F J Bloemen Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation

His Honour then turned to consider the validity of the assessments. In his Honour's view, the three alternative assessments did not reflect a valid and complete assessment process, with the consequence that each of the notices of assessment was void. His Honour further held that the Commissioner was not entitled to rely upon s177(1) because, in the language of Dixon J in R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox & Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 at 615, the notices were not a bona fide attempt to exercise the power of assessment and were not reasonably capable of reference to the power of assessment given to the Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner. THE STATUTORY BACKGROUND Before considering the validity of the notices of assessment, it is useful to set out the relevant statutory provisions. Section 161 of the Act requires the lodgement of returns, containing such information as the form of return requires, inter alia, in relation to the income, profits or gains, and deductions or losses of a person. Further returns may, in a particular case, be required by the Commissioner: ss 162 and 163. From those returns and any other information in his possession, the Commissioner is required by s166 to make "an assessment of the amount of the taxable income of any taxpayer, and of the tax payable thereon". Section 6(1) of the Act defines "assessment" to mean relevantly: "(a) the ascertainment of: (i) the amount of taxable income ... and of the tax payable on that taxable income ...". See, too, the definition of "taxable income" in the same sub-section. Where there has been a default in furnishing a return or the Commissioner is not satisfied with the return as furnished, or the Commissioner has reason to believe that there is some taxable income derived not referred to in the return, the Commissioner may act in accordance with s167 to make what the side heading to s167 refers to as a default assessment, that is to say, "an assessment of the amount upon which in his judgment income tax ought to be levied". Should the Commissioner do so, "that amount shall be the taxable income of that person for the purpose of section 166". As was said in George v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1952) 86 CLR 183 at 203-4, s167 is not an independent power, it is epexegetical to s166. See, too, Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco (1990) 168 CLR 614 per Brennan J at 620 and per Toohey J at 630.

Where there has been no prior assessment for the year of income, a default assessment will naturally be the original assessment for that year. Where, as in the present case, a prior assessment has issued for the year of income, an assessment made under s167 will, of necessity, be an amended assessment. The power to make an amended assessment and the prerequisites to the exercise of that power are to be found in s170 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of that section provides: "The Commissioner may, subject to this section, at any time amend any assessment by making such alterations therein or additions thereto as he thinks necessary, notwithstanding that tax may have been paid in respect of the assessment." Should it appear that an original assessment was too high the Commissioner may reassess the liability downwards, subject to the limitations contained in s170(3). An amended assessment may be either an assessment made under s166 or a default assessment. An amended assessment will not operate as an alternative to an original assessment, for it operates to alter the original assessment by amending it. An amended assessment is an assessment for most purposes of the Act: s173.

In addition to the power of assessment conferred in ss166 and 167, the Commissioner has power, under s168, to make a special assessment of the taxable income derived in a particular year or any part of it. Although the language of s168 is not confined to an assessment in respect of a part of a year only, that is the usual application of the power conferred by the section. So if a taxpayer dies or a company goes into liquidation, at some stage during the year of income it may be necessary to issue an assessment of the taxable income for part of the year of income and the tax payable in respect of that part year. So, too, where a taxpayer ceases to be a resident of Australia, it may be necessary for the Commissioner to make an assessment in respect of the period prior to the taxpayer ceasing to be a resident. Section 169 is in even more general terms. It provides: "Where under this Act any person is liable to pay tax, the Commissioner may make an assessment of the amount of such tax." The general language of s169 (and for that matter the language of s168) does not suggest that these sections replace or are alternative to the ordinary assessing power conferred upon the Commissioner in ss166 and 167. Examples of exercise of the power of assessment under s169 include the assessment of a trustee under ss98 or 99A of the Act, or an assessment of undistributed profits tax upon a company pursuant to the former Division 7 of the