Thus, in ordinary usage it is common to speak of (for example) purchasing several copies of a particular book. There is no single original. Rather, the original edition itself consists of some number of copies.
17 In the age of word processors and printers, one could sensibly speak of a "copy" of a statutory demand in this alternative sense. But, as his Honour held, it seems clear from the language of s.109X as a whole that the word "copy" was here intended to be given the first meaning. That is, Parliament deliberately used the word "copy" in paragraph (1)(b) so as to specify a photocopy or duplicate, in contradistinction to the original, the latter being referred to as "it" or "the document".
18 As Callaway, J.A pointed in argument, however, it does not follow that service of an original is therefore to be regarded as non-compliance with paragraph (b). If it is right to regard service of the original as the highest and best form of service, and service of a copy as in that sense only second-best, then it cannot be supposed that a creditor who does more than the statute requires - by serving an original rather than a mere photocopy - fails to comply. On the contrary, in my view, where doing the lesser would suffice, doing the greater must also suffice.
19 Nor can there be any legitimate complaint that, by serving the original, the creditor has fallen short of "strict compliance", as Emhill contended. The doctrine of strict compliance means that nothing less than that which the statute requires will suffice. Here, the creditor has done more than was required.
20 So to construe the provision will be in accordance with what appears to be the clear intent of s.109X - to facilitate service on companies. This construction is, moreover, consonant with the statement in the Explanatory Memorandum for the Bill which introduced Division 3 of Part 5.4 of the Act, that the provisions were intended to ensure that disputes involving statutory demands would be resolved "on the basis of the commercial justice of the matter, rather than on the basis of technical deficiencies."[8]
21 For these reasons, I conclude that service of the original statutory demand was service which complied with s.109X(1)(b) of the Act. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether some other basis existed to validate service.
22 Emhill argued, in the alternative, that the trial Judge had impermissibly ignored the other grounds set out in the originating process. Counsel drew attention to paragraph 1 of his Honour's reasons, which states: