THE DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE
11 The primary judge noted that:
(a) The originating application had been made under s 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRC Act) alleging disability discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DD Act) against Mr Ellis by the respondent (at [3]).
(b) In Arirang Restaurant (No 1), the Court dealt with and dismissed an application for security for costs by the respondent, and in the course of so doing made observations as to the prospects of success of Mr Ellis' application as it then stood (at [4]).
(c) In Arirang Restaurant (No 1), the primary judge observed (at [15]) that the application was not then properly particularised and Mr Ellis had not then filed any evidence, but went on to observe (at [16], [18] and [20]) that:
16. There can be no doubt on the evidence filed by [the respondent] that there was no ramp, or other infrastructure, available to facilitate access to the premises for a person who could not use the steps. Indeed, [the respondent's] case is that its employed staff would physically assist disabled persons into the restaurant, after the disabled persons had requested assistance. Whether or not that physical assistance precludes a finding of disability discrimination in relation to access to the premises, or constitutes a reasonable adjustment for the purposes of s.5(2) of the DD Act, is a matter which can only be determined at a hearing upon the evidence led at hearing. As the Court discussed with Counsel for [the respondent] at hearing the fact that a disabled person, unlike a non-disabled person, has to stand outside the restaurant, attract the attention and assistance of employees inside the restaurant, and then be physically assisted into the [respondent's premises], with the possible indignity that that might entail for some disabled persons, must make the Application on its face at least arguable as a case of direct discrimination under s.5(1) of the DD Act. The Application is, therefore, not without prospects of success.
[…]
18. [The respondent's counsel's] comments concerning whether or not Mr Ellis is disabled, or otherwise as to the extent of his disability and his capacity to access the [respondent premises] via the steps have been disregarded by the Court. [The respondent's counsel] gave no evidence of having any qualifications which would enable him to assess whether Mr Ellis has a disability, or whether Mr Ellis could, given the extent of any disability, access the [respondent] premises via the steps. Further, the Court regards it as unhelpful that a person involved in the litigation without expert qualifications to assess disability, or the capacity of a person with a disability to access premises, proffers an inexpert opinion, especially where that inexpert opinion is not said to be based upon any personal observation of Mr Ellis endeavouring to walk up or down the [respondent's premises'] steps, or any steps. The fact that there are apparently only two steps, and that they are only 33cm high, is also a matter upon which the Court places no weight: the number and height of the steps is of no assistance without a knowledge of the nature and extent of Mr Ellis' disability, and his capacity to walk up or down steps of any height, which evidence can probably only come from expert medical practitioners and allied health professionals.
[…]
20. For reasons set out above, the Court is of the view that the Application is not without prospects of success. In that regard, the Application is still in its very early stages in relation to the Court's processes, and in those circumstances to impose a security for costs order at this stage would in the Court's view be oppressive because it may stultify a claim which, on the materials presently before the Court, is legitimate and is not without prospects of success.
(d) Arirang Restaurant (No 1) was delivered on 22 April 2016, and the matter was adjourned to a further directions hearing (at [6]).
(e) The matter next came before the Federal Circuit Court on 16 June 2016, together with four other claims by Mr Ellis, and the following orders were made (at [7]-[8]):
1. [Mr Ellis'] affidavits in support of the claim be filed and served by 16 August 2016.
2. The respondent's affidavits in opposition to the claim be filed and served by 16 October 2016.
3. [Mr Ellis'] outline of submissions be filed and served by 16 December 2016.
4. The respondent's outline of submissions be filed and served by 16 January 2017.
5. The matter be listed for hearing at 10.15am on 16 March 2017.
6. Costs be reserved.
(f) On 5 August 2016, Mr Ellis filed an affidavit (Mr Ellis' August 2016 Affidavit) in the following terms (transcribed without amendments) (at [9]-[10]):
1. I make this affidavit to affirm that I was discriminated against by Arirang and will be filing outline of submissions by 16 October 2016.
2.
I have suffered physical and mental damage to a higher degree than able bodied people. as I rely on businesses to make sure that they have disability access and a duty of care.
3.
My health has been severely damaged by immense emotional stress.
4.
