Fitzgerald v State of New South Wales - [2019] NSWSC 1439 - NSWSC 2019 case summary — Zoe

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Fitzgerald v State of New South Wales

[2019] NSWSC 1439

Supreme Court of NSW|2019-06-03

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2019-06-03

Catchwords

(1996) 139 ALR 1 Commonwealth of Australia v Shaw (2006) 66 NSWLR 325
135 ALR 353 Holt v Wynter [2000] NSWCA 143

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

(1996) 139 ALR 1 Commonwealth of Australia v Shaw (2006) 66 NSWLR 325135 ALR 353 Holt v Wynter [2000] NSWCA 143

Judgment (24 paragraphs)

[1]

Judgment

HER HONOUR: By notice of motion filed 11 April 2018, the plaintiff seeks an order pursuant to s 60G(2) of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) that the time in which the plaintiff may bring proceedings against the defendant be extended up to and including 27 November 2015. The defendant opposes the orders sought.
The plaintiff is Bede Gregory Fitzgerald. The defendant is the State of New South Wales. The parties relied upon two joint court books which included two affidavits of Moya Regina de Luca-Leonard sworn 18 April 2018 and 27 March 2019, as well as the affidavit of the plaintiff sworn 27 February 2017 and his supplementary statements.
The plaintiff alleges in his claim that between 10 December 1979 and 4 October 2001 he performed duties for the New South Wales Police Force ("NSWPF") at a variety of stations within New South Wales. The plaintiff alleges that as a result of being exposed to various traumatic incidents identified in his statement of claim, he suffered injury by way of post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). The plaintiff alleges that his PTSD was caused by the defendant's negligence and breach of the duty of care it owed to him. I shall set out the particulars of the breach of duty of care later in this judgment.
In his affidavit dated 27 March 2019, the plaintiff adopted his earlier statement dated 27 February 2017. He also relied upon his evidentiary statement dated 22 April 2018 (annexed to the affidavit of his solicitor Ms de Luca-Leonard sworn 10 April 2018) and outlined some minor amendments that have now been corrected.

[2]

Background

For the purposes of this application, I have taken the plaintiff's case at its highest. The plaintiff's evidence is as follows.
The plaintiff was a member of the NSWPF from 10 December 1979 until he was medically discharged on 4 October 2001. His last day of active duty was 21 July 1999.
On 23 March 2000, the plaintiff applied for a medical discharge in relation to his PTSD and medical conditions to his back and neck. In a report dated 18 January 1996, psychologist Mr F McCombie stated that the plaintiff told him that he had been suffering from severe anxiety and depression for at least four years. The plaintiff stated that he felt that he had been traumatised by a long history of incidents, had been unable to ask anybody for support and now suffered a great deal of distress. In a latter report, Mr McCombie opined that the plaintiff was presently suffering from an exacerbation of his underlying depression and anxiety. He thought the plaintiff was suffering from a "depressive disorder".
As part of his application, the plaintiff included a chronological account of events entitled, "REASONS I BELIEVE PREVENT ME FROM PERFORMING POLICE DUTIES OF MY OFFICE." The document outlined various traumatic events which the plaintiff experienced while on duty with the NSWPF.
In January 1999, the plaintiff first noticed a tightening in his chest. He complained to his doctor, Dr Ellis Abbott. Although the tightening sensation cleared by about April 1999, since that time he has suffered from occasional chest pain. On 18 November 2009, Dr W D Wade, consultant psychiatrist, diagnosed the plaintiff with PTSD. The plaintiff says that Dr Wade told him, "I am diagnosing you with PTSD, chronic in duration, with mixed anxiety and depression and melancholic features".
In about mid-2001, the plaintiff began to suffer flashbacks and nightmares which resurfaced traumatic events he had experienced at work. He also experienced physical symptoms of sweating, nausea, chest pains, irregular heartbeat, pins and needles in his extremities, difficulty sleeping, loss of appetite, grinding of his teeth, stiffness in the back of his neck and tension and knotting in his belly. The plaintiff felt irritable, stressed and anxious. His relationship with his wife became strained.
Dr Abbott has recorded that the plaintiff suffered from high blood pressure, chest pain and anxiety every year from 2008-2012. Dr Abbott referred the plaintiff to a heart specialist in Sydney, Dr Ross Walker.
The plaintiff's wife has cared for him as necessary over the years, especially in the two periods between November 1998 to July 1999 and April 2001 to August 2004. During those months, his wife managed his medication, organised his meals, reminded him to dress, shower, brush his teeth, go to and get out of bed, and participate in the aspects of daily functioning. Some of that care was active, such as cooking, and some was more passive, such as calming him during nightmares and flashbacks and watching to ensure he did not attempt self-harm. The plaintiff estimates that his wife provided care of this kind for about 50 hours per week.
The plaintiff says that between about September 2004 and August 2015, his wife managed certain aspects of his care such as reminding him to take his medication and monitoring his food and alcohol consumption, about 5 hours per week. He says he has felt "disconnected" from his wife in his mind, which he has not been able to improve through communication. During this period, he continued to be treated for his injuries and disabilities including through medication, monitoring, and counselling with partial success.
During the period between September 2004 and August 2015, the plaintiff worked part-time as a courier driver, cashier and service officer. He worked in accordance with the recommendations of his doctors, keeping in mind goals of rehabilitation, avoiding unhealthy rumination on the past and managing PTSD symptoms of anger and sadness by distracting himself with work.
In about August 2016, it became too difficult for him to continue with work, as his PTSD symptoms were interfering with his job performance. The plaintiff was becoming emotional with customers and experienced flashbacks and day terrors while at work. On the advice of his doctors, he discontinued work and is now surviving on a pension. The plaintiff presently suffers from insomnia. He feels tired, unconfident, easily distracted, paranoid and washed out.
The plaintiff manages his injuries and disabilities with medical treatment, regularly seeing his general practitioner, psychiatrist and psychologist. With their input, his symptoms have stabilised.
The plaintiff believes that he is unable to work any longer. His early retirement has distressed him greatly, as he had planned to work into his 70s. He prided himself on police work and identified strongly with ideas of fairness, justice and helping the community. He feels deflated by his new lifestyle and isolated from his community. He misses the sense of satisfaction he received from helping others.

