FALLAH v THE QUEEN [2010] NSWCCA 212 | Case summary

22 September 2010 Ali FALLAH v THE QUEEN Judgment 1 BASTEN JA: On 12 February 2009 Ali Fallah ("the applicant") was convicted on one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm inflicted upon the complainant, KZ. On 27 March 2009 the applicant was placed upon a bond to be of good behaviour for a period of 12 months, pursuant to s 9 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ("the Sentencing Procedure Act"). There is no challenge to the sentence, the period of the bond having now expired and, indeed, having expired before the appeal against conviction was lodged on 4 May 2010. 2 The appeal raises two grounds, namely that the verdict was "unreasonable" and, secondly, that the trial judge "failed properly to put the defence case to the jury". Neither of these grounds involved "a question of law alone" and accordingly leave to appeal was required: Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5(1)(b); see Carlton v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 244; 189 A Crim R 332 at [10]; Gillies v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2008] NSWCCA 339 at [3]; Smith v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 156 at [1]. 3 The matters raised by counsel for the applicant were reasonably arguable and warranted consideration by this Court of the circumstances in which the verdict was given. Nevertheless, as will be explained below, they do not demonstrate a miscarriage of justice of the kind which would warrant an order setting the verdict aside. There should be a grant of leave to appeal, but the appeal should be dismissed. Background 4 The Director of Public Prosecutions laid an indictment containing five counts. The counts covered three incidents. The first, which was identified as taking place between 29 July 2006 and 13 November 2006 alleged the assault occasioning actual bodily harm, on which the applicant was found guilty together with a charge of having sexual intercourse with the complainant without her consent and knowing that she was not consenting, on which the applicant was found not guilty. As will be seen below, the incident probably occurred in September 2006. 5 The second incident was said to have taken place between 1 October 2006 and 2 February 2007 and involved a single count (count 3) charging an assault. The applicant was acquitted. 6 The third incident was said to have taken place on or about 2 February 2007 and also involved two charges, the first being an assault (count 4) and the second having sexual intercourse without the complainant's consent and knowing she was not consenting (count 5). The applicant was acquitted of counts 4 and 5. 7 The primary basis on which the verdict on count 1 was said to be unreasonable was that, in order to acquit on count 2, the jury must have doubted the credibility of the complainant. Without the complainant's evidence, it was submitted, there was no basis for conviction on the first count so that, if the credibility of that evidence were insufficient to satisfy the jury on the second count, it should have failed to satisfy them on the first. 8 This line of reasoning is undoubtedly available to an applicant in an appropriate case: there will be cases where rejection of the complainant's version of an event resulting in an acquittal on one count will be sufficient to demonstrate that the jury could not properly have convicted on another count arising out of the same events: see Jones v The Queen [1997] HCA 56; 191 CLR 439 at 453 (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 9 That reasoning, however, depends upon two premises. The first is that the jury were correct to acquit. That is an assumption to the benefit of which the applicant is fully entitled as a matter of law. The second premise is that the acquittal demonstrates that the jury held a view as to the credibility of the principal prosecution witness. The conclusion is that, holding such a view, the jury should properly have acquitted on the other count. In this sense, the verdicts may be said to be "inconsistent". 10 For the purposes of argument, the premises may be accepted; whether the conclusion follows, however, will often require careful analysis. As has been explained by Spigelman CJ, such a conclusion "must depend on the full range of relevant circumstances": R v Markuleski [2001] NSWCCA 290; 52 NSWLR 82 at [65]. The relevant circumstances must take account of the elements of each offence, the possibility of corroboration in respect of elements of one offence but not the other and whatever may be gleaned from the transcript of the evidence given by the key witness. This reasoning is consistent with the statement of the High Court that "if there is a proper way by which the appellate court may reconcile the verdicts, allowing it to conclude that the jury performed their functions as required, that conclusion will generally be accepted": Mackenzie v The Queen [1996] HCA 35; 190 CLR 348 at 367. 