[The respondent] does have a billion dollar multinational insurance policy and what I am asking for in disability and injury compensation would come from the public liability insurer.
5.
I want $1 million in compensation as [the respondent] has caused me immense emotional injury and distress, caused by their negligence and a lack of duty of care or adequate access. I was further treated with contempt, as my stresses and anxiety did not matter to them or [the lawyers].
6.
[The respondent] is paying a fortune in legal fees, but refuses to even negotiate on a settlement with me on the compensation factor.
7.
I have lost myself totally, due to [the respondent's] not so kind, kind.
8.
I have had to fight constantly for my dignity, respect, safety, against disability discrimination, disability inaccessibility, the fight for my human rights and acknowledgment, as well as adequate actions that should have been taken, without the need for court action.
9.
This immense stress and running around to court and printing off material has damaged me mentally and physically, as I suffer from depression and a physical disability, that can make me subject to shocking falls and muscle strain, if I am pushed to do more than I usually do in my day to day activities.
10.
Going to court and facing sleazy lawyers, who will never defend me or the disabled, but will fight me and the disabled and further damage our worth, dignity and respect, has made me irritable, sad. sleepless, anxiety ridden and aggressive toward those I love, due to enduring this enhanced and unnecessary suffering, due to [the respondent's] lack of care or compassion for a disabled person, that their very own duty of care failed to protect and ensure that I was not discriminated against or injured physically or mentally by their poor business practices.
11.
My life and that of the disabled is already diminished enough by the government, business and the general community, with injustice, poverty, unemployment, lack of adequate access and disability discrimination, without [the respondent] further harming my already damaged body and emotions, due to a disability I was not born with or created by my own self harm, misadventure or neglect.
12.
[The respondent's] lawyer [Mr X], has defamed, victimized and used a THIRD PARTY to do so, with HEARSAY. Double standards, using a violently abusive female called […], while being his own racist, to a white, Christian, disabled person, male and an Australian larrikin from non-convict stock.
13.
[The respondent's counsel] [Mr X] then had the nerve to stand up in court to use my larrikin Australian personal views on his legal and citizenship credentials to try and destroy my credibility. l [sic] see him as nothing more than the true racist, as he is a true foreigner in my country, using the COMMONWEALTH COURTS to preach his race rights, while taking away my race rights and committing disability hatred along the way.
14.
With the paragraph above, this is nothing more than [the respondent] and [the respondent's solicitors] acting with corruption, collusion and conspiracy, to commit acts of defamation, victimisation, perjury, fraud and [the respondent's counsel] [Mr X] practising CONDUCT UNBECOMING of a LEGAL PRACTITIONER.
15.
No disability access, defamation, victimisation, hearsay and excusing DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION and DISABILITY HATRED, is an affront to humanity, disabled persons, Australia and the courts.
16.
If [Mr X] or [the respondent] try the race card to try and destroy my justice and liberty, then this proves racial and disability hatred, as I would not do this to them in disgusting evil and corrupt CHINA, where they come from. I would have no rights in CHINA either way, as a true fact of the matter.
17.
There is no race card here, just DISABILITY HATRED. [The respondent's counsel] [Mr X] and the ARIRANG directors are not even a race either way we look at, as they are from foreign and incompatible regions of Earth and are acting outside of humanity, which is a race.
18.
The fact that [the primary judge] already berated [Mr X] In open court and dismissed the fast action of [the respondent's solicitor] to have me listed as a VEXATIOUS LITIGANT and pay 10,s of thousands of dollars up front, it is offensive to me and our sacred courts and proves outright that I have a case and plenty of evidence and facts to win my claim.
(g) On 26 October 2016, 'Mr Y' filed a notice of change of lawyer indicating that Mr Y had been appointed to represent the respondent in place of 'Mr X' (at [12]).
(h) On 22 November 2016, the matter came before the Federal Circuit Court again. There was no appearance by Mr Ellis and the Court's endeavours to contact him by telephone were unsuccessful. Mr Y appeared for the respondent. Mr Y made the argument that Mr Ellis' August 2016 Affidavit did not deal with the (at [13]):
… threshold issue - is Mr Ellis disabled, to what extent is he disabled and is he disabled such that he would not be able to access this premises via the steps … [there is] no medical evidence in relation to that threshold issue, which makes it very difficult for the respondent, in terms of how to address the case, and, in fact, whether any affidavit evidence should be filed on behalf of the respondent …
(i) Mr Y sought that there be some documentary evidence, at least, of Mr Ellis' disability filed before the matter could be properly heard (bearing in mind it was listed for final hearing on 16 March 2017) (at [13]).