[3]

First contact with Ms de Luca-Leonard - 24 July 2015

On about 24 July 2015, the plaintiff first spoke to his solicitor Ms de Luca-Leonard by telephone. After introducing himself, he said that he had just spoken with Nathaniel Gillett ("Nat"). Nat is the plaintiff in State of New South Wales v Gillett [2012] NSWCA 83 ("Gillett"). The plaintiff knew Nat from the police force when they were both police officers.
The plaintiff told Ms de Luca-Leonard that Nat had suggested she might be able to advise the plaintiff about bringing a claim against the police force in relation to his psychiatric injuries. He asked Ms de Luca-Leonard whether he may have a claim against the NSWPF.
Ms de Luca-Leonard asked him whether he had made or been advised about any claims. The plaintiff replied that he had made claims for hurt on duty benefits and for victim's compensation. He informed Ms de Luca-Leonard that he could provide her with copies of his applications for hurt on duty benefits from 1998 and 2000, his application for medical discharge dated 23 March 2000, and for his associated pension entitlements. The plaintiff told her that he had been told by his previous lawyers that these were the only legal claims available to him.
When Ms de Luca-Leonard asked the plaintiff to recount the history of work events he considered to be relevant to his claim, he said that he had documents that set out the major incidents he encountered during his career as a police officer, and that he had been diagnosed with PTSD. Ms de Luca-Leonard advised him that she would read those papers and give him some preliminary advice. She also said that she needed the file from his previous solicitors, and asked if he could sign an authority to release to her.
The plaintiff delivered the relevant papers that same day. Ms de Luca-Leonard looked them over, then handed him some other documents and said words to the effect of, "I invite you to read a number of documents I am giving you now. Once you have read them, please come and see me again. In the meantime, I will read the papers you have given me and give you some preliminary legal advice."
The documents she gave the plaintiff included a Task Force Alpha Report, Delaforce Report, Jan Westerink Report, Umbudsman Report to Police, and a document titled "Instruction 12" ("the documents"). These documents outlined risks to policing, and certain steps that might have been taken by the NSWPF to mitigate or avoid injury to police officers.
The plaintiff signed an authority to release the documents from Walter Madden Jenkins, his previous solicitors, and from Whitelaw McDonald, who acted and were to continue to act in his superannuation pension increase claims. The plaintiff asked Ms de Luca-Leonard to send the authority to Walter Madden Jenkins and receive their files without delay. He also sought a copy of his police file.
On 3 September 2015, the plaintiff received a letter from Ms de Luca-Leonard, as she had foreshadowed when they first spoke (Exhibit "A" to statement 27 February 2017). He arranged a flight from Coffs Harbour to see her at her office at Miranda, Sydney.