Act, or an assessment of business profits under the former s136 of the Act: see Cadbury-Fry-Pascal Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1944) 70 CLR 362 and Lever Bros Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1948) 77 CLR 78, discussed later. Once an assessment has been made, the Commissioner is required under s174(1) of the Act to serve notice of it upon the person liable to pay the tax. It is service of that notice which imposes upon the taxpayer for the first time a liability to pay the tax assessed: s204 and see Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 150 CLR 1 at 16-17 per Mason J, with whom Aickin and Wilson JJ agreed. It is the service of that notice of assessment also which enlivens the right of the taxpayer, if dissatisfied with the assessment, to object and appeal, matters now dealt with in the Taxation Administration Act 1953 Part IVC. The notice of assessment thus brings to an end what is referred to as the process of assessment: "... by which the provisions of the Act relating to liability to tax are given concrete application in a particular case with the consequence that a specified amount of money will become due and payable as the proper tax in that case." See Batagol v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1963) 109 CLR 243 at 252 per Kitto J. The tax so assessed and notified is, from the time it becomes due and payable, a debt due to the Commonwealth, payable to the Commissioner: s208(1). It may be recovered in a suit instituted by the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner (s209) and whether or not the taxpayer may have objected against the assessment or appealed against an adverse objection decision: ss14ZZM and 14ZZR of the Taxation Administration Act. Unless a stay be ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction and subject to the exercise of appropriate judicial discretion, the tax debt created by service of the notice of assessment may become the subject of a judgment, execution may be levied on that judgment, and the judgment may found a bankruptcy notice, a bankruptcy petition, or, if the taxpayer be a company, a winding up petition. In any proceeding to recover income tax so assessed, the provisions of ss175 and 177(1) of the Act will be relevant. These sections provide: "175 The validity of any assessment shall not be affected by reason that any of the provisions of this Act have not been complied with. 177(1) The production of a notice of assessment, or of a document under the hand of the Commissioner, a Second Commissioner, or a Deputy Commissioner, purporting to be a copy of a notice of assessment, shall be conclusive evidence of the due making of the assessment and, except in proceedings under Part IVC of the Taxation Administration 1953 on a review or appeal relating to the assessment, that the amount and all the particulars of the assessment are correct." THE CASE FOR THE COMMISSIONER Without reference to authority, but having regard to the statutory scheme outlined above, it is difficult to conclude other than that the Act contemplates, in respect of any one taxpayer in any one year, that there will be only one assessment of taxable income and one amount of tax payable thereon. In saying this it would be assumed that an amended assessment does no more than act to amend the original assessment and does not produce an alternative or conflicting assessment. Given the statutory framework outlined it would not lightly be assumed that Parliament contemplated that there should be extant at any one time three conflicting and inconsistent assessments of a taxpayer's taxable income and the tax payable thereon in a particular income tax year. Section 177(1) of the Act would have a somewhat schizophrenic operation if three inconsistent assessments for one income tax year were tendered in recovery proceedings. The section clearly reinforces the view that the Act contemplated one only assessment for income tax of a taxpayer for the year of income operative at any one time. However, it is the Commissioner's submission that the Act indeed authorises him to issue alternative and inconsistent assessments creating alternative and inconsistent liabilities and that in such a case the Commissioner may nominate which of those liabilities is to be enforced and which may remain outstanding. The Commissioner's submission proceeds thus. (1) It is clear that two assessments may issue against different taxpayers in respect of the same year of income, including in the assessable income of each taxpayer the same amount of income: Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 168; Richardson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1932) 48 CLR 192. (2) More than one assessment may issue under different sections of the Act in respect of the same year of income against the same taxpayer: Cadbury-Fry-Pascal and Lever Bros (supra). (3) Where the Commissioner issues an amended assessment, there are two assessments extant, the original assessment and the amended assessment, both in respect of the same taxpayer in respect of the same year of income: F J Bloemen Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 87 ATC 4096 per Enderby J.

