32 Accordingly, the sentence I impose is a fixed term of four years and six months commencing 16 December 2005 and ending on 15 June 2010 upon which date the offender will be eligible to be considered for parole in respect of the sentence of thirteen years he is serving for the drug offence which expires on 4 January 2014."
14 The appellant appears for himself. The ground of appeal identified in his Notice of Appeal reads:
"To appeal conviction and the severity of contempt of court before Registrar Youness. The appeal is expressed to be against the decision of Adams J."
15 The appeal was supported by lengthy written submissions. In those submissions the appellant argued that his conviction for contempt should be set aside. He emphasised that the affidavit which supported the orders that he attend for examination was sworn by Mark Standen, an assistant director/senior investigating officer of the respondent, who has since been arrested and charged with serious offences, making his evidence in the appellant's proceedings unreliable. He further submitted that because an order has now been made that he forfeit his assets there is no utility in his further punishment for contempt. He further submitted that the sentence imposed by Adams J was excessive and that his Honour failed to give appropriate weight to the appellant's medical condition, in particular the report of Dr Braune which referred to the possibility that the appellant may have paranoid ideation, be mentally impaired by way of judgment and have some other symptoms of organic brain disease.
16 The charge of contempt was founded on the disobedience by the appellant of the order that he answer questions before the registrar of the Supreme Court. Unless that order was set aside the appellant was required to answer when asked.
17 The evidence before Hulme J, which I do not understand to be disputed by the appellant, was that the appellant indicated to a registrar that he was not prepared to take an oath or affirmation or be examined as required by the order made by Simpson J on 4 July 2001. That order was not appealed and when the matter came before Hulme J no challenge was made to it. The appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of contempt.
18 By his plea of guilty the appellant acknowledged both his obligation and his failure to obey the court's order. He was rightly convicted of contempt. The challenge which the appellant now seeks to make to his conviction by reason of the fact that Mr Standen has been charged is not a matter which can be considered by this Court.
19 In support of the submission that the sentence imposed by Adams J was manifestly excessive the appellant referred to 11 decisions of this Court where, in varying circumstances, custodial sentences and, in some cases, fines were imposed for contempt. The maximum penalty imposed in these cases was imprisonment for a period of 12 months. He argued that by comparison the sentence of a fixed term of 4 years and 6 months imposed by Adams J was excessive. He further submitted that his Honour should have imposed a period of parole and, I infer, submitted that part of the determinate sentence should have been served on parole. He nominated a period of 13½ months as the appropriate period of parole which would have allowed his release from prison in April 2009.
20 The actions of the appellant in twice refusing to submit to an examination before the Supreme Court were serious. It was a contumacious contempt in circumstances where the appellant was fully aware of the possible consequences. This Court has on many occasions considered the correct approach to punishment for contempt in similar circumstances. In Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam (No 2) (1992) 26 NSWLR 309 Kirby P observed at 314-315:
"A conviction of contempt of court is a conviction of an offence, criminal in nature. Punishment of the convicted contemnor must therefore take into account the considerations normally applicable to the punishment of crime and apt to uphold the purpose of this jurisdiction, viz, the undisturbed and orderly administration of justice in the courts according to law. Thus, in determining the punishment which is apt to the circumstances which have led to a conviction of contempt, it is appropriate to bear in mind the purposes of punishing the contemnor; deterring the contemnor and others in the future from committing like contempts; and denouncing the conduct concerned in an approximately emphatic way: see Director of Public Prosecutions v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 732 at 741.
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