11 Counsel for the applicant drew the Court's attention to a passage in the judgment of Simpson J in TK v R [2009] NSWCCA 151; 74 NSWLR 299 for the purpose of distinguishing it. Her Honour's judgment in that case provided a full explanation of the case law concerning unreasonable verdicts. The case was one involving, amongst other offences, a charge of sexual intercourse without consent, knowing the complainant was not consenting. Her Honour stated: "158 It would hardly be surprising in an allegation of sexual intercourse without consent in the context of a marriage, and particularly where there has been explicit evidence of a history of consensual sexual intercourse (and of the kind the subject of one of the charges), if the jury regarded the issue of the state of mind of the accused person as a primary one. That is more particularly so where, as is here the case, the evidence that the complainant did not consent is rather weak. Even weaker is the evidence that the complainant did anything to convey to the appellant that she was not consenting. 159 Notwithstanding that, relatively little attention appears to have been paid, until a rather late stage in the trial, to the question of the appellant's state of mind regarding the complainant's consent, as distinct from the question of whether the Crown had proved, as a matter of fact, that the complainant did not consent." 12 As will be seen, there are elements of that description which are apt in the present case. However, a more important factor is that the assault did not depend upon an assessment by the jury of the state of mind of the applicant. In other words, where there is a real issue as to the state of mind of the applicant, it does not follow necessarily that an acquittal casts doubt on the jury's view of the credibility of the complainant. On the other hand, the applicant was able to point to the acquittals with respect to the other two incidents in support of his claim as to the unreasonableness of the one guilty verdict. Unreasonable verdict 13 The background to the relationship between the applicant and the complainant commences with the complainant's arrival in Australia from Iran in 1998. She was accompanied by her husband, but they were divorced in 2002. 14 The complainant met the applicant at a wedding in Iran in late 2001 when the complainant's best friend married the applicant's brother. They remained in contact after the complainant returned to Australia in February 2002. Following her divorce in that year, the complainant returned to Iran in October 2002 and a de facto relationship commenced in Iran. The relationship faltered, according to the complainant, because of the applicant's drinking and abuse of her. On 14 September 2003 she and her daughter returned to Australia. 15 By September 2005, it appears that the two had patched up their differences and the complainant supported an application to the Department of Immigration for the applicant to come to Australia. The applicant arrived in Australia on 29 July 2006. At that stage, the complainant's daughter went to live with her father, apparently because she did not like the applicant: Tcpt, 03/02/09, p 12. 16 It appears that the first incident did not occur immediately upon the applicant's arrival in Australia but reasonably shortly thereafter. The applicant gave evidence that it occurred before October 2006, at a time when she was working at a Persian restaurant in North Parramatta: Tcpt, 3/2/09, p 15-16. She worked at the restaurant for a little over a month, before she got a job at a department store in October. Evidence was given by a neighbour of the complainant, Ms Zunic, to the effect that the incident occurred about a month after the applicant moved into the complainant's apartment: Tcpt, 06/02/09, p 364. 17 The complainant's description of the incident commenced when she was at work in the restaurant and she gave the applicant $20 shortly before she left to go to work. Her work shift normally took her through to 10pm, but on that evening the applicant arrived at 8pm and asked her to leave work early: Tcpt, p 16. She said that the applicant was "fully drunk". When she said that she could not leave he went outside and sat on a chair and, when she went to check on him, he was crying: Tcpt, p 17. At first she asked the applicant to go away, but he did not, so she sought permission from her employer to leave the restaurant early and take him home. As they were walking home, she met a friend, Nasrin and Nasrin's daughter. Nasrin gave the complainant and the applicant a ride home and came in to have coffee. The complainant said she made a remark that the daughter was beautiful, to which the applicant responded that "her mother's beautiful too". Nasrin left shortly thereafter and the complainant, in irritation at the remark the applicant had made to her friend, ignored the applicant. She then raised the question of what he had done with the $20, at which he became angry. She accused him of spending it on alcohol: Tcpt, pp 19-20. The complainant then stated that the applicant started to swear at her and abuse her, for seeking to make him answerable for what he had done with the money: Tcpt, pp 20-21. She said that he then grabbed her and described the incident in the following terms: "Q. And then what happened? A. WITNESS: At that stage I was in the middle of the lounge and he has started to slap me in my face and he just punch me into my biceps like both of them. Q. You've indicated the bicep area of each of your arms? A. WITNESS: Both. Q. You said that he slapped you on the face? A. WITNESS: Yes. Q. How many times did he slap you on the face? A. WITNESS: I can't remember, once or twice, I'd say twice. Q. And which part of your face did he slap? A. WITNESS: It was left because he's right handed so he always did left. … [Tcpt, p 24] Q. You've said that he punched you to the biceps, did you receive any injuries as a result of that? A. WITNESS: I had two like big bruise, it was purple. Q. You've indicated, again the area of your upper arm where the bicep is. Did you have a bruise on each arm? A. WITNESS: Each arm. Q. How long did the bruise last for? A. WITNESS: I would say about ten days, one week." 18 The witness gave further detail of the bruising suggesting that it extended over an area of about 7 or 8 centimetres by about 3 or 4 centimetres wide: Tcpt, pp 24-25. 