Fair Work Ombudsman v Maritime Union of Australia - [2014] FCA 440 - FCA 2014 case summary — Zoe

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Fair Work Ombudsman v Maritime Union of Australia

[2014] FCA 440

Federal Court of Australia|2014-05-06|Before: Siopis J

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Source facts

Court

Federal Court of Australia

Decision date

2014-05-06

Before

Siopis J

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (46 paragraphs)

[1]

The applicant's evidence 62 The applicant adduced affidavit evidence from a number of persons who were not cross-examined. The evidence comprised affidavits made by the following persons: Ms Amy Wiseman, Mr Raymond Palmer, Mr Glenn Humphreys and Ms Jemillah Bickerton and a statement of anticipated evidence by Mr Peter Kerr. In respect of Mr Kerr's statement, the respondents did not object to the statement standing as Mr Kerr's evidence-in-chief. 63 The applicant also adduced evidence from each of the named employees, as well as Mr Edward, Mr Strickland, Mr Pearce, Mr Gray and Mr Leatt-Hayter - each of whom was cross-examined. 64 The applicant also adduced expert evidence from a psychiatrist, Dr Lawrence Terace. Dr Terace was also cross-examined. I discuss his evidence later in these reasons.

[2]

Mr Douglas Watson 65 Mr Watson was employed as a small craft master on a casual basis. Mr Tracey submitted that the Court should approach Mr Watson's evidence with caution. Mr Tracey complained that Mr Watson was doing no more than reciting his affidavit which had been prepared for him by the applicant's solicitors. There were also other criticisms made which I have dealt with later in these reasons. 66 In my view, Mr Watson was a reluctant witness. He was uncomfortable because he was conscious of the power of the MUA on the waterfront. However, although there was some difficulties with his evidence which I have referred to below, in my view, Mr Watson gave his evidence to the best of his ability, and I have, generally speaking, accepted his evidence.

[19]

ADVERSE ACTION - THE ALLEGED CONTRAVENTION OF S 346(C) OF THE FAIR WORK ACT 85 Section 346 of the Fair Work Act relevantly provides as follows: A person must not take adverse action against another person because the other person: … (c) does not engage, or has at any time not engaged or proposed to not engage, in industrial activity within the meaning of paragraphs 347(c) to (g). 86 Relevantly, Item 7(b) of s 342(1) of the Fair Work Act provides that adverse action is taken by an industrial association or an officer of such an association, if the association or officer: (b) takes action that has the effect, directly or indirectly, of prejudicing the person in the person's employment or prospective employment. 87 Section 342(2)(b) of the Fair Work Act provides that "adverse action" includes "organising such action". 88 The adverse action alleged by the applicant against Mr Tracey is that during the period 6 to 15 December 2011, Mr Tracey had: organised to be published and/or disseminated and/or organised to be disseminated copies of a poster entitled "Attention: Scabs in Fremantle" (Scab Poster) at various maritime sites, including: (a) in Fremantle, including at the FPA site; and/or (b) south of Fremantle down to and including Rockingham. (Original emphasis.) 89 The applicant referred to the impugned action of Mr Tracey as "the scab poster action". 90 The applicant alleged further that the scab poster action of Mr Tracey had the effect of directly or indirectly prejudicing each of the five named employees in their employment and/or prospective employment. In support of that allegation, the applicant provided particulars to the effect that the adverse action exposed each named employee to vilification, ostracism, intimidation and risk of violence, damaged their reputations, caused them emotional distress, reduced the prospects of them obtaining future work with another employer within Australia, and caused them psychological and psychiatric injury. 91 The applicant went on to plead that Mr Tracey engaged in the scab poster action because the named employees did not take part in "industrial activity", being the 48 hour strike commencing on 1 December 2011. 92 In the alternative, the applicant alleged that, if the Court was to find that the 48 hour strike action was not "industrial action" within the meaning of 347(f) of the Fair Work Act, the applicant would contend that the impugned action was taken for one or more of the following reasons, namely, that one or more of the named employees: (a) did not promote the two day strike action for or on behalf of the MUA; (b) did not encourage or participate in the two day strike action which was organised or promoted by the MUA; and/or (c) did not represent or advance the views, claims or interests of the MUA by participating in the two day strike action. 93 The applicant contended that because Mr Tracey had taken adverse action against each of the five named employees, his conduct, therefore, constituted five separate contraventions of s 346 of the Fair Work Act. 94 The applicant also contended that in respect of "the requisite intent" under s 346 of the Fair Work Act, namely, in this case, that Mr Tracey had taken the impugned action because the named employees had not taken part in the 48 hours strike action, the applicant would rely upon the operation of s 361(1) of the Fair Work Act. 95 Section 361(1) of the Fair Work Act, provides that if, in an application of this kind, it is alleged that a person took action for a particular purpose or with a particular intent, and taking that action for that reason or with that intent, would constitute a contravention of Pt 3-1 of the Fair Work Act, then it is presumed in those proceedings, that the action was, or has been taken, for that reason, unless the person proves otherwise. 96 The alleged impugned action of Mr Tracey fell within Pt 3-1 of the Fair Work Act, and, therefore, s 36(1) of the Fair Work Act would apply in this case.

[20]

The issues arising from the adverse action claim against Mr Tracey 97 At the trial, Mr Tracey relied upon a further amended defence dated 31 January 2013 (the defence). In his defence, Mr Tracey made it clear that he was relying upon the "penalty privilege". However, notwithstanding this plea, Mr Tracey admitted a large number of allegations made in the statement of claim by the applicant. 98 As mentioned, the core allegation made against Mr Tracey (pleaded in para 23 of the statement of claim) is that during the period 6 to 15 December 2011, Mr Tracey had: organised to be published and/or disseminated and/or organised to be disseminated copies of a poster entitled "Attention: Scabs in Fremantle" (Scab Poster) at various maritime sites, including: (a) in Fremantle, including at the FPA site; and/or (b) south of Fremantle down to and including Rockingham. (Original emphasis.) 99 In the defence, Mr Tracey denied organising the publication of, or organising the dissemination of the scab posters, said he was not at Rockingham during the period of approximately 6 to 15 December 2011, and otherwise did not admit para 23 of the statement of claim. 100 Mr Tracey also denied the allegation that the impugned action had the effect of prejudicing the named employees in their employment. Mr Tracey said any prejudice which the named employees may have suffered occurred because the named employees had worked during the two day strike action, when their co-workers had not. 101 Mr Tracey also pleaded that the alleged effects of the scab poster action relied on by the applicant did not, as a matter of law, prejudice the named employees in their employment or prospective employment within the meaning of Item 7(b) in s 342(1) of the Fair Work Act. 102 Also, contended Mr Tracey, as each of the named employees was employed at the time of the trial, the question of any impact of the alleged adverse action on prospective employment did not, as a point of law, arise. 103 The pleadings in respect of the applicant's claim that Mr Tracey had contravened s 346 of the Fair Work Act gave rise to the following issues: (a) whether Mr Tracey published or disseminated copies of the scab poster, and/or organised for copies of the scab poster to be published and/or disseminated; (b) whether the scab poster action had the effect directly or indirectly of prejudicing any one or more of the named employees in their employment and/or prospective employment; (c) whether the two day strike action was "industrial activity" within the meaning of s 347(f), or, alternatively, s 347(b)(ii), (iii), (v), s 347(c) or s 347(d) of the Fair Work Act; (d) whether Mr Tracey engaged in the scab poster action because the named employees did not take part in the "industrial activity".

[21]

WHETHER MR TRACEY DISSEMINATED COPIES OF THE SCAB POSTER, OR ORGANISED FOR THE SCAB POSTER TO BE PUBLISHED AND/OR DISSEMINATED 104 I now deal with the first issue. 105 As mentioned, the applicant pleaded in para 23 of the statement of claim that the scab posters were disseminated at maritime sites in Fremantle (including the outer harbour), south of Fremantle "down to and including Rockingham". The outer harbour is located in Kwinana. Rockingham is a location some 10 km south of Kwinana. In the particulars of this allegation, however, the applicant did not identify any location south of the outer harbour, as a location where the scab posters had been disseminated. The only locations identified were locations in the inner and outer harbours. One such location was on a bollard at the entry gate to Victoria Quay 3 in the inner harbour. 106 During his opening, senior counsel for the applicant said that the applicant would be relying upon the CCTV security footage from a security camera at the entry gate to Victoria Quay 3 to prove that Mr Tracey had affixed a scab poster to the bollard at the entry gate. At that point, however, senior counsel for Mr Tracey interjected to advise the Court that Mr Tracey admitted that he had attached a scab poster to the bollard at the entry gate to Victoria Quay 3. Senior counsel for the MUA joined in the admission on behalf of the MUA 107 Further, in the course of his evidence-in-chief, Mr Tracey also admitted that he had attached scab posters on the MUA noticeboards in the crib room at H and J berths in the inner harbour, on the MUA noticeboards in the stevedore foreman's office at KBT, on the MUA noticeboards in the stevedore crib room at KBT, on a glass fronted noticeboard in the maintenance crib room in the maintenance workshop and in the fire station at the inner harbour. 108 It is on the basis of these admissions that I have made the findings at [28] and [29] above. 109 Accordingly, by the time that closing submissions came to be made, the questions in issue were: (a) whether the scab posters were disseminated at maritime sites as far south as Rockingham; and (b) whether Mr Tracey, in addition to disseminating the scab posters to the locations which he had admitted, had organised the scab posters to be published and/or had organised the scab posters to be disseminated. 110 The applicant contended that findings should be made against Mr Tracey in respect of each of these two issues. In support of that contention, the applicant relied upon admissions said to be made by Mr Tracey during conversations between Mr Tracey and other persons during which the scab posters had been discussed. The applicant also contended that the Court should draw inferences. 111 I deal first with the allegation that Mr Tracey made admissions during the following conversations: a telephone conversation between Mr Tracey and Mr Pearce on 8 December 2011, a conversation on 19 December 2011 between Mr Tracey, Mr Gray and Mr Pearce, and a conversation between Mr Tracey and Mr Watson on 6 February 2012 at the Tradewinds hotel.

[22]

