3 The substantive parts of the Amended Statement of Claim extend over 11 pages of typescript, with paragraphs grouped under subject headings. After some introductory factual recitations, the sub-headings are pleaded as follows:
"Trespass to land:
Trespass into house (5 March 1997):
Trespass: damage to house:
Trespass to goods (5 March 1997):
Trespass: taking of Jason:
Trespass: killing of Jason:
False imprisonment (by RSPCA NSW):
Assault (by RSPCA NSW):
False imprisonment (by NSW police):
Battery (by NSW police):
Trespass: search and seizure (6 August 1997):
Malicious prosecution:
Abuse of legal process:
Breach of statutory duty:
Defamation:
Action in equity."
4 It may be taken that each subheading is intended to represent a separate cause of action. Under each heading appears a series of numbered factual assertions. In the case of all except two of these headings, the last is an assertion that as a consequence of the facts pleaded, injury was caused to the plaintiff. The injury is variously particularised, but generally includes distress, anxiety and humiliation. The two exceptions are the causes of action pleaded as "abusing legal process" and defamation.
5 I shall attempt to put, generally in narrative form, the allegations made by Dr Fleet. I do not pretend that the summary I set out below is a complete paraphrase of the contents of the statement of claim; it is included merely to give a sense of the nature of Dr Fleet's claims against each defendant.
6 As at 5 March 1997 Dr Fleet was the owner of a German Shepherd dog called Jason, and was the occupier of premises at 6 Sixth Avenue, Seven Hills. On 5 March 1997 certain named police officers entered upon Dr Fleet's land, and entered his home. There, one or more of the police officers caused damage; one or more of them "ransacked" Dr Fleet's house, and removed some items such as tools. An officer or officers also removed the German Shepherd Jason. The following day, 6 March 1997, the first defendant, the RSPCA, killed Jason. On the same day the second and third defendants, both employees of the RSPCA, without lawful justification or excuse, arrested Dr Fleet and detained him for an unspecified period. Dr Fleet was taken to the Blacktown Police Station where the third defendant threatened to shoot him. Dr Fleet was received into the custody of NSW police officers. They handcuffed him; a police officer used the door of the police vehicle to strike Dr Fleet on the leg.
7 Dr Fleet asserts that, in contravention of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, he was tortured, although the only specific allegation of torture is to be found at page six, in the paragraph numbered (11) (under the heading "Battery (by NSW police)"). That pleading reads:
"… the plaintiff was tortured (including, in relation to the plaintiff's hand or hands, and the invasion of the plaintiff's body by foreign particles."
8 Dr Fleet claims to have been searched and a bag of groceries and a bag containing an assignment for his theological studies seized. Other items (including his money, keys and belt) were also taken.
9 On 6 August 1997 the second defendant instituted criminal proceedings against Dr Fleet, charging him with an offence against s27A of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 ("the Act") (of failing to provide his name and address to an officer); and, under s5(3)(c) of the Act, with failing to provide an animal with necessary veterinary treatment. Both charges were brought maliciously, and were ultimately terminated in favour of Dr Fleet.
10 Dr Fleet asserts that these prosecutions caused him injury and amount to the tort of malicious prosecution. The second defendant also charged him with an offence of aggravated cruelty to an animal, an offence against s6 of the Act.
11 Dr Fleet asserts that this prosecution was brought without reasonable or probable cause, and for a purpose other than the due, just and proper enforcement of the law, and was malicious.
12 He also asserts that, on 12 December 2005, an agent of the first, second and third defendants forced entry into his home in relation to the service of documents. This amounted to a trespass. Some damage was caused to his house. Dr Fleet suffered injury as a result.
13 Under the heading "Abuse of legal process" Dr Fleet repeats some of the factual matters previously pleaded in relation to his allegation of malicious prosecution. The factual matters purported to be pleaded under this head include the following:
"(15)(a) The CHRONOLOGY (for the State of New South Wales and others) that was submitted to the Supreme Court of New South Wales Common Law Division by the fourth and fifth defendants (in relation to their notice of motion filed on the 3rd August 2004), and on behalf of the first, second and third defendants (in relation to their notice of motion filed on the 26th July 2004), is a litany of lies or relevant omissions or distorted comments, that either imply or portray a different picture to the true facts regarding the plaintiff's civil legal actions."