[6]

Report of Dr Neil Adams - 2 March 2016

On 2 March 2016, the plaintiff's solicitor obtained a report of Dr Neil Adams, a safety management and ergonomic consultant. I have set out his concluding comments, as they establish that the plaintiff had a viable cause of action or, to put it another way, a real case to advance. Under the heading "5.1 Regarding cause", Dr Adams opined that he had "little doubt" that the plaintiff's exposure to distressing and traumatic situations during his years of service in the police force had resulted in "PTSD or a level of psychological disturbance not markedly less". Dr Adams wrote, "The increasing exposure that [the plaintiff] encountered, with no effective critical incident stress debriefing or other form of counselling following any of the repeated exposure to trauma and death, would have eventually exacerbated his stress levels beyond his coping limit".
Under the heading "5.2 Regarding probability/foreseeability", Dr Adams considered it "quite probable that [the plaintiff], as would any person who was not extremely psychologically resilient and/or who was not given appropriate support…might suffer a PTSD or some other form of stress disorder". Dr Adams gave the opinion that the probability of the plaintiff developing these disorders would have been obvious to the police force. General information about the causes and effects of occupational stress and PTSD were available to the NSWPF before the plaintiff's commencement of employment. Dr Adams opined that the NSWPF had assumed knowledge of the kinds of situations to which an officer would be exposed, and that the repeated exposure would have a cumulative effect. He stated that the lack of any effective psychological preparation or post-incident support in the course of the plaintiff's employment would have had "an intense psychological effect, with the potential for equally intense and possibly lasting psychological consequences". Dr Adams considered that it was entirely foreseeable that the plaintiff would be cumulatively stressed and eventually succumb to its effects.
Under the heading "5.3 Regarding preventability", Dr Adams gave opinions similar to those contained in the documents which Ms de Luca-Leonard gave to the plaintiff. Dr Adams also referred to a 2007 report which addressed the awareness within the Police Force of relevant preventative measures that might have been taken to mitigate the injury to police officers arising from work-related trauma. Although Dr Adams acknowledged that many of these preventative measures would only have been known near the end of the plaintiff's service on the NSWPF, there was relevant information available to the defendant before that time.

[7]

The pleading in the amended statement of claim

By amended statement of claim ("ASC"), the plaintiff pleads that he was exposed to trauma in 1983 (if not before) and repeatedly thereafter.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendant breached its duty of care to him by failing to implement a safe system of work which would prevent and/or reduce the risk of "psychological/psychiatric injury". He alleges that repeated exposure to trauma caused him harm.
In summary, the cause of action is said to have accrued from the defendant's acts or omissions as follows: 1. in failing to institute, supervise or maintain a safe system of work, or work environment, such as to address the risks of harm to the plaintiff; or 2. in failing to warn or educate the plaintiff about the risks of harm to his mental or psychological or emotional health arising from a failure to intervene, treat or monitor the symptoms of work-related mental, psychological or emotional trauma, depression or PTSD; or 3. in failing to warn the plaintiff that failure to implement a safe system of work, or work environment, might cause the plaintiff to suffer significant or long-term significant mental illness including depression or PTSD; and 4. despite the plaintiff's complaints of distress from overwork, exposure to trauma, and other work-related problems as a police officer, and despite the plaintiff's requests for the defendant to intervene or to help him alleviate the impact of the things he complained of any time before he went off hurt on duty.
The defendant identified a shooting incident of 20 November 1998 as having "a profound effect" upon him, but stated that he experienced additional stressors before and after, including immediately before he went off duty in July 1994.
The particulars of negligence alleged against the defendant which are relevant for present purposes include that: 1. the defendant had access to various written instructions or expert advices (including the documents which Ms de Luca-Leonard provided to the plaintiff) at times during the plaintiff's work as a police officer, and did not convey information from the instructions, or give or inform the plaintiff of such instructions or implement them in respect of the plaintiff or his place of work, before the plaintiff left work; and 2. although the knowledge or implementation of the instructions, or compliance with the duties arising from them, might foreseeably have avoided or reduced the risk of the plaintiff's injuries or disabilities, particularly those which are continuing such as inability to avoid ruminations, nightmares and flashbacks to distressing incidents, such as to interrupt cognitive thinking or restful sleep; 3. the defendant breached its duty of care to the plaintiff; and 4. the breach of that duty as particularised came home to the plaintiff as significant long-term injury and disability and was a necessary condition of the harm to the plaintiff.
The particulars set out in the ASC accord with the opinions of Dr Adams, even though Dr Adams' report was prepared after the ASC was filed.

