His Honour also referred, at 197, to documents that required the use of an instrument to read the information and commented:
'A litigant who keeps all his documents in microdot form could not avoid discovery because in order to read the information extremely powerful microscopes or other sophisticated instruments would be required. Nor again, if he kept them by means of microfilm which could be read without the aid of a projector.'
23 Walton J rejected the contrary decision of McInerney J in Beneficial Finance Corporation Co Ltd v Conway [1970] VR 321 preferring the decision of Hoare J in Cassidy v Engwirda Construction Co [1967] QWN 16. Counsel for the applicant referred to a number of other cases in which members of the High Court had implied or expressed a preference for the conclusion to which Walton J came rather than that in Beneficial Finance Corporation Co Ltd v Conway; see Australian National Airlines Commission v Commonwealth of Australia (1975) 132 CLR 582 at 594 per Mason J and Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions for the State of Victoria (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 193 per Dawson J.
24 In my view both the authorities and common usage support the conclusion that the word 'document' in the orders includes the electronic form of the CM File and the floppy disk that contained a copy of the CM file. The use of electronic media to store information that might in earlier times have been written on paper is now so common that, in the absence of an applicable restrictive definition of the word, I do not think that there is any sensible argument to the contrary. Both the rules of the Federal Court (O 1 r 4) and the definition in Pt 1 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) confirm this use.
25 At the hearing on 14 August 2003 that Mr Austin failed to attend, I raised a concern in relation to order 5. The order imposes an obligation on 'a director of the First Respondent and the Second Respondent' to file an affidavit that provides the information sought in the subparagraphs. The issue is whether the order is directed to the first respondent or merely to one of the two directors. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the order should be read as requiring the first respondent, by a director, to make, file and serve an affidavit. It was submitted that the order was not ambiguous but merely inelegantly expressed and that it was not reasonable to assume that anyone would be confused by it. Ultimately I accept that submission. Mr Austin did not suggest that there was any confusion about what was required and clearly viewed his affidavit of 28 July 2003 as having been made both in his personal capacity and in his capacity as a director of the first respondent.
26 In his defence Mr Austin was not able to point to anything that either respondent had done which showed a bona fide attempt to comply with orders 5(a), (b) and (c). His affidavit makes no reference to any attempt to ascertain to whom the advertising material, that is referred to in order 5(c), had been sent or who had access to it. On cross-examination Mr Austin admitted he had made no such attempt saying that it would have been useless.
27 I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents made no serious attempt to comply with orders 5(a), (b) and (c) of the orders made in this proceeding on 22 July 2003 and are therefore in contempt. This brings me to the question of penalty.
28 Mr Austin expressed no contrition either personally or on behalf of the first respondent. He did not attend Court on 22 July 2003 or dispute that he was properly notified of the necessity to do so. He clearly understood the orders made on 22 July but chose not to comply. As mentioned earlier, he rejected the obligation imposed by order 4 because he did not agree with it. In relation to orders 4, 5(a), (b) and (c) he made a colourable attempt to comply by filing one, grossly insufficient, affidavit on behalf of both respondents.
29 Mr Austin said that he attempted to obtain legal advice from one firm of solicitors but those solicitors could not advise him because of a conflict of interest. He made no further attempt to obtain legal advice and offered no explanation as to why. It would seem that Mr Austin hoped that if he ignored the court proceedings they would go away. This is not acceptable behaviour. However, although disobedience of a Court order is a very serious matter, I do not find that in these circumstances there has been contumacious breach of the Court's orders. Rather, I think that Mr Austin did not fully appreciate the seriousness of the offence and that, rather than face the matters confronting him, he decided to ignore them.
30 In the circumstances it is appropriate that both respondents should be subject to a fine and, as I see no basis on which to differentiate between their liability, they will each be fined $3,500, to be paid to the Registrar within 28 days of the date of this order. They must also pay the applicant's costs on an indemnity basis. In imposing a fine at the lower end of the scale I am mindful of the comments of Moore J (with whom Tamberlin and Goldberg JJ generally agreed) concerning the appropriateness of taking the indemnity costs order into account when fixing a penalty; Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 13.
I certify that the preceding thirty (30) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Stone.