11 The Defendant relied on the affidavit of his solicitor, Michael Vassili, sworn 14 August 2009. Mr Vassili states that he raised with the Council at the earliest opportunity that the proceedings had been commenced against the wrong person and that the Defendant could not have committed the offence because he was overseas at all material times. Mr Vassili's affidavit provides a similar summary of the court appearances in the matter after the summons had been issued as that set out in the affidavit of Mr Castellan. Annexed to Mr Vassili's affidavit were, inter alia, three letters sent by Mr Vassili to the Council's solicitors dated 20 November 2008, 26 November 2008 and 19 March 2009. In the letter of 20 November 2008 Mr Vassili confirms informal representations made to the Council that the Defendant was absent from the jurisdiction at all material times and that documentary verification of this was being sought. In the letter of 26 November 2008 Mr Vassili advises that the Defendant's passport does not indicate re-entry but confirms the representation that the Defendant was out of the country at all material times. In the letter of 19 March 2009 notice is provided that Mr Jazaar has passed away and that the Defendant has acted as a trustee in holding the property the subject of proceedings on trust for Mr Jazaar.
Defendant's submissions
12 There were two errors in the investigation of the Council. Firstly, Mr Green failed to establish that he was speaking to the Defendant when he attended the site on 18 December 2007. He should have asked for photographic identification at that stage to be certain that the person he was speaking to was (or was not) the Defendant. The Council had an obligation to commence proceedings on the basis of a prima facie case after conducting a reasonable investigation and has failed to do so. Section 257D(1)(a) applies in these circumstances.
13 Secondly, the Council failed to properly investigate whether the Defendant was in control of the building works the subject of the charges carried out on the property. Commencing in November 2008 Mr Vassili made representations on behalf of the Defendant that he was out of the country and stated that his passport and tickets demonstrating travel arrangements would be provided. Mr Vassili attended with the passport at the offices of Mr Castellan. The passport showed that the Defendant went to Lebanon on 7 October 2007 (the demolition work the subject of the charges was in July 2007). In November 2008 the Council could have issued a notice under s 118BA of the EP&A Act requiring the Defendant to attend an interview for questioning. As a responsible prosecutor, that course should have been taken at the earliest opportunity. Further representations were made in relation to the passport during November 2008 and thereafter. This shows a failure to which s 257D(1)(c) applies.
14 In March 2009 the circumstance was raised by the Defendant's solicitors that the Defendant held the property on trust for another person. This was confirmed in the affidavit of the Defendant sworn 6 April 2009 and that he was inactive in relation to the property. This could also have been explored with the issue of a notice under s 118BA once again and this should have been done before the amended summons was filed in March 2009 to change the basis of the charge to vicarious liability. It is not for the Defendant to foreshadow relevant issues. Lateness in relation the disclosure of the trust should not result in the Defendant being penalised by there being no award of costs.
15 The further inquiries undertaken by the Council's solicitor would not have advanced the position at all given the content of par 14 of the Defendant's affidavit that he signed various documents. These inquiries simply delayed the decision to discontinue the proceedings and caused further costs to be incurred.
16 The Council's own evidence was that it had the wrong person as identified in the second affidavit of Mr Green. The first reference to Mr Safwan Jazaar is in a letter dated 19 March 2009 from Mr Vassili but he was already known to the Council because he was the applicant for a modification application in relation to the development consent granted in September 2008.
17 These circumstances are exceptional as the failure to inquire about the identity of the person on site was quite unreasonable so that s 257D(1)(d) applies. The Defendant considered his strongest case was in relation to s 257D(1)(c) rather than (a).
18 The written submissions identified numerous authorities concerning what a failure to properly investigate entailed such as Halpin v Department of Gaming and Racing [2007] NSWSC 815, JD v DPP [2000] NSWSC 1092 and Port Macquarie - Hastings Council v Lawlor Services Pty Limited; Port Macquarie - Hastings Council v Petro (No 7) (2008) 159 LGERA 87.
Council's submissions
19 The Defendant has at no time contested the following facts, all of which are the subject of evidence filed for the Council:
(a) The Defendant was at all material times the sole registered proprietor of the land
(b) The subject demolition and building works were carried out on the land:
(i) the demolition of the existing cottage was carried out in around late July 2007
(ii) building works for the erection of the new dwelling on the land were carried out in the period from around late July 2007 through to about December 2008, by which time the new dwelling was substantially completed.
(c) There was a development consent in force in respect of the development, namely DA 263/2007 (the development consent)
(d) The development consent included condition 6
(e) No construction certificate was ever issued for the carrying out of the works approved by the development consent.
20 Although there was no contest as to the above facts, the Defendant disputed that he was responsible for the carrying out of the subject demolition and building works.
21 Until being notified of the property being held in trust by the Defendant, via submissions from his solicitor in March 2009 and finally in the affidavit of Mr El Nachar dated 6 April 2009, as far as the Council could be aware, the property was held by him as the registered proprietor and he applied as the applicant and owner for development consent to demolish and rebuild on a residential lot. That was the nature of the work carried out without a construction certificate the subject of the offences. It was entirely reasonable for the Council to assume the work was being done for the benefit of the Defendant. That there might be an alibi if the Defendant was overseas does not mean that the Council should not pursue charges based on vicarious liability where the building had been erected. Mr Green went to the property and the person there said he was the Defendant. The failure to ask for photographic identification, if that was failure, was not unreasonable in the circumstances and not so deficient as to enliven s 257D(1). It was reasonable to commence proceedings and pursue them with a further summons filed in March 2009.