19 The complainant said she was screaming, but no one came and after about 10 or 15 minutes the situation calmed down. She went to bed and he followed her and raped her. According to the description she gave, the applicant could have been in no doubt that she was not consenting. 20 The complainant then gave evidence that when she left the apartment the next day she met her next door neighbour, Ms Suzie Zunic. They had a conversation in the course of which Ms Zunic asked what had happened the previous night and the complainant had told her that "he beats me up": Tcpt, p 31. She said that Ms Zunic saw her arms. 21 Ms Zunic gave evidence of a man who moved in with the complainant in 2006, giving a description which appeared to be a tolerably accurate description of the applicant, including a noticeable mole on his cheek: Tcpt, p 362. She gave evidence of hearing voices yelling and crying: Tcpt, p 365. She identified them as the complainant and her boyfriend: Tcpt, p 366. She identified when it occurred as being "Some time after 8 o'clock". Prior to the incident she saw a woman and a child leaving the apartment. She also gave evidence of going to the laundry the following morning and the complainant coming in a little later. She stated (Tcpt, p 369): "A. I noticed she had a black eye. She also had bruises on her face, the side of her face and at the top of her arms. Q. When you say 'the top of her arms', where in particular on the top of her arms? A. Well, she was wearing a singlet, so I could pretty much see the whole -- HIS HONOUR Q. You're indicating the upper levels of both arms? A. Yeah. Q. From the shoulder down to where? A. Just down, just along here. TRIAL ADVOCATE Q. This is all being recorded, so that -- A. Sorry, from her shoulder to her elbow." 22 She was asked how long the bruises lasted and stated "A few weeks": Tcpt, p 370. She did not see the complainant's boyfriend again. She and her partner left the units in late 2006. 23 Ms Zunic stated that on the Friday night of the altercation, she was at home watching "Big Brother Friday Night Games" on television. In cross-examination it was put to her (the fact being accepted as correct for the purposes of the trial) that the program she said had been watching aired from 22 April 2206 to 31 July 2006, Tcpt, p 371. The inference which the jury was invited to draw from that fact was that the incident she described must have taken place either within two days of the arrival of the applicant in Australia, which seemed unlikely, or involved another man. 24 The dates referred to in the first and second counts in the indictment were, respectively, the date of the applicant's arrival in Australia and the date on which the complainant had the applicant removed from her premises. 25 While the cross-examination of the complainant put to her that there was no violence and no forced intercourse after Nasrin left, it also focused on the differences in the description of the injuries as she described them and as Ms Zunic described them. The cross-examiner obtained agreement from the complainant that the bruising was only on her arms and that she had no bruises to her face and no black eye: Tcpt, 5/2/09, pp 200-201. She was also cross-examined about a claim she had made to police in 2002 that her former husband had grabbed her by the arm and bruised her bicep. She acknowledged that complaint, but denied that, in 2006, she was involved in any angry exchanges with her former husband. 26 On 13 November 2006 Constable Bunting and a colleague went to the complainant's flat. They were called in relation to a domestic argument: Tcpt, 6/2/09, p 384. He was asked whether the complainant had referred to number of similar incidents that had occurred over a two month period and said that she had. The examination in chief continued (Tcpt, p 385): "Q. Did she advise you that the last incident which had occurred, occurred approximately two months before you attended on 13 November. A. Yes she did. … Q. Did [the complainant] also explain to you and Constable Vojnikovic that as a result of the last incident she was apparently left with two large bruises to one of her biceps from being punched by [the applicant] with a closed fist? A. That's correct." 