Mr Tracey's conversation with Mr Pearce on 8 December 2011 112 Mr Pearce made an affidavit dated 17 October 2012 in which he deposed to the contents of his conversation with Mr Tracey on 8 December 2011. However, senior counsel for Mr Tracey objected to that part of the affidavit being adopted by Mr Pearce as his evidence-in-chief and required that that evidence be adduced orally. 113 In his evidence-in-chief, Mr Pearce deposed he had a telephone conversation with Mr Tracey on 8 December which was initiated by Mr Tracey, who wanted to adjourn a meeting which was to be held with Mr Pearce and Mr Gray. Mr Pearce said that Mr Tracey had told him that he needed to adjourn the meeting because he was very busy organising the upcoming industrial action. Mr Pearce understood that Mr Tracey was referring to two 48 hour strikes involving the VTSOs and small craft masters due to commence on 10 December and 12 December 2011 respectively. Mr Pearce said that Mr Tracey said that he was going to shut down the Kwinana bulk terminal as part of the industrial action on Saturday, 10 December. Mr Pearce went on to say that Mr Tracey said that there would be a picket line on that day and no one would be allowed in or out. No ships would leave and no trains would come in. Mr Pearce said that he asked Mr Tracey why he intended to take this action at the outer harbour in relation to a dispute about workers at the inner harbour, which had nothing to do with workers at the outer harbour. Mr Tracey replied that the KBT was "the biggest in the port now" and he was going to "shut you down". 114 Mr Pearce said that, during that conversation, he said to Mr Tracey that they had removed a scab poster from one of their noticeboards and he was surprised that there was no MUA emblem on it. Mr Pearce then deposed as follows: What did Mr Tracey say in response to you commenting about no logo on the posters?---He said that they were from the MUA, and I knew that, and that they were everywhere, they were even down in Rockingham. What did you say after being told that they were MUA and everywhere?---I said they were not appropriate, certainly not to name people on the posters, and that they would be removed and not allowed in the outer harbour. What did Mr Tracey say in response to you saying that, that he would remove them?---He said that they were scabs, that's why we named them, and we haven't had scabs on the wharf for 30 years. Do you recall if there was any other discussion about the topic of scabs?---Nothing specifically, no. What - did you notice anything about Mr Tracey's demeanour during the conversation concerning the posters of scabs?---He was certainly passionate about the conversation, more passionate than normal in our discussions. Have you had many discussions with Mr Tracey in the past prior to this conversation?---I would say, yes, many, yes. 115 In his evidence, Mr Tracey admitted that he was a party to that telephone conversation. Mr Tracey denied that he had said that the scab posters were from the MUA. He also denied that he had said that "we named them". However, he accepted that he had said that the posters were even down in Rockingham. However, he deposed that his comment in relation to the posters being even down in Rockingham was a "wind up". 116 During cross-examination, Mr Pearce adhered to his evidence-in-chief that Mr Tracey had said that the posters were from the MUA and that Mr Tracey had said "we named them" and that Mr Tracey had been more passionate than normal during the conversation. 117 Further, during cross-examination of Mr Pearce, the following exchange occurred: The phone call? All right. And when he mentioned posters in Rockingham, you took that as a throwaway line, a bit of a wind up?---Yes. Because you didn't think there were any posters in Rockingham, did you?---I don't know. No. What you mean you don't know? At the time, when you said that, you didn't think that there were, did you?---No. No. So this was just Mr Tracey being Mr Tracey, winding you up?---Yes. 118 Also, during cross-examination, Mr Pearce conceded that his evidence, as recorded in his affidavit, that Mr Tracey had said that he intended to close down Kwinana bulk terminal "tomorrow [which was a Saturday]", was incorrect because, in fact, the day after the conversation on 8 December 2011, was a Friday and not a Saturday. I mention this because senior counsel for Mr Tracey sought to make something of this concession, to suggest that the Court should approach Mr Pearce's evidence with caution. Senior counsel had previously elicited an answer from Mr Pearce that he was sure that his affidavit evidence was correct. The concession about the mistaken day, said senior counsel, stood in contrast to that evidence. In my view, the error made in the affidavit and Mr Pearce's failure to recognise it until cross-examination, was a minor matter and does not result in me not accepting Mr Pearce's evidence, or approaching his evidence with caution. 119 I prefer Mr Pearce's evidence on this conversation to that of Mr Tracey. In particular, I accept the evidence that Mr Tracey was more passionate than usual when speaking about scabs. I was able to discern from his cross-examination, the intensity of Mr Tracey's feelings on this question, and I accept that he would have used language of the kind to which Mr Pearce deposed, during their conversation.

[23]

The meeting between Mr Gray, Mr Pearce and Mr Tracey on 19 December 2011 120 Mr Gray and Mr Pearce attended a meeting with Mr Tracey and Mr Orchard, a stevedore, on 19 December 2011 at the outer harbour. Mr Tracey was present at this meeting as a MUA representative for Mr Orchard. 121 Mr Gray gave oral evidence-in-chief about this meeting because senior counsel for Mr Tracey objected to his evidence-in-chief of the meeting being given by the adoption of his affidavit evidence. 122 Mr Gray deposed that during the meeting conversation turned to the scab poster. Mr Gray said that Mr Tracey asked what CCTV security camera he had been caught on. He said that Mr Tracey went on to say: "I reckon it must have been the one at Victoria Quay in the inner harbour" and that he did not realise that his "ugly face" would be caught on the camera. Mr Gray deposed that Mr Tracey had said that he was not the author of the posters, that he did not deny putting up the posters and had put up some 500 odd posters between Fremantle and Rockingham. Mr Gray said that Mr Tracey had also asked what law he had broken and what they were going to get him on. 123 Mr Gray went on to say that Mr Tracey then asked whether anyone else had been caught on any of the outer harbour cameras. Mr Gray said that he did not respond to Mr Tracey's questions. Mr Gray said that after the meeting he immediately walked back to his office which he used at KBT and made a note of the conversation. 124 Mr Pearce also gave oral evidence-in-chief about this meeting. He said that during the meeting, Mr Tracey had said that he heard there was security footage of "people - MUA members" putting up the scab posters on billboards in Fremantle. Mr Pearce deposed that he had responded to Mr Tracey's comment by saying that Mr Tracey had told him in their earlier telephone conversation that he was involved in putting up the posters. Mr Pearce went on to say that Mr Tracey had questioned whether he had done anything wrong. Mr Pearce accepted in cross-examination that Mr Tracey had not asked whether there was security footage of "MUA people" putting up posters, but whether there was security footage of "people" putting up posters. 125 In his evidence-in-chief, Mr Tracey accepted that during the conversation with Mr Gray and Mr Pearce he had inquired whether his action in putting up the poster at the bollard at the entry to Victoria Quay had been captured on CCTV security footage. Mr Tracey also said that he had asked Mr Gray whether anybody else had been caught on CCTV security footage in the outer harbour or whether the company only had information on the inner harbour. However, Mr Tracey denied that he said that he had put up 500 posters between Fremantle and Rockingham. Mr Tracey deposed that he had said that there were 500 posters between Fremantle and Rockingham and that he had put up some posters but had not been the author of the posters. However, Mr Tracey said that his comment about there being 500 posters between Fremantle and Rockingham, had been a "wind up". 126 During Mr Gray's cross-examination, it was suggested to him that Mr Tracey had not said that he had put up the 500 posters but rather that he had said that there were 500 posters. Mr Gray adhered to his evidence-in-chief. However, Mr Gray also accepted, during cross-examination, that Mr Tracey was known from time-to-time to make statements with the intention of "winding up" other persons and also to make "outrageous" statements. 127 I accept Mr Gray's evidence as to the terms of the conversation with Mr Tracey and Mr Pearce on 19 December 2011. Immediately after the meeting ended Mr Gray made a note of the conversation. In that note Mr Gray has recorded that Mr Tracey said that: "Yes he put up posters probably 500 but wasn't the author, so what law did he break." The note also records that Mr Tracey asked if anyone else had been caught on CCTV security footage in the Kwinana area, which as I have said, Mr Tracey does not dispute saying. Mr Gray's note does not, however, refer to Rockingham in relation to the posters. However, as mentioned, Mr Tracey accepted that at the meeting he had referred to Rockingham. 128 I also accept Mr Gray's and Mr Pearce's evidence in relation to the content of the conversation with Mr Tracey on 19 December 2011. The fact that Mr Gray was able to refresh his memory from his note enhances the reliability of Mr Gray's evidence. 129 However, in light of Mr Pearce's and Mr Gray's evidence of Mr Tracey's propensity to say things to wind people up, I accept Mr Tracey's evidence that, whilst he may have said that he did so, he did not actually put up 500 posters between Fremantle and Rockingham; and that he was "winding up" Mr Pearce and Mr Gray when he said so during the conversation in question. 130 The applicant did not adduce any further evidence in support of the claim that scab posters were disseminated to maritime sites extending as far as Rockingham. 131 Accordingly, I find that the only locations to which the scab posters were disseminated were at locations in the inner and outer harbours. 132 I also make the following additional findings in relation to the conversations of 8 December 2011 and 19 December 2011: (a) During the 8 December conversation with Mr Pearce, Mr Tracey did say that the posters were from the MUA, that they were scabs and that's why we named them and that we haven't had scabs on the wharf for 30 years. (b) During the 19 December conversation with Mr Gray and Mr Pearce, Mr Tracey asked whether he had been caught on CCTV security footage and whether any other people had been caught putting up posters on CCTV security footage at the outer harbour.

[24]

The conversation with Mr Watson on 6 February 2012 133 The applicant also relied on statements made by Mr Tracey during a conversation between Mr Watson and Mr Tracey on 6 February 2012 at the Tradewinds hotel. 134 Mr Watson made an affidavit dated 11 October 2012 and he adopted the bulk of that affidavit as his evidence-in-chief. However, consequent upon the objection made by Mr Tracey, Mr Watson gave oral evidence-in-chief in relation to the two conversations with Mr Tracey to which he had referred in his affidavit, being conversations on 12 December 2011 and 6 February 2012 respectively. I will refer to the 12 December 2011 conversation later in these reasons. 135 Mr Watson deposed that he had a conversation with Mr Tracey at the Tradewinds hotel on 6 February 2012. The conversation, according to Mr Watson, became heated. Mr Watson said to Mr Tracey that he was still seeking a public apology about being named as a scab when he had not worked during the strike. Mr Tracey, said Mr Watson, replied that "scabs like you don't get apologies". 136 Mr Watson said that he asked how he could be a scab and Mr Tracey had said: "Well you were the first fucking scab in that situation". Mr Watson said that Mr Tracey had then said that Mr Watson had left 15 minutes late and had had coffee with the oncoming crew. Mr Watson deposed that he asked: "Are you willing to crush my career just over 15 minutes?", and that Mr Tracey responded by saying: "For scum like you, yes. You're a scab." 137 Mr Watson went on to depose that Mr Tracey then said that he had not printed the posters, but he had put up six of the scab posters and was proud of it. Mr Watson deposed that Mr Tracey then said to him: "Good luck getting another job in the maritime industry." 138 Mr Watson said he made a handwritten note of the conversation on notepaper from the Tradewinds hotel. 139 In his evidence, Mr Tracey agreed that the conversation had taken place. Mr Tracey took issue with how the conversation had started, suggesting that Mr Watson had used abusive language towards him. Mr Tracey agreed that Mr Watson was upset. Mr Tracey also agreed that during the conversation Mr Watson had asked him why he had called him a scab and that he had indeed responded by saying: "Well you were the first fucking scab in that situation." Mr Tracey also accepted that he had told Mr Watson that he did the handover and had a drink of coffee with the oncoming crew. Mr Tracey denied that he said that he would crush Mr Watson's career. Mr Tracey admitted that he had said to Mr Watson that he had put up posters and that he did not print them, but denied that he had said that he was proud of it. 140 During cross-examination, Mr Watson deposed that he had told the applicant's investigators during interviews conducted two days after his conversation with Mr Tracey that he was not sure whether Mr Tracey had actually used the word "proud" in relation to him putting up the posters. Mr Watson also conceded in cross-examination that he had deposed in his oral evidence-in-chief to that effect, because that was what was stated in his affidavit. He also accepted in cross-examination that Mr Tracey had not said that he would crush Mr Watson's career. 141 Senior counsel for Mr Tracey relied upon this concession to challenge Mr Watson's evidence that Mr Tracey had threatened to crush his career. However, in my view, by his concession, Mr Watson was not thereby accepting that Mr Tracey had not threatened to crush his career, but rather that it was he, and not Mr Tracey, who had used the words: "Are you willing to crush my career" as part of his inquiry of Mr Tracey. In this regard, it is relevant that this version of events is recorded in the handwritten note Mr Watson made of his conversation with Mr Tracey. 142 Senior counsel also contended that Mr Watson's evidence that Mr Tracey had used the word "proud" should not be accepted, because two days after the conversation Mr Watson had told the applicant's inspectors that he was not sure whether Mr Tracey had used that word. There were other criticisms of Mr Watson's evidence to the effect that Mr Watson was reciting as best he could his affidavit evidence of the conversation which had been prepared for him by the applicant's solicitors, rather than relying on his own recollection of the conversation. 143 I accept senior counsel's for Mr Tracey submission in respect of the use of the word "proud". There are two grounds for doing so. First, Mr Watson was not able to recollect two days after the event, whether the word had been used. Secondly, Mr Watson's note does not contain a reference to the word. 144 However, I regard the other criticisms of Mr Watson's evidence as being relatively minor. They do not amount to a basis on which to reject the evidence of Mr Watson as being unreliable. In relation to each of the conversations which he had with Mr Tracey, Mr Watson made a handwritten note of the conversation immediately after the conversation and was able to rely on the note to refresh his memory. 145 I find that Mr Tracey and Mr Watson had an animated conversation at the Tradewinds hotel. I find that during the course of that conversation Mr Tracey admitted that he had said that he had put up six scab posters but had not printed them. I also find that Mr Tracey said to Mr Watson: "Good luck getting another job in the maritime industry", and that Mr Tracey responded to Mr Watson's inquiry whether he would be willing to crush Mr Watson's career over 15 minutes, by saying: "For scum like you, yes. You're a scab."