(4) In any event, each of the three assessments is entitled to the protection of ss175 and 177 of the Act, which sections must operate to defeat any challenge, except in proceedings under Part IVC of the Taxation Administration Act. Further, it is said, the present case does not fall within any of the exceptions contemplated by Dixon J in Hickman. WHETHER EACH ASSESSMENT WAS A TENTATIVE ASSESSMENT It has been recognised, ever since the decision of the High Court in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Hoffnung & Co Ltd (1928) 42 CLR 39, that an assessment made tentatively and so as not to create a definitive liability was not an assessment for the purposes of the Act. Hoffnung concerned the War Time Profits Tax Assessment Act 1917-18 (Cth). The case proceeded upon agreed facts, one of which was that the Commissioner had intimated when making an assessment that an adjustment remained to be made and that pending such adjustment, payment of tax was to remain in abeyance. The date for payment was crossed out on the notice of assessment. The taxpayer had not objected against this assessment and, if valid, tender of the notice would have been conclusive evidence of its due making. The question arose as to whether the assessment was an "assessment" contemplated by the Act, with the consequence that if it was not, the notice of assessment was not a notice of assessment authorised by the Act. Isaacs J, at 54-5, said:

"In the first place, the notice itself does not on its face bear out those requirements. It describes the matter as tentative'. The assessment' and the notice of assessment required by the Act to fix the taxpayer with liability for a Crown debt carrying interest and penalties must be definite and certain, or, as it has been described throughout the argument, definitive', as opposed to provisional'. There is no evidence, or at all events no satisfactory evidence, to displace the self description in the notice. The facts as admitted and the correspondence taken as a whole confirm the apparently provisional character of the assessment and notice." Later (at 55-56) his Honour said: "If an assessment definitive in character is made, it assumes that, so far as can there be seen, a fixed and certain sum is definitely due, neither more nor less. In short, it ascertains a precise indebtedness of the taxpayer to the Crown. But if an assessment is made which recognizes that one matter is unsettled and remains for settlement, and until it is settled - and probably to the advantage of the taxpayer - then, if that is the basis of the assessment, it is not the assessment contemplated by the Act. Every assessment, of course, contemplates that it may appear thereafter that an alteration or addition is necessary. But that is a different thing - there is no then existing matter known to be a presently necessary factor and put aside for future adjustment." Higgins J said (at 58): "The Act contemplates an assessment which is definitive, so as to bind the taxpayer subject to the power of the Commissioner to make all such alterations in or additions to any assessment as he thinks necessary (sec.23). Here, the notice of original assessment itself ... is accompanied by a paper giving details, but headed thus:- Tentative - War-time Profits Tax - Assessment. If the notice is tentative' merely, how can the taxpayer be expected to lodge an objection within thirty days, or be for ever silent (see sec.28)? The course which the Commissioner has adopted, that of a tentative' or experimental assessment or alteration of assessment may be convenient in certain circumstances; but it does not put the taxpayer under an obligation to pay within thirty days after notice of the assessment (secs.32 and 34), or within thirty days after notice of the amended assessment." Starke J was to similar effect. At 65 his Honour said: "... the facts establish that he [the Commissioner] never made a complete and final assessment - or perhaps I should say any assessment - under the Act, until the so-called amendment of July 1925. Everything else was tentative' or subject to further revision' or remained to be finalized at an early date.' Only in July 1925 was a final, or what was called during argument a definitive', assessment made according to the true meaning and intent of the taxing Acts ...". This case provides the origin of the phrase "definitive assessment", a phrase used in many later authorities to emphasise that the Act requires a definitive determination of a taxpayer's liability to tax. It is interesting to note while considering Hoffnung that Isaacs J discussed (at 54) the question whether two assessments existed where there had been an original assessment followed by an amended assessment. His Honour said: "An `alteration or addition' is not something extraneous to a standing assessment. When an alteration or addition is made the assessment henceforth exists as altered or added to, and not as previously existing plus independent alteration or addition." To the extent that his Honour's views are inconsistent with those of Enderby J in Bloemen, those of the High Court are to be preferred. When Enderby J refers to the possibility of there being more than one assessment on foot, his Honour was concerned with a case where an objection to an original assessment had been referred to a taxation board of review, and an objection to an amended assessment had been referred to the Court. But the fact that issues arising from the assessment and issues arising from the fresh liability assessed in the amended assessment must be argued in different proceedings does not require the conclusion that the Act authorises more than one assessment of a taxpayer's taxable income for the one income tax year.

Hoffnung's case was considered by the High Court in F J Bloemen Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 360, so far as that report relates to the appeal of Mr Simons, heard together with the appeal lodged by F J Bloemen Pty Ltd. An adjustment sheet, which had accompanied the notice of assessment issued to Mr Simons, read "Your assessment will be reviewed upon determination of the objection against your assessment for 30 June 1977". The question raised for decision by the High Court was whether the notice of assessment was valid. The principal judgment was that of Mason and Wilson JJ, with whom Stephen J agreed. Their Honours said (at 378): "The Simons notice, if read with the adjustment sheet, is more debatable. However, we read it as a definitive assessment by the Commissioner intended to create a legal liability to pay the tax specified, coupled with an intimation that the Commissioner will review the taxpayer's liability in a certain event. If it be assumed that the Commissioner lacks power to amend the assessment in the circumstances contemplated, this does not affect our conclusion. It merely means that the Commissioner is mistaken in supposing that he has power to review. Accordingly, the notice of assessment will, on production, bring s177(1) into play."