[8]

The law

The plaintiff relies upon ss 60G and 60I of the Limitation Act. Section 60G falls within subdivision 3, Division 3, Part 3 of the Limitation Act.
The purpose of subdivision 3 is set out in s 60F. It reads: "60F Purpose of this Subdivision The purpose of this Subdivision is to provide a procedure for a further discretionary extension of limitation periods where the plaintiff was unaware of the fact, nature, extent or cause of the injury, disease or impairment at the relevant time. This procedure is available for causes of action accruing on or after 1 September 1990, and also (by the operation of Schedule 5) for causes of action that accrued before that date."
Clause 4 of Schedule 5 of the Limitation Act reads: "(1) Section 60G also applies to a cause of action, founded on negligence, nuisance or breach of duty, being a cause of action that accrued or would have accrued before 1 September 1990, … … (3) Section 60G and 60H so apply; (a) Whether or not a relevant limitation period has expired; (i) Before 1 September 1990, or (ii) Before an application is made under either of those sections in respect of the cause of action, and (b) Whether or not an action has been commenced on the cause of action before 1 September 1990, and ... (4) The court may make an order under Section 60G in relation to a cause of action referred to in this clause, if an application for such order is made within (b) The period of 3 years referred to in s 60I, or …"
Pursuant to s 60J, an order may not be made under subdivision 3, Division 3, Part 3 of the Limitation Act unless the time has expired for the making of an order under subdivision 2. Section 60J reads: "60J Operation of this Subdivision An order may not be made under this Subdivision in relation to a limitation period unless the time has expired for the making of an order under Subdivision 2, but nothing in this Act prevents the making of orders under section 60D(2)(a) and section 60H(2)(b) in relation to the one matter."
In these proceedings, the time for making an order under subdivision 2 has expired.
Section 60G of the Limitation Act reads: "(1) This section applies to a cause of action that accrues on or after 1 September 1990, founded on negligence, nuisance or breach of duty, for damages for personal injury, … (2) If an application for an order under this section is made to a court by a person claiming to have a cause of action to which this section applies, the court, after hearing such of the persons likely to be affected by the application as it sees fit, may, if it decides that it is just and reasonable to do so, order that the limitation period for the cause of action be extended for such period as it determines."
Section 60I identifies the matters that the Court must take into account determining an application under s 60G. It reads: "(1) A court may not make an order under s 60G or s 60H unless it is satisfied that: (a) the plaintiff: (i) did not know that personal injury had been suffered, or (ii) was unaware of the nature or extent of personal injury suffered, or (iii) was unaware of the connection between the personal injury and the defendant's act or omission, at the expiration of the relevant limitation period or at a time before that expiration when proceedings might reasonably have been instituted, and (b) the application is made within 3 years after the plaintiff became aware (or ought to have become aware) of all three matters listed in paragraph (a)(i)-(iii). (2) Subsections (2), (3) and (4) of section 60E apply with any necessary adaptions, in relation to applications for orders under this Subdivision."
The plaintiff seeks to rely upon s 60I(a)(ii), on the basis that he was unaware of the nature or extent of the personal injury suffered, or upon s 60I(a)(iii), on the basis that he was unaware of the connection between the personal injury and the defendant's act or omission.
Section 60I involves an examination of the plaintiff's knowledge of the three threshold factors set out in s 60I(1)(a), and in particular, that of which the plaintiff became aware last. The statement of claim was filed on 27 November 2015. In this case, the examination under s 60I will therefore focused on the plaintiff's state of knowledge as at 27 November 2012, and the date when the plaintiff became aware or ought to have become aware that he had suffered personal injury, its nature and extent, and its connection to he defendant's act or omission, whichever is the latter (see s 60I(1)(a)(ii) and (iii)). The onus of proof rests upon the applicant: see Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541; (1996) 139 ALR 1 ("Taylor").
The plaintiff submitted that his statement of claim filed 27 November 2015 outlines a viable cause of action in negligence against the defendant for damages he sustained in the course of his police duties. The defendant submitted that on the contrary, the plaintiff has not demonstrated a prima facie case in relation to the defendant's failure to devise, institute and maintain a safe system of work so as to avoid the plaintiff's injury. The defendant argued that the plaintiff has not articulated or established how the defendant could have protected him from the alleged injury. I do not agree. The allegations outlining how the defendant could have protected the plaintiff are set out at [40] of this judgment. Hence, for the purposes of this application only, and accepting the views expressed by the plaintiff's expert Dr Neil Adams, I accept that the plaintiff has a viable cause of action.