[25]

Did Mr Tracey organise for the scab posters to be published and/or disseminated? 146 The next issue is whether Mr Tracey organised the scab posters to be published and/or disseminated. 147 Mr Tracey denied that he organised the publication or dissemination of the posters. However, I am of the view that the applicant has established on a balance of probabilities that Mr Tracey organised the scab posters to be published and disseminated. In coming to this view, I am aware that the Court is required to apply s 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) in these circumstances. I am for the reasons which follow comfortably satisfied that, in addition to distributing some of the posters himself, that Mr Tracey organised the publication and dissemination of the scab posters. 148 First, Mr Tracey was angry that the strike had failed and wanted to exact vengeance on those persons who, in Mr Tracey's opinion, had caused the strike to fail. 149 Mr Tracey gave evidence that he had personally invested a great deal of time and effort in planning an industrial strategy which included, as an integral part, the two day strike. Mr Tracey's evidence was that had the strike been successful, he would have succeeded in achieving his objectives in relation to the negotiation of the new enterprise bargaining agreement. I find that Mr Tracey was personally aggrieved and affronted by the fact that the strike had failed, and that the strategy which he had carefully planned had been thwarted by a small number of persons. In my view, Mr Tracey's anger would have been further inflamed by his passionate loathing of persons whom he regarded as scabs. Evidence of Mr Tracey's hostility to scabs is set out at [260] of these reasons. Further evidence of the intensity of Mr Tracey's animosity at this time towards the persons who had worked during the strike, is to be found in the evidence of Mr Pearce who said that, Mr Tracey was more passionate than usual when speaking about the scab posters during their conversation of 8 December 2011. In this regard, it is relevant that Mr Tracey's passion was still high, notwithstanding that this conversation took place five days after the strike had ended. 150 In his evidence, Mr Tracey said that he was "very annoyed" with the persons who had worked during the strike. That expression, in my view, understated the intensity of Mr Tracey's anger. In my view, it was Mr Tracey's anger and desire for a vengeful response which caused him to organise the production of the scab posters as a means of expressing that anger and exacting vengeance upon those persons who had, in Mr Tracey's view, caused the strike to fail. 151 Secondly, Mr Tracey admitted in his telephone conversation with Mr Pearce on 8 December 2011, that the poster was an MUA poster, that "we named" the scabs, and that there had not been scabbing on the wharf for 30 years. 152 In my view, this evidence provides further support for the inference that Mr Tracey organised the publication of the poster. Mr Tracey was the officer in the MUA who was most involved in the negotiation of the enterprise bargaining agreement. As mentioned, it was Mr Tracey who had invested his time and emotional energy in planning the industrial campaign in support of those negotiations. It was, therefore, Mr Tracey, more than anyone else in the MUA, who felt personally aggrieved and angry at the conduct of persons, whom he regarded as loathsome human beings. I find that Mr Tracey had the motivation and desire to exact vengeance upon the persons whom he, and the MUA, despised. I find, therefore, that it was Mr Tracey who was the person within the MUA who organised the publication of the scab posters. Further evidence of Mr Tracey's personal involvement in the organisation of the publication of the scab posters is to be found in his statement to Mr Pearce that "we named" the scabs. I infer from this comment that Mr Tracey, along with at least one other officer of the MUA, participated in the decision to name the employees in the scab poster as a means of exacting vengeance. 153 Thirdly, Mr Tracey's statement that he only became involved in the dissemination of the scab posters by coincidence, is not plausible. 154 It was Mr Tracey's evidence that his involvement with the scab posters came about by coincidence. Mr Tracey said that he happened to meet Mr Elliot on the stairs in the MUA office and Mr Elliot happened to be carrying about 20 scab posters which he then handed to Mr Tracey who then, without thinking very much about it, during his rounds, put up the scab posters at the various locations to which I have referred. 155 In my view, that evidence is simply not plausible. This is because it does not take account of the intensity of Mr Tracey's anger, his loathing of the persons he regarded as scabs, and the fact that, according to what Mr Tracey told Mr Pearce, there had not been scabs on the wharf for 30 years. For this last mentioned reason, in particular, in my view, both Mr Tracey personally, and the MUA as an organisation, perceived the need to respond aggressively to what each regarded as subversive and provocative conduct by persons they despised. 156 Mr Tracey's evidence paints an implausible scenario whereby Mr Tracey was content to do nothing in response to the anger and frustration which he felt in respect of provocative and subversive conduct which had not occurred on the wharf for 30 years; and that it was only because of a coincidental meeting with Mr Elliot (who happened to be carrying some scab posters) on the stairs in the MUA office, that Mr Tracey decided to put up the posters, without thinking much about it, as he went about his daily rounds. Because this evidence is not plausible, I do not accept it. 157 Fourthly, I infer from matters mentioned above, and the fact that Mr Tracey inquired during the meeting between Mr Tracey, Mr Gray and Mr Pearce on 19 December 2011 whether other people had also been caught on the security footage distributing posters, that Mr Tracey knew that other persons had been involved in doing so, and that he knew this because he had been instrumental in organising them to do so.

[26]

PREJUDICING THE NAMED EMPLOYEES IN THEIR EMPLOYMENT 158 As mentioned, Item 7(b) of s 342(1) of the Fair Work Act relevantly provides that adverse action is taken by an industrial association or an officer against a person if: the industrial association or the officer: (b) takes action that has the effect, directly or indirectly, of prejudicing the person in the person's employment. 159 The next question, therefore, is whether the scab poster action had the effect, directly or indirectly, of prejudicing each of the named employees in their employment or prospective employment. 160 It was common cause that none of the named employees had suffered any detriment in their terms and conditions of employment by reason of the adverse action alleged. Indeed, there was undisputed evidence that the FPA was grateful for the work that the named employees had done during the strike. 161 The applicant, however, alleged that the impugned action had the effect of prejudicing the named employees directly or indirectly, in their employment or prospective employment in a different way. The applicant relied upon the following particulars of "prejudice": (a) Exposing the [named employees] to vilification, ostracism, intimidation and/or the risk of violence from FPA employees or other maritime workers in Fremantle and/or Western Australia and/or Australia; (b) Casting aspersions on the [named employees] honesty, integrity and reputation; (c) Damaging or otherwise defaming the reputations of the [named employees]; (d) Reducing the prospects of the [named employees] obtaining work with another employer with in the maritime industry in Fremantle and/or Western Australia and/or Australia; (e) Subjecting the [named employees] to the fear of any of the above matters referred to in (a) to (d) occurring; and/or (f) Psychiatric or psychological injury, emotional distress and upset by reason of the content and/or distribution of the Scab Poster, including by reason of any of the matters in (a) to (e) above. 162 The words "FPA employees" is a defined term in the statement of claim and refers to the group of employees comprising the VTSOs and the small craft masters.

[29]

Mr Daly 167 I deal first with Mr Daly's evidence on ostracism. Mr Daly said in evidence that on Mr Fellowes' return to work after the December 2011 strike, his relationship with Mr Fellowes went from "zero to minus ten" and that Mr Fellowes had not spoken to him since the strike. Mr Daly also said that since the posters were put up he loathed going to work for night shifts because Mr Fellowes was there. However, the evidence showed that there was a poor relationship between Mr Fellowes and Mr Daly of some longstanding before the strike and on Mr Daly's own admission, the deterioration in his relationship with Mr Fellowes occurred immediately on Mr Fellowes returning to work after the strike. Mr Fellowes deposed to like effect. He said that his already poor relationship with Mr Daly deteriorated further after the strike. He said that he was disappointed in those persons who had worked during the strike, and from then on he confined his communications with them to matters that were necessary to do the job. 168 I find that Mr Fellowes stopped speaking to Mr Daly except to the extent that it was necessary to do their work, immediately upon Mr Fellowes returning to work after the strike. 169 Mr Letch gave evidence that on his return to work after the strike he changed his relationship with Mr Daly. From then on, said Mr Letch, he confined his verbal communication with Mr Daly only to what needed to be said to carry out their work. Mr Letch also deposed that he had told Mr Daly that he was disappointed in him. 170 I accept the evidence of Mr Letch that the change in the way he dealt with Mr Daly started immediately on his return to work and that this change in the response of Mr Letch to Mr Daly was caused by the disappointment Mr Letch felt in relation to Mr Daly's actions in working during the strike. In my view, such a response is a natural response. Mr Letch explained that he was particularly disappointed in Mr Daly because he had by his previous actions promoted the strike, but then not gone on strike. The evidence of Mr Letch is consistent with the evidence given by Mr Daly in cross-examination when he accepted that whilst Mr Letch had said that he was disappointed in him, Mr Letch had not stopped speaking to him. 171 Mr Daly did not give evidence of ostracism by any other of his co-workers. 172 In fact, Mr Daly said on the return of his co-workers after the strike, his relationship with another of his co-workers, Mr Ralston, did not change. In cross-examination, Mr Daly accepted that when he was interviewed by the applicant he had said that Mr Ralston was a "great guy". Mr Daly also said that prior to the time in 2012 when he had worked during a strike by the port service officers, these workers were "good too". 173 I find, therefore, that insofar as the applicant relies upon the actions of Mr Fellowes and Mr Letch as comprising ostracism in relation to Mr Daly, that that ostracism was not attributable to the scab poster action which did not take place until 7 to 8 December 2011 - some four to five days later - but was attributable to the fact that Mr Daly worked during the strike. 174 Further, during cross-examination, Mr Daly had said that between the strike in December 2011 and his participation in the port service officers strike in 2012, he had received no threats, no intimidation and no bullying. 175 In his evidence-in-chief, Mr Daly said that he had first found out about the existence of the scab posters on 12 December 2011 when the article appeared in the West Australian. Thereafter, Mr Strickland showed Mr Daly a scab poster. Mr Daly said when he saw the poster he put on a brave face and tried to joke about it, but that the impact of reading the scab poster was like acid continually eating away at him. He said that he could not believe that such things could be said about him. Horror, he said, gave way to hurtful resentment and shame that someone had said such a "disgusting thing" about him. Being named and shamed a scab, said Mr Daly, was the worst feeling he had experienced in his life. 176 Mr Daly also said that he had to go home and pretend to his children that he had had a good day. He said that he did not want his children to know that someone thought so little of him. He said that he was horrified "because whatever you are, your children are, so by saying I'm a scab and the lowest form of life on this planet, it means my children are too". 177 Mr Daly also said that after the posters were put up he worried about the safety of his wife and children. Mr Daly said that he still worries about this. Mr Daly said that he had never experienced so much anguish in his life. 178 During cross-examination, Mr Daly admitted that the FPA had offered to provide counselling to him but that he had declined to take up the offer. He said that his reason for declining to take up the offer was because it had nothing to do with the FPA. Mr Daly denied that he had been offered security assistance by the FPA. In that respect his evidence was at variance with that of Mr Gray, and I prefer the evidence of Mr Gray. 179 Further, senior counsel for Mr Tracey took Mr Daly to his evidence before the applicant's inspectors in relation to his reaction to the article in the West Australian newspaper on the day it was published. In his interview with the inspectors, Mr Daly said that whilst he was initially horrified when he learned of the West Australian article and of the scab poster, as the day wore on he changed perspective a little bit and realised that in fact the article was not defaming him and was having a go at the people who had put the posters up. However, when asked by senior counsel for Mr Tracey whether he agreed that his perspective had changed a bit over the day he said: "No my perspective did not change at all." 180 Notwithstanding that there were unsatisfactory elements to Mr Daly's evidence, I accept his evidence that he suffered the emotional distress of the kind to which he deposed, at the time that he found out about the scab posters. I also accept that he felt anxiety and fear for the safety of his family. However, I also find that in assessing the extent and continuing effect of the distress and fear suffered by Mr Daly, it is necessary also to have regard to the fact that Mr Daly declined the offer of counselling and security assistance from the FPA and also that he was content to work during the two strikes by the port service officers, performing their work, within the ensuing 12 months immediately following the dissemination of the scab posters. Accordingly, I approach with caution Mr Daly's evidence that being named and shamed as a scab was "the worst feeling I have had in my life" and that he had "never experienced so much anguish" in his life.