(j) The Court made the following orders on 22 November 2016 (at [14]):
1. [Mr Ellis] file and serve a list of documents to be relied on at hearing on by 6 December 2016.
2. [Mr Ellis] provide copies of the documents in the list in order 1 to the respondents by 6 December 2016.
3. The matter be listed for a further directions hearing at 9.30am on 8 December 2016, with leave to the respondent to apply for summary dismissal of the application in the event of non-compliance with orders 1 and 2.
4. No order as to costs.
(k) The directions hearing on 8 December 2016 was administratively adjourned and on 13 January 2017, Mr Y filed an affidavit referring to the Federal Circuit Court's orders of 22 November 2016 and indicating that Mr Ellis had not (at [15]-[16]):
(i) served a list of documents; and
(ii) provided copies of documents to the respondent.
12 The primary judge then described what occurred at a directions hearing on 24 January 2017.
13 The primary judge pointed out that this matter was one of a number of matters listed at 11.30 am on 24 January 2017 for directions. Earlier that morning, at 10.00 am, the Court had delivered a number of judgments in relation to matters in which Mr Ellis was involved. His Honour said that to give what occurred at the directions hearing in this matter some context it was necessary to briefly set out a summary of those judgments. His Honour did so as follows (at [18]-[24]):
Context - earlier judgments delivered on 24 January 2017
18. In Ellis v Kanyana Wildlife Rehabilitation Centre Inc [2017] FCCA 89 at [52] per Judge Lucev ("Kanyana Wildlife"), the Court concluded that:
a) Mr Ellis' Statement of Claim did not allege discrimination which:
(i) is the same, or the same in substance, as the discrimination alleged in the relevant complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission ("AHRC"); or
(ii) arises out of the same, or substantially the same, acts, omissions or practices that were the subject of the relevant complaint to the AHRC;
b) Mr Ellis' Statement of Claim did not identify the disability alleged, or how the discrimination arises because of any disability alleged;
c) Mr Ellis' Statement of Claim should be struck out in its entirety; and
d) Mr Ellis should be granted leave to file a further Statement of Claim within a prescribed time.
19. In Ellis v Left Bank Holdings Pty Ltd [2017] FCCA 90 at [8] per Judge Lucev ("Left Bank Holdings"), the Court dealt with an application in a case by the respondent that Mr Ellis file and serve a full Statement of Claim setting out the basis of his claim against the respondent, and any affidavits in support of his Statement of Claim, and for discovery of relevant documents. In Left Bank Holdings at [36] per Judge Lucev the Court concluded that:
a) Mr Ellis was to file a Statement of Claim and affidavits in support of the Statement of Claim; and
b) that the Court would not make a declaration or order in relation to discovery at the stage at which the proceedings had reached.
20. In determining that Mr Ellis was to file a Statement of Claim and affidavits in support of the Statement of Claim the Court:
a) had regard to the fact that Mr Ellis' Originating Application in those proceedings failed to provide any detail as to his disability, or as to the basis upon which he claimed to have suffered discrimination because of his disability;
b) adverted to the fact that any Statement of Claim filed by Mr Ellis must set out the fact of any disability that he has upon which he relies for the purposes of the proceedings, and the extent of that disability insofar as it is relevant to those proceedings, and the existence and identify of any assistance dog or animal that he uses in relation to the disability; and
c) noted that Mr Ellis was required to set out the disability relied upon in relation to the alleged discrimination, and to specify why it is that the alleged discrimination was because of the disability, citing Purvis v New South Wales [2003] HCA 62; (2003) 217 CLR 92; (2003) 78 ALJR 1; (2003) 202 ALR 133; (2003) 77 ALD 570; [2004] EOC 93-305 ("Purvis"); Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama [2008] FCAFC 69; (2008) 167 FCR 537; (2008) 247 ALR 273; (2008) 101 ALD 459; [2008] EOC 93-493 ("Gama").