[10]

The defendant's submissions

The defendant submitted that the plaintiff knew of the injury and of its extent before August 2015, and that he cannot demonstrate otherwise. The plaintiff made an application for medical discharge from the NSWPF in 2001 on the basis that he suffered from PTSD and a depressive order. The injury was determined to be so severe that it precluded him from continuing to work as a police officer.
Consideration
The test of knowledge posed by s 60I(1)(a)(ii) requires the Court to look at the plaintiff's actual awareness. Neither the reasonableness of that awareness, nor constructive knowledge, is an element of s 60I(1)(a): see Harris v Commercial Minerals Limited (1996) 186 CLR 1; 135 ALR 353 ("Harris") at 359. Harris is a case of a disease of gradual onset.
The nature or extent of the plaintiff's injury is to be determined as an objective fact as at the date of the hearing of the application. A plaintiff may be held to have been aware of the nature or extent of his injury within the relevant period if, during that period, he was aware of the effect which the injury was having upon him and of its likely future course, even though he may have been unaware of the precise pathology or medical diagnosis. In particular, if a plaintiff was aware that the injury would deteriorate, he or she may be aware of the extent of the injury for the purpose of s 60I(1)(a)(ii) even though the injury developed particular consequences that the applicant did not precisely foresee. As long as the consequences are of a kind that an applicant expects, the applicant will be considered to have been aware of the extent of the injury: see Harris at 359.
The plaintiff's symptoms of PTSD and depressive disorder are outlined in detail earlier in this judgment. They began to manifest in 1999 and have fluctuated in intensity. On 4 October 2001, his injuries were determined to be so severe that they precluded him from continuing to work as a police officer. The NSWPF accepted his application for medical discharge.
During the periods from November 1998 to July 1999, and then again from April 2001 to August 2004, the plaintiff says that he required about 50 hours assistance per week from his wife. From 2004 until August 2015, the plaintiff enjoyed a period of greater functionality, and was able to work as a courier, cashier and service officer. Because his symptoms of PTSD were less severe, he required less assistance from his wife. However, in 2015 the plaintiff's condition intensified.
I accept that the plaintiff became aware in August 2015 that his wife had been doing more things for him including cooking, cleaning, reminding him to take medication and supporting him through memories and flashbacks. He was aware by 4 October 2016 that he was no longer able to work.
However, although the plaintiff's symptoms of PTSD intensified in 2015 after a period of decreased severity, he had become aware in 2001 of the nature of his PTSD and depression. In my view, it was at this time that the plaintiff can be said to have been aware of the effect the PTSD and depression was having upon him and of their cause, even though he did not foresee the likely consequences. If the consequences of the PTSD and depression are of a kind that the plaintiff expects, he is to be considered to have been aware of the extent of the injury: see Harris at 359.
For these reasons, it is my view that the plaintiff was aware of the nature and extent of his injuries by 4 October 2001, when he applied to the NSWPF for a medical discharge. As such, the plaintiff's claim under s 60I(a)(ii) fails.

[11]

