Reasons
29Associate Professor O'Reilly's obligation to give reasons required him to set out "the actual path of reasoning" by which he arrived at the assessment of 0% WPI: Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Limited v Kocak [2013] HCA 43 at [48] (Kocak); Frost v Kourouche [2014] NSWCA 39. The reasons actually stated are to be understood as recording the steps that were in fact taken at arriving at that result: Waterways Authority v Fitzgibbon [2005] HCA 57 at [130] per Hayne J.
30Some latitude is to be given to the reasons of an administrative decision-maker, which are not to be construed "minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error" (Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic [1993] FCA 322; 43 FCR 280) and are to be given what has been referred to as a "beneficial construction": Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259 at 271-272. However, a beneficial construction does not permit reasons to be inferred which are not stated if they are not necessarily implied by what is expressed: SZCBT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] FCA 9 at [26] per Stone J. Although reasons need not be extensive, where more than one conclusion is open it is necessary for the decision-maker to explain a preference for one conclusion rather than another: Campbelltown City Council v Vegan [2006] NSWCA 284; 67 NSWLR 372 at [121]-[122] per Basten JA.
31The assessment of WPI required an assessment to be made of the plaintiff's capacity with respect to mastication (chewing) and deglutition (swallowing). According to the AMA 4 Guides (by which Associate Professor O'Reilly was bound by reason of their partial incorporation in the Guidelines), dietary restrictions are "the most objective criteria by which to evaluate permanent impairment of these functions". This relationship explains why the table provides for the % WPI to be related to the level of dietary restriction.
32In my view, the reasons show that Associate Professor O'Reilly adjudged 0% to be the appropriate percentage on the basis that he did not consider that the plaintiff qualified for the lowest band in Table 6 of 0-19% because his diet was not limited to semisolid or soft foods. I consider that this follows from the recitation in the reasons of the foods that the plaintiff ate, not only in the three-day period prior to the assessment, but also more generally as a matter of habit at the time. In my view, the requirement to give reasons was satisfied by the description of the food that the plaintiff habitually ate, and was capable of eating. Although the need to specify the means of preparation prior to cooking might arise in the case of hard-tack ANZAC biscuits because they are notoriously hard and therefore challenging to consume if not processed in some way, I do not consider the analogy to be apposite in the present case. It would be reasonable to assume, in the absence of contrary intention, that a reference to an apple is a reference to a whole, uncooked fruit; a reference to a minute steak to be a reference to a thin slice of cooked beef; a reference to carrot that is cut up into pieces to be a reference to uncooked carrot; and a reference to a spring roll to be a reference to a deep-fried spring roll. At all events, these were matters of factual judgment and expert opinion which were pre-eminently a matter for the assessor.
33Whether, and how, pain ought be taken into account was not the subject of detailed argument, although reference was made to cl 1.40 of the Guidelines and 15.3 of the AMA 4 Guide. In my view, there is no substance in the contention that Associate Professor O'Reilly did not take into account pain in making his assessment, even if he was obliged to. The difficulty encountered by the plaintiff in eating apples is specifically referred to. The principal reference to pain is in the record of current symptoms which refers to the plaintiff suffering pain mainly in his right ear after eating. In my view, Associate Professor O'Reilly was entitled to infer that the foods that the plaintiff generally ate were a sufficient indication of his ability to chew and swallow, this capacity being the matter germane to the assessment. If the pain during (or in this case, after) this activity were of significance, it would have affected the plaintiff's history. The plaintiff did not raise pain as an inhibiting factor in his choice of foodstuffs, except tangentially by reference to apples.
34However one might classify the range of food stuffs that the plaintiff reported to Associate Professor O'Reilly that he regularly consumed, I do not consider that they could collectively be regarded as being confined to the category of "soft and semi-solid food". Accordingly, the conclusion would follow from the plaintiff's history that his diet was not limited to semisolid or soft foods. Because of the importance placed on dietary restrictions in the assessment of permanent impairment in the AMA 4 Guides, it was, in my view both sufficient and appropriate for Associate Professor O'Reilly to document the plaintiff's diet with its restrictions in his assessment of permanent impairment. Dietary restrictions were not, in the context of the assessment of permanent impairment under Table 6, a mere matter of history. They were substantially determinative in that a capacity to consume foods that were more challenging in terms of mastication and deglutition than "semi-solid or soft foods" results in a 0% WPI. The statement of the plaintiff's diet in Associate Professor O'Reilly's reasons is, for the reasons given by Hayne J in Waterways Authority v Fitzgibbon, to be understood as amounting to a step taken by him in arriving at the result of a WPI of 0%.
35I consider that Associate Professor O'Reilly has adequately explained the basis of his assessment of 0% WPI. An assessment of 0% WPI figure is consistent both with:
(1)a finding that the plaintiff's diet is not restricted to soft and semi-solid food; and
(2)a finding that it is restricted to soft and semi-soft food but that he is at the lowest end of the range
36In my view, Associate Professor O'Reilly's reasons make it plain that finding (1) above is the basis for the assessment of 0% WPI in the present case.
37I do not consider that the obligation to give reasons required Associate Professor O'Reilly to say something to the effect that because red meat; chopped, uncooked carrots; and spring rolls require greater mastication and deglutition than semisolid or soft foods, the plaintiff's capacity to consume these items demonstrated that he did not qualify for a finding above zero WPI. In my view, such a statement would be an expression of the obvious, having regard to the context in which the assessment was made, the applicable AMA 4 Guides and the Guidelines and the recitation of food stuffs eaten by the plaintiff.