27 In his address to the jury, counsel for the applicant accepted most of the account given by the complainant of the night in question, except the suggestion that the applicant got angry at being asked to explain what he had done with the $20. Counsel submitted (Tcpt, 10/02/09, p 39): "It just doesn't make sense ladies and gentlemen. Look they probably did argue that night. Suzie [Zunic] heard yelling. There is no big secret there. They argued. Okay. It doesn't mean anything else happened in that flat. Now we know that according to [the complainant] not only was - she punched into the biceps but she was also forced to have sexual intercourse that night. We certainly know, come 13 November when she's telling the police about a brief history, there's certainly no mention of any rape happening to her two months earlier. All she's reported was that she was punched to the bicep and left with two bruises on one arm. … ... Now ladies and gentlemen we know that Suzie [Zunic] has got things wrong. She's got things wrong in a significant number of ways. She saw this happen on the night of Big Brother and we know that Big Brother ended on 29 July, that the accused only arrived on that night. She gave evidence as we know of seeing bruises on the face, a black eye. The complainant acknowledged that - conceded that she'd never been touched, hit there before, in any way, shape or form by the accused. The only bruises that could have possibly been on her arm - sorry that could have possibly been on her from [the applicant], were the bruises on the arm but that's not what Suzie saw so what do we make of that. … When did this actually happen. Now even though she's wrong about the night of Big Brother, maybe her state of mind is looking back two years on, or perhaps, now three years on, perhaps her state of mind is that it was right when Big Brother was on or shortly thereafter. … on 29 July he arrives. Just before that, the ex-husband has come to get the daughter. … We know they fought in 2002. We know that back in 2002 that he, the ex-husband at least, grabbed her by the bicep causing a bruise. Now I grant you this is four years ago, I'm not suggesting it is the same bruise but what is to say there hadn't been another blue with the ex-husband, before [the applicant] arrived …. If Suzie [Zunic] is actually right that there were bruises on her face and a black eye, well how did they get there. They didn't get there from us. … Just say, we'll accept for a fact - and you possibly do - that there was a bruise or two on her arm. Certainly not the discolouration all the way from elbow to shoulder top as Ms …[Zunic] … referred to and certainly not anything on the face but assuming we accept that there were a couple of bruises somewhere on this arm. What is not to say that it could have come, as I said I've already indicated - maybe it came from someone else such as the ex-husband. What is not to say it happened accidentally somehow or other. What is not to say that during lovemaking with the accused that he might have been holding … he might have been holding her by the biceps during the act of intercourse. What is to say that's not possible. The accused said she bruises easily." 28 The likely basis for convicting the applicant for the assault is apparent from the evidence set out above. Furthermore, the basis for distinguishing between the assault and the alleged rape is also apparent. Thus, in respect of the assault: o the evidence of the complainant that she received bruises to the biceps was confirmed by an independent witness, Ms Zunic; o the incident was described to police approximately two months later on 13 November 2006; o the evidence as to time of the assault, namely the evening of the visit of Nasrin and her daughter, was corroborated by Ms Zunic, and o the circumstances leading up to the assault were consistent with the applicant being angry and, possibly, feeling humiliated by the complainant. 29 The evidence in respect of the sexual assault is quite different: o the evidence of the complainant was uncorroborated; o her conversation the following morning with Ms Zunic referred to her boyfriend "beating up on her" but made no mention of a sexual assault; o her complaint to the police two months later referred to the assault, but not the rape. 30 Little weight was placed in submissions on the acquittals on the other counts. In the course of a tempestuous relationship, there appear to have been numerous arguments and threats. It would be readily understandable if, in these circumstances, a jury diligently considering the instruction to be satisfied in respect of particular incidents beyond reasonable doubt had looked for a level of precision and support in the evidence for complaints which formed the basis of the charges. In relation to count 3, a charge of simple assault, the complaint was that the applicant had assaulted the complainant on some occasion after 5 December 2006 and possibly in January 2007, after he had returned from a lengthy stay in Canberra. The complainant identified the occasion as one when the applicant had rung her whilst she was at the house of a female friend. When they met, she asserted that the applicant had slapped her in the face; she could not recall on which cheek and did not call the police on that occasion. There was a suggestion that, after later provocation, she did go to the police, on 22 January 2007, but the police records did not support her. 31 Counts 4 and 5 involved events which occurred on the evening of 1 February 2007. In brief, the applicant came to the complainant's home and tried to persuade her to take him back. Having persuaded her to open the door and let him in, an argument occurred in the course of which she said that the applicant slapped her on the left side of her face and kicked her two or three times on her left thigh, with a bare foot (count 4). There was also a complaint that the evening ended with non-consensual intercourse (count 5). 