Left Bank Holdings at [17]-[18] per Judge Lucev.
21. In Ellis v Wadjemup Trading Pty Ltd ATF Wadjemup Unit Trust T/A Rottnest Express & Ors [2017] FCCA 88 at [48] per Judge Lucev ("Wadjemup Trading"), the Court set out a history of non-compliance with various orders of the Court over a number of months, before dismissing Mr Ellis' application alleging disability discrimination against the second respondent (the Fremantle Port Authority ("FPA")) for non-compliance with orders made by the Court in June 2016 and August 2016. It is pertinent to note that the June 2016 orders required Mr Ellis to file and serve a factual summary articulating the acts or omissions of the FPA that he alleged amounted to a breach of the DD Act, and to provide further facts and particulars in relation to those alleged acts or omissions, and that the August 2016 orders required Mr Ellis to file and serve an outline of submissions in relation to FPA's application in a case to dismiss his application as against the FPA because of non-compliance with the June 2016 orders: see Wadjemup Trading at [17] and [19] per Judge Lucev.
22. In Ellis v Rottnest Lodge (1989) Pty Ltd Trading As Rottnest Lodge [2017] FCCA 84 ("Rottnest Lodge") the Court had before it an application in a case for a communication restraint order and substituted service wherein the respondent sought to prevent Mr Ellis from communicating with it (and its solicitors) and for a form of substituted service whereby the Court served relevant documents on Mr Ellis: Rottnest Lodge at [2] per Judge Lucev. Those orders were sought because of a communication sent by email by Mr Ellis to a legal assistant at the respondent's solicitors which the Court described as "vile": Rottnest Lodge at [15] per Judge Lucev. For reasons set out in Rottnest Lodge the Court ultimately dismissed the respondent's application in a case for orders against Mr Ellis, and there was no order as to costs: Rottnest Lodge at [36] per Judge Lucev.
23. In each of Kanyana Wildlife, Left Bank Holdings and Wadjemup Trading costs were ordered against Mr Ellis for $4,010.50, $3,470.00 and $4,958.00 respectively.
The directions hearing - transcript
24. As indicated above, this matter was one of six matters involving Mr Ellis and applications alleging disability discrimination listed for directions hearings against various respondents at 11.30am on 24 January 2017. This matter was called at 11.54am, and what occurred is best reflected by setting out the relatively short transcript of the directions hearing, which was as follows:
HIS HONOUR: Yes. In this matter there were orders on the last occasion for you, Mr Ellis, to undertake to file certain documents as I recall it.
MR ELLIS: Which one is this, again? Which case, sorry?
HIS HONOUR: This is Silver Vision.
MR ELLIS: Yes. And they know full well I'm sick - was sick, too.
HIS HONOUR: [Mr Y], you - - -
MR ELLIS: And why would I - why would I submit anything more? I've already said it.
HIS HONOUR: [Mr Y], you appear for [the respondent].
MR ELLIS: This dickhead is appearing for another smackface. Shit. Can't win. Bloody traitorous asshole working for smackfaces. They're not even Australians you piece of shit.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Ellis, you've not complied with the orders of the court made on the last occasion to file certain documents. Do you propose that anything should be done in relation to the matter.
MR ELLIS: How can I do it when I've already told you I have a medicate certificate, which - your court staff are hiding on purpose, too, so don't sit there and talk to me about being bad when you've got corrupt people working there or purpose.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Ellis - - -
MR ELLIS: Now listen, I'm not - - -
HIS HONOUR: Mr Ellis, no affidavit material has been filed.
MR ELLIS: Why would it be filed. I said they know that I wasn't available - - -
HIS HONOUR: Well - - -
MR ELLIS: - - - because I've been unwell and off the system for months because of my unwellness.
HIS HONOUR: All right.
MR ELLIS: Part of it caused by their stress, their stupidity. [The primary judge], why don't you go down there for lunch and look at the fact they don't have a ramp and make a decision just based on your own eyes instead of putting me through more crap. I mean, this is insane crap. This isn't justice, it's sick.
