The contention is advanced on behalf of the applicants that each of them answers to the description contained in this definition and that each is, therefore, an exclusive licensee within the meaning of s. 96. In support of this contention counsel asked us to disregard initially the concluding words of the definition - "to the exclusion of all other persons, including the patentee" - and then to ask ourselves whether each of the appellants does not hold a licence which confers upon it "the right to make, use, exercise and vend the patented invention, throughout Australia". Clearly enough each does hold such a licence limited respectively to the fields of which mention has already been made. Then, so runs the argument, each licence, within each limited field, confers upon each applicant a right to make use exercise and vend the patented invention throughout Australia "to the exclusion of all other persons, including the patentee". But the argument is fallacious in the extreme. And if it were sound it would create a situation where, for instance, B.N.S. might apply for an extension of the term of the letters patent under s. 95 and find itself opposed by I.C.I. as a "person interested" pursuant to sub-s. (7). Further in such an application the loss or damage for consideration would be that of B.N.S. alone unaffected in any way by gains or profits which might have been made by I.C.I. by the exploitation of the invention in fields other than that reserved to B.N.S. by its licence. However, strange as these and other obvious consequences of accepting the contention would be, the question must be solved by consideration of the terms of the definition.