The applicant is the executor of his late sister who was a lessee in a dwelling in a retirement village of 108 units operated by the respondent in Bayview, a northern suburb in Sydney, NSW.
When she moved into the retirement village in about early September 2014, the lessee had paid a "standard" lease ingoing contribution of $205,000 by way of loan none of which was non-refundable, for an independent living unit which comprised, internally, one bedroom, living/dining, kitchen and bathroom/laundry.
The lessee died on 4 March 2021. It was common ground that her death ended the registered lease dated 2 September 2014 and registered 26 September 2014 between her and the registered lessor which appeared to be (from its name) an associated company of the operator.
These proceedings, commenced by application by the deceased lessee's executor and dated 30 August 2021, concern obligations during and after termination of the lease, on the operator and the lessee.
Leave for legal representation was granted to both parties at a directions hearing on 19 October 2021. Each party made detailed written submissions but pointed to no case law relevant to the contentious interpretation issues.
[2]
Executor's contentions
It was common ground that the deceased was a heavy smoker which was frequently an incident of a neurological condition from which she suffered. There was no contradiction of oral evidence given by the executor that at an interview prior to lease with the operator's representatives the foregoing information was disclosed. The lease did not prevent smoking in the premises.
In the application the executor sought that the operator pay for capital maintenance and replacement that were said to be its obligation to pay for during the lease, in addition to any discretionary expenditure the operator chose to undertake to refurbish the dwelling and what it was obliged to pay at exit for remediation of fair wear and tear. To the extent that the operator had not paid for such capital maintenance and replacement during the lease in breach of its obligations, it could not deduct those amounts from the lessee's exit entitlement as a cost of refurbishment, nor could it deduct the cost of remediating fair wear and tear at exit. It could deduct only the costs of damage for which the lessee was responsible and which had not been remediated by the lessee during the lease.
If those matters increased the capital gain on sale of the dwelling then the lessee by her estate was entitled, as a registered interest holder under the Retirement Villages Act 1999 (NSW) (RVA) and the Retirement Villages Regulation 2017 (NSW) (RVR), to the stipulated percentage of that capital gain. It was common ground that the lessee's stipulated percentage was 65%.
The executor said that, apart from painting and carpet replacement, all items sought to be charged by the operator to the estate as a deduction from the deceased's lessee's exit entitlement were capital costs of maintenance and replacement that ought to have been paid and attended to by the operator during the life of the lease, or were fair wear and tear for which the operator was responsible at end of the lease, or were refurbishment costs at end of lease that were discretionary. In the circumstances of disclosed smoking without objection, the admitted effect of the smoke on the paint and the state of the carpet was within fair wear and tear; no painting and re-carpeting had been done since the start of the lease.
The executor also said that there was no deliberate damage, which was the only obligation on a lessee to repair or replace during the term of the lease or at the end of the lease.
The executor put into evidence a report from an expert building consultant who was not cross-examined. Apart from painting and carpet replacement, replacement of blinds and curtains and cleaning, the consultant, in his report dated 28 June 2021 based on inspection the same day, said that items in the dwelling were functional and in operative and habitable condition even if aged. The airconditioner was said to be dirty which inferred a need for cleaning. There was no damage from the heavy smoking to other than paint and carpet, not to hard surfaces. The expert costed the items he had mentioned at $5,490 including GST. The expert's photographs on inspection were taken before the deceased's effects had been removed.
Arising from that report, the executor undertook cleaning at the estate's expense and accepted responsibility on behalf of the estate for painting and carpet replacement. The executor said that the blinds and curtains and the state of the airconditioner were maintenance and replacement obligations of the operator for capital items during the lease. The executor said, uncontradicted, that the operator had not inspected or sought consent to inspect or exercised its powers to enter to maintain and replace during the deceased's occupation. The executor at about the end of 2021, after removal of the deceased's effects and cleaning, took photographs that were in evidence.
The executor pointed to items in the "premises condition report" annexed to the lease, signed by operator and lessee and dated 15 September 2014, with its recorded negative comments on blinds and curtains and no recording of new items other than the carpet and painting.