In other words, their Honours did not regard the notice of assessment in Simons as indicating a tentative assessment in the sense that those words are used in Hoffnung. Subject to the time constraints in s170, each assessment issued is subject to a power in the Commissioner to review that assessment and amend it. So that fact alone does not operate to make an assessment tentative in the Hoffnung sense. Aickin J in Bloemen referred to what had been said in Hoffnung earlier and continued (at 381-382): "In that case [referring to Hoffnung] it is important to observe that, as well as the fact that the paper accompanying the original assessment described it as tentative, in the notification of the amendment of the assessment made in August 1923 the Commissioner struck out the printed words on the notice which specified the time within which an objection could be lodged. In the present case the notice of assessment had attached to it a paper headed Adjustment Sheet' which has been correctly treated as part of the notice of assessment. It bore the note Your assessment will be reviewed upon determination of the objection against your assessment for 30 June 1977'. That notification conveyed no more than that there was an outstanding objection in respect of the preceding year of income, the determination of which might require an amendment of the assessment notified by the notice of assessment, including the alteration sheet. It does not convey the meaning that the notice or the assessment are tentative or that payment of tax should remain in abeyance. There is in my opinion no warrant for having regarded the assessment as other than `definitive'. The notification did no more than inform the taxpayer of what its officers no doubt knew, namely that the determination of its objection for the previous year might affect its liability for tax in that year and therefore possibly give rise to a credit prior to the due date for payment of the current assessment. These circumstances fall far short of the situation dealt with in Hoffnung's Case." Once it was concluded, as it was, that there was nothing to indicate that the assessment notified to Mr Simons was tentative, it followed that upon the tender of a notice of the assessment, s177 did its work in putting that making of the assessment beyond challenge. The notice in proper form of the assessment necessarily compelled the conclusion that there was an assessment made in fact (see per Mason and Wilson JJ at 378). The operation of s177 was subsequently discussed by the High Court in Richard Walter. Brennan J in that case expressed (at 199-200) the Hoffnung principle in the following terms: "If it appears, either on the face of a notice of assessment ... or from elsewhere ... that the Commissioner has not attempted in good faith to determine the taxable income ... or has not made an assessment definitive of the tax liability of the taxpayer, the assessment does not attract the protection of s175."

For this proposition his Honour cites both Hoffnung and Bloemen. See, too, per Dawson J at 219 and per Toohey J at 229. The taxpayer failed to have the assessments in Richard Walter set aside because the mere existence of two assessments issued against different taxpayers, by which the same amount was included in the assessable income of each, did not compel the conclusion that the assessments were tentative in the relevant sense. Thus McHugh J (at 237), discussing the facts, said: "On its face, each of the documents issued to the taxpayer is in the form of an assessment within the meaning of s6 of the Act. It specifies that a fixed sum is definitely due and payable by the taxpayer. There is nothing tentative or provisional about the tax liability that it assumes." But the present case is quite different. It is impossible to determine what the fixed sum is that is definitely due and payable by the taxpayer in respect of the particular year of income. This is recognised by the Commissioner who accepts that only one amount need be paid. Why that should be the highest amount is a matter known only to the Commissioner. These matters, together with the admissions made in the Commissioner's defence and the acceptance that each assessment is based on one of the positions in the Commissioner's "position paper", lead inexorably to the conclusion that none of the assessments purports to fix a definitive liability. The consequence is that none of the assessments is an assessment or "ascertainment" of tax. Another consequence is that because the assessment process has not been completed by the production of a definitive assessment, the notices of assessment are not valid notices of assessment as required by the Act. That the process of assessment is one which must produce a definitive liability in a fixed and certain sum, with the corollary that if it does not the process has not been concluded, emerges from numerous statements to that effect by members of the High Court, in addition to those in Hoffnung. It is true that in none of the cases to which reference is hereafter made was the present question in issue. However, the statements represent dicta of the highest authority and dicta which accord completely with the policy of the legislation. Reference will suffice to merely a few of the many comments to this effect. In Batagol, Kitto J (at 252), with whose judgment Menzies J agreed, spoke of the process