135 In Codelfa, the High Court declined to imply a term into a construction contract because it was impossible to say, with any degree of certainty, what the term would have said. In this case, it is by no means clear that it is the proposed term which the parties would have agreed on, in the event that they agreed to there being a fair selection process. Counsel for the plaintiff submits that, if the Court considers the proposed term to lack clarity, it may substitute a term that does. With respect, it is the lack of clarity which itself which prevents the proposed term or any other term differently express, from being implied into the contract. Because the terms of an agreement to conduct a fair selection process may take innumerable forms, and hence lack the necessary clarity, the only term which is capable of clear expression is a general term of fairness in complying with the defendant's obligations under the Constitution. However, the problem with taking that approach is twofold. First, it would be necessary to also imply a selection process for one type or all types of members before the implication of a general requirement of fairness would have a sphere of operation which would assist the plaintiff in her claim. Secondly, both a general requirement of fairness and a selection process would not, in my opinion, meet the other criteria for the implication of a contractual term.