32 This incident resulted in the complainant calling the police in the early hours of the morning of 2 February 2007. However, despite the immediate complaint, there was limited supporting evidence of either an assault or non-consensual sex. The police officer who first spoke with the complainant made a note of a "red mark" below her eye, but in evidence in chief was unable to specifically recall the red mark, although he could recall that her eyes were red from crying. There was also medical evidence of a scratch on her leg which it was hypothesised could have been caused by a fingernail of a person pulling down her pyjama pants. That evidence must have been viewed by the jury as equivocal. There was no unequivocal evidence to support non-consensual intercourse, despite an immediate medical examination, corroborative of her complaints. 33 In the context of the relationship between the complainant and the applicant, the jury may well have been satisfied that something untoward happened that night which caused the complainant to be highly distressed, but not to be satisfied that there was an assault of the kind described, or that the elements of the sexual assault were made out beyond reasonable doubt. 34 The acquittals on the later charges are not inconsistent with the guilty verdict on the earlier assault charge. Indeed, they demonstrate the likelihood that the jury paid careful attention to its task and the level of satisfaction required in order to convict and did so only in that case where the evidence satisfied it beyond reasonable doubt. The first count of assault stands out from each of the other charges in being supported by plausible objective and independent evidence. 35 As demonstrated by the address by counsel for the applicant to the jury, there was an attack on the credit of the complainant and on the reliability of the evidence given by Ms Zunic. However, the suggestion that Ms Zunic was describing an event which occurred before the applicant arrived in Australia, because of her identification of the television program, and that the assailant was possibly the complainant's ex-husband, might well have been dismissed as fanciful. It could not be said that it was not open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the applicant in respect of the charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The distinction drawn by the jury between the two counts is readily seen as logical and reasonable. There is no occasion for this Court to intervene on the basis that the conviction was unreasonable. Failure to put defence case to jury 36 The complaint that the defence case on the assault occasioning bodily harm was not adequately put to the jury must be rejected for three reasons. First, it is not the obligation of the trial judge to repeat to the jury all the matters put by counsel for the accused in his address. Secondly, although his Honour dealt with the evidence witness by witness, rather than charge by charge, the essential elements relied upon by the defence were addressed. Thirdly, there was no application for any further directions in this regard by counsel for the accused. This was a case in which forensic decisions may have played a significant part in how the case was left to the jury. Thus it was quite possible that counsel for the accused might have preferred to have the jury left to consider matters in the way in which he had put them, rather than have them repeated in more muted and unappealing terms by the trial judge. It was therefore a case in which, in the absence of any evidence of miscarriage, leave to rely on the ground should be rejected, there being no compliance with r 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules. 37 Counsel for the applicant asserted that leave should be granted because it was fundamental to a fair trial that the judge put fairly before the jury the defence case, regardless of any request from defence counsel. Authority for that proposition was said to flow from a number of cases, including RPS v The Queen [2000] HCA 3; 199 CLR 620 at [41] (Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). However, a proposition so broadly stated is unhelpful. The suggestion that the trial judge failed to put the defence case to the jury requires identification of the elements of that case, a consideration of the summing up, bearing in mind the context, which includes counsel's addresses to the jury. 38 Dealing with specific issues, the defence relied upon inconsistencies between the evidence of the complainant and that of Ms Zunic, together with Ms Zunic's evidence as to the timing of the events she was describing. As noted above, the primary focus of defence counsel's address was on the question of timing and Ms Zunic's belief that she was watching a Big Brother program on television at the time of the incident. 39 Before referring to specific passages in the summing up, it is necessary to make two general comments about the form of the summing up. First, his Honour addressed the elements of the offence by handing to the jury a document which had been settled in consultation with counsel. In relation to the charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the statement of the elements of the offence was straightforward and uncontroversial. Although counsel for the applicant complained that there was inadequate discussion of those elements, that was clearly a matter which could have been the subject of further directions had counsel sought it at trial, and there is no substance in that aspect of the complaint. 