[30]

Mr Mawbey 181 Mr Mawbey deposed that he had not had any "bad experiences" from other workers after the distribution of the scab posters. Mr Mawbey attributed this to the fact that he thought the workers respected him safety-wise. Mr Mawbey said that he was 70 years old and was on the verge of retirement. Further, during cross-examination, when asked about the way in which he had been treated by his co-workers after the dissemination of the scab posters, Mr Mawbey said that "nobody has treated me other than as a damn good friend". 182 I find that Mr Mawbey did not suffer any ostracism by reason of the scab poster action. 183 Mr Mawbey said the whole experience of being named in the scab poster had been quite upsetting for him. Mr Mawbey said that when he read the poster for the first time he noticed that he was the first person named as a scab. He said that he thought the comments on the poster were about as "low as you can get". He said that he felt that the poster was "trying to push all workers" against him and the other persons named in the poster. He said that when he read the West Australian article he felt sick in the stomach and "bludgeoned down". He said that he was so upset that his overall reaction was that he felt like he was ready to fight someone. 184 Mr Mawbey also said that reading the poster reminded him of some bad experiences he had suffered on the waterfront in the 1980s when he was "blackballed" by the MUA, which was then known as the Seamen's Union, for standing up to the union delegate. At that time, said Mr Mawbey, he had things happen to him like his motorcycle tyres were let down to 10 pound pressure, cigarettes were lit and laid on his motorcycle duco so that they created burn marks and other workers simply were not talking to him. Mr Mawbey said that at that time he had consulted a psychologist because he had been so upset by those experiences. 185 I find that Mr Mawbey suffered emotional distress to which he deposed as a consequence of the dissemination of the scab posters. This distress comprised the feelings of anger and the re-awakening of bad memories, which included the fear of a retaliatory response from members of the MUA. 186 The applicant also sought to rely upon evidence given by Mr Gray during his re-examination that Mr Gray had found Mr Mawbey in the vessel traffic centre with the door secured and that Mr Mawbey had said that he had done that because he was frightened that someone from port service would harass him about working. However, Mr Mawbey did not depose to this incident in his affidavit, nor did senior counsel for the applicant ask Mr Mawbey any questions about this incident during his evidence. The failure by the applicant to lead evidence from Mr Mawbey about this incident attracts the operation of the principle in Commercial Union Assurance Company of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389. Accordingly, I do not draw an inference favourable to the applicant in relation to there being a causal relationship between the impugned conduct and Mr Mawbey's securing of the door.

[31]

Mr Donaldson-Stiff 187 Mr Donaldson-Stiff adopted his affidavit of 31 October 2012 as part of his evidence-in-chief. In that affidavit, he said that on 3 December 2011 the day the strike ended, he worked the day shift, and so far as he noticed it was business as usual other than being given the "silent treatment" from two or three co-workers including Mr Fellowes. 188 Mr Donaldson-Stiff also adopted, as part of his evidence-in-chief, a supplementary affidavit that he made on 7 March 2013 - a few days before commencement of the trial. In the supplementary affidavit, Mr Donaldson-Stiff said that since the distribution of the poster he had noticed that some colleagues would only talk to him about matters related to work if they were very important. He said that before the poster came out he had regular social conversations with his colleagues. Mr Donaldson-Stiff said that employees in other areas of the port had ignored him since the appearance of the poster. Mr Donaldson-Stiff said that in February 2013, he had been ignored by a casual port service officer called "Taki", and that there had been a similar rebuff at the end of December 2012 from a port service officer called "the Remo". 189 Mr Donaldson-Stiff also said in his supplementary affidavit that in December 2012 he was subjected to aggressive conduct by port service officers who were on strike and who had formed a picket line. Mr Donaldson-Stiff said he had been attempting to go to work on the day of the port service officers' strike and had encountered the picket line. Mr Donaldson-Stiff said that he was subjected to violent language and one of the pickets swung a clenched fist at him, knocking off his hat. Another picket tried to remove the keys from his vehicle's ignition. Further, during the day whilst he was working in the control tower, workers abused him and threw rocks at the tower in which he was working. 190 Mr Donaldson-Stiff said that he now finds going to work very stressful and he sometimes feels angry. Mr Donaldson-Stiff said that he has not resigned from the FPA, although he has thought about it, because he did not think that he would be able to get another job in the industry now that he has been labelled a scab. 191 In his supplementary affidavit, Mr Donaldson-Stiff also deposed that he had consulted a doctor, Dr Murray Jacobs, on 19 February 2013, who diagnosed him with major depression, and prescribed him anti-depressants. Mr Donaldson-Stiff went on to say that he was reluctant to take the medication. Mr Donaldson-Stiff also said that he had taken one week's stress leave and had been in recent times attending the port's counselling service. Consequent upon an objection by Mr Tracey as to the hearsay aspect of this evidence, the applicant said that he did not rely upon this evidence for the truth of the diagnosis of major depression, but only on the fact that Mr Donaldson-Stiff had been prescribed anti-depressants. 192 Mr Donaldson-Stiff accepted in cross-examination that Mr Letch had taken the matter in his stride in the sense that Mr Letch had not said anything negative to him. Mr Letch's evidence is consistent with this evidence of Mr Donaldson-Stiff. Mr Letch said that immediately after the strike he only communicated with Mr Donaldson-Stiff about matters necessary to carry out their work. Mr Donaldson-Stiff also said that Mr Fellowes had not made any threats to him. 193 Also, during cross-examination, Mr Donaldson-Stiff initially said that for a couple of days after the strike he had been subjected to the "silent treatment" from most of his co-workers, but had not otherwise been the subject of any threats or negative treatment from his co-workers (Transcript pp 76-77). Then later (Transcript p 79) he said that the co-workers' conduct had got worse after the posters were put up. 194 The following exchange then occurred: MS ARCHER: …Mr Donaldson-Stiff, you said just a moment ago that there was a couple of days of silent treatment after the strike and then after the posters it got worse. You don't say that in your affidavit, do you?---No, I didn't say that at the time. And you didn't tell that to the Fair Work Ombudsman during the interview?---Not at the time, no. You told them that for a couple of days, there was a little bit of silent treatment for a couple of people and that was it?---I did. 195 Mr Donaldson-Stiff also said during cross-examination that he was telling the truth when he told the applicant's inspectors that his co-workers had been "great" after the strike. 196 Mr Donaldson-Stiff's evidence was not entirely satisfactory. This was because of his vacillation in relation to the question of precisely how he was treated by his co-workers following the strike. I do not accept Mr Donaldson-Stiff's evidence that the ostracism got worse after the distribution of the scab posters. This is because of the inconsistency between this evidence and the evidence which he gave to the applicant's inspectors, which was shortly after the event, and the fact that this evidence did not appear in his first affidavit. 197 I find that Mr Donaldson-Stiff did experience some ostracism at work by being given the silent treatment by Mr Fellowes and Mr Letch. However, I find that this ostracism had commenced before the scab posters were disseminated and that the cause of the ostracism which Mr Donaldson-Stiff experienced was caused by the fact that Mr Donaldson-Stiff had worked during the period when his co-workers were on strike. 198 I find that the hostility which Mr Donaldson-Stiff experienced in December 2012 was not caused by the scab poster action - which had occurred a year earlier. In my view, the hostility which Mr Donaldson-Stiff experienced at the picket line arose from the fact that he wanted to cross the picket line to go to work. The same is true in relation to the acts of aggression which he experienced whilst he was working in the control tower in December 2012 - during the port service officers' strike; and the subsequent rebuffs he received from the two port service officers, referred to as Taki and Remo. 199 Mr Donaldson-Stiff said that he first became aware of the scab poster when he received an email from Mr Edward which contained a photograph of the poster. Mr Donaldson-Stiff did not say when that was. Mr Donaldson-Stiff said he expected some reaction because of his having worked during the strike, but not to the extent of the dissemination of the scab poster. Mr Donaldson-Stiff said he thought the poster was petty and childish. He said that he was angry about being named and feared for his safety and the safety of his family. 200 Mr Donaldson-Stiff also said that he had a conversation with a MUA delegate about two or three months after the posters had appeared. Mr Donaldson-Stiff deposed that the delegate had said that he (the delegate) had to stop Mr Tracey from "putting the dogs" on to Mr Mawbey. Mr Donaldson-Stiff said that after that conversation he had put extra lighting around his house, because he thought that if Mr Mawbey was a target he could also be a target. 201 I find that Mr Donaldson-Stiff did experience distress when he found out about the content of the scab poster. This is evidenced by the fact that he felt angry and made a complaint about the poster to Mr Edward. 202 I also find that Mr Donaldson-Stiff entertained fear for his own safety and his family's safety as a consequence of the scab poster action.

[32]

Mr Scott 203 Mr Scott said in his evidence-in-chief that the first he knew about the scab poster was on Monday, 12 December 2011 when he was telephoned by a friend. She informed him about the West Australian article but said that there were no names mentioned in the article. Mr Scott replied that he was one of the people who had worked but he doubted whether his name was on the scab poster because he was not a member of the MUA, so that he was not a scab in that sense. 204 Mr Scott said that he then rang Mr Millett, the deputy harbour master, who confirmed that the scab posters had been put up and that his name was on them. Mr Scott then went out and bought a copy of the West Australian newspaper and read the article. Mr Scott said that, as a practising Christian, he was offended by the text of the poster, particularly, the portion which compared him negatively to Judas Iscariot. He later received a copy of the poster itself from Mr Donaldson-Stiff. 205 Mr Scott's evidence was that a day or so after reading the poster he started to worry that some individual might do violence to his family or himself. He said that it weighed on his mind that it would only take one person to decide to take matters into his own hands and take some sort of action to pull him into line and teach him a lesson. Mr Scott went on to say that after a week or so he talked himself out of dwelling on those sorts of thoughts. 206 Mr Scott said that after the strike action, he was given the "cold shoulder" by his colleagues in the control tower. Mr Scott said that after the strike one of his colleagues gave him the silent treatment for months on end. Mr Scott said that when he partnered with that colleague on movement control duties, his colleague would go so far as to take the scheduling books downstairs rather than sit up in the control tower with Mr Scott. 207 During cross-examination, Mr Scott said that the "cold shoulder" that he had been given was mostly from the "older guys" and that these co-workers had given him the cold shoulder immediately after the strike. However, Mr Scott went on to say that the behaviour of one of those persons, referred to as Ross, had changed markedly after the posters went up. However, it subsequently emerged that Mr Scott had a pre-existing poor relationship with Ross arising from Ross's insistence that Mr Scott fill in, what Mr Scott referred to as, "a little archaic" leave roster. Ross's insistence that Mr Scott fill in the leave roster had led to confrontation with Ross about 10 days after the strike. 208 I find that Mr Scott suffered some ostracism from some of his co-workers in the control tower. However, I find that the ostracism started immediately after the strike and so was not caused by the scab poster action. I find that the adverse change in the relationship between Mr Scott and Ross which occurred after the posters went up, was not attributable to the scab poster action. First, Ross was an immediate co-worker of Mr Scott and would not have had to rely upon the scab poster to be informed that Mr Scott had worked during the strike. Secondly, there was a pre-existing poor relationship between Ross and Mr Scott arising from Mr Scott's disdainful attitude to Ross's insistence on operating a leave roster. This was exacerbated by an incident which occurred at around the time of the scab poster action and which was unrelated to that action but founded on the pre-existing animosity. 209 However, I find that the scab poster action by Mr Tracey induced in Mr Scott a fear for the safety of himself and his family. 210 I also find that Mr Scott was offended by the comparison between himself and Judas Iscariot.