[3]
Operator's contentions
The operator said that, even if a lessee was permitted to smoke, the situation was akin to other legal permitted activity such as keeping a pet - the lessee was responsible for damage done by the activity. It accepted an obligation to pay for certain specified items, and at hearing recognised a potential obligation to pay for replacement of curtains and blinds, but not paint and carpets which it said were new prior to occupation by the lessee, nor any other items of replacement such as hard surface fixtures and fittings. It denied that the other items were required to be maintained or repaired during the term of the lease and that they were the lessee's responsibility, because they had been damaged by smoking and required replacement for that reason.
The operator said that the RVA required the dwelling to be valued for resale or sold in its current condition for the purposes of paying 65% of capital gain to the estate of the lessee unless the lessee voluntarily contributed to refurbishment or accepted its obligations to repair smoke damage. It said that the executor effectively accepted that position because his evidence was that the dwelling was functional and able to be re-sold in current condition apart from specific matters (already described).
The operator's position was: an exit value for the unit on current valuation at $320,000; deduction of $64,040 from that exit entitlement, leaving a balance of $255,960 before other deductions not the subject of dispute in these proceedings; derivation of the $64,040 from reduction of the builder's quotation dated 5 April 2021 for $69,500 of $5,460 (being what the operator had accepted).
The operator's position was that the exit entitlement was payable 14 days after the earlier of the happening of an event within RVA s 180 (such as sale of the premises) and five years from the date of termination of the lease by the death of the lessee. No such date had yet arrived so the executor's claim for interest for delayed payment was premature.
The operator had obtained a report on alleged damage from a consultant dated 24 September 2021 based on inspection 17 September 2021. That consultant was not required for cross-examination but the report was objected to on the grounds of relevance as unqualified opinion. It was said that the consultant had not disclosed qualifications to give a relevant opinion and the opinion was not supported by adherence to the Tribunal's code for expert witnesses and by substantiating reasoning. I indicated that I would take the document into evidence but treat the matters of objection as going to weight, consistent with the Tribunal's not being covered by the rules of evidence and the Tribunal's code of conduct for expert witnesses.
The photographs in the report showed that, like the executor's expert, the inspection pre-dated removal of the deceased's effects and cleaning of the premises.
The report was titled and described as a "condition audit". Under "assessment request" it was stated "The unit requires refurbishment for on-sale regardless of the outcome of the dispute". It was not clear if this was part of the expert opinion or instructed assumption. Under "industry practice" it was stated that the review had been undertaken in line with the RICS best practice guidance note in relation to "Schedule of Make Good Works". That note was not attached to the report or otherwise in evidence.
The report said that the premises were considered to be in "fair to poor condition for its age". Each room in all aspects was assessed as "poor". The cost estimates for remedial and repair work in each room were said to be estimates for a stand-alone project and "to provide an order of magnitude only for budget purposes". They were said not to take into account, among other matters, preliminaries and builder's margin, but the final figure of $72,565 did include preliminaries of $9,465 on a trade cost of $63,100; it was not clear whether GST was included.
There was no reference to adherence to the Tribunal's code of conduct for expert witnesses and no statement of the authors' qualifications to give the opinions. In fairness, the title of the report suggested that it was prepared for purposes other than use in evidence.
[4]
Relevant legislative and lease provisions
It was common ground by the hearing that the deceased lessee was a registered interest holder under RVA s7(1)(c) as her registered lease was for her life or 50 years, the term being from 29 August 2014 to 28 August 2113, and included a provision that entitled the lessee to at least 50% of any capital gain. It was implicitly accepted that the deceased lessee had a residence right as defined in para (c) of the definition of that term in RVA s4(1) and (2) and that the lease was a residence contract and a village contract as defined in s 4(1). It was not disputed that the complex in which the dwelling was located was a retirement village in s5.
"Item of capital" is defined in RVA s 4(1) to mean "(a) any building or structure in a retirement village, and (b) any plant, machinery or equipment used in the operation of the village, and (c) any part of the infrastructure of the village, and (d) any other item prescribed by the regulations, but does not include any item excluded from this definition by the regulations". Relevant regulations are set out below. The operator accepted that the fixtures and fittings in contention in these proceedings were items of capital.
RVA s 7A, inserted in 2008, provides: "(1) In this Act, 'capital gain', in relation to a resident's entitlement under a residence contract or the sharing of a capital gain under a village contract between the operator and a resident, means any increase between the amount that the resident paid for the residence right for the relevant premises and the amount that the next resident pays for a residence right for the same premises, less any costs associated with the subsequent sale or lease of the premises. (2) Fees and charges payable under a village contract are not to be included in the calculation of the capital gain."