22 It was reasonable to prosecute both proceedings until the issue that the Defendant held the property in trust for Mr Jazaar was raised in the affidavit of the Defendant dated 6 April 2009. The Council addressed whether it was reasonable to make inquiries as detailed in Mr Castellan's affidavit, summarised above. The documents such as the First Home Owners Grant application in which the Defendant attests that he intended to occupy the property for six months is in accordance with the eligibility criteria specified in s 12 of the First Home Owners Grant Act 2000 suggest that the Defendant intended to have a greater involvement with the property than the Defendant's affidavit sworn in April 2009 suggested. It was necessary and reasonable for the Council to consider all these matters before it decided not to proceed with the prosecutions.
23 Sections 257D(1)(a) and (c) relate to investigation rather than proceedings. Section 257D(1)(d) is the only section relied on by the Defendant's solicitor dealing with the conduct of proceedings and there are no exceptional circumstances justifying an award of costs.
Finding
24 In order to make an award of costs in the Defendant's favour at least one of the subsections in s 257D must be satisfied. In Fosse v Department of Public Prosecutions [1999] NSWSC 367 Wood CJ at CL held that the onus lay on the defendants seeking a costs order to bring themselves within the statutory provisions of s 118D(1) of the Justices Act 1902 (the predecessor to s 257D and now repealed). The parties have identified many relevant authorities. Most recently I considered the relevant principles in Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Vurlow; Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Hockey; Gordon Plath of the Department of Environment and Climate Change v Southton [2009] NSWLEC 102 at [25]-[28] in relation to the failure to properly investigate in s 257D(1)(a). The failure does not have to be a failure to meet optimum standards but is an objective test based on what inquiries were made and should have been made by the Council. Section 257D(1)(c) requires a finding that the prosecutor unreasonably failed to investigate a relevant matter of which it should have been aware and which suggested that the accused person might not be guilty, inter alia. The Defendant's solicitor did not identify with much precision the matter(s) which the Council should have been aware of but I infer it was that the person on site interviewed by Mr Green was not the Defendant, despite saying that he was, and that the beneficiary of the development consent was really Mr Jazaar not the Defendant because Mr Jazaar was the applicant for the modification of the development consent in September 2008.
25 In relation to the period leading up to the commencement of proceedings and whether the investigation giving rise to these was conducted in a proper and reasonable manner, for the reasons given by the Council I consider the proceedings commenced in September 2008 and the further summons filed in March 2009 were reasonably commenced. The circumstances of this matter demonstrate clearly no concern arises in relation to the Council's investigation as being improper or unreasonable in relation to s 257D(1)(a). The Council officer Mr Green not asking for photographic identification when the person on site acted as if he was the Defendant was not unreasonable. Further, while the Defendant's solicitor argued that the Council should have required attendance at an interview under s 118BA, the affidavit of Mr Castellan identifies the steps the Council did take in light of the submissions received. These steps show the Council was taking active and proper steps to investigate the matters being raised.
26 The representations made by Mr Vassilli in relation to the Defendant's alibi and the production of the passport all took time and not all the information about travel such as tickets and an itinerary was provided in any event. As pointed out by the Council, based on the passport stamps the Defendant was in Australia at the time of the demolition giving rise to the prosecution. The Council appears to have acted properly in relation to the inquiries it undertook. No failure to investigate properly a relevant matter arises in the circumstances and s 257D(1)(c) does not apply to this stage of the proceedings.
27 In relation to the Council's inquiries to establish the bona fides of the Defendant's evidence in relation to the trust, I note that no documentary proof of the existence of the trust was attached to the Defendant's affidavit. There is simply an assertion in par 14 that the Defendant signed some documents which he thinks related to the trust. Given that there was delay in advising of the existence of the trust by the Defendant, which was clearly a material matter about which the Council could not be expected to have any knowledge other than what the Defendant or his advisers told the Council, it was reasonable for the Council to undertaken further inquiries concerning the Defendant's behaviour in relation to the property of which he was the registered proprietor. That these inquiries suggested that the Defendant had made applications for a mortgage and a grant under the first home owners scheme which suggested that he intended to live at the property, contrary to his affidavit filed in these proceedings, was material which the Council had to weigh up in determining if the two proceedings should be pursued. The Defendant's submission that he should not be penalised is not to the point. What has to be assessed is the reasonableness of the Council's behaviour.
28 I should note that the Defendant's solicitor stated in his submissions in reply that had the two matters been heard there would have been a dispute and evidence, including the calling of a handwriting expert, about whether the signatures on the documents produced under subpoena were those of the Defendant. The highly unusual circumstance that all the documents with the signature of the Defendant obtained by the Council under subpoena were not signed by him is not a matter about which the Council could have any knowledge. It was reasonable for it to proceed with its investigation on the usual basis that the signatures on the documents were the Defendant's. The investigations identified in the affidavit of Mr Castellan were entirely reasonable in the somewhat peculiar circumstances of this matter. Not discontinuing the proceedings until August 2009 was reasonable. A failure referred to in s 257D(1) does not arise in this part of the proceedings either.
29 There was no additional evidence relied on in the Defendant's submissions in relation to the application of s 257D(1)(d), that there were exceptional circumstances relating to the conduct of the proceedings suggesting it was just and reasonable to award costs. Having failed to satisfy ss (a) and (c) there would have to be some additional matter which would cause ss (d) to arise in the circumstances of this case and there are none relied on by the Defendant.
30 The Defendant has not established any of the grounds in s 257D(1) to warrant an award of costs in his favour and the Notice of Motion is dismissed. The Council is not entitled to its costs in light of s 257B so that each party should pay its own costs of the motion.