HIS HONOUR: [Mr Y] - - -
MR ELLIS: All right. I'm not doing anything more about this matter. You make your sleazy judgments and they can win. I don't give a shit what you do because you're going to let them win anyway (laughs).
HIS HONOUR: All right.
MR ELLIS: Was [Mr Y] one of your gay lovers on the weekend? Is he? Probably. Probably.
HIS HONOUR: [Mr Y], do you seek an order to - dismissing the matter for non-compliance.
[MR Y]: Yes, I do, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: All right. There will be an order in those terms. Do you seek costs?
[MR Y]: Yes, I do.
MR ELLIS: Good luck with that, asshole (laughs). You piece of shit (laughs).
[MR Y]: You may also like to not [sic], your Honour, that this matter is listed for a trial on 16 March - - -
HIS HONOUR: Yes.
[MR Y]: - - - this year, so that will become available - that hearing date.
HIS HONOUR: All right. Well, there will be an order dismissing the matter for non-compliance. There will also be an order that [Mr Ellis] pay the respondent's costs. Do you seek them on the basis of the schedule or indemnity costs, [Mr Y], in the circumstances?
[MR Y]: Indemnity basis, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: All right. Well, I think it's an appropriate case for the reasons that I will make clear in due course, that [Mr Ellis] pay the respondent's costs on an indemnity base, those costs to be assessed by a registrar of this court.
MR ELLIS: Not paying anything.
HIS HONOUR: And, (3) that reasons for judgment in relation to orders 1 and 2 be published electronically from chambers at a later date. All right. The orders in those terms. The court will adjourn until 2.15.
14 The primary judge then dealt with r 13.03A(1) and r 13.03B(1) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (at [26]-[27]). His Honour then (at [28]) cited his own decision in Ellis v Wadjemup Trading Pty Ltd ATF Wadjemup Unit Trust T/A Rottnest Express & Ors [2017] FCCA 88 (at [26]-[32]).
15 The primary judge said that it was plain that Mr Ellis had not complied with orders 1 and 2 of the Federal Circuit Court's orders of 22 November 2016. His Honour continued (at [29]):
… In ordering the dismissal of Mr Ellis' Application against Arirang Restaurant by reason of that non-compliance, the Court had regard to:
a) the Court's comments in Arirang Restaurant (No 1) where it determined that the Application was not without prospects of success, but that the proceedings were at a very early stage, and that Mr Ellis had not filed any evidence, had not particularised his disability, and had not filed any expert evidence concerning his disability: Arirang Restaurant (No 1) at [15]-[20] per Judge Lucev. The comments made by the Court in Arirang Restaurant (No 1) make it plain that there is a necessity to file evidence, including expert evidence so as to identify the relevant disability, and identify that the alleged discrimination is because of that disability. The necessity to do so is well established: DD Act, s.5(1) and (2); Purvis; Gama at [90]-[91] per French and Jacobson JJ. In Gama a ground of appeal in relation to alleged disability discrimination was successful because Mr Gama made "no attempt … to identify a disability which allegedly caused the less favourable treatment": Gama at [90] per French and Jacobson JJ, and the first instance court "did not identify the relevant disability nor the particular way in which the remarks constituted less favourable treatment because of the disability": Gama at [91] per French and Jacobson JJ;
b) Mr Ellis' August 2016 Affidavit is in large part irrelevant and scandalous, and therefore inadmissible: Sims v Jooste & Ors (No.3) [2016] FCCA 1751 at [24]-[30] per Judge Lucev, and fails to:
i) indicate with any particularity what actually happened, when it happened or where it happened; and
ii) identify how the alleged discrimination was based on the particular disability, that is that [Mr Ellis] was discriminated against "because of" a disability;
c) the Court's inability to have regard at a final hearing to material contained in the AHRC complaint, as that forms no part of the Originating Application, or any relevant pleading, save for the purposes of ascertaining whether or not the Originating Application is in relation to substantially the same alleged acts of discrimination as was the AHRC complaint: Charles v Fuji Xerox Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1531; (2000) 105 FCR 573; (2000) 105 IR 153 at [37]-[41] per Katz J; Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118; (2010) 63 AILR 101-302 at [46]-[48] and [50] per Marshall, Rares and Flick JJ; Kanyana Wildlife at [27]-[29] per Judge Lucev;