[33]

Mr Watson 211 Mr Watson said that after the strike, Mr Fellowes would not speak to him during shifts and that he felt it was a very uncomfortable place to work. However, Mr Watson accepted in cross-examination that prior to the strike he had had a very poor relationship with Mr Fellowes. Mr Watson gave no other evidence of being ostracised at work following the strike or as a consequence of the scab poster action. I find that the poor relationship between Mr Fellowes and Mr Watson predated the strike, and that to the extent that this relationship deteriorated, it was due to Mr Fellowes' perception that Mr Watson had participated in a handover with the incoming crew on the first morning of the strike. I find that the ostracism experienced by Mr Watson is not causally linked to the scab poster action. 212 Mr Watson said that he found out about the scab poster on 9 December 2011 during the night shift, when one of the pilots he was working with, told him about it. Mr Watson said he was really upset that he had been named as a scab in the poster and when he finished his shift early on 10 December he drove to the MUA office to try and find and confront Mr Tracey. However, the office was closed. 213 Mr Watson said he returned to the MUA office on 12 December 2011 and was advised that Mr Tracey was not available. Mr Watson left a message and Mr Tracey called Mr Watson on his mobile. Mr Watson's evidence was that he asked Mr Tracey whether he knew anything about the poster and Mr Tracey said that he did not know anything about it. 214 Mr Watson said that, in response to his query as to why he was called a scab when he did not work during the strike, Mr Tracey said that everybody knew down at small craft that he was a scab and the only reason he had joined Fremantle port was to get his MED1 (marine engine driving) ticket and then go off to Europe and work on barges. 215 Mr Watson said that he said to Mr Tracey that he had been to the MUA office to become a member; and asked Mr Tracey whether he was saying he was a scab because he was not a fully paid up member yet. Mr Tracey responded by saying that there is no way Mr Watson would be accepted into the MUA because he was a scab and that everybody down at the port thought he was a scab as well. Mr Watson also said Mr Tracey had said that the posters had gone right up north and down south, and that he would never get a job up north or down in the Bass Strait. 216 Mr Watson made a handwritten note of the conversation with Mr Tracey. Mr Tracey accepted that the conversation occurred but said that he had said that if Mr Watson had not worked during the strike it would be "okay". Mr Tracey denied the rest of Mr Watson's version of the conversation. I prefer Mr Watson's evidence. He had the benefit of being able to refresh his memory from his handwritten note. 217 Mr Watson said that he was upset further by the article in the MUA WA branch newspaper, WA Rank & File Voice, which was entitled "Plenty of Battles Still to be Fought" and which referred to the fact that there had been scabs working at Fremantle port. 218 Mr Watson said that as a result of the publication of the poster he felt that his reputation had been damaged and that he could not sleep for a number of nights. Also, Mr Watson said that every time he did a course at the port he felt that he needed to explain himself to other people who recognised his name from the poster and assumed that he had worked during the strike action. 219 Mr Watson also said that after he found out about the scab poster he became fearful for his safety and the safety of his family. Mr Watson also said that he was worried that he would not be able to get another job on the waterfront because of the scab poster and the power of the MUA. Mr Watson said that he had had plans to go to Europe and then come back to Australia and get further work on the ports. However, he now felt that he could not go to Europe to work because he feared that he would not be able to get another job in the ports because of the scab poster. Accordingly, he said that he felt he had to hang on to his current job. 220 I accept Mr Watson's evidence of his reaction to the discovery that he had been named in the scab poster. I, therefore, find that Mr Watson suffered fear for his personal safety and also for his family. I also find that he feared that he would not be able to find another job in the industry, and was distressed by the perception that damage had been done to his reputation.

[35]

Psychiatric harm 223 The applicant contended that each of Mr Daly, Mr Donaldson-Stiff, Mr Scott and Mr Watson had suffered psychiatric harm by reason of the scab poster action. In support of this contention, the applicant relied upon the evidence of Dr Terace, a psychiatrist. 224 Dr Terace opined that each of Mr Daly, Mr Scott, Mr Watson and Mr Donaldson-Stiff suffered from a recognisable psychiatric condition. 225 In assessing the weight to be placed on Dr Terace's evidence, it is important to identify precisely the conduct which has been pleaded and found as comprising the adverse action, namely, the conduct of Mr Tracey in putting up the posters and organising for the posters to be printed and disseminated. It is, therefore, the causal effect of that conduct, and not any other conduct, which must be considered. 226 It is important, therefore, to distinguish between the events pleaded as comprising the adverse action, and a number of other facts and circumstances, which were referred to in the evidence, but which were not pleaded as constituting the adverse action relied upon by the applicant. Among those facts and circumstances were the following. 227 First, it was common cause that there is, on the waterfront, a traditional hostility among workers to co-workers, referred to as "scabs", who work during a strike. 228 Secondly, the evidence showed that the MUA gave expression to that hostility by printing and distributing scab stickers, and by denouncing scabs in its newspaper. As mentioned, these matters were not pleaded as comprising the adverse action. 229 The adverse action complained of in this case is confined to an allegation that Mr Tracey and the MUA gave expression to their hostility to scabs by organising the publication and dissemination of a specific document, namely, the scab poster. It is, therefore, the effect on each of the named employees of that specific conduct, rather than the wider expressions of hostility to scabs, which must be examined in determining whether each of the named employees was prejudiced directly, or indirectly, in their employment. 230 It is relevant, therefore, in this context, to observe that I have found that the ostracism that each of the named employees alleged he had suffered, did not occur by reason of the scab poster action, but by reason of the hostility of his co-workers to his conduct in relation to the two day strike in December 2011. 231 There are two aspects of Dr Terace's evidence which preclude me from placing any weight on his evidence as comprising evidence that the scab poster action as pleaded (namely, the publication and dissemination of the scab poster) was the cause of each of the four named employees psychiatric condition which he diagnosed. 232 The first aspect is the failure by Dr Terace to use the term "scab poster action" in his report with precision to mean only the production and dissemination of the scab posters. An examination of Dr Terace's report reveals an imprecise use of the term "scab poster action", such that it is apparent that Dr Terace was not mindful of the distinction to which I have referred in [226] above. That there is this elision by Dr Terace is not surprising when regard is had to the applicant's instructions which were given to Dr Terace. These instructions included within the concept of the scab poster action, the production by the MUA of the scab stickers, and also the article in the West Australian newspaper. Dr Terace was not convincing when he was cross-examined on the question of the precision with which he used the concept of the scab poster action. 233 The second aspect of Dr Terace's evidence which renders his expert evidence of no weight is the emphasis that Dr Terace has placed on the ostracism suffered by each named employee, as being an important contributing factor to the psychiatric condition which Dr Terace has diagnosed in respect of each of the four named employees he examined. As I have found, the ostracism which each of the named employees complained of, occurred not by reason of the scab poster action, but by reason of the hostility of their co-workers to their conduct in relation to the strike. This is a distinction which finds no expression in the evidence of Dr Terace, and, therefore, undermines the weight that can be placed on Dr Terace's evidence for the purpose of seeking to establish that the psychiatric condition diagnosed by Dr Terace was causally linked to the pleaded scab poster action. 234 It follows, therefore, that I do not find that each of Mr Daly, Mr Donaldson-Stiff, Mr Scott and Mr Watson suffered the condition identified by Dr Terace by reason of the adverse action pleaded.

[36]

Did the scab poster action prejudice the named employees in their employment? 235 Both parties accepted that an employee would be prejudiced in their employment within the meaning of Item 7(b) of s 342(1) of the Fair Work Act, when there was any adverse affection of, or deterioration in, the advantages enjoyed by the employee before the impugned conduct; and that it was not necessary that the employee in question suffered an infringement of a legal right (Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1 (Patrick Stevedores Operations) at 18, Qantas Airways Ltd v Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association (2012) 202 FCR 244 (Qantas) at [31] and [32]). 236 The respondents, however, contended that the scab poster action did not have the effect of prejudicing the named employees in their employment. The respondents emphasised the words "in the person's employment" in Item 7(b) of s 342(1), and contended that those words meant that there had to be a link between the prejudice suffered and that person's employment. The respondents went on to contend that there was no such link. It was common cause, said the respondents, that terms and conditions of employment of the named employees had not been adversely affected. Further, said the respondents, none of the named employees had been subjected to threats or acts of intimidation by reason of the scab poster action, and such ostracism as they had suffered from their co-workers, had been caused, not by the fact that the scab posters had been disseminated naming them as scabs, but because they had, to the knowledge of their co-workers, worked during the strike. 237 The respondents said that the fact that the named employees had been upset and distressed by the dissemination of the scab posters did not have the effect of prejudicing them in their employment within the meaning of Item 7(b) of s 342(1). The concept of prejudice in employment, said the respondents, did not include emotional distress or one's co-workers not liking you. 238 The respondents also relied upon observations by Jessup J in CFMEU v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1218 (BHP Coal (No 3)) at [111] in support of their contentions. 239 In BHP Coal (No 3), an employee, Mr Doevendans, held up a scab sign while standing on a road outside the entrance to the workplace. The scab sign read: "No Principles Scabs No Guts". Mr Doevendans held the sign as a protest against those employees who worked during protected action which was being undertaken during negotiations for a new enterprise agreement to apply at BHP's operations at seven coal mines in Queensland. The scab signs were waved in front of employees as they drove past the protestors on a number of days in February 2012. Jessup J found that Mr Doevendans displayed the scab sign in the vision of the employees going to work because they had declined to take part in industrial action. Mr Doevendans was subsequently dismissed. 240 One of a number of issues in the case was whether Mr Doevendans' display of the scab sign amounted to adverse action against the employees who had attended work, within the meaning of Item 7(b) of s 342(1). The employer's contention was that the display of the scab sign was an attack on, or a criticism of, the employees who had chosen to work, and that this had the effect of "prejudicing" them in their employment. 241 Jessup J, adopting the observations made in Patrick Stevedores Operations, found that the concept of prejudicing an employee in their employment "covers not only legal injury but any adverse affection of, or deterioration in, the advantages enjoyed before the conduct in question". However, Jessup J went on to find that Mr Doevendans' conduct did not fall within Item 7(b) of s 342(1). 242 At [111] in BHP Coal (No 3), Jessup J observed: The only "effect" of Mr Doevendans' display of the scabs sign on which the respondent relied was the direct one of being subject to the attack or criticism implied by the display of the sign as such. It was not said that there was any indirect effect. But I could not find that the direct effect relied on was "in the…employment" of the persons to whom it related. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the effect was "intimately connected with the employment" in the sense that the attack/criticism related to something done by these employees with reference to their employment. But that is not the discrimen under s 342(1). What is required is that the prejudicial effect occur in the employment; a relationship will not be sufficient. There is no suggestion that any of the employees who continued to work were, even indirectly, prejudiced in their employment. I do, therefore, reject this argument on behalf of the respondent. (Original emphasis.) 243 This decision was overturned on appeal (BHP Coal Pty Ltd v CFMEU [2013] FCAFC 132), but not in a manner which affected the observations made by Jessup J referred to above. 244 The question of whether the adverse action has the effect of prejudicing an employee directly or indirectly in their employment, is a question of fact. 245 In my view, the facts of this case distinguish it from BHP Coal (No 3). In this case, a limited number of employees were specifically named as scabs in the poster. Further, the scab posters were distributed at workplace locations of the FPA beyond the immediate work location of the named employees. By disseminating the posters widely throughout the workforce, members of the FPA's workforce who would not otherwise have known of the identity of each of the named employees and that they had worked during the strike, were informed of these matters. Further, the language of the poster was extreme, offensive, cruel and abusive. It named the employees and condemned them as being unworthy of being treated with the respect and dignity otherwise to be accorded to co-workers and implicitly invited the other employees to share, and give effect to that view. 246 In BHP Coal (No 3), by contrast, there was no attack made on any specifically named individual with the object of demeaning and marginalising them in the workplace. 247 The language of the scab poster was also defamatory of the named employees, but, in my view, the language of the scab poster went further. It invited the reader to treat each of the named employees as devoid of human dignity. The recognition of respect for the human dignity of an individual is a value which finds expression in Australian law. Thus, for example, aggravated damages may be awarded to vindicate an infringement of human dignity. A striking example of this is to be found in the case of Henry v Thomson [1989] 2 Qd R 412 where a policeman in Queensland urinated on a prisoner and the Court awarded aggravated damages. There are other examples. (See, for example, Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1; TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Ilvariy Pty Ltd (2008) 71 NSWLR 323.) 248 Further, in the case of Monis v The Queen (2013) 295 ALR 259 (Monis) at [247], Heydon J observed: The former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, Aharon Barak, said: "Most central of all human rights is the right to dignity. It is the source from which all other human rights are derived. Dignity unites the other human rights into a whole". Those observations have force. If so, why should a constitutional right be invented which is capable of injuring the right to dignity? An aspect of the right to dignity must be the right to be free from abuse after the loss of a loved one. The former President also said: "Human dignity regards a human being as an end, not as a means to achieve the ends of others". Why should a freedom of political communication be implied into the Constitution when it permits persons like the appellants to disregard the relatives of soldiers as ends, and treat the infliction of pain on them only as a means of achieving their own ends? (Footnotes omitted.) 249 I observe that unlike in Monis, no issue in relation to the implied freedom of political communication arose in this case; but the observations of Heydon J are significant in demonstrating the importance of respect for human dignity as a value entrenched in Australian law. 250 The poster was particularly obnoxious because in inviting the reader to treat the named employees as devoid of human dignity, it thereby marginalised them and licensed their co-workers to treat them as less than human. 251 By engaging in the scab poster action Mr Tracey intended to cause fear, emotional harm and distress to each of the named employees in their employment, and his conduct had that effect. 252 In my view, the scab poster action had the effect of prejudicing each of the named employees in their employment because on discovering that each had been named in the scab poster, each named employee felt the emotional distress and anger of marginalisation in the workplace. They knew that their co-workers had been invited to regard each of them as being unworthy of being treated with the respect and dignity which would otherwise be accorded to co-workers, and indeed, fellow human beings. Mr Mawbey best described the feeling of marginalisation in the workplace, when he said that he felt that all the workers were being "pushed against" him and the other named employees. 253 Further, after learning of the scab posters, the named employees developed a fear that a co-worker, influenced by the content of the scab poster, would visit violence upon him or upon a member of his family, or upon his property. Thus after, and because of the scab poster action, each named employee attended work with an underlying apprehension and fear that a co-worker, whom they may not even know, would visit violence upon him, whilst at work, or upon him and/or his family after work, or upon his property. 254 Before the dissemination of the poster, as they went about their duties at work, each of the named employees had not been burdened by the distress of marginalisation within the whole work force nor with the fear of violence to person or property at the hands of a co-worker, whom they might not know, but who was influenced by the inflammatory content of the poster. In my view, this deterioration in the position of the named employees falls within the concept of "prejudicial alteration" referred to by the High Court in Patrick Stevedores Operations and applied in Qantas. 255 Accordingly, in my view, the scab poster action of Mr Tracey had the effect of prejudicing each of the named employees in their employment. 256 I have already found that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that the scab poster action had the effect of prejudicing the prospective employment of each of the named employees. None of the named employees gave evidence of even trying to find alternative employment.