RVA s 6 defines "ingoing contribution" to refer, in the present proceedings, to the $205,000 paid by the deceased on entry.
Under RVA s 8, permanent vacation for the RVA's purposes is relevantly taken to have occurred where: the executor delivers up vacant possession, or a registered interest holder dies or (for recurrent charges purposes) his or her executor delivers up vacant possession. There were substantially similar relevant provisions in cl 11.1 of the lease.
Under RVA s 11(1), the Act applies despite any lease or other terms to the contrary. RVA s 199 prohibits contracting out in the current circumstances.
RVA s 38 requires a condition report to be executed on entry into a residence contract.
RVA s 67 specifies the circumstances for entry into premises by operators. They relevantly include consent of the resident and seven days' or more notice for repairs. There is no general right of inspection entry with registered interest holders apart from consent. Relevantly similar provisions were in the lease cl 8.
Under RVA s 93 an operator is to maintain, within a reasonable time after awareness of need, capital items for which the operator is responsible in a reasonable condition having regard to the age, prospective life and monies paid by residents under village contracts including ingoing contributions, and to replace within a reasonable time after awareness items not practical to maintain. Under RVA s 94 a resident has obligations to notify maintenance or replacement needs and to reimburse an operator in respect of damage to capital items caused by the resident other than fair wear and tear. Lease cl 7 was in substantially similar terms in relevant provisions.
Under s 97: the operator may fund capital maintenance from any capital works fund or recurrent charges; the operator must bear the cost of capital replacement for items for which it is responsible; refurbishment of vacant residential premises cannot be funded from any capital works fund or from recurrent charges.
RVA s121 provides Tribunal jurisdiction for resolution of disputes such as the present. RVA s128 empowers the Tribunal to make a range of specific performance and monetary orders, among other orders, with no monetary limit (s127).
RVA s 129(2)(a) and (b) provide relevantly for a residence contract of a registered interest holder to terminate on the date that the resident permanently vacates the premises with one months' minimum notice unless in circumstances including death of the resident; the lease definition was relevantly the same.
RVA s 192(3) provides that "Termination of a residence contract does not affect any other right or obligation of the parties under a village contract".
RVA Pt 10 applies on exit despite any contrary provisions in a village contract. Division 4 deals with repair and refurbishment of premises. Under s 162, in Div 4 "'refurbishment' of residential premises the subject of a residence contract means any improvement of the premises in excess of that required to reinstate the premises to the condition they were in (fair wear and tear excepted) at the commencement of their occupation by the resident under the contract". RVA s 163 does not apply to registered interest holders.
Under s 164, "A former occupant of residential premises in a retirement village who entered into his or her residence contract in respect of those premises on or after the commencement of this section is not liable to refurbish (or pay for the cost of the refurbishment of) the premises". This applies to the deceased lessee.
RVR reg 4 states that capital maintenance does not include work to substantially improve a capital item beyond its original condition or work to maintain or repair a capital item where it would be more cost effective to replace the item.
RVR reg 5 defines capital item in reg 4 to be fixtures, fittings, furnishings and non-fixed items, with broad examples of each that were the same in the lease cl 1.2 definition. The executor said, without dispute by the operator on this classification, that the examples demonstrated that all items in the operator's quotation were within the defined terms as capital items. What was in contention was that the executor said that these items had not been damaged by the smoking beyond what was fair wear and tear in any event, except for the the carpets, painting and cleaning, and the cleaning had in any event now been done by the executor.
Relevant provisions of the lease were as follows, to the extent not already mentioned.
Financial terms item G provided for the 65% of capital gain. Item I provided for the payment on termination of residence right, being loan repayment and 65% of capital gain less departure fee in item G, less (relevantly) recurrent charges after termination until successor occupation and any reinstatement costs under cl 39. The provisions of cl 41, with the definition in cl 20 of "exit entitlement date" as the earlier of 14 days after receipt of a full new entry payment and five years after termination date or any earlier date in the RVA, were consistent with RVA s 180 mentioned earlier.