d) the fact that by the time that the Court made orders 1 and 2 of the orders made on 22 November 2016 Mr Ellis was generally aware of the requirement to set out his case with a sufficient degree of specificity of the material facts so as to define the issues and inform the other party of the case that had to be met: Chang v CST Minerals Lady Annie Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 620 at [19]-[21] per Mortimer J. The Court had made the orders referred to as the June 2016 Orders above in the Wadjemup Trading case, which required Mr Ellis to serve a factual summary articulating the acts or omissions alleged to constitute discrimination and to provide further facts and particulars in relation to the alleged acts or omissions (in that case of the FPA): see [23] above. In Ellis v FJM Property Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 808 ("FJM Property") in dismissing an application by the respondent to appear by a non-lawyer the Court observed that a paucity of information, in that case in both the Originating Application and the Response, meant that it was not possible to discern with any certainty on the face of the documents the precise or relevant factual matrix relating to the allegation of disability discrimination made by Mr Ellis: at [25] per Judge Lucev, and in relation to the quantum of compensation sought (being $1 million in that case as well) that expert evidence of the loss or damage suffered by Mr Ellis would be required to assist the Court in determining such compensation: at [28(b)] per Judge Lucev. FJM Property was delivered on 13 April 2016. In Ellis v Adventureworld (WA) Pty Ltd As Trustee of The Adventureworld Unit Trust [2016] FCCA 2504 ("Adventureworld"), a judgment delivered on 30 September 2016, this Court in dealing with an application for costs against Mr Ellis set out a passage from the judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Manolakis v Carter [2008] FCAFC 183 at [12] per Spender, Graham and Tracey JJ ("Manolakis") where the Full Court said that:
12 An aggrieved self-represented applicant must, like any other litigant, address:
• his or her standing to make claims against other persons,
• the jurisdiction of the court in which he or she wishes to make those claims,
• the precise identity of the parties against whom the claims are to be made,
• the relief that is to be sought, and
• the facts which are said to found an entitlement to that relief.
e) Mr Ellis' submissions at the directions hearing on 24 January 2017 made it plain that he thought he had "already said it": […], and was "not doing anything more about this matter": […] and that he did not care what the Court did because the Court was making "sleazy judgments" and the Court would "let them win anyway": […], which were plainly references to the judgments of the Court referred to at [18]-[22] above. No matter how misguided Mr Ellis' basis for concluding that he will not do anything more in relation to this matter is, it is the case that that is his position, and it is therefore futile for the Court, against the background set out above, including the non-compliance with orders 1 and 2 of the 22 November 2016 orders, to continue to make orders which will plainly not be complied with, and will result in ongoing non-compliance: Lenijamar at 396 per Wilcox and Gummow JJ;
f) it would be futile for this matter to proceed to the presently listed final hearing on 16 March 2017 in circumstances where:
i) Mr Ellis bears the onus of proof generally: Ferrus v Qantas Airways Limited [2006] FCA 812; (2006) 155 IR 88 at [48] per Collier J; Vassollo v Jetswan Pty Ltd [2010] FMCA 708 at [20] per Lloyd-Jones FM ("Jetswan") (and cases there cited), save where a person against whom indirect discrimination is alleged has to prove that a requirement or condition imposed which must be complied with by the person alleging discrimination is reasonable: DD Act, s.6; Jetswan at [20] per Lloyd-Jones FM (and cases there cited), but Mr Ellis has filed no affidavit, or any other material, capable of fulfilling the onus of proof;
ii) the lack of materials, and the refusal to file any further materials, means that Mr Ellis has put no materials before the Court as to the conduct alleged to constitute disability discrimination (including a clear factual statement as to when, where and how the discrimination occurred), or whether the discrimination is direct or indirect, and importantly in a disability discrimination case, there is no indication as to what disability Mr Ellis suffers from, or how any disability actually gave rise to any discrimination. Nor is there any setting out of the less favourable treatment alleged or any alleged comparators (for the purposes of direct discrimination under s.5 of the DD Act), or the facts which constitute a requirement or condition which is not reasonable in the circumstances of the case and which is likely to have the effect of disadvantaging a person with the relevant disability (for the purposes of indirect discrimination under s.6 of the DD Act); and
iii) it is not sufficient for Mr Ellis to merely establish a terminated complaint, that he is an affected person, and for him to allege unlawful discrimination, or to assert that any failings in the "pleadings" (in this case, materials before the Court) did not necessarily have to plead out or establish every element of the alleged unlawful discrimination: Shurat HaDin, Israel Law Center v Lynch (No. 2) [2014] FCA 413 at [36]-[37] per Robertson J; and
g) to proceed to a final hearing would be to prejudice Arirang Restaurant by causing further costs to be incurred, in circumstances where by reason the inadequacy of Mr Ellis' August 2016 Affidavit, the failure to comply with the November 2016 orders, and the indication that Mr Ellis proposes to do nothing further in relation to the matter, there is effectively no evidence giving rise to a case which requires an answer from Arirang Restaurant.
