72 The increase in the maximum penalty from $120,000 to $250,000 for individuals in May 2006 should not result in a commensurate automatic increase in penalties of over 50 per cent but does reflect a legislative intention to increase penalty levels substantially; Environmental Protection Authority v Nalco Australia Pty Ltd [2007] NSWLEC 831 at [28] referring to R v Slattery (1996) 90 A Crim R 519 at 524. The relative criminality must be considered in relation to the worst case for which the maximum penalty is provided; Environmental Protection Authority v Timber Industries Ltd [2001] NSWLEC 25 approved in Cabonne Shire Council v Environmental Protection Authority (2001) 115 LGERA 304 at [37].
General deterrence
73 Section 3A(b) of the CSP Act states that one of the purposes for a court in imposing a sentence is to prevent crime by deterring offenders. Sentences imposed in relation to environmental offences must embrace powerful considerations of general deterrence: see Axer Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 113 LGERA 357 per Badgery-Parker J at 367. In Axer, Mahoney J stated at 359:
The quantum of the fines which the legislation allows to be imposed has no doubt been fixed not merely to indicate the seriousness with which such pollution is regarded but also to deter those engaged in such activities and to procure that they will take the precautions necessary to ensure that it does not occur.
74 The Prosecutor submitted that the objects of the POEO Act require a substantial sentence to punish the Defendant, to deter others and to encourage full compliance with the Act, per Camilleri's Stock Feeds Pty Ltd per Kirby J at 701. The importance of deterrence in environmental offences was discussed in Bentley v BGP Properties (2006) 145 LGERA 234 at [139]-[141] and in relation to the application of pesticides in Environment Protection Authority v Williams [2006] NSWLEC 722.
75 There is also a need to consider specific deterrence, per Axer Mahoney JA at 359 to 360. The Defendant operates a business using toxic chemicals for commercial gain. Any penalty must reinforce the need to conduct his business so as not to cause pollution, see Environment Protection Authority v Colenden [2007] NSWLEC 289 at [30] and Environment Protection Authority v Cargill Australia Ltd [2007] NSWLEC 337 at [36].
76 I accept that general deterrence is an important consideration in relation to sentencing in these circumstances where the Defendant is engaged in a commercial operation as a pest controller. As it is his first offence after 34 years working in such a business, he has expressed remorse and will take care to ensure there is no further occurrence, I do not consider that he is likely to re-offend within the context identified in Veen v The Queen [No. 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465. At 477 the majority judgment of Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ stated that past criminal behaviour is relevant in sentencing:
to show whether the instant offence is an uncharacteristic aberration or whether the offender has manifested in his commission of the instant offence a continuing attitude of disobedience of the law .
77 I accept his submissions that he has found the prosecution a salutary experience. The Prosecutor has referred to Colenden and Cargill Australia (par 75) to support its submission that specific deterrence is necessary where a defendant is engaged in commercial activities involving the use of chemicals which can harm the environment. The defendants in both matters were companies. Each case must be considered on its facts and in this case concerning an individual defendant the circumstances do not suggest that specific deterrence is warranted.
Proportionality
78 An appropriate sentence is to be determined by considering the gravity of the offence per Hoare v R (1989) 167 CLR 348 at 354 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ):
… a basic principle of sentencing law is that a sentence…imposed by a court should never exceed that which can be justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered in the light of its objective circumstances (see Veen v. The Queen (No. 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465, at pp 472, 485-486, 490-491, 496).
Evenhandedness
79 The principle of evenhandedness requires that the Court consider if there is any sentencing pattern for like offences in order to determine a consistent approach to penalty. This principle must always be applied subject to the particular circumstances of the case before the Court.
80 In Environment Protection Authority v Brazel (No 3) (2002) 121 LGERA 156 the defendant was found guilty of an offence under s 120 but Talbot J dismissed the charge pursuant to s 10 of the CSP Act. The employee of the defendant placed pesticide in a position where it fell and spilt into a nearby drain. The pesticide contained Bifenthrin and another highly toxic chemical. The harm caused included environmental degradation of the street gutter and associated drainage works. Further harm was avoided by the defendant's cooperation and prompt and efficient action in containing the spread and diluting it before it reached any sensitive waters. Although the offence was described as not trivial, the escape of the pesticide was not foreseeable and the defendant acted reasonably at all times. In applying s 10, Talbot J noted the defendant's impeccable character, the absence of previous convictions and financial statements evidencing a small family business and the defendant's modest means. The defendant was ordered to pay the prosecutor's costs.
81 In Environment Protection Authority v Jolly's Pest Control Pty Ltd [2003] NSWLEC 398 the defendant pleaded guilty to an offence under s 120. A pesticide including Bifenthrin was washed into a stormwater drain after the defendant had sprayed a site. The stormwater entry point was underneath the vehicle and trailer belonging to the defendant. The defendant did not realise this. The liquid was pumped out of the drain with the cooperation of the Environment Protection Authority (the EPA) and the defendant. Cowdroy J found that the defendant could have taken measures to avoid the offence involving properly surveying and bunding the site. The potential for harm was high because without pumping high concentrations of toxic pesticide would have entered a river. No actual harm occurred. The likely harm was reasonably foreseeable and the defendant had control over the incident. Consideration was given to the defendant's early guilty plea, the absence of prior convictions and limited financial means. A penalty of $7,500 was imposed. The maximum penalty at the time was $120,000.
82 Fairfield City Council v Hong Song Ngo [2008] NSWLEC 200 is the only case that has imposed a penalty for offences under s 120 of the POEO Act since the maximum penalty for an individual was raised from $120,000 to $250,000 in 2006. In this case the defendant was instructed by his employer to wash the inside of a garbage truck on a number of occasions with a fire hose and tip the wastewater remaining in the truck into a stormwater drain. The wastewater included solid matter and food waste left over from the rubbish lawfully tipped elsewhere. The offences caused actual harm to the stormwater drainage system by introducing wastewater and some solids. The defendant did not know the acts were wrong as he assumed his manager had obtained the approvals required. Jagot J considered the defendant's limited financial means, his limited bargaining power in the relationship with his employer, his good character, expression of remorse and the unlikeness of further offences. Jagot J did not make a s 10 order as weight had to be given to the POEO Act's objects of adequate punishment, deterrence of others, protection of the community and denunciation of the defendant's conduct. A penalty of $22,500 was imposed.
83 This matter is more serious than Brazel (No 3) and Jolly's Pest Control given the greater environmental harm. The penalty impose in Ngo of $22,500 reflects in part the greater maximum penalty now in place since May 2006 for this kind of offence.
Mitigating factors
84 A number of mitigating factors should be taken into account to reduce any penalty, as provided for in s 21A(3) of the CSP Act.