Additional definitions cl 20 in the absence of a sale defined "capital gain" for circumstances where there was not a new resident lease or new resident limited lease, as "on the date we repay you your entry payment, we have not yet entered into a new lease of your premises with a new resident and received the new entry payment from the new resident". In those circumstances, the capital gain was the amount, if any, by which the resale value exceeded the standard entry payment. "Resale value" was defined as the amount agreed or determined from time to time under cl 38 as the market value of a standard lease of the premises. Clause 38 provided for an independent valuation process. The resale value which was proposed by the operator in its letter to the executor dated 16 April 2021 appeared not to be in dispute at least for the purposes of these proceedings. There was no submission that the definition of capital gain in the lease was inconsistent with the definition in RVA s 7A.
Clause 15.1 said that the lessee was not liable to pay for the cost of any improvement to the premises in excess of that required to reinstate the premises to the condition it was in when the lessee commenced occupation, fair wear and tear excepted.
Clause 30 set out requirements for lessees not to damage the premises, to keep the premises clean, well maintained and in good repair and to pay for repair and replacement of deliberate damage or "accelerated wear in excess of fair wear and tear".
Clause 37 relevantly provided that on termination, unless the RVA provided otherwise, vacant possession must be given, resale value must be agreed or determined and the premises must be reinstated and may be refurbished.
Clause 38.1 provided that "resale value" meant the "fair market value of a standard lease of [the] premises determined on the basis that: (a) [the] premises have been or will be: (i) reinstated if necessary under cl 39.2; and (ii) if [the lessor] so elect, refurbished under cl 39.5; and (b) the new resident and the terms of the new lease will be as required under cl 40". Clause 38.2 provided for the valuation by agreement or an independent valuation process.
"Reinstatement work" was defined in cl 39.1 to mean "the work needed to reinstate [the] premises as nearly as possible to the same condition they were in when [the lessee] first occupied [the] premises at the beginning of the contract, fair wear and tear excepted". It was said that it may include cleaning, repainting and associated re-plastering, replacing carpets and other floor coverings, repairing damage, insect treatment and replacing, renewing or renovating fixtures, fittings, equipment, appliances, furnishings (including screens and awnings) and other property provided by the lessor in the premises. Clauses 39.2 and 39.3 provided for the lessor to do the work, including any obligations unfulfilled under cl 30 (see above), and bill the lessee or to require the lessee to do the work.
"Refurbishment work" was defined in cl 39.4 to mean "any improvement of [the] premises in excess of the work referred to in cl 39.2". Under cl 39.5, the operator could elect to do refurbishment work but was not obliged to do so. If the operator elected to do the work, it controlled the extent and the lessee could agree to pay all or part of the cost.
[5]
Consideration and conclusion
Both parties accepted that there was a consumer protection focus purpose and object within the RVA: cp RVA s3. This of course does not displace the obligation to interpret particular provisions in the RVA and subordinate regulation in the RVR consistent with the language and purpose of the statute as a whole which provides the context for the particular provisions. Context also includes legislative history and extrinsic materials but they cannot displace the meaning of the statutory text and they have utility if, and in so far as, they assist in fixing the meaning of the statutory text: Project Blue Sky v ABA (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381-382, [69]-[71]; FCT v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503, [2012] HCA 55 at [39]; SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362 at 368, 374.
The premises condition report attached to the lease at time of the lessee's occupation of the premises said that the carpets and painting were, respectively, new and fresh. The blinds and curtains were said not to be new (with no installation date given) and the blue curtains were said to be "a bit dirty/torn". Date of installation was not given. The split system airconditioner was said to be used but working.
The quotation obtained by the operator and dated 5 April 2021 provided for $14,090 for "reinstatement" comprising: cleaning $770; flooring (presumably the carpets) $6,700; painting $5,520 (vivid white); electrical check $660; smoke detector $440. In subsequent communications the last two items were accepted as an operator expense. The executor had undertaken the cleaning by time of hearing.
Other items headed "refurb" provided for significant renovation to each room and totalled $45,140, with the operator accepting $1,200 for a new hot water heater for the bathroom/laundry as its expense. A final item "building repairs" totalled $10,270: new split system airconditioner $3,360; replace all window winders $990; remove all curtains and blinds and make good $660; replace wardrobe in living area $1,100; replace entry fly screen door $1,950; remove and dispose awning $220; make NBN ready $990. The operator accepted the last three items as its expense. There was also an allowance of $1,000 "due to horrendous conditions allowance to sugar soak all walls, ceilings, cornice".