16 The primary judge also noted that Mr Ellis suggested during the course of the directions hearing on 24 January 2017 that he had a medical certificate which was being hidden from the primary judge by the Federal Circuit Court staff, and that he had been 'unwell and off the system for months because of my unwellness' (at [30]). In order to prove that he was medically unfit at the time at which he was required to comply with the 22 November 2016 orders, the primary judge noted that Mr Ellis would have been required to provide evidence on oath which properly explained his medical condition and why it prevented him from complying with those orders (at [31]).
17 Where an indulgence (such an adjournment, an extension of time or a release from the consequences of non-compliance with court orders) is sought from a court on the basis of an alleged medical condition, the primary judge noted that the requirement to file evidence on oath properly explaining the medical condition is well established (at [32]). His Honour referred (at [33]) to NAKX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1559 per Lindgren J (at [5]-[10]):
5 The medical certificate dated 13 December 2003 in respect of the male applicant states as follows:
'This is to certify that on 13/12/2003 I examined the above person. In my opinion he/she is suffering from Dermatitis atopic and will be unable to attend court from 13/12/2003 to 01/01/2004 inclusive.'
The certificate of the same date in respect of the female appellant states:
'This is to certify that on 13/12/2003 I examined the above named person. In my opinion he/she is suffering from Anxiety disorder/Depression and will be unable to attend court from 13/12/2003 to 13/01/2004 inclusive.'
6 The medical certificates are quite unsatisfactory. They do not address the critical question whether, and if so why, the medical condition would prevent the appellant from travelling to the Court and participating effectively in a court hearing.
7 I do not accept that either of the medical conditions referred to would make the sufferer 'unable to attend court' - apparently each was able to attend upon the medical practitioner.
8 If the certificates were meant to say that the medical condition would prevent the sufferer from participating effectively in a court hearing, they do not in fact say that and do not explain why the medical condition would have that effect.
9 I take into account the fact that the two medical certificates are structured identically, use the expression 'he/she', and are dated the same day, which was only two days before the hearing. The certificates have the appearance of being pro forma certificates which are available for the asking.
10 In any event, even accepting the certificates on their face, I find them unpersuasive for the reasons given at [6]-[8] above.
18 The primary judge also cited Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75 per Collier, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ (at [48]-[49]); BYF15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 774 per Perry J (at [35]) and WZAWB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor (2016) 309 FLR 398 per Judge Lucev (at [98]).
19 The primary judge confirmed that the Federal Circuit Court had reviewed the court file which revealed no document (be it by way of letter, email or court filed document) in this matter, either at or about the time that Mr Ellis was required to file documents in accordance with the orders made on 22 November 2016, or otherwise, which indicated that Mr Ellis was ill or unwell, at or about the relevant time (being November 2016 to January 2017). There was no basis upon which Mr Ellis could justify the non-compliance with the 22 November 2016 orders of the Federal Circuit Court on the basis of a medical condition or illness, because there was no evidence of those matters before the Court (at [38]).
