Underlying the power that courts have assumed to stay or dismiss proceedings for abuse of process is a policy of preventing waste of judicial resources and their use for purposes unrelated to the determination of genuine disputes. There is, in my opinion, another element to be considered and that is the necessity to maintain confidence in and respect for the authority of the courts."
19 Hunt CJ at CL in Haines at 414 continued:
"There are obviously limitations to striking out pleadings or causes of action as an abuse of process upon the basis stated in Reichel v Magrath and elaborated in the cases to which I have referred. The issue determined in the earlier case which is sought to be litigated in the later case must be one which the party propounding it in the latter lost in the former. The principle does not work in reverse to enable the party who won the issue in the earlier case to prevent it being litigated in the later proceedings by someone who was not a party in the former. It must be an issue which was necessarily determined in the earlier case, and one of importance to the final result. It must have been properly argued - by which I mean that it is readily apparent from whatever records there are of the earlier case that the tribunal which decided it was an appropriate one to do so, that the parties were appropriate contradictors and that the issue was regarded by them as one of importance in that case. In normal circumstances, the decision disposing of the issue must have been a final one - by which I mean that it is not subject to appeal. (The filing of a notice of appeal may clearly be seen in some circumstances as merely seeking to delay the inevitable.) There may also be circumstances in which, notwithstanding the absence of an appeal, it is clear that the earlier decision has overlooked some binding authority, or that it has caused the unsuccessful party a manifest injustice. As most of the cases have emphasised, all the circumstances of the determination in the earlier case may be considered, and there can be no definitive statement of the circumstances which will inevitably lead to a finding of abuse of process."
20 Counsel for Five D submitted that this passage confines abuse of process to prior and subsequent litigation involving the same parties. I do not agree. The issue before Hunt CJ at CL was whether the same imputation, which had previously been determined by, separate trial when subsequently raised against a new party constituted an abuse of process. His Honour found that it would have been an abuse of process but for the late amendment, which raised a substantially different case.
21 Counsel for Impact referred to Cleary v Jeans 65 NSWLR 355; [2006] NSWCA 9, a decision which was not before the Magistrate. The facts in Cleary are that Mr Jeans sued a Bank in the Federal Court for damages and an order setting aside a guarantee he had given. The Bank cross claimed against Mr Jeans under the guarantee. At that stage Mr Cleary's execution of the guarantee was common ground. On the third day of the trial, Mr Jeans was asked in the witness box to confirm his signature on the guarantee and he refused to do so. He then applied for leave to withdraw his admissions in the pleadings that he had executed the guarantee. The Federal Court Judge held that Mr Jean's claim raised a triable issue but refused the application for leave to amend because of the prejudice to the Bank. The Federal Court dismissed Mr Jean's claims and entered judgment for the Bank on its cross-claim. Mr Jeans sued Mr Cleary, an officer of the Bank, for damages in the Supreme Court alleging that Mr Cleary had fraudulently attested a forged signature on the guarantee and that Mr Jeans had not checked his signature until asked to do so in the witness box having assumed it was genuine. Mr Cleary applied for summary dismissal on the basis of an Anshun estoppel or abuse of process. Her Honour Mathews AJ held that the allegation of fraud excluded an Anshun estoppel and prevented the proceedings being an abuse of process.
22 In Cleary, both Handley JA and Young AJA referred to a passage in Secretary of State of Trade and Industry v Bairstow [2004] Ch 1; [2004] 4 All ER 325 where Morritt VC set out three propositions where collateral attack to an earlier decision is considered an abuse of process. Their Honours extracted at [38] the propositions so far as they are relevant in New South Wales. They are:
"(a) a collateral attack on an earlier decision of a court of competent jurisdiction may be but is not necessarily an abuse of process of the court; …