Other matters to be considered
52. Firstly, it must be said that the two letters placed before the Court, one from the Director-General of NSW DPWS and the other from the Director-General of NSW NPWS, leave the Court in no doubt that the representatives of the defendant deeply regret what occurred. The Director-Generals', however, both emphasise that there was a concern of imminent failure of the capacity of the temporary pond and that prospect had to be balanced in the light of the time constraints and a consideration of the risks involved when the decision was made to commission the new pond before it had been fully tested. Obviously, reliance was placed upon an assumption that the new pond had been completed to a stage where it should have been watertight. The authorities were not prepared to take the risk of failure of the temporary pond during a testing period which could have occurred over two weeks. Although the expressions of regret are tempered by the explanations offered, they are nevertheless clear evidence of contrition on the part of the defendant.
53. There is no question that the defendant, through its representatives, has co-operated to the fullest extent with the prosecutor, not only in relation to its inquiries but also in relation to the implementation of remediation action.
54. The matters identified by s 241 of the PEO Act, in so far as they are relevant, must be taken into consideration by the Court in imposing a penalty for the offence.
55. The prosecutor emphases upon the sensitivity of the waters in Perisher Creek and the locality generally, being within the Kosciusko National Park. Even though there is no concise explanation of how or where the discharge occurred, it is nevertheless conceded by the defendant that the partially treated effluent would have found its way into Perisher Creek and ultimately the Snowy River. There is no evidence of any person suffering actual harm.
56. Although the controls imposed by the licence are expressed as a measure of faecal coliforms cfu/100ml, the Court has the benefit of an opinion provided to the defendant by Associate Professor Ashbolt, who explains that faceal coliforms are not pathogens but simply indicators of possible faecal contamination. It is the actual pathogens present, not faecal coliforms, that may cause environmental harm. There is no evidence of the extent of pathogens reaching Perisher Creek. Professor Ashbolt explains that unless people are ingesting contaminated creek water, human enteric viruses, which may have persisted and be present in the river for a considerable distance downstream of the discharge point, would be of negligible environmental consequence given their dilution and the general environmental sequestering within the creek/Snowy River hydroelectric scheme environment.
57. In any event, given the state of the evidence, the Court cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that any pathogens entered the water. However, the extent of the harm likely to be caused by operating the STP in circumstances where the effluent was not effectively retained until final treatment had been completed must be regarded as significant notwithstanding the potential for dilution and the unlikely prospect of direct exposure to humans given the seasonal conditions. There is no evidence that the pollution of the waters persisted for any significant period of time. Accordingly, the actual or likely extent of harm as the result of the defendant's actions in the circumstances is to be regarded as being in the very lowest range of seriousness for the purposes of s 241(1)(a) of the PEO Act.
58. Although the Court does not accept that it would have been reasonable to expect the defendant to install a protective liner, it nevertheless is reasonable to expect that some manner of testing or verification of the impermeablity of the installed clay liner should have been carried out before the new pond was commissioned. The Court appreciates the dilemma in which the defendant's agencies were placed in the period immediately leading up to the incident which gave rise to the offence. However, questions remain as to how it was that the completion of the works was still extant so far beyond the date originally proposed for completion. Without pausing to identify how the difficulty may have been resolved, it is the fact that the clay liner failed at a time when full testing had not been undertaken. The dilemma which required a choice between two unsatisfactory solutions does not necessarily provide the basis for vindication when the chosen course fails.
59. The Court nevertheless accepts the submission made by Mr Rushton that the decision to commission the new pond is to considered in the light of the prospect of the alternative available at the time, namely that the defendant rely solely upon the temporary pond in respect of which there would have been a high prospect of failure.
60. In regard to the issue of whether the harm caused or likely to be caused to the environment by the commission of the event could have been reasonably foreseen, the defendant makes the submission that it was entitled to rely on the belief that the contractor had installed the clay liner in accordance with the specification. It is not suggested that the design was not suitable. Visual inspection by various officers of the defendant revealed nothing which would suggest the clay liner would leak. The defendant has been assured that the compaction results were satisfactory. Assuming that the defendant was entitled to rely upon the contractor, the efficacy of the design and the integrity of the works, then it may not have foreseen the prospect of leakage and a consequent discharge to Perisher Creek. However, the prospect of the escape of effluent from any STP plant is generally foreseeable and needs to be taken into account. For the reasons outlined above, the Court cannot be satisfied that the defendant had taken all of the opportunities available to it to overcome the prospect of the foreseeable harm to the waters of Perisher Creek and beyond.
61. There can be no question that the defendant had effective control over the site and the operation of the STP. The defendant's control over the installation, compaction and compliance with the design of the clay liner was constrained to the extent that it was dependant upon the efficiency and integrity of its contractor. Its control over the circumstances that gave rise to the offence was in respect of the final determination to go ahead and commission the new pond without testing the watertightness of the clay liner.