20 As to the inspection suggestion, his Honour noted that Mr Ellis endeavoured to make some suggestion that his non-compliance might be justified by the fact that the Federal Circuit Court had not gone down to the Arirang Restaurant for lunch, looked at the fact that they do not have a ramp, and made a decision 'just based on your own eyes' (at [39]). The Federal Circuit Court had, of course, his Honour said, undertaken inspections in particular cases, and more often than not an inspection would be required where it was alleged that there is disability discrimination in relation to access to premises. To suggest, however, that the Federal Circuit Court go on an inspection of its own was to invite the Court into error, and, in particular, to invite the Court to embark upon a course which would give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias or a denial of procedural fairness (at [40]). In making this observation, the primary judge cited Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 per Mason J writing for the majority comprised also of Gibbs CJ and Brennan J (at 350); Re Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance & Anor; Ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Limited and Ors (1994) 119 ALR 206 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ (at 210); and Le v Magistrate Barbara Lane [2014] WASC 494 per EM Hennan J 9at [34]).
21 The primary judge also explained the indemnity costs by reference to the improper conduct of Mr Ellis (at [45]-[48]). His Honour, in noting that the unreasonable conduct of a party may form the basis of an order for indemnity costs, relied upon Colgate-Palmolive Company & Anor v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225 per Sheppard J (at 233), Fazio v McNally [2014] WASCA 79 per Pullin and Newnes JJA; Lance v QAV Pty Ltd [2013] WASC 13 per McKechnie J (at [21]-[22]); Manolakis v Carter [2008] FCAFC 183 per Spender, Graham and Tracey JJ (at [9]); Sims v Jooste & Ors (No 4) [2016] FCCA 2011 per Judge Lucev (at [89]-[98]) and Tetijo Holdings Pty Ltd v Keeprite Australia Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 225 per French J (at 8).
22 In this instance the primary judge noted (at [49]):
(a) as early as 23 May 2015, the respondent's then solicitors wrote to Mr Ellis requesting a detailed explanation for each claim, but as is evident from the primary judge's reasons and those in Arirang Restaurant (No 1), no proper particulars of Mr Ellis' claim were ever provided to the respondent;
(b) on 21 June 2015, Mr Ellis sent an email to the respondent's then solicitors threatening that if they did not give in to his demands he would take an elder discrimination claim on behalf of his elderly mother in addition to his disability discrimination claim, and threatened to increase the amount claimed to $5 million (from the $1 million in the application);
(c) Mr Ellis published on Facebook a letter to Mr X, the respondent's then solicitor, in which he said that Mr X's name was a 'poof name in Australia', and asked whether he was 'shafting your boyfriend client' and asked whether the firm's name was '[…] GAY LICK', and went on to make various disparaging observations about the national and racial characteristics of the proprietors of the respondent, including describing them as 'Chinese criminals', 'deceiving worms', people with 'narrow mind and narrow sight' and 'cowardly yellow skin' and inviting them to 'open the zippers on your eyes and lean forward to stop the slope angles on your mind from blocking your vision';
(d) at the hearing of the security for costs application on 10 March 2016, the Federal Circuit Court told Mr Ellis that this case was not about Mr X, whom Mr Ellis had adverted to as being of 'Asian background';
(e) Mr Ellis' August 2016 Affidavit:
(i) contains material largely irrelevant to the establishment of a claim of disability discrimination, being comment, opinion and argument, rather than fact related to the claim before the Court; and
(ii) engages in criticism, none of it relevant to Mr Ellis' actual claim, and much of it scandalous, directed towards Mr X; and
(f) at the directions hearing on 24 January 2017, Mr Ellis' conduct was wholly reprehensible, and included:
(i) racist slurs (including the use of the words 'smack face') against the respondent and those involved in and associated with it;
(ii) disgraceful and unwarranted abuse of the respondent's new lawyer, Mr Y; and
(iii) an implication that the primary judge was not impartial, including an assertion, which is not true, that the primary judge and Mr Y were engaged in an undisclosed sexual relationship.
23 His Honour said that the reprehensible abuse and untruthful assertions made by Mr Ellis in these proceedings were an affront to the administration of justice, and no court, and no lawyer appearing in a court, should have to put up with them, stating, that the Federal Circuit Court was therefore of the view that the above circumstances warrant an award of indemnity costs in these proceedings, and that the nature of Mr Ellis' conduct in this matter as a whole warrants the Federal Circuit Court exercising its discretion such that the award of indemnity costs ought to extend to all of the proceedings in this matter (including the application for security for costs in respect of which the respondent was not successful).