The plaintiff's submissions

The plaintiff submitted that it was only after 24 July 2015, when he was given the documents and legal advice from his solicitor, that he became aware of the relevant connection between his injury and the defendant's failure to act to prevent it. He says that before that time, he was not aware he had a cause of action against the defendant for breach of its duty of care to him.
The plaintiff submitted that it was also after 24 July 2015 that he retained Ms de Luca-Leonard as his solicitor, accessed the documents, sought out the liability report from Dr Neil Adams and received counsel's advice.
The plaintiff submitted that he was unaware of the information contained in the documents because the defendant failed to disclose it. This failure to disclose forms an aspect of the plaintiff's claim for breach of duty of care against the defendant.
The plaintiff submitted that although on 9 October 2001 the commissioner delegate of the workers compensation branch of the NSWPF accepted the plaintiff's injury as "infirmity" which was "caused" by "the member being hurt on duty", the plaintiff was then only aware that he had a claim for benefits. He says he was not aware that he could bring the present cause of action against the defendant in negligence.
After first receiving advice from his current solicitor on 24 July 2015, the plaintiff says he exercised diligence in commencing his case by 27 November 2015.
The plaintiff argued that for the purposes of s 60I(a)(iii), he was not aware as a matter of law on 4 October 2001 of the connection between his personal injury and the defendant's acts or omissions. The plaintiff submitted that the wording of subs (a)(iii) identifies the nature or quality of a relevant further fact. The further fact must identify, sufficiently, but not necessarily as a matter of law, the relevant "connection between the personal injury and the defendant's act or omission". The plaintiff submitted that the facts which arose to the plaintiff in the 3 years prior to 27 November 2015 differ from those known to him on 4 October 2001. As such, the Court should grant an extension of time.

[12]

The defendant's submissions

The defendant referred to Drayton Coal Pty Ltd v Drain [1995] NSWCA 131 ("Drayton Coal"), where the Court of Appeal per Gleeson CJ stated: "For the purposes of a case such as the present the decision of the High Court in Dedousis establishes the following propositions: 1. Section 60F is no more than an introductory provision that indicates the purpose of subdiv 3. It is in s 60l(l), and not in s 60F, that the requirements to be satisfied by a plaintiff are to be found. 2. The requirement, in s 60(l)(a)(iii), that the plaintiff was, at a specified time, unaware of the connection between the plaintiff's personal injury and the defendant's act or omission, is not identical to a requirement (of a kind which might be inferred from s 60F) that the plaintiff was unaware of the cause of the injury. (The decision in Dedousis turned upon that difference). 3. Section 60l(1)(a)(iii) is concerned with ignorance of the existence of acts or omissions rather than legal conclusions. The legal complexion which may be put upon a set of facts or circumstances (e.g. actionable negligence), and the plaintiff's awareness of that legal complexion, is not what matters for the purpose of s 60l(l). 4. The acts or omissions referred to in s 60l(l)(a)(iii) are acts or omissions, in a case such as the present (as in Dedousis) will be found in the plaintiff's particulars of negligence. (In this connection I refer, not to the product of some word processor, which, as some of the particulars in the present case illustrate, might include allegations that are either inapplicable or of marginal relevance, but to the material particulars as they emerge from a consideration of the statement of claim and the evidence in support of the application for an extension of time). 5. If a plaintiff alleges that his or her employer has failed to provide him or her with a safe system of work and is able to establish that he or she was not aware that there was a safer alternative system then s 60l( 1) (a) (iii) will be satisfied. 6. Even so, it will still be necessary for the court dealing with the application for an extension of time to decide whether, under s 60G(2), it is just and reasonable to extend the limitation period."
The defendant also referred to State of New South Wales v Judd [2003] NSWCA 355, where the Court of Appeal held that in respect of s 60I(1)(a)(iii), the test to apply is whether the applicant knows the facts, not whether he is aware of their legal significance. The question is one of actual subjective knowledge or awareness: see Harris.
The defendant submitted that the plaintiff's application for medical discharge shows that he understood that there was a connection between his personal injury and his work for the NSWPF. The question is whether he knew of the connection between the injury and any alleged omission of the NSWPF. The defendant submitted that the plaintiff has not established that he did not possess the requisite knowledge.

[13]