All photographs in evidence clearly indicated the need for carpet replacement and painting and replacement of curtains and blinds. The carpet had distinct marks that included furniture feet embedded in an irreparable way. The differing patches on the walls appeared to be where pictures had been hung plus other discolouration. The executor's photographs showed the result of removal of the deceased's personal effects and cleaning. Otherwise, they showed that the condition of fixtures and fittings appeared good but dated in appearance and style and without significant appearance of smoke damage.
The executor's expert's report contained the following relevant opinions: the carpet floor in two rooms (living and bedroom), which appeared to be the entire area apart from tiled kitchen and bathroom/laundry, was in poor condition and needed replacement at an estimated cost of $1,440 based on a midpoint for Rawlinson's cost guide for domestic grade carpet; internal walls, windows and doors in all rooms were marked and covered in dirt and required repainting at an estimated cost of $2,273 based on an hourly rate analysis from MBA costing and materials cost; the curtains and blinds in the four windows in the premises were in poor condition and required replacement and he agreed with the $660 quoted to the operator; the bathroom/laundry tiles were dirty and required cleaning; the airconditioner was also noted as dirty in a photograph.
The expert said that the amounts for items in the quotation obtained by the operator, apart form curtains and blinds, were excessive and not substantiated. The quotation was not in the form of a compliant expert report and the builder providing the quotation and its nominated supervisor were licensed only for residential work contracts not exceeding $20,000.
The expert assessed total costs for the premises at $5,490 comprising cleaning $618, painting $2,273, carpet $1,440, curtains and blinds $660 totalling $4,991 plus GST. Net of cleaning and curtains and blinds that figure was $3,713 and with GST $4,084.30.
For the remaining items in the quotation obtained by the operator, the executor's expert said that they were working satisfactorily and in good condition that did not require repair or replacement. They were not made of materials that absorbed cigarette smoke. The quotation obtained by the operator did not substantiate why replacement was required.
I have set out earlier the "condition report" obtained by the operator and the objections to it.
I accept the executor's submission that the weight of evidence favours the executor's expert's opinion on the condition of the premises.
In this respect, neither the quotation nor the condition report put forward by the operator complied with the formal and substantive requirements for an expert opinion. In particular, there was no reasoned substantiation in either of the opinions about what caused the state of the premises as perceived, the state as perceived did not accord with the photographic evidence, particularly after cleaning, and the costings were not adequately substantiated.
The curtains and blinds were in poor condition at the outset of the lease and were clearly capital items as defined.
Accordingly, the operator's case that the lessee's estate was liable to make good items other than painting and carpets (with cleaning already done) was not made out. The operator did not establish that the other items were smoke-damaged or "accelerated wear in excess of fair wear and tear". I am doubtful in any event that the phrase "accelerated wear in excess of fair wear and tear" in cl 30 could have any meaning beyond the definition of "reinstatement work" in cl 39.1 as it would otherwise be inconsistent with the provisions of the RVA and RVR.
I am of the view that the other works, including curtains, blinds and airconditioning, would have come within the operator's responsibilities during the life of the lease and the operator would be liable for repair or replacement as required. Such obligation would survive the end of the lease on the express provision in RVA s 192(3) set out above.
Accordingly, if it had been established that work was required in any event to the items that the operator said was required by reason of the lessee's smoke damage (which I have not accepted), the operator under its pre-termination obligations would be required to pay for such repair and replacement before valuing the premises or offering them for sale, even if such works equated with what was required to refurbish the premises. Any increased capital gain would be shared in by the lessee's estate.
However, the evidence did not go so far as to establish that the operator had failed to maintain or replace these items during the life of the lease (apart arguably for the curtains and blinds with replacement costed at $660). Indeed, the executor's expert's report established that these items were functioning adequately and did not assess if any should have been maintained or replaced and the cost of doing so.
Accordingly, since the operator has not established that the lessee's estate is liable for smoke damage to the contentious items and the executor has not established that the operator was liable on pre-termination obligations to maintain or replace those items (except arguably for the curtains and blinds), work and associated costs in respect of those items falls to be assessed as a refurbishment expense if the operator chooses to do that work. If it does choose to do that work, it can ask the lessee's estate to contribute. The lessee's estate can choose whether or not it contributes.