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THE REASON FOR THE ADVERSE ACTION 257 The next question is whether the adverse action was taken against each of the named employees because the employees did not engage in the December 2011 strike. 258 As mentioned, by reason of the operation of s 361(1) of the Fair Work Act, Mr Tracey was presumed to have engaged in the adverse action for that purpose, unless he proved otherwise. 259 Mr Tracey made no attempt to prove otherwise. 260 Mr Tracey was forthright in admitting his hostility to persons he regarded as scabs. This is evident from the following passage of evidence he gave during cross-examination: Okay, okay. Now, you would agree, your experience on the waterfront, you would know the power of the word "scab," to be called a scab?---Yes. Yes. And, you agree it's a very derogatory term?---Yes. Which, it's fair to say, is probably even a more derogatory term on the waterfront?---Well, it's a derogatory term anywhere. Yes. Okay. And, you agree, it doesn't just mean that you work during a strike, does it? It means something more, that you're being disloyal to your fellow workers?---Well, that's what working during a strike is. Sorry?---That's what working during a strike is. Yes. But it's saying - by calling someone a scab you're saying you have been disloyal to your fellow workers. Correct?---No, you're saying you worked during a strike. Yes. And but you're also saying you're being disloyal by saying "scab"?---By working during a strike, yes. Yes. And it's also saying that you can't be trusted?---I would imagine that would be the assumption. Yes. And that you're lowlife?---Yes. Yes. And that you're despicable?---Yes. That you're scum?---Yes. That you lack morality?---Absolutely. Yes. And that you're poisonous or toxic to be with?---Certainly, I think people will avoid mixing with people who've been scabs, yes. Yes, yes. And you know that to be labelled as a scab on the waterfront you can expect to be the subject of contempt?---Yes. A lack of respect?---Yes. People shunning you and avoiding you?---That depends on the circumstances but, yes. Yes. And people showing hatred towards you?---Yes. 261 Also, Mr Tracey freely admitted that the reason why he distributed the scab posters was because he was "very annoyed" at the persons who had worked during the strike and the fact that their doing so had undermined his industrial campaign strategy. He also said that he engaged in that action because he was annoyed by the "boastful" attitude of Mr Daly when the other workers returned from the strike. 262 During his evidence-in-chief, Mr Tracey said: The posters that you did put up, Mr Tracey, why did you put them up?---Look, certainly at one level I was feeling annoyed with the people who had scabbed. We had an agreed campaign in respect of how we would conduct, I guess, or pursue the claims that were on foot. We went to a lot of effort to draw the claims, negotiate them and then decide that one support wouldn't meet those claims, go through a process of protected action. That is, make the application, have the hearing, make sure that the ballot was successful. Go through that entire process and all the resources that it ties up, get agreement from the work force as a collective that that was the course of action that we would take. Be very clear, and I was, in my view, that it would only take one or two days complete stoppage of the port to achieve the bulk of what it is we were chasing and then that fell apart, that part of the industrial strategy fell apart when those people went and worked on those two days. As soon as the port had a capacity to work the inner harbour, the effect of the action these guys were taking fell away. So looking at one level, I was very very annoyed with the action that had been taken, the impact that had on our ability to win that campaign. The second thing, particularly in relation to the small craft, was that when the small craft guys returned to work, John Daily [sic] and one other, I was informed, but John Daily [sic] in particular on his first day back, as the guys were coming in, was quite loudly and almost in a boastful way, indicating that the two days he had just worked while they were on strike were the two best work days he had had at port in his career and there was enough tension in the work force as it was, without having John Daily [sic] seeking to flame [sic] that by indicating that they were the best two days of work he had had while these people were on strike, striking for wages and conditions that he would invariably get in any event, despite the fact that he had been at work. So, look, I was definitely annoyed. There was no conscious campaign to go around and drive and put the posters up. They were simply put up at the workplaces I visited as I was doing my rounds over those two days. 263 Accordingly, I find that Mr Tracey engaged in the scab poster action because the named employees had not participated in the December 2011 strike.

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WAS THE DECEMBER 2011 STRIKE "INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY" FOR THE PURPOSE OF S 346(C) OF THE FAIR WORK ACT 264 Section 346(c) of the Fair Work Act relevantly provides: A person must not take adverse action against another person because the other person: … (c) …has at any time not engaged…in industrial activity within the meaning of paragraphs 347(c) to (g). 265 At issue between the parties was the meaning in s 346(c) of the words "engaged…in industrial activity within the meaning of paragraphs 347(c) to (g)". This is because, whilst Mr Tracey admitted that he had put the scab posters up because he was very annoyed that the named employees had not participated in the December 2011 strike, he contended that it did not follow that s 346(c) had been satisfied by reason of that admission. 266 The applicant contended that the two day strike in December 2011 was "industrial activity" for the purpose of s 346(c), because it fell within the ambit of s 347(f), which provided as follows: A person engages in industrial activity if the person: … (f) takes part in industrial action. 267 Section 19(1) of the Fair Work Act defines "industrial action" as follows: "Industrial action" means action of any of the following kinds: … (c) a failure or refusal by employees to attend for work… 268 So, contended the applicant, because the December 2011 two day strike was an event where the bulk of the VTSOs and small craft masters had failed or refused to attend for work, they had engaged in "industrial action" within the meaning of s 347(f), and it followed that s 346(c) applied. 269 However, the respondents contended that s 346(c) had no application in relation to the December 2011 strike because the strike was protected industrial action, and para 347(f) does not refer to protected industrial action. It was common ground that the two day strike action was protected industrial action. 270 The respondents contended that this conclusion flowed from the application of the principles in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, namely, that the construction of a statutory provision should be construed so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all of the provisions of the statute. 271 Applying this approach to statutory construction, the respondents observed that s 340 of the Fair Work Act precluded a person from taking adverse action against another person because the person had or had not exercised a "workplace right". The respondents went on to observe that a "workplace right" was defined in s 341. They drew attention particularly to s 341(2)(c) which provided that participation in "protected industrial action" fell within the definition of a workplace right. 272 Accordingly, said the respondents, if, as is the case, a person was precluded under s 340 from taking "adverse action" against a person who had exercised their right to participate in, or not participate in, protected industrial action, then there would be, if the applicant's contention was correct, an overlap between the preclusion in s 340 and s 346. This is because each of those sections would preclude a party from taking adverse action in relation to a person who has or has not taken protected industrial action. 273 The respondents went on to say that if the applicant's contention was correct, the same overlap would exist between s 343 and s 348 - each of those sections applies, mutatis mutandis, to a person acting with the intent to coerce another person from engaging in the conduct described in each of s 340 and s 346. 274 On the other hand, contended the respondents, if the words "industrial action" in s 347(f) were construed to apply only to industrial action which was not "protected industrial action", then the overlap would be resolved. 275 I do not accept the respondents' submissions that the term "industrial action" in s 347(f) is to be construed as referring only to "non-protected" industrial action so that the preclusion in s 346 is to be construed as operating only in respect of non-protected industrial action. 276 First, it is apparent from s 409 of the Fair Work Act that the term "industrial action" is a wider term than "protected industrial action". This is because s 409 defines the circumstances when "industrial action" will be "protected industrial action". This point is made clear by the following observations of Jessup J in BHP Coal (No 3) at [46]: [I]t seems to be uncontroversial that the definition of "protected industrial action"…is that set out at s 409 of the FW Act. At base, the action must be "industrial action" as defined in s 19 of the Act. 277 Secondly, the mere fact that there may be more than one statutory provision which may be available to a person to pursue a remedy in respect of the same conduct, is not unique. 278 It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider the alternative contentions made by the applicant by reference to s 347(b)(ii), (iii) or (v), s 347(c) and/or s 347(d) of the Fair Work Act.