of assessment as one bringing about the consequence that the amounts of taxable income and tax payable "have been fixed", so that "The respective amounts of the taxable income and the tax have been rendered certain" (emphasis added). Owen J in the same case, with whose judgment Menzies J also agreed, referred to the process of assessment as being a "fixation operation" (see at 257). In Bloemen, Mason and Wilson JJ spoke of the process of ascertainment, that is to say the process of assessment, as involving the rendering certain of the amounts of taxable income and tax payable thereon (see at 372). In Richard Walter, McHugh J (at 237), spoke of a definitive assessment as being one under which "... a fixed and certain sum is definitely due, neither more nor less". In Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Prestige Motors Pty Ltd (1994) 181 CLR 1 the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ (at 13) cites Batagol as determining that service of the notice of assessment "fixes the ascertainment of the amount of the taxable income and the amount of the tax payable by the taxpayer" (emphasis added). THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CADBURY-FRY-PASCAL AND LEVER BROS In Cadbury-Fry-Pascal the Commissioner had made an assessment under s104 of the Act and separately under s105 of the Act. These sections, which have no present counterpart in the legislation, operated to impose tax on undistributed amounts of private companies. There had, in addition, been an ordinary assessment of the taxable income and tax payable by the company made under s166. It was held that each of ss104 and 105 authorised separate and independent assessments of tax additional to the tax assessed under s166. Of the last mentioned section, Latham CJ said, in a passage quite contrary to the Commissioner's submissions before us, that s166 authorised "one assessment only" (see at 381). The Chief Justice in that case was of the view that the assessments authorised by ss104 and 105 were assessments made under s169. Speaking of that section, his Honour said (at 381-382): "This provision confers a power additional to that created by s166. It authorises an assessment of the amount of any tax where any person is `liable to pay tax' under the Act. Section 169, unlike s166, contains no reference to taxable income, because the provisions to which it refers cannot be applied by ascertaining the taxable income of the taxpayer and applying provisions as to the rates of tax to that income regarded only as the taxable income of the taxpayer. The amount of tax payable may be determined in these cases by the tax which would be payable in circumstances which do not actually exist and by persons other than the taxpayers, as is in the case of s104 and s105. In my opinion, s169 confers an authority to make an assessment wherever it is declared by the Act that a person is liable to pay tax and therefore enables the Commissioner to make separate assessments to tax under s104 and s105 - ie, assessments additional to any assessment made under s166." The present is not a case where any provision of the Act authorises a liability to tax separately and distinct from the ordinary liability to pay tax on taxable income as assessed under s166. None of the present assessments could be supported as an assessment under s169. Lever Bros is likewise of no assistance to the Commissioner. In that case, ordinary assessments had been made in respect of a number of years of income under s166. Subsequently, the Commissioner made assessments under s136 of the Act, in respect of the same years of income. Section 136 of the Act operated, notwithstanding any other provision of the Act, to create a liability in a taxpayer to pay income tax upon a taxable income of such amounts of the total receipts of a business as the Commissioner determined, where the prerequisites to the section were otherwise satisfied. In addition, the Commissioner made assessments of undistributed profits tax authorised by s169. It was held that the assessments authorised by s136 (the assessing power was thought to be s169) were original assessments and not amended assessments, so that the time limits in the Act for making amended assessments were not relevant to the making of the assessments authorised by s136. The case is authority for the proposition that there could, in respect of the year of income, be at least three assessments, one, made under s166 of the taxable income and tax payable thereon, one made under s169 deriving its authority from s136, and one made under s169 of undistributed profits tax. But that does not mean that there could be three alternative assessments made under s166, each of the taxable income and tax payable thereon of a particular income tax year. It is important also to notice that the making of the s136 assessment operated to replace the assessments originally made under s166. The assessment authorised by s136 did not operate as an alternative to the assessment under s166. Clearly an assessment of Division 7 tax, by reference to an inadequate dividend distribution, would likewise not be an alternative to an assessment under s166. The relationship between the s136 assessment and the s166 assessment appears in the following passage in the judgment of Williams J (at 82): "The assessment of the taxpayer on his notional taxable income under s169, as the Board