El-Saeidy v NSW Land & Housing Corporation
[2012] NSWSC 876
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Supreme Court of NSW
Decision date
2012-08-06
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (13 paragraphs)
Judgment 1HER HONOUR: In this matter the plaintiff is Fawzi El-Saeidy and the defendant is NSW Land & Housing Corporation (Housing). Both parties seek to vary orders made by this Court. On 27, 28 and 29 June 2011, this matter came before me for hearing. On 9 August 2012, I delivered the substantive judgment in which I made findings about the presence of asbestos at premises in Villawood where the plaintiff and his family are residing. On 22 September 2011, I made an order that: "1.The defendant is to carry out the following work on the premises the subject of a residential tenancy agreement between the defendant as lessor and the plaintiff as lessee, as follows: (a)Remove and replace all the asbestos cement wall linings and all asbestos cement sheets and linings of ceilings in the bathroom, kitchen and laundry; and remove and replace all the asbestos linings on the eaves and in the electricity meter box." 2On 12 December 2011, I made the following orders: "BY CONSENT THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1.Defendant is to relocate the plaintiff and his family to an alternative 3-bedroom property for the duration of the works to XX XXXX Street, Villawood, subject to Mr El-Saeidy's inspection. 2.Defendant is to pay the costs of the plaintiff's removal into and out of the premises (including packing if necessary). 3.The defendant guarantees to relocate Mr El-Saeidy to XX XXXX Street, Villawood after the completion of the works within 7 days on the same lease terms. THE COURT ORDERS (NOT BY CONSENT) THAT: 4.The defendant is permitted to use its own contractors to undertake the work. 5.The plaintiff's possessions are to be relocated for the duration of the works." 3There are two notices of motion before the Court. By further amended notice of motion filed 26 July 2012, the plaintiff now seeks to vary the orders made on 12 December 2011 as follows: "1That in Order 1 made on the 12 December 2011 the following is added: a)In the current circumstances where the Defendant has not been able to supply suitable asbestos free accommodation to the Plaintiff, that the Defendant temporarily relocate the Plaintiff and his family to room no 20 in XXXXX Motel located at XX XXXX XXXX Bass Hill in the State of New South Wales 2197 within 7 days of the date of these orders. 2That in Order 5 made on the 12 December 2011 the following is added: Where the Plaintiff is relocated to the motel above in 1(a), the Plaintiff's possessions are to be kept in the three bedrooms in XX XXXX Street, Villawood NSW 2163 (the property) and that these three bedrooms are to be sealed off in accordance with the occupation, health and safety code of practice. 3The Defendant to commence carrying out the works on the property within 14 days from the day that the Plaintiff and his family are relocated to a suitable temporary accommodation. 4The Defendant is to complete the works on the property within 70 days from the day that the Plaintiff and his family are relocated to a suitable temporary accommodation. a)The Plaintiff allows additional 4 weeks as fair and reasonable time in addition to the Defendant's estimate of 6 weeks for the completion of the works to compensate for any delay in the works to be carried out caused by inclement weather. 5That during the period of the works being carried out that Mr Mahen De Silva have access on three separate occasions to carry out any works needed for the issuing of the Clearance Certificate for the property, before the Plaintiff and his family are allowed to return to the property known as XX XXXX Street, Villawood NSW 2163, as follows: a.3 hours access allowed, after all asbestos materials and sheetings are removed from inside the property including eaves and electricity meter box and before the new material is put in as replacement. b.3 hours access allowed, after asbestos material and all top soils from both front and back yards are removed and before new (clean) top soils are put in as replacement. c.2 hours access allowed, after new (clean) top soils are put in the front yard and back yard of the property..." 4By notice of motion filed 4 July 2012 (amended orally in court; see T5-6), Housing now seeks to vary my orders dated 12 December 2012. Housing seeks that: 1Order 1 of the Consent Orders made on 12 December 2011 is varied to remove the words "subject to Mr El-Saeidy's inspection". 2A declaration that the premises located at XX XXXX Avenue, Bankstown are a suitable "alternative 3-bedroom property", in compliance with order 1 of the Consent Orders made on 12 December 2011. 3The plaintiff and his family are to temporarily relocate to XX XXXX Avenue, Bankstown within 14 days, to enable the defendant to commence works on XX XXXX Street, Villawood as orders by this Court on 12 December 2011. 3AIn the alternative the plaintiff and his family are to temporarily relocate to XX/6 XXXX Street, Villawood within 14 days, to enable the defendant to commence works on XX XXXX Street, Villawood as orders by this Court on 12 December 2011. 4The plaintiff is to pay the defendant's costs of an incidental to this Notice of Motion. 5The defendant is permitted to set off the costs in (4) above against the costs orders made in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant in these proceedings, and/or against the award of damages made in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant on 9 August 2011..." (emphasis in original) 5Mr El-Saeidy relied on his affidavit dated 28 May 2012 and four affidavits of his solicitor Kirco Jakimoski dated 21 May 2012, 28 May 2012, 31 May 2012 and 25 July 2012. Housing relied on the affidavit of its solicitor Leighton James Hawkes dated 3 and 24 July 2012. 6The first issue that I need to address is whether I have power to hear the issues raised in these motions. 7Rule 36.11 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (UCPR) relevantly reads: 36.11Entry of judgments and orders (1)Any judgment or order of the court is to be entered. (2)Unless the court orders otherwise, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the court's computerised court record system..." (emphasis added) 8The judgment in this matter was entered on 12 December 2011. As judgment has been entered I may be functus officio. 9A helpful "common sense" guide in determining whether a case is finalised after judgment can be found in Burrell v The Queen (2008) 238 CLR 218 where Gummow ACJ, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ discuss when an order had been "perfected". Their Honours stated at 224: "Whether a court may reopen a proceeding and reconsider the order that has been pronounced is often described as hinging about whether the order has been "perfected". This use of terminology must not be seen as giving form and procedure precedence over substance and principle. The questions that arise in this matter must depend for their answer not upon what forms and solemnities have been observed but upon how effect is to be given to the principle of finality. In particular, what is to mark the point at which a court concludes its consideration of a controversy? (emphasis added) 10In Landsal v REI Building Society (1993) 41 FCR 421 the Full Court of the Federal Court stated at 427: "This court's implied power to regulate its own procedures in the administration of justice in a particular regard is not confined to a situation in which there is no statute or rule of court that could possibly apply to what is to be done in that regard. The true rule is that a court may exercise its inherent or implied powers in a particular case, even in respect of matters that are regulated by a provision of a statute or rules of court, so long as it can do so without contravening any such provision: see Taylor v The Attorney-General (1975) 2 NZLR 675 at 680, 687-8 and 692-3. Cf Wentworth v NSW Bar Assn (1992) 66 ALJR 360 at 364." (emphasis added) 11On the topic of a Court's inherent jurisdiction, in McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 104, Sackville AJA (with whom Young JA agreed) appeared to approve Landsal v REI Building Society. His Honour said at [187] that: "There is authority for the proposition that the court's inherent jurisdiction is not displaced by rules of court, provided the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction does not contravene the requirements of the rules of court: Lansdale Pty Ltd (in liq) v REI Building Society [1993] FCA 121; 41 FCR 421, at 476, per curiam. But where the rules of court contain provisions such as UCPR, r 2.1, which confer broad powers on the court to give directions or make orders for the conduct of proceedings, there is no good reason in policy or practice to extend the inherent jurisdiction of the court beyond its established scope. To put the matter another way, it is not necessary to extend the inherent jurisdiction of the court beyond its established parameters where the existing powers of the court are adequate to ensure that the interests of justice are served."