34 The degree of culpability of the defendant is to be assessed on the basis that it is responsible for the actions of its employees (including pilots) their training, and supervision. If fault is to be found in the sense of neglect, it is the area of testing and training of the pilots and the lack of regular supervision and observation of his actions. The company relied upon his experience in previous employment and took only a limited opportunity to familiarise him with the aircraft in the first instance and thereafter to follow up by sufficient observation of his practices. This did occur from time to time as the evidence of Mr Wood shows. There is no history of any earlier incidents except out of the mouth of Mr Williams, all of which are denied by Mr Wood.
Conclusion
35 I find the offence proved. The liability of the defendant is strict. It has pleaded guilty to the essential elements of the offence.
36 Section 109 of the Pesticides Act requires the Court to take into account the various matters specified therein when imposing a penalty. Section 21A, s22 and s 23 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 provide for further criteria to be taken into account. No submission has been made that s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act should be applied.
37 Until such time as the evidence of the reporting officer of the Prosecutor together with the affidavit by Mr Williams became available, the defendant, on the advice of its solicitor, did not enter a plea. Up to that time, the full circumstances surrounding the incident were unclear. The inquiries made on behalf of the defendant, including the pilot, had not shown a definite cause for the dumping on Ms Wilson's car. Once that information became available and Mr Williams entered a plea of guilty, the company promptly arranged for its solicitor to enter a plea of guilty.
38 In the circumstances I am prepared to regard the plea of guilty as having been entered promptly for the purpose of assessing any discount which should otherwise be imposed upon the defendant. The relevant provisions of s 109 of the Pesticides Act are as follows:
109 Matters to be considered in imposing penalty
(1) In imposing a penalty for an offence under this Act or the regulations, the court is to take into consideration the following (so far as they are relevant):
(a) the extent of the injury, damage or harm caused or likely to be caused by the commission of the offence,
(b) the practical measures that may be taken to prevent, control, abate or mitigate any such injury, damage or harm,
(c) the extent to which the person who committed the offence could reasonably have foreseen the injury, damage or harm caused or likely to be caused by the commission of the offence,
(d) the extent to which the person who committed the offence had control over the causes that gave rise to the offence,
(e) whether, in committing the offence, the person was complying with orders from an employer or supervising employee,
(f) in any case where the defendant is a corporation, the type of corporation concerned (eg whether it is a sole trader or a family-owned business),
(g) whether the person who committed the offence complied with any relevant pesticide code of practice.
39 The Court is required under s 109(1)(a) to take into consideration the extent of the injury caused or likely to be caused to Ms Wilson. Fortunately the effect upon her health was temporary and although inconvenient and troubling to her it was minor, with no long-term consequences.
40 Apart from the prospect of constantly checking and reiterating correct procedure and practices, the practical measures that could have been taken to prevent, control or abate or mitigate the injury, were limited. The aircraft is a single seater aircraft and as the facts show, any aerial observation, familiarisation, or training procedures, were, of necessity, carried out from or on the ground. Nevertheless, I have already made some observation in this respect and concluded that it was open to the company to have expanded or amplified its procedures in this respect.
41 There is no corroborated evidence which leads the Court to conclude that the aircraft was not maintained to at least a satisfactory level. Even Mr Williams has not been able to create a direct link between the event that occurred on the 14 September 2004 and a failure to maintain the aircraft in a proper manner. His evidence in this context is based solely on conjecture.
42 Section 109 (1)(c) requires the Court to take into consideration the extent to which the person who committed the offence could reasonably have foreseen the injury, damage or harm caused or likely to be caused by the commission of the offence. The occurrence was not an unlikely event and clearly foreseeable as a direct and natural consequence of aerial spraying in the vicinity of a public road.
43 Having regard to my findings as to the extent to which pilot error played a part, that is not a matter over which the owner of the aircraft had direct control, except to the extent of constantly reiterating the need for the operation to be carried out in a safe manner.
44 The Prosecutor does not raise any issue in relation to s 109 (1)(e) or (g). It is appropriate to note however, that the company is effectively a small business carried on behalf of two individual shareholders essentially operating as sole traders in the nature of a family-owned business, contemplated by s109 (1)(f). The company has ceased to trade except as a training organisation. It continues to own and hire aircraft and is engaged in the buying and selling of aeroplanes. However, on 1 July 2006 the agricultural operational rights, firebombing contracts, the right to use the name Super Spread Aviation, the premises at Deniliquin, the ground equipment and two aircraft were sold to another company, so that the likelihood of this company re-offending in the same way is remote.
45 The Prosecutor does not make any submission that any of the aggravating factors in s 21A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act apply. The Chief Judge was not prepared to find in the case of Mr Williams that the offence was committed without regard to the public safety and I agree that the company did not act in that way. That factor therefore does not arise in the present case.
46 In regard to the mitigating factors enlivened by the provisions of s 21A(3) I accept that the injury to Ms Wilson was not substantial. The company does not have any record of previous convictions and apart from the attempted slurs by Mr Williams, the evidence shows that it has been held in high regard by other operators in the same industry. For example the Chief Pilot/Chief Flying Instructor at Sydney Flight Training Centre speaks highly of Mr Peter Wood and the Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment Manager, states that the company attained a 96% performance rating across all aspects of services provided to the State Aircraft Unit. That is above average for similar services provided by other operators.
47 It is clear to me from observing Mr Wood in the witness box and generally, that those associated with the corporate entity are remorseful and have suffered substantial embarrassment as a consequence of the offence. Mr Wood was concerned that any person should suffer an adverse effect no matter to what degree, from the operations of the company. He expressed what I consider to be sincere heart felt concern at the impact upon Ms Wilson albeit slight and short term.
48 I have already dealt with the entry of the plea of guilty at an appropriate time and there is no dispute between the parties that the defendant has provided assistance to the investigating officers. In particular, Mr Wood who participated in a full recorded interview on 28 October 2004.
49 The defendant has been vindicated by the tests taken subsequent to 14 September 2004 where no leaks or trailing jets were found. It is open therefore for the Court to be confident that the occurrence was not as a consequence of a leak from the aircraft. Other human intervention was required. The only other person capable of human intervention or omission was the pilot. Even if there was a leak, it would not have covered the windscreen in the way that Ms Wilson described. It is relevant that it was not only the windscreen of the car that was impacted.
50 There are obviously economic considerations that need to be taken into account in relation to the extent to which an operator is required to go firstly in respect to the maintenance of an aircraft and secondly, in respect of the supervision and control of highly trained operators in a specialised profession. There is no evidence before me that would justify a finding that the company was parsimonious in this respect.
51 The company has agreed to pay the Prosecutor's costs in the amount agreed of $13,500. That in itself is a penalty incommensurate with the nature of the offence and its consequences in the context of the maximum penalty applicable to a corporation of $120,000. The company is essentially a small business operated by individuals. It is worth noting that the maximum fine for an individual offender is $60,000.
52 Having regard to the whole of the circumstances and in the absence of any suggestion to the contrary and in the light of the plea of guilty, I find the offence proved. The defendant is convicted of the charge in the Summons. The amount of the penalty will reflect a consideration of all of the matters outlined above. It is appropriate that a conviction be recorded and a penalty imposed as a general deterrent to others in order to remind operators of aircraft in particular that the expectations in terms of safety are high. It is appropriate for there to be a nominal penalty. Accordingly, the defendant company is ordered to pay a fine in the sum of $1,000.
Orders
- The Offence as charged is proved.
- The defendant is guilty of the offence as charged.
- The defendant is ordered to pay a fine in the sum of $1,000.