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COERCION - SECTION 348 OF THE FAIR WORK ACT 280 Section 348 of the Fair Work Act provides as follows: A person must not organise or take, or threaten to organise or take, any action against another person with intent to coerce the other person, or a third person, to engage in industrial activity. 281 By way of a further or alternative claim to the adverse action claim, the applicant contended, that by engaging in the scab poster action, Mr Tracey took action against each of the named employees with the intent to coerce one or more of the named employees to participate in industrial activity, namely, the proposed 10 December 2011 strike action and the proposed 12 December 2011 strike action. 282 In further support of this claim, the applicant also alleged at para 32 of the statement of claim that the scab poster action involved "illegitimate, unconscionable and/or unlawful conduct" by reason of one or more of the following matters: (a) the content of the scab poster; (b) the prejudice suffered by the named employees; (c) the scab poster being defamatory of the named employees; (d) the scab poster action contravening s 346 of the Fair Work Act; and/or (e) the scab poster action being contrary to well accepted principles of freedom of association, including as recognised in ss 3(e) and 336(b) of the Fair Work Act. 283 The applicant also invoked the assistance of s 360 and s 361 of the Fair Work Act in respect of the alleged contraventions of s 348 of the Fair Work Act. 284 In his defence, Mr Tracey denied the allegation that by engaging in the scab poster action, he took action against each of the named employees with the intent to coerce one or more of the named employees to participate in the proposed strike action intended to commence on 10 December and 12 December respectively. Mr Tracey went on to plead that as a matter of law, the further proposed strike action was not "industrial activity" within the meaning of the relevant sections of the Fair Work Act. 285 Mr Tracey also did not admit the allegations, made in para 32 of the statement of claim, that the scab poster action involved "illegitimate, unconscionable and/or unlawful conduct".

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Did Mr Tracey engage in the impugned conduct with the intent to coerce? 286 The first question is whether Mr Tracey engaged in the impugned conduct with the intent to coerce one or more of the named employees within the meaning of s 348 of the Fair Work Act. 287 There was some controversy between the parties as to the meaning of the conduct carried out with "intent to coerce" within the meaning of s 348. Mr Tracey adopted the argument of the second respondent in relation to this question. The parties advised the Court that their research had not found an instance of where a court had considered the words "intent to coerce" in the context of s 348. 288 The respondents contended that the Court should apply the same construction to those words as the Court has applied in relation to the words "intent to coerce" in s 343 of the Fair Work Act. That section provides as follows: (1) A person must not organise or take, or threaten to organise or take, any action against another person with intent to coerce the other person, or a third person, to: (a) exercise or not exercise, or propose to exercise or not exercise, a workplace right; or (b) exercise, or propose to exercise, a workplace right in a particular way. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to protected industrial action. 289 The respondents contended that there were two elements to the test to be applied in assessing whether the impugned conduct contravened s 348. 290 The first element, said the respondents, requires the coercing party to have the intention to negate the choice of the other person, leaving that person with no realistic choice but to succumb to the course of action required by the coercing party. This element requires an assessment of the subjective intention of the coercing party. 291 The respondents referred to a number of authorities in support of their contention. In particular, the respondents relied upon observations by Weinberg J in National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Commonwealth of Australia (2002) 117 FCR 114 at [103]: The approach to the expression "intent to coerce" taken in each of the authorities set out above makes it clear that what is required is an intent to negate choice, and not merely an intent to influence or to persuade or induce. Coercion implies a high degree of compulsion, at least in a practical sense, and not some lesser form of pressure by which a person is left with a realistic choice as to whether or not to comply. (Original emphasis.) 292 Weinberg J's observations were made by reference to s 170NC of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), an Act which has subsequently been repealed. 293 The respondents also referred to a Full Court decision in Schanka v Employment National (Administration) Pty Ltd (2000) 170 ALR 42 (Schanka). That case considered the concept of duress in s 170WG(1) of the Workplace Relations Act. That section precluded a person from applying duress to an employer or employee in connection with an Australian workplace agreement. In Schanka, the Full Court cited with approval the observations of Lord Scarman in Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation [1983] 1 AC 366. The respondents drew particular attention to the following observations of Lord Scarman: The authorities…reveal two elements in the wrong of duress: (1) pressure amounting to compulsion of the will of the victim; and (2) the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted. There must be pressure, the practical effect of which is compulsion or the absence of choice. Compulsion is variously described in the authorities as coercion or the vitiation of consent. The classic case of duress is, however, not the lack of will to submit but the victim's intentional submission arising from the realisation that there is no other practical choice open to him. 294 The second element of the test of whether the impugned conduct contravened s 348 of the Fair Work Act, said the respondents, was whether the impugned conduct undertaken was illegitimate, unconscionable or unlawful. This element, said the respondents, required an objective assessment. 295 The respondents observed that Lord Scarman had used "coercion" and "vitiation of consent" interchangeably. The respondents also relied on the observations of Gyles J in Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2000) 106 FCR 16 at [21] to the effect that Schanka provided authoritative guidance as to the meaning of "coerced" and that there was no meaningful difference between duress and coercion. The respondents went on to contend that conduct which amounted to "duress" had to be illegitimate, unconscionable or unlawful. 296 The applicant contended that the language used in in the Fair Work Act was different to that used in the Workplace Relations Act. The applicant went on to contend that the cases relied on by the respondents were, therefore, distinguishable and the concepts which operated in relation to the construction of those provisions, should not be imported into a consideration of s 348 of the Fair Work Act. 297 Accordingly, contended the applicant, the words "intent to coerce" in s 348 of the Fair Work Act did not import the stringent requirement of an "intent to negate choice". Nor did s 348 require that the impugned conduct be illegitimate, unconscionable or unlawful. 298 After judgment in the case was reserved, judgment in State of Victoria v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2013] FCAFC 160 (State of Victoria) was delivered. That case involved a claim under s 343 of the Fair Work Act by the CFMEU against the State of Victoria, which, as I have said, also proscribes conduct taken with the intent to coerce. 299 The Federal Minister intervened in the State of Victoria proceeding. Before the Full Court, the Federal Minister made contentions as to the construction of s 343 of the Fair Work Act and as to the status of earlier authorities decided by reference to the Workplace Relations Act. The Federal Minister made submissions to the same effect as was made by the applicant in this case. In fact, the Federal Minister was represented by the same senior counsel who represented the applicant in this case. In State of Victoria, the Federal Minister argued that the primary judge had erred in finding that proof of conduct carried out with "intent to coerce" within the meaning of s 343 of the Fair Work Act, required the establishment of the two elements referred to above. There was, said the Federal Minister, no warrant in the language of s 343 for the importation of those requirements. 300 The Full Court rejected the Federal Minister's contentions. The Full Court confirmed that the law in relation to the meaning of conduct which was undertaken with intent to coerce as used in s 343 of the Fair Work Act, was settled. The first element required that the impugned person have the intent to negate choice and the second element required that the conduct be illegitimate, unconscionable or unlawful. 301 As mentioned, I was not referred to any case which has considered the test for action taken with "intent to coerce" in s 348 of the Fair Work Act. However, in my view, the Court should adopt the same approach in relation to the construction of those words in s 348, as the Full Court in State of Victoria adopted in relation to the same words in s 343. 302 Section 348 is one of three sections in Pt 3-1 of the Fair Work Act which proscribes action engaged in by a person against another person with "intent to coerce" the other person. The other sections are s 343 and s 355. Section 343 proscribes "coercion" in relation to the exercise or non-exercise of a workplace right and s 355 proscribes "coercion" in relation to the allocation of duties. In identifying the proscribed conduct in each of the three sections, the legislature has used identical language in each section, namely: A person must not organise or take, or threaten to organise or take, any action against another person with intent to coerce the other person… 303 There is no justification, in my view, for attributing to the legislature an intention to have identical words in the same Part of the Act construed differently in relation to each of the three sections in which those words appear. 304 Accordingly, the proscribed action taken with "intent to coerce" in s 348 of the Fair Work Act should be construed as having the same meaning given by the Full Court in State of Victoria to the same words in s 343 of the Fair Work Act.

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Mr Tracey's intent 305 The next issue, therefore, is whether Mr Tracey's scab poster action was carried out with the intent to leave each of the named employees with no realistic choice but to participate in the strike action proposed for 10 December and 12 December 2011 respectively; and whether Mr Tracey's scab poster action was illegitimate, unconscionable or unlawful. 306 The applicant contended that the focus in s 348 is on the intent of the actor and not the actual outcome. 307 The applicant contended that the scab poster action was an attempt to prevent a free exercise of will of each of the named employees, whether to strike or not. That conclusion, said the applicant, was supported by the text of the scab poster and the timing of its distribution. 308 The applicant said that the text of the scab poster made it plain that the poster was directly referable to the exercise of the rights of the named employees. Further, the text of the scab poster also strongly conveyed the author's disgust at each of the named employee's individual decision to exercise his rights in a particular manner. The applicant said that it could be inferred that the intent of the poster was to make the further exercise of a right to work during upcoming strikes so untenable as to coerce the named employees to participate in the proposed strike action. The applicant contended that the wording of the poster was such that it could not be construed simply as an attempt to persuade or induce the named employees to go out on strike in future with their co-workers. 309 The applicant said that the timing of the distribution of the poster, in the immediate lead up to the proposed strike action, supported a strong inference that one of the poster's principal aims was to achieve compliance by the named employees with the upcoming strike action. The applicant also relied for that inference on the fact that the earlier two day strike action had not been effective in closing down Fremantle port. 310 Section 360 and s 361 of the Fair Work Act apply in relation to the assessment of this issue. The onus is, therefore, on Mr Tracey to show that in taking the scab poster action he did not intend to coerce any one or more of the named employees into participating in the strikes proposed to occur on 10 December and 12 December 2011 respectively, and thereby negate their choice of going to work during the strikes. 311 I have already found that the reason Mr Tracey engaged in the scab poster action was because he was angry at the fact that the named employees had worked during the two day strike and had, in his view, undermined his industrial strategy. And also because of the reports he had received that Mr Daly had boasted to his co-workers who had gone on strike, that working during the strike (whilst they were absent) had been the best working days of his life. 312 Further, I find that, contrary to the submissions of the applicant, the text of the scab poster does not support the contention that Mr Tracey's intent was to coerce one or more of the named employees into going on strike. This is because the scab poster does not contemplate any redemption for a person who has been branded a scab. To the contrary, the scab poster states that there is "no coming back" from that status. The poster states: Once so branded a SCAB, they are marked for life. There is no escape. It is infinitely worse than the brand placed upon Cain. It goes with them everywhere, it shadows their every footstep. It never dies, and no wonder, for it is synonym of all that is mean, contemptible and unmanly. It signifies that it is impossible for its owner to descend to lower depths. 313 Also, I accept the respondents' contention that the circumstances of the scab poster action do not readily give rise to an inference that Mr Tracey intended to leave each of the named employees with no practical choice but to engage in the strike action. In this case, the scab poster did not threaten retribution in respect of future conduct such as to leave the named employees with no practical choice but to submit. To the contrary, as I have said, these persons had already been condemned by the author of the poster to a status from which there was no redemption, and the dissemination of the poster publicised that view. 314 In my view, these findings are sufficient for Mr Tracey to rebut the claim made by the applicant that Mr Tracey's intent in engaging in the scab poster action was to coerce any one or more of the named employees into going on strike on 10 December and 12 December 2011 respectively. 315 However, I deal, for the sake of completeness, with the other evidence given by Mr Tracey in respect of this question. 316 In response to his senior counsel's request to respond to the allegation that his intention in putting up the scab posters was to coerce one or more of the named employees to take part in the upcoming strike action, Mr Tracey made a long response. 317 In essence, Mr Tracey gave three reasons why, in putting up the posters, he did not intend to coerce any one or more of the named employees to engage in the proposed strikes. 318 First, Mr Tracey said that a number of the named employees had already terminated his authority as their bargaining agent and, therefore, it was not possible legally for those named employees to engage in protected industrial action. It followed, said Mr Tracey, that if any of these named employees took part in industrial action, it would taint the legality of the industrial action taken by the other employees. 319 Secondly, Mr Tracey said that after the failure of the two day strike in the inner harbour, he and Mr Cain changed the focus of their industrial strategy from the inner harbour to the outer harbour. The revised strategy was to "lock up and picket" the outer harbour. 320 Thirdly, Mr Tracey said that he could not see how one could "strong arm" a person who did not want to participate in a strike or a picket line. He said that: "If they choose to work, they choose to work." 321 In relation to the first of the matters referred to by Mr Tracey, during cross-examination, senior counsel for the applicant suggested to Mr Tracey that the niceties of the legality of the proposed strike were not a matter to which Mr Tracey had regard at that time, because Mr Tracey intended to use non-MUA members to form a picket line in order to disrupt or shut down operations at the Kwinana Bulk Terminal as part of his revised industrial strategy. The following exchange occurred: OK. So I suggest to you your suggestion that you wouldn't even countenance these scabs working again because they wouldn't be taking protective action is simply nonsense, isn't it?...That's not correct no. 322 I accept the applicant's submission that the Court should reject the first explanation given by Mr Tracey. 323 In my view, the explanation amounted to an ex post facto rationalisation by Mr Tracey. This is because, as senior counsel for the applicant contended, the alternative strategy which Mr Tracey had decided upon was not legal either. 324 However, the acceptance of the applicant's contention on this point, is not fatal to Mr Tracey's case. As I have already held, Mr Tracey's intention in taking the scab poster action was to punish the named employees in respect of their past action, by a means which did not contemplate their redemption from the status of scab. It may also have been intended to deter other MUA members from not working during the proposed strike, but this allegation was not made in the applicant's statement of claim. In any event, such an intention would not have satisfied the stringent "intent to coerce" requirement of s 348 that the coercing party leave the coerced party with no realistic choice but to go on strike. 325 Mr Tracey's second explanation why his conduct was not carried out with the impugned intent, was that there was a switch in industrial strategy to concentrate upon disrupting the operations of the outer harbour. Mr Tracey's evidence on this point was corroborated by Mr Pearce who said that during his telephone conversation with Mr Tracey on 8 December 2011, he threatened disruption to the operation of the outer harbour. 326 It follows that I dismiss the applicant's claim brought under s 348 of the Fair Work Act.