Consideration

In Gillett, although dealing with 50D of the Limitation Act, the Court of Appeal stated at [84]: "[84] In Drayton Coal, Gleeson CJ (Priestley and Meagher JJA agreeing) considered that questions of degree may be involved in determining whether a plaintiff was unaware of the connection between the personal injury and the defendant acts or omissions. His Honour stated, at 7: '…a court may well be confronted with a situation where, before and at the relevant time, the plaintiff was aware of some act or omission on the part of the defendant, and the connection between those acts or omissions and the plaintiff's injury, but not of other acts or omissions upon which reliance will be placed at a trial. The mere fact that plaintiffs' lawyers can think up some act or omission, upon which they will wish to place some reliance at trial, which was not known to the plaintiff at the relevant time, does not automatically mean that the requirements of s 60I(1)(a)(iii) are satisfied. On the other hand, the decision in Dedousis establishes that unawareness of a material act or omission; which constitutes a substantial ground upon which reliance will be placed is sufficient to satisfy s 60I(1)(a)(iii).'"
As at 4 October 2001, the plaintiff knew that he had a significant injury which prevented him from performing his duties as a police officer, and was aware that the proper respondent for his workers compensation injury was the insurer of the police service. After he was discharged from the NSWPF, the plaintiff had sought legal advice and was advised that he could apply for hurt on duty benefits, medical discharge, associated pension entitlements, workers compensation payments and claims for s 12D victim compensation. I accept that he was diligent in finding out what legal rights were reasonably available to him. The plaintiff sought out, retained, and acted upon legal advice from various advisors. Among the available options, he was advised to pursue claims in workers compensation, victims compensation, and pension increase. He received legal advice that no other actions were available to him throughout that period of time after 4 October 2001 until he finished his part-time work in mid-2015 and saw Mr Nathaniel Gillett.
It was only in late August 2015, when the plaintiff realised that due to his worsening symptoms of PTSD he could no longer work, that he spoke to Nat. Nat told him, "You know, you might have a case." The plaintiff explained to Nat that he had already made legal claims between 1998 and 2000. Nat replied, "No, I am not talking about those claims. You may be able to sue the police for what happened to you. Ask Moya, my solicitor."
The plaintiff consulted Ms de Luca-Leonard, who provided him the documents illustrating the various interventions and resources the NSWPF could have provided the plaintiff to prevent or reduce his injury. It did not take any of the available steps. He was not offered any counselling, even when he had requested it, nor was he offered training in self-help strategies.
In November 2015, the plaintiff and his solicitor attended a conference with counsel, Mr Kelvin Andrews. It is the plaintiff's evidence that it was only at that conference that he understood that the documents he was given informed the duty of care that the NSWPF had to him when he was a police officer. It was only then that he understood that the NSWPF's failure to implement any of those strategies to mitigate his psychological injuries gave rise to a claim in negligence. The plaintiff's understanding of what counsel said to him was that he had a claim with merit against his employer for a breach of its duty of care to him, and that the breach, over many months or years, caused the mental injury and disability from which he suffers. I accept this evidence. It is my view that it was in August 2015 at the earliest, but more likely in September 2015, that the plaintiff became aware of the connection between his PTSD and depression and the defendant's acts or omissions. The plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of s 60I(a)(iii).

[16]