38Nor do I consider that it was necessary for Associate Professor O'Reilly to refer specifically to cl 6.20 of the Guidelines. The obligation to give reasons does not require a decision maker to set out all the law that affects the decision. The Guidelines provide, as set out above, in cl 1.20(iii) that: "The applicable parts of the MAA Guidelines and the AMA 4 Guides should be referenced." Although I consider that Associate Professor O'Reilly complied with this requirement by referring to Table 6 and Chapter 9.3b, I would not regard non-compliance as resulting in invalidity of the certificate since I do not discern any legislative intention that such a result ensue: see Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355 at [91] and [93].
39At any event, I do not discern any reason to suppose that Associate Professor O'Reilly did not apply the band of 0-19% (which was the result of cl 6.20), rather than 5-19% (for which AMA 4 Guide provided) to his assessment. More would be required to draw such an inference than that he did not refer specifically to cl 6.20.
40In these circumstances, the presumption of regularity has not been displaced. As was said by Hope JA, Samuels and Priestley JJA agreeing, in Carpenter v Carpenter Grazing Co Pty Limited (1987) 5 ACLC 506 at 514:
". . . the true rule is that the presumption may reasonably be drawn where an intention to do some formal act is established, when the evidence is consistent with that intention having been carried into effect in a proper way, the observance of the formality has not been proved or disproved and its actual observance can only be inferred as a matter of probability: Harris v Knight (1890) 15 PD 170 at 179-180; In the Estate of Bercovitz [1962] 1 WLR 321 at 327."
41The plaintiff's challenge to the certificate based on the history given to Dr McGlynn, although propounded as a failure to give adequate reasons, also included a submission that Associate Professor O'Reilly failed to take into account relevant, highly probative evidence.
42Dr McGlynn's history provided some basis to consider that the plaintiff could qualify for the lowest band in Table 6. However, Associate Professor O'Reilly's obligation was to make his own assessment as at the assessment date on the basis of the history he was given by the plaintiff and the material provided to him. Dr McGlynn's assessment was of different injuries and did not require him to assess the plaintiff's capacity for chewing and swallowing, this being within the province of Associate Professor O'Reilly's assessment.
43Mr Romaniuk confirmed that he did not submit that Associate Professor O'Reilly was required to interrogate the plaintiff about what he said to Dr McGlynn. However, he did submit that the contents of Dr McGlynn's certificate required Associate Professor O'Reilly to probe his answers to the questions about diet to elicit more detail for the purposes of resolving any inconsistency between Dr McGlynn's finding that his diet was limited to semisolid and soft foods and the history he gave to Associate Professor O'Reilly. Mr Romaniuk contended that if Associate Professor O'Reilly asked the plaintiff whether he ate steak and the plaintiff said that he preferred minute steak Dr McGlynn had a duty to inquire why he preferred minute steak.
44I do not accept that the duty to inquire which is relevant to the determination of the legality of administrative decisions made under delegated legislation mandates such an interrogation, or indeed authorises this Court to dictate the minutiae of how an assessor, such as Associate Professor O'Reilly, ascertains the dietary restrictions of a person such as the plaintiff. In the context of judicial review of administrative decisions, the so-called duty to inquire is of limited operation. For this Court to find that the alleged failure of a duty to inquire results in the invalidity of the certificate, I would have to be satisfied that there was an implied obligation on Associate Professor O'Reilly to examine and investigate the plaintiff's answers to questions about his diet at a level of particularity that distinguishes between minute steak on the one hand and steak on the other: Foster v Minister for Customs and Justice [2000] HCA 38; 200 CLR 442 at [22]-[23] per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J.
45Although one might accept that it is easier to chew and swallow minute steak than thick-cut steak, the distinction would seem to be largely immaterial when the lowest level of impairment that results in a WPI between 0 and 19% is where the diet is limited (by compromised mastication and deglutition) to semisolid or soft foods. The intricacies of the debate tend to indicate, in my view, that it can hardly have been contemplated that this level of particularity is required for the validity of the assessment.
46Further, I do not accept the proposition that Associate Professor O'Reilly overlooked Dr McGlynn's assessment when making his own. Dr McGlynn's reasons were referred to expressly in Associate Professor O'Reilly's reasons. The history obtained by Associate Professor O'Reilly himself was more detailed. Further, he was not entitled to act on a different history obtained by another specialist in an area which was not as apposite to the assessment he was obliged to undertake. I do not accept that Dr McGlynn's reasons were, as the defendant contended, "of no moment". Nonetheless, a medical assessor's duty is to come to his or her own opinion and take his or her own history, not to analyse every piece of information from every opinion contained in a document with which he was provided: Kocak at [47]. The plaintiff's resort to authorities such as Origin Energy v BestCare was, in my view, misplaced. The assessment made was not illogical. Associate Professor O'Reilly took into account Dr McGlynn's reasons. Furthermore, Mr Romaniuk conceded that the assessment was open to him.
47As it was accepted by Mr Romaniuk that the decision of Ms Redmond was not independently challenged, there is no need to consider that decision further. It was common ground that if the assessment of Associate Professor O'Reilly was set aside as being invalid, Ms Redmond's decision would also have to be set aside but that if his assessment was not set aside, her decision would also stand.
48Had the plaintiff made out any of his grounds of challenge, I would have been inclined to refuse relief on discretionary grounds: Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 at 145; Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; 204 CLR 82 at 122. The decision by the assessor was not only plainly open but appears to have been required by the findings as to mastication and deglutition arising from the plaintiff's history. However as the plaintiff has not established an error of law it is not necessary to say more about it.