14 There follow some assertions that, contrary to something he alleges was said by counsel for the first, second and third defendants in that chronology, the plaintiff had not applied for special leave to apply to the High Court of Australia.
15 In the same series of factual assertions, Dr Fleet accuses the defendants of fraudulent misrepresentation to the court.
16 Under the heading "Breach of statutory duty" Dr Fleet appears to plead (against which defendant or defendants is not clear) an offence of perverting the course of justice.
17 Dr Fleet then pleads, under the heading "Defamation" a cause of action said to be under the Defamation Act 1974. The allegedly defamatory matter is nowhere particularised. Nor is any date assigned to the alleged defamatory publication.
18 Finally, under the heading "Action in equity", Dr Fleet asserts that judgments had been obtained:
"by the NSW Police and/or the relevant defendants (including the second defendant and/or the first defendant)"
by fraud, following fraudulent misrepresentation to the courts. He appears to make a claim that judgments thereby obtained be set aside.
The notices of motion
19 By notice of motion filed on 2 May 2006, the first, second and third defendants seek, pursuant to UCPR 14.28 orders that identified parts of the Amended Statement of Claim be struck out. They seek, alternatively, an order that the plaintiff, within 30 days, particularise his claims in accordance with UCPR 15.2, and ask that, if such an order is made, it be self-executing - i.e. that it contain provision for dismissal of the proceedings in the event of non-compliance.
20 By notice of motion also filed on 2 May 2006, the fourth and fifth defendants seek orders that certain identified parts of the Amended Statement of Claim be dismissed pursuant to UCPR 13.4; as an alternative, that those parts of the Amended Statement of Claim be struck out pursuant to UCPR 14.28; and an order, also pursuant to UCPR 14.28, that all references to the fifth defendant, that is, the District Court of NSW, be struck out. Counsel who appeared for the fourth and fifth defendants adopted the alternative claim, advanced on behalf of the first to third defendants, for a self-executing order that the plaintiff provide particulars of his claims.
21 Dr Fleet appeared unrepresented. It is apparent that he had prepared his own pleadings. They betray his lack of legal training. Counsel for the defendants very sensibly and properly forbore to take pleading points of insignificant detail, concentrating only upon those issues that they perceived to be of real substance.
22 Dr Fleet's position was difficult to gauge. On many, many occasions during the short hearing, including at the commencement of the proceedings, he objected (although to what he objected was never quite clear). When asked whether he had been served with the notices of motion, he declined to give a clear answer, reiterating repeatedly that he was:
"… not aware at the present time of the defendants' documents."
He said that he wished to claim privilege under s120 of the Evidence Act 1995 (a provision which is directed to preserving the confidentiality of certain communications by or on behalf of an unrepresented litigant). However, Dr Fleet was unable to identify what confidential communications were in danger of being disclosed, or the basis of his claims. He repeatedly referred to efforts he said he had made to contact "the Principal Registrar", and claimed to have been:
"… effectively shut out of the case …"
23 I was satisfied that Dr Fleet had had adequate notice of the defendants' applications, and of the fixture for hearing, of the notices of motion. The hearing thus proceeded despite Dr Fleet's objections. He declined, effectively, to participate in the hearing, merely maintaining a general objection, and asserting some kind of "privacy and confidentiality" privilege. In reply to the oral submissions advanced on behalf of the defendants, he invoked s56(1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005.
24 Those subsections provide:
"(1) The overriding purpose of this Act and of rules of court, in their application to civil proceedings, is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.
(2) The court must seek to give effect to the overriding purpose when it exercises any power given to it by this Act or by rules of court and when it interprets any provision of this Act or of any such rule."
25 Dr Fleet claimed that the notices of motion are oppressive to him.
26 I reject this. The defendants are well within their rights to take objection to pleadings. There is nothing oppressive about the notices of motion.
27 As I have mentioned above, in respect of all except two of the subject headings, Dr Fleet appears to make a claim for personal injury. For example, under the heading:
"Trespass: taking of Jason"