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The case by reference to s 793 of the Fair Work Act 329 The applicant alleged that the MUA was liable for the scab poster action by reason of the operation of s 793 of the Fair Work Act, in that Mr Tracey engaged in the impugned conduct as an officer or employee of the MUA within the scope of his actual or apparent authority. 330 Section 793(1) of the Fair Work Act relevantly provides that: (1) Any conduct engaged in by a body corporate: (a) by an officer, employee or agent (an official) of the body within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority;… is taken for the purposes of this Act and the procedural rules, to have been engaged in also by the body. 331 The applicant also relied on s 363 of the Fair Work Act to contend that the impugned conduct of Mr Tracey is taken to be conduct of the MUA. 332 The MUA admitted that in disseminating the scab posters Mr Tracey had acted within the scope of his apparent authority, as an officer of the MUA, and that the MUA was, therefore, liable for that aspect of the scab poster action. I find that the scope of Mr Tracey's apparent authority also extended to organising the publication and dissemination of the posters. This is because it was by the dissemination of the posters that the objective intended by the production of the posters, namely, the expression of anger and vengeance, was achieved. The action of organising the production was necessarily a preliminary and ancillary act to the act of dissemination, and, therefore, I find that that act was also within the scope of the apparent authority of Mr Tracey. In any event, I have also found that the scab poster action was within the actual authority of Mr Tracey as an officer of the MUA. 333 It is unnecessary, therefore, to make findings in relation to liability by reference to s 363 of the Fair Work Act. 334 Accordingly, I find that the MUA is liable, by reason of the operation of s 793(1) of the Fair Work Act, for the contravention of s 346 of the Fair Work Act, in respect of the adverse action which I have found was taken by Mr Tracey in respect of each of Mr Daly, Mr Scott, Mr Donaldson-Stiff, Mr Mawbey and Mr Watson.

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Was the MUA directly liable for the scab poster action carried out by Mr Tracey? 335 Notwithstanding that the MUA had admitted that the dissemination of the scab posters by Mr Tracey was conduct within the scope of his apparent authority as an officer of the MUA, and was, therefore, conduct to be taken as the conduct of the MUA, the applicant persisted with its claim that the MUA was directly liable for the scab poster action. 336 There were two limbs to the applicant's contention of direct liability. 337 First, the applicant contended that Mr Tracey acted in relation to negotiations for the new enterprise bargaining agreement for the VTSOs and the small craft masters as a representative of the MUA, and not as an unaligned individual bargaining agent. 338 The second limb of the contention was that Mr Cain is to be regarded as the directing mind of the MUA in Western Australia, and that he knew of, and authorised Mr Tracey, to undertake the scab poster action, with the consequence that the scab poster action is the action of the MUA. 339 The applicant clearly established the first limb of its contention. There were a number of items of evidence which showed that the negotiations were in reality conducted by Mr Tracey as a representative of the MUA, rather than as an unaligned individual. For example, the evidence showed that the MUA encouraged the VTSOs and small craft masters to pay union fees, notwithstanding that the MUA did not have coverage in relation to that group of employees. There was also evidence that the MUA paid the legal fees for Mr Tracey's representation at the hearings before the Fair Work Commission for the protected action ballots. Further, in his email communications and reports in respect of the negotiations, Mr Tracey used MUA insignia and referred to himself as an officer of the MUA. Also, in its newspaper, the MUA claimed that it represented the VTSOs and small craft masters in their negotiations with the FPA, and referred to those negotiations as MUA campaigns. Also, in his interview with Mr Kerr, the journalist, Mr Tracey referred to the claims of the VTSOs and small craft masters as "MUA claims". 340 At trial, the MUA did not seriously dispute that Mr Tracey acted as a MUA representative in relation to the relevant negotiations. The admission, in my view, properly made by the MUA, that Mr Tracey was acting within his apparent authority as an officer of the MUA in disseminating the scab posters was, in effect, an acknowledgement of the fact that Mr Tracey acted as a representative of the MUA in relation to the negotiations for the enterprise bargaining agreement on behalf of the VTSOs and small craft masters. 341 As to the second limb of the applicant's contention, I find that Mr Cain was the state secretary for the Western Australia branch of the MUA, and thereby the most senior official in the Western Australia branch of the MUA. I find on that basis that Mr Cain was the directing mind of the MUA in Western Australia for the purposes of applying the direct liability doctrine. For the following reasons, I find that Mr Cain authorised Mr Tracey to engage in the scab poster action. 342 First, I find that Mr Cain was fully aware of the progress of the negotiations that Mr Tracey was conducting on behalf of the VTSOs and small craft masters and the importance of strike action as a component of the industrial strategy being pursued by Mr Tracey. This finding is based on the following evidence. 343 Mr Tracey gave evidence that he reported to Mr Cain and kept Mr Cain apprised generally of the work that he engaged in as a MUA official. Mr Tracey also gave evidence that he had breakfast with Mr Cain on 6 December 2011 to discuss the direction of the industrial strategy to be pursued following the failure of the two day strike. Further, thereafter, Mr Cain participated directly in the negotiations on behalf of the VTSOs and small craft masters, with Mr Leatt-Hayter acting on behalf of the FPA. During the course of those negotiations on 8 December 2011, Mr Cain said to Mr Leatt-Hayter that he was not happy that the FPA was "running the port using scabs". 344 It follows that I find by 6 December 2011, at the latest, Mr Cain was fully aware that the strike had failed and that the reason why the strike had failed was that a number of employees had worked during the strike. 345 Secondly, I infer and find that by the time of their breakfast meeting on 6 December, Mr Tracey and Mr Cain were each very angry and determined to take vengeance against the non-strikers; and that during the breakfast meeting Mr Cain and Mr Tracey decided that a scab poster which named the persons who had worked during the strike should be published and distributed and that Mr Tracey should give effect to that decision. The inference is supported by the following matters. 346 It is inconceivable that at their breakfast meeting on 6 December 2011, Mr Tracey and Mr Cain would not have discussed the response the MUA should make to the fact that the strike failed because a small number of employees worked during the strike. This is particularly the case because they were faced with the situation where, according to Mr Tracey, there had not been "scabbing" on the wharf for 30 years. Mr Cain and Mr Tracey would have seen this as a threat to the authority of the MUA and would have felt compelled in that situation to assert the power and wrath of the MUA. 347 Further, Mr Tracey told Mr Pearce during their telephone conversation on 8 December 2011, that there had not been scabs on the wharf for 30 years, that the scab posters were MUA posters, and that "we named them". Mr Tracey's reference to the fact that there had not been scabs on the wharf for 30 years and his statement that "we named them" suggests a collective decision was made as a vengeful response to the fact that the authority and discipline of the MUA had been challenged. 348 Further, it was only on 6 December 2011, that Mr Tracey first came into possession of the posters. Mr Tracey's evidence that it was purely by coincidence that he obtained possession of the posters on 6 December 2011 when he happened to pass Mr Elliot on the stairs at the MUA office, is not plausible. 349 In addition, Mr Tracey gave evidence that Mr Cain and the executive of the MUA knew that he had the posters during the two days when he put them up. I infer from the fact that, although Mr Cain knew that Mr Tracey had the posters, he did not stop Mr Tracey from putting up the posters, that, in putting up the posters, Mr Tracey was acting with Mr Cain's consent. 350 As I have mentioned, I find that the reason Mr Cain authorised Mr Tracey to organise the publication and distribution of the posters was that he, like Mr Tracey, was angry at the failure of the strike and the emergence of "scabs" on the waterfront after an absence of 30 years and needed to, and wanted to, respond firmly to that circumstance. 351 In making this finding, I observe that Mr Cain did not give evidence. No explanation was given by the MUA for the failure to call Mr Cain to give evidence. Accordingly, I infer that such evidence that Mr Cain would have been able to give on this issue, would not have assisted the MUA. This assists in drawing the inference which I have drawn. I am also aware that this finding is a serious finding against Mr Cain and that, accordingly, s 140(2) of the Evidence Act applies. However, I am comfortably satisfied on the evidence that Mr Cain authorised Mr Tracey to carry out the scab poster action. 352 For the reasons set out above, I find that Mr Cain authorised Mr Tracey to organise the publication and dissemination of the scab posters. 353 Accordingly, I find that the MUA is directly liable for the contravention of s 346 of the Fair Work Act in respect of Mr Tracey's scab poster action. 354 By reason of my finding in respect of Mr Tracey's direct liability, it is not necessary to deal with the applicant's claim that Mr Tracey was knowingly involved in the MUA's contravention.

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PENALTY AND COMPENSATION 355 The applicant sought orders for the payment of penalties and, also, for the payment of compensation to each of the named employees pursuant to, in particular, s 545(2)(b) of the Fair Work Act which provides for an award of compensation for loss that a person has suffered because of a contravention of the Fair Work Act. 356 The parties did not make submissions on penalty on the basis that they would await the findings of the Court. 357 However, in relation to the payment of compensation, the applicant identified, in his submissions, a specific amount of compensation which should be paid to each of the named employees. The parties also addressed the question of whether Pt 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) would limit the power of the Court to award compensation for personal injury under s 545 of the Fair Work Act. The submissions were, of course, made without knowing the findings upon which any argument that the named employees had suffered a compensable loss might be based. Thus, for example, the applicant's submissions proceeded on the assumption, amongst other things, that the Court would find that each of the named employees had suffered psychiatric damage. I did not make such a finding. 358 The Court would, therefore, be assisted by the parties addressing submissions on the question of whether, on the basis of the findings the Court has made, any compensation and, if so, the quantum thereof, is payable to the named employees, as well as any effect of Pt 2 of the Civil Liability Act (WA). 359 Accordingly, I will hear from the parties in respect of the filing of submissions both in relation to the question of penalty and any compensation payable to the named employees. 360 I will also direct the parties to produce a minute of orders which reflects the findings of the Court in these reasons. I certify that the preceding three hundred and sixty (360) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Siopis.