Presumably those decisions will be made on each party's assessment as to whether or not the increased resale price or exit valuation will be greater than the cost of that work.
Accordingly, I cannot make the orders sought by the executor except for the central order, namely, that the costs in respect of work on the deceased lessee's independent living unit to be deducted from exit entitlement are not to exceed $4,810.30 for painting and carpet. The time for exit entitlement to be paid has not yet arisen so no question of interest arises.
The way ahead will then be subject to any agreement between the parties on a contribution by the lessee's estate to refurbishment costs for the purposes of re-sale or exit valuation.
[6]
Costs
Rule 38 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) applies when the amount claimed or in dispute in the proceedings exceeds $30,000. It applies in those circumstances the ordinary costs rules rather than the requirement for special circumstances to justify an award of costs under CATA s 60.
In my view the present proceedings concerned a direct claim for monetary relief by adjustment exceeding $30,000 to a claimed deduction from exit entitlement. The amount claimed or in dispute thereby exceeded the rule 38 threshold: cp the principles expounded in Owners SP 63341 v Malachite Holdings PL [2018] NSWCATAP 256 esp at [86]-[111].
The starting point for exercise of costs discretion on the usual principles is that costs follow the event. "The event" is usually the overall outcome of the proceedings - did the successful party have to go to the Tribunal (in this case) to get what it achieved, rather than being offered at least that relief. If there are distinct issues on which the party seeking relief did not succeed, that may be taken into account in the exercise of costs discretion. Appeal Panel decisions have made no order as to costs (to the intent that each party paid its or their own costs of the appeal) where there has been a measure of success on both sides: Johnson t/as One Tree Constructions v Lukeman [2017] NSWCATAP 45 at [25]-[29]; applied in Oppidan Homes PL v Yang [2017] NSWCATAP 67.
[87] For an award of costs on other than the ordinary basis, a party's conduct of the proceedings themselves, or the nature of the proceedings themselves (for instance, misconceived), or an outcome less favourable than an offer, are considered. The principles are explored in Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534, Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 and in this Tribunal in Thompson v Chapman [2016] NSWCATAP 6 and Bonita v Shen [2016] NSWCATAP 159, citing earlier consistent authority. The principles have resonance with at least some of the "special circumstances" in CATA s 60 that are required to justify a costs order when rule 38 does not apply.
Here in my view the executor has not succeeded in obtaining a direct share in any increased value from refurbishment without agreeing to contribute to works of refurbishment, but has entirely succeeded in what was the central issue in the proceedings, namely, not being liable for the particular category of exit expenses beyond an amount (conceded by the executor after the expert report) for painting and carpet and cleaning.
In those circumstances, I consider that the executor applicant has achieved overall success in the proceedings and is entitled to be paid his costs of the proceedings by the operator on the ordinary basis as agreed or assessed. I shall make a costs order to that effect. In my view there is insufficient basis for a divisibility of or deduction from costs on the basis of distinct issues with separable evidence.
Here the executor made an open offer in the terms, as I understand it, of his expert's opinion, offering in effect to pay for painting, carpet and cleaning at his expert's figures. The letter was not expressed to be in terms that it would be relied upon on questions of costs if the executor "beat the offer", but could be taken that way.
I shall give the parties if so advised the opportunity to make costs submissions to vary the above order, including on the basis of the open letter.
[7]
Orders
I make the following orders:
1. Order that the costs in respect of work on the deceased lessee's independent living unit to be deducted from exit entitlement are not to exceed $4,084.30, subject to any agreement between the parties on a contribution by the estate of the applicant to refurbishment costs for the purposes of re-sale or exit valuation.
2. Subject to orders 3 and 4, order that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of the proceedings on the ordinary basis as agreed or assessed.
3. Any party who seeks an alternative costs order to order 2 is to file and serve written submissions in respect of such alternative costs order (including if an oral hearing on costs is sought and, if so, why) on or before 1 February 2022.
4. Written submissions in reply to any written submissions under order 3 are to be filed and served on or before 15 February 2021.
[8]
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.
Registrar
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Decision last updated: 21 March 2022