amounting to obfuscation and pettifoggery'. The Tribunal expressly rejected that submission.
26 Had it upheld that submission, a conclusion of absence of good faith would not have been surprising. However, the Tribunal expressly concluded that FMG had 'discharged its duty fairly and conscientiously' concluding that there was no evidence that it had deliberately avoided negotiating about the Proposed Tenement or that it had engaged in deliberately misleading behaviour designed to avoid engaging in meaningful negotiations ([74]). Indeed, the Tribunal concluded that there had been productive negotiations on the LAA ([57]).
27 'Good faith' is to be construed contextually (that is, it is necessary to identify what the 'good faith' obligation is intended to achieve). That obligation is made obvious by the wording of the provision in which it is found within the context of the statutory scheme. There is no reason to think that the ordinary meaning of 'good faith' should not apply. In the present circumstances there could only be a conclusion of lack of good faith within the meaning of s 31(1)(b) of the Act where the fact that the negotiations had not passed an 'embryonic' stage was, in turn, caused by some breach of or absence of good faith such as deliberate delay, sharp practice, misleading negotiating or other unsatisfactory or unconscionable conduct.
28 The difficulty confronting PKKP is that the Tribunal quite reasonably concluded that FMG had negotiated in good faith during the six month period with a view to reaching the relevant agreement. There is nothing more under the statute that it was required to do. It is not surprising that the Tribunal reached that conclusion as the chronology of events makes it clear that from an early time an extensive draft LAA (exceeding 50 pages) was made available to PKKP dealing with all of the matters which would be expected to arise in such negotiations (as suggested by s 39 of the Act). FMG invited PKKP to participate in negotiations in relation to that draft LAA. Negotiations ensued. It was PKKP who suggested that there should be a negotiation protocol. FMG agreed. Much of the six month period was taken with addressing that topic but it was clearly directed to an attempt to reach agreement for the purposes of s 31(1)(b).
29 PKKP complains that there was only one meeting held following conclusion of the negotiation protocol and at which there was discussion about the sorts of activities that FMG proposed to carry out on its mining interests. FMG complains that PKKP exaggerates the suggestion that this was the only occasion on which there was negotiation as such. Either way, it is clear from the factual conclusions in the Tribunal's reasons that there had been conscientious and bona fide negotiation for a six month period directed towards the agreement required under s 31(1)(b). The conclusion that the negotiations had, notwithstanding their length, only advanced to an embryonic stage and therefore could not fall within the category of negotiations contemplated by s 31(1)(b) is, in our view, not supported by the statutory scheme.
30 The Tribunal made it clear that in the conventional sense there was no finding of an absence of good faith on the part of FMG. In those circumstances the fact that the negotiations had reached only a preliminary stage before expiry of the six month period and before it proceeded with an application under s 35 of the Act could not constitute a failure to negotiate in good faith for the purposes of s 31(1)(b).