40 The second aspect of the summing up was the approach taken by the trial judge to the evidence. His Honour dealt with the evidence by summarising it chronologically, as given at the trial. There was an advantage in taking this course, to the extent that the credibility of individual witnesses was in issue. The disadvantage was that it failed to relate specific evidence to specific issues, charge by charge. For example, it might have been of assistance if the trial judge had isolated the evidence with respect to the assault occasioning actual bodily harm, so that the jury could focus on the issues raised in relation to that charge. (The same approach could have been taken in respect of each charge.) Such an approach would conform to the principle identified in Alford v Magee [1952] HCA 3; 85 CLR 437 at 466. Just as it is important not only to explain the law to the jury, but to explain how it may apply with respect to the facts of the particular case, so it will often be helpful to identify the specific matters in dispute in respect of a charge and identify the evidence relevant to the factual findings which need to be made to resolve those issues. 41 The first specific matter raised in the applicant's submissions was that there had been no complaint about the allegation in count 1 until a year after complaint was first made to the police in relation to other matters, namely not until 2008. It was submitted that his Honour should have given directions in respect of the delay. That allegation is, however, without substance. As noted above, complaint was made within two months, when the police attended at the residence of the complainant. 42 The second failure was said to have been the absence of reference to the issue of timing. Ms Zunic's evidence was sufficient, the defence contended, to raise a reasonable doubt as to when the incident occurred. If she were correct in assigning the date to the period when Big Brother was showing on television, then there must have been a reasonable doubt as to whether the incident involved the applicant. 43 The third, and related, omission related to the inconsistency between the evidence of the complainant and the evidence of Ms Zunic as to the bruising. With respect to the bruises on the arms, their evidence was largely consistent; however, although the complainant said she had been hit across the face, she denied that the blow resulted in bruising. Ms Zunic, by contrast, asserted she had a black eye and bruises on her face. 44 In respect of these matters, his Honour summarised the evidence of each witness, including that extracted in cross-examination, but, it was contended, failed to draw the jury's attention to the potential doubts raised by that evidence as to when the incident occurred and as to the injuries suffered. 45 The difficulty with the applicant's submission is that it does not relate to an omission to refer to evidence as such, but rather an omission to identify the significance of the evidence. However, the issue was identified and the significance was self-evident. When summarising the addresses of counsel, the timing issue was raised by his Honour by reference to the address of the prosecutor, noting (summing up, p 52): "She says that you would be satisfied that there is some confusion about Ms Zunic about the date of watching Big Brother and she must have been mistaken about that but not mistaken she says about the other things or submits to you about those other matters." 46 With respect to counsel for the defence, his Honour stated (p 54-55): "Mr Johnson on behalf of the accused reminds you, as do I, about the presumption of innocence and to also remind you that this is not a case of comparing stories. You need to be satisfied on the evidence of the complainant beyond reasonable doubt in relation to each and every element on each and every count. … He takes you to various other aspects of the relationship and the other evidence about Ms Zunic, the dates, why the police were called on 13 November …." 47 The complaint now made is very much one of impression concerning the running of the trial. Where there were three incidents and five charges, it was important that the more important issues were kept in focus. They were undoubtedly the allegations of sexual assault without consent. The summing up dealt comprehensively with the evidence, but was reasonably concise. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the two real points in issue in respect of the assault occasioning actual bodily harm would have been clear to the jury when they commenced their deliberations. There is no doubt that more comprehensive directions could have been given in relation to the defence in relation to count 1. However, no further direction was sought. To have sought such a direction might well have affected the balance and focus of the case, at the point at which it was left to the jury. If it had been thought desirable by trial counsel, as to whose competence and diligence there was no issue, a further direction would have been sought. As it was not, r 4 precludes the issue being raised, without leave of the Court. The case is not an appropriate one for the grant of leave. Accordingly, this ground must be rejected. Conclusions 48 I would propose the following orders:

FALLAH v THE QUEEN

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Judgment (15 paragraphs)

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