Now, this Ordinance - so far as regards clause 34 - was not valid at its inception; and I cannot find any Act of Parliament that validates it. The Act of 1897 does not - the Church Acts Repealing Act 1897. That is an Act to (inter alia) "repeal the Acts 7 Wm. IV. No. 3, 8 Wm. IV. No. 5, ... to bring lands held for Church purposes under the provisins of Ordinances of Synod, to validate the appointment of past trustees," &c. It recites that an Ordinance had been passed in 1895 providing for an application to Parliament to repeal the said Acts "but without prejudice to anything done under the said Acts before the repeal thereof"; that provision should be made in the Act for bringing under the provisions of any Ordinance which may from time to time be passed by a Synod all lands held for the benefit of the Church in the Diocese "whether such lands were held upon the trusts of the repealed Acts or upon any other trusts, but without prejudice to anything done," &c. It recites that "provision has been made for the management of parochial Church property," &c.; and that the said Church Acts should be repealed. The said Church Acts are then repealed (including 8 Wm. IV. No. 5). By sec. 2 all lands which, at the commencement of the Act, are held by any person &c. as trustee upon trust for any parochial Church purpose in connection with the Church of England in any Diocese, "and whether subject to the provisions of the said Church Acts or any of them or not (and in the case of lands so subject whether made so subject by reference in the deed or instrument creating the trust or otherwise), except lands, the management of which may be specially provided for by Ordinance of Synod or by Act of Parliament, shall be held subject to the provisions of any Ordinance or Ordinances in force for the time being in such diocese freed and discharged from the provisions of the trust deeds and of the said Church Acts, but not diverted from the purposes to which the said lands are respectively devoted." The effect of secs. 1 and 2, so far as material to this case, is that not only is the Act 8 Wm. IV. No. 5 repealed, but, lest it should be thought that the reference in the deed of grant to that Act compelled the trustees still to obey the trusts declared in the repealed Act, it was provided that the glebe land should be held subject to the provisions of any Ordinance or Ordinances in force for the time being (this includes any valid future Ordinances) freed and discharged from the provisions both of the trust deeds and of the repealed Acts. That is to say, as soon as a valid Ordinance is made, it is not to be controlled by the provisions of the trust deed or of the Church Acts. I cannot see any room for doubt that these sections, in effect, put all the provisions of the trust deed in the melting pot, did not create new trusts, but gave the Synod, as representing all interests of the Church of England in the Diocese, power to declare new trusts - not merely to alter the administration, for such an alteration could be made by the Synod under the existing Constitutions. But there was a qualification of this power; in declaring the new trusts, the Synod was not to "divert" the land from the "purposes" to which the said land "is devoted." We must find the meaning which will give full effect to both these members of sec. 2, and make them consistent if possible. The provisions of the deed may be altered by the Synod; but, in altering the provisions, there must be no diversion of the land from the purposes to which it is devoted; and yet these purposes are a very substantial part of the provisions, and appear as such in the deed of grant. Where is the line to be drawn between "purposes" of the land, and the other provisions or trusts as to the land? It is to be noticed that the second member of the sentence forbids merely any diversion of the land from its purposes, and forbids nothing directly as to the rents. It does not forbid - as did the Constitutions of 1866, which were made binding by the Act of 1866 - all diversion of any kind of Church property, moneys or revenues, the subject of any specific trust. The words in the Constitutions were "not diverting any specifically appropriated or the subject of any specific trust nor inter fering with any vested rights" (cl. 3). The Act of 1866 itself (sec. 1) also excepted from the powers of the Synod absolutely all land the subject of an express trust. The change of language is significant, especially when the word "diverting" is seen to be retained. This Act of 1897 allows the Synod to deal with land the subject of an express trust - to deal with it "freed from the provisions (that is to say, all the provisions) of the trust deed" and of the Act 8 Wm. IV. No. 5 (amongst other Acts). Does not this section mean that the Synod may change the beneficiaries or may vary the benefits; but must not divert the land from the purpose to which it was "devoted"? The only interpretation that I can give to sec. 2 of the Act of 1897 is that, so long as the purpose - the ecclesiastical purpose or mode of use - to which each piece of land was "devoted" is retained, the Synod may make any other provision with regard to the land and its rents and profits that it thinks fit. The Synod is a body representative of all the interests of the Church of England, and apparently is treated as worthy to be entrusted with the function of prescribing how the income of the Church lands can best be applied in the interests of the Church. But if the land was devoted to the purpose of a Church, it was to retain that purpose; if it was devoted to the purpose of a dwelling house for a clergyman, that purpose was not to be changed; if it was devoted to the purpose of a burial ground, a burial ground it should remain; if it was devoted to the purpose of a glebe, a glebe it should remain. It might be difficult, as an abstract proposition, to say where precisely the "purposes" of a piece of land, as distinguished from the rest of the trusts of the land, begin and end; but that difficulty should not prevent us from recognizing that in the Act of 1897 Parliament intended to draw such a distinction; and it is sufficient for the present case to say that the "purposes" of the land here refer to the mode of using the land, the ecclesiastical "object" to which it has been "consecrated" or "devoted"; and the word does not refer to the persons (or parishes or Churches) who are to receive the benefit of any of its rents, issues or profits. If the Synod were to make an Ordinance depriving St. Phillip's trustees of the ownership or management of the land, or even depriving St. Phillip's of its primary claim on the rents - a course which the Synod has not taken, and - if one may judge from the Ordinance of 1891 and from the Constitutions of the Synod - is not likely to take; it may be that this would be an interference with the purposes of this land. For it is of the essence of a glebe that it be, as it were, appurtenant to some Church or parish. There cannot be - if I may adopt a well known analogy - a glebe in gross. The glebe must be "annexed" to some Church, and the Church here is at present St. Phillip's. I am at present inclined to think that, so long as the land remains glebe land annexed to some Church or Churches, the Synod has power to commit the administration and to give the benefit of the rents to such Churches and in such manner as it thinks fit - that the Synod may change the objects of the trust, but not the character of the consecration (under the Act of 1897). But this is really not the stage for deciding the exact limits of the powers of the Synod. This Court can merely say, in general terms, that the Synod has power now to make any Ordinance with regard to this land, with this qualification - that it must not divert the land from the purpose to which it is "devoted" - that is to say, as a glebe, or as a glebe annexed to a Church.