Defendant's submissions

The defendant referred to Pearce v Commonwealth of Australia [2006] NSWCA 210, where Basten JA (with Handley and Ipp JJA agreeing) held at [33]): "[33] So much may be accepted: the critical question is by what criteria a normative judgment should be made as to whether he 'ought' to have taken steps through which he probably would have become aware of the fact that he had suffered an injury. As noted in Shaw at [32]-[33], there is some awkwardness in asking whether a person ought to have sought medical treatment, in order to be allowed to bring legal proceedings against the person who may have caused or contributed to the condition from which the person suffers, the relevant criterion being his own responsibility for his continuing ignorance. Factors which might make it inappropriate to conclude that the plaintiff 'ought' to have taken steps which would have resulted in him obtaining knowledge that he had suffered an injury may include, depending on the circumstances: (i) any known link between the injury and the failure to take such steps; (j) any conduct of the prospective defendant which may have discouraged the taking of such steps; (k) particular characteristics of the plaintiff which may have discouraged the taking of such steps; and (l) the likelihood, in the plaintiff's mind, that such steps would be appropriate for the purpose for which they were taken, which will probably be to obtain advice as to appropriate medical treatment."
The defendant submitted that the plaintiff cannot demonstrate any of these factors. Again, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's knowledge at the time that he prepared his application for medical discharge shows that the plaintiff understood that there was a connection between his personal injury and his work for the police force.
The question is whether the plaintiff knew of the connection between the injury and any alleged omission of the NSWPF. The defendant submitted that the plaintiff has not established that he did not possess the requisite knowledge.
In Shaw at [30]-[31], Basten JA commented upon the normative element of s 60I(1)(b) in the following terms: "[30] Paragraph (b) requires the Court to be satisfied that the application to extend time was brought within three years of the date when the plaintiff became aware or ought to have become aware of the relevant matters specified in paragraph (a). Thus, even if the date of actual awareness falls within the three-year period, the Court is required to consider whether the plaintiff ought to have become aware of the last of the relevant matters at a date prior to the commencement of that period. [31] It is well established that this limb involves a separate and distinct test, not limited to actual awareness, but taking into account other matters, thought appropriate in the circumstances, including the particular circumstances affecting the plaintiff. In Telstra Corporation Ltd v Rea [2002] NSWCA 49 at [36], Foster AJ (with whom Mason P and Einstein J agreed) in relation to this issue) adopted a concept of 'constructive knowledge', as explained by Lord Reid in Central Asbestos Co Ltd v Dodd [1973] AC 518 at 530: 'In order to avoid constructive knowledge the plaintiff must have taken all such action as it was reasonable for him to take to find out.'"
In Shaw, Basten JA further expounded on the issue at [73]-[77]: "[73] There is no doubt that the normative limb of par (b) requires an evaluative judgment of a somewhat imprecise kind. Although each case must be governed by its own factual circumstances, it is desirable that similar cases (and there are now many arising from the Melbourne/Voyager collision) should, so far as possible, be decided consistently. That does not mean, of course, that all must reach the same result but that where possible, reasons given should indicate why a particular result has been reached in one case which appears superficially similar to others, but may not have the same outcome. No attempt was made in the present proceedings to approach the matter in that way. Accordingly, the trial judge not having addressed the issues under par (b) it is necessary to reach a judgment on the material presented. [74] In my view the plaintiff ought, for the purposes of par (b), to have sought medical advice at an earlier stage and if he had done so, it is likely that he would have become aware of the nature and extent of his illness and its connection with the collision at sea. There are four factors which, cumulatively, lead me to that conclusion. First, it seems not to be in doubt from his own evidence that he was aware of suffering from some form of psychological disorder: see his evidence set out in part at [50] and [51] above. This was not a case in which he was completely unaware of having a problem. Indeed, the primary judge was not satisfied that he was unaware of suffering an injury of a relevant kind. That he did not wish to be told to stop drinking is understandable, but it does not follow that he should now be entitled to bring proceedings to recover financial compensation in respect of the cause of his psychological disorders."
The defendant submitted that the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he took all such action as it was reasonable for him to take to find out. The defendant argued that if the plaintiff had acted, it is more than reasonable to infer that he would have gained knowledge of each of the matters outlined in s 60I(1)(a) of the Limitation Act. As such, the plaintiff has not established that he can satisfy the requirements of s 60I.

[17]

Consideration

The issue here is whether after 2001, the plaintiff took all such action as was reasonable for him to take to find out if he had any further legal remedies against the NSWPF. As at October 2001, when the plaintiff was discharged from his position as a police officer, he was aware that he had suffered a significant psychiatric condition as he had been diagnosed with PTSD and depression.
A reasonable person after leaving the NSWPF would have been diligent in seeking legal advice concerning the remedies available to him. A reasonable person would have also most likely accepted that legal advice and pursued those remedies. This is what the plaintiff did. He followed legal advice and was successfully awarded various types of compensation. Afterwards, in about 2001, he was told by those lawyers that he had no other legal action available to him. As he had already been awarded compensation, he accepted that advice.
What steps would a reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the plaintiff, have done after he had been advised in 2001 that no other legal action was available to him? Would he have gone to other solicitors in the ensuing years in the hope that he may have further legal redress? From 2001 to 2015, the plaintiff was able to work and largely cope with the activities of daily living. In these circumstances, a reasonable person would have continued to work and live as he was. Unless there was something to alert such a reasonable person that he may have some further avenue of redress, he would not have any cause to seek legal advice. When the plaintiff's condition deteriorated and he could no longer work, he spoke to Nat. Nat's case was factually and legally different to that of the plaintiff's, and its judgment was handed down in 2012. In other words, Nat's case did not assist the plaintiff.
After speaking to Nat, the plaintiff immediately sought advice from Nat's recommended solicitor, Ms De Luca-Leonard. She furnished documents to the plaintiff. These documents were not known to him, nor could it have been expected that a reasonable person would have known of their existence prior to being shown them by the solicitor. It is my view that in these circumstances, a reasonable person in the shoes of the plaintiff would not have taken steps to seek out further legal advice from the end of 2001 in the period no earlier than August 2015.
It is my view that under the circumstances, the plaintiff took all such steps that were reasonable. He ought to have become aware of the connection between his injury and the act and omissions of the defendant no earlier than August 2015. On 27 November 2015, the statement of claim was filed, well within the three year limitation period. The plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of s 60I of the Limitation Act.

Fitzgerald v State of New South Wales

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Cases Cited (18)