said, replaces the assessment of the taxpayer on his actual taxable income under s166, and the moneys paid under the earlier assessment must be refunded or set off against his liability under the new assessment." THE HICKMAN EXCEPTIONS Since, in the present case, there was no assessment and thus no notice of assessment attracting the protection of s177, it is strictly unnecessary to consider whether the doctrine in Hickman as discussed in Richard Walter has any present operation. Because s75 of the Constitution precludes the legislature excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court to review the exercise of statutory power by an officer of the Commonwealth, sections such as ss175 and 177 must be read down if they are to be valid. The consequence, as enunciated by Dixon J in Hickman at 615 is, in the present case, that s177(1) will be given effect only to the extent that there has been a bona fide attempt to exercise the power of assessment, that that exercise relates to the subject matter of the Act and that it is reasonably capable of reference to the power of assessment. The learned trial judge was of the view that there was not, in the present case, a bona fide attempt by the Commissioner to exercise the power of assessment. We agree. In so saying, it is not suggested that in the present case the Commissioner in making the assessment acted mala fide. Nothing in the correspondence or material before his Honour would justify such a conclusion. What is meant is no more than to say that because the Commissioner had not exercised the function of assessment so as to create a definitive liability, a fortiori there had not been a bona fide exercise of that function. No separate matter thus arises from his Honour's initial conclusion that the assessments were tentative. THE ALTERNATIVE DETERMINATIONS At the heart of his Honour's view that the determinations made under Part IVA of the Act were void was the acceptance of a submission from the taxpayer that it was not possible to have a tentative or "alternative position" determination. Sections 177F(1) and 177F(2) of the Act, under which the purported determinations were made, authorise the Commissioner, inter alia, to make a determination in a case where a tax benefit has been obtained, that an amount be included in the assessable of the taxpayer and, at the same time, under sub-sec(2) determining the provision of the Act, pursuant to which that amount is deemed to be included in the assessable income. Where a determination is made, the Commissioner is directed to take such action as he considers necessary to give effect to that determination. At least in the normal case that will involve the Commissioner making an assessment under ss166 or 167: Commissioner of Taxation v Jackson (1990) 27 FCR 1 at 17-18. Certainly this would, of necessity, be the case where the consequence of making the determination was to increase the amount of the taxpayer's taxable income in excess of that already assessed under an assessment made at an earlier time. The use of the word "necessary" suggests, that there might be occasions when no action at all was required to give effect to a determination. Whether this is so need not be considered. It is unnecessary, however, to consider whether it is possible, as a matter of construction of s177F(1) in the context in which it appears, for the Commissioner to make alternative determinations in respect of the same events affecting the same taxpayer. If it is, the determinations must ultimately culminate in one definitive assessment. If there is but one assessment which, on its face and by reference to external circumstances is definitive, that assessment will attract the provisions of s177. Absent any of the exceptions to the Hickman principle, the underlying validity of that assessment will be protected by s175, whether or not alternative determinations may be relied on to support it. It will then be for the taxpayer, appealing against an objection decision, to show that the assessment made was excessive. In that appeal the question of the validity of the determination will be open to challenge. If, however, as in the present case, there is no assessment, then the validity of the alternative determinations does not arise. It suffices that the Court declare that the three notices of assessment were not valid notices of assessment, pursuant to the provisions of s174 of the Act. For these reasons, the Court makes the following orders:

1. That the orders made below be varied by substituting for the declaration included therein a declaration that three notices of amended assessment dated 3 June 1994 referred to in cl 10 of the statement of claim are not valid notices of assessment under s174 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936.
2. That the appeal be otherwise dismissed.
3. That the appellant Commissioner of Taxation pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. I certify that this and the preceding thirty-four (34) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of their Honours Spender, Burchett and Hill JJ.

Counsel and Solicitors B J Shaw QC with G T Pagone for Applicant: instructed by Australian Government Solicitor Counsel and Solicitors D H Bloom QC with A Robertson SC for Respondent: and S Gageler instructed by Sharwood Eyers Wilkie Date of Hearing: 25 November 1996 Date Judgment Delivered: 24 December 1996