Ekes v QBE Insurance

Decision of Smith FM 3 The facts giving rise to the sequestration order are contained in his Honour's judgment. From those facts the following is established. 4 The applicant, who the Court is informed is a solicitor of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, found himself unable to pay his debts as they fell due. The respondent ('QBE') commenced proceedings No 4673/08 ('the District Court proceedings') in the District Court of New South Wales on 3 October 2008. QBE alleged that the applicant owed QBE $106,500.00 under a deposit bond issued in 2006. The statement of claim joined Wajiha Ahmed, the applicant's former wife, as a second defendant. The total claim of QBE, together with costs and interest amount to $110,114.62. 5 Following the institution of the District Court proceedings Mr Ekes initiated the provisions of Part X of the Act. On 11 June 2009 a controlling trustee was appointed pursuant to s 188 of the Act. 6 QBE claimed to be a creditor of the applicant and lodged a proof of debt dated 15 July 2009 with the controlling trustee, attaching a copy of the statement of claim in the District Court proceedings. The documentation lodged with the trustee indicated that QBE had not 'obtained a judgment', nor received any payments in reduction of its debt owed to it by the applicant. 7 The controlling trustee's report included QBE as a creditor and identified QBE's debt as the same as that referred to in the District Court proceedings. 8 On 16 July 2009 QBE participated in a meeting of the creditors which approved the proposed agreement of compromise ('the compromise agreement') amongst the applicant's creditors. Under this agreement, the applicant's unsecured creditors would receive an estimated dividend of 2.17 cents in the dollar. 9 On 2 September 2009 the applicant was allegedly surprised to learn that the District Court proceedings had been fixed for hearing on that day. The applicant attended the District Court where he negotiated a document entitled 'terms of judgment/order' which recorded terms of settlement of the District Court proceedings. Such document made provisions for payment of QBE's debt by instalments of $30,000 to be paid over a period of 12 months. Judgment was entered against the applicant for the total amount of the liability allegedly owing to QBE ('the judgment'). 10 The terms of the settlement were not fulfilled by the applicant. Accordingly QBE issued a bankruptcy notice and subsequently a bankruptcy petition against the applicant, relying upon the judgment obtained in the District Court proceedings. The act of bankruptcy relied upon by QBE was the applicant's non-compliance with the provisions of a bankruptcy notice served on 24 February 2010. Such date was subsequently extended until 12 April 2010 by orders of Smith FM. 11 On the hearing of the bankruptcy petition before Smith FM the applicant argued that QBE was bound by the compromise agreement made pursuant to s 229(1) of the Act, and as such it was not competent for QBE to commence any legal proceeding in respect of its debt, or to take any 'fresh step' in such a proceeding (see s 229(2)(c) of the Act set out below). Smith FM dismissed the applicant's submissions and made the sequestration order against the applicant. 12 Section 229(2) of the Act provides: (2) If a personal insolvency agreement has become binding on the creditors of the debtor, it is not competent for a creditor, so long as the agreement remains valid: (a) to present a creditor's petition against the debtor, or to proceed with such a petition presented before the agreement became so binding, in respect of a provable debt; or (b) to enforce any remedy against the person or property of the debtor in respect of a provable debt; or (c) to commence any legal proceeding in respect of a provable debt or take any fresh step in such a proceeding.

Findings 14 Section 52(3) of the Act vests in a court having jurisdiction under the Act, the power to stay 'all proceedings under a sequestration order for a period not exceeding 21 days'. 15 The applicant appeals to this Court for relief against the decision of Smith FM pursuant to s 24 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ('the Court Act'). Further, O 52 r 17 of the Federal Court Rules ('the Rules') generally authorises the Court to grant a stay. Neither s 24 of the Court Act nor O 52 r 17 of the Rules contain a time limit upon the duration of a stay. 16 In Evans v Heather Thiedeke Group Pty Ltd (1990) 95 ALR 424 the Court held that the power to grant a stay pursuant to s 52(3) of the Act does not nullify the Court's jurisdiction to order a stay under O 52 r 17 of the Rules. Further, since the application for a stay against the operation of the sequestration order was made under s 24 of the Court Act and not under any provision of the Bankruptcy Act, the time limit of 21 days prescribed by s 52(3) of the Bankruptcy Act did not apply. Instead, O 52 r 17 empowers the Court to grant a stay of proceedings unlimited as to time. 17 Subsequent decisions of this Court have referred to and impliedly agreed with the decision in Evans: see Kellow v Dudzinski [2003] FCA 238 per Cooper J; Coleman v Lazy Days Investment Pty Ltd (1994) 55 FCR 297; Freeman v National Australia Bank Ltd [2002] FCA 427 per Spender J. 18 In Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation (1996) 67 FCR 65 Burchett J, delivering the judgment of the Court at 66, referred to the matters necessary to warrant a stay of proceedings. In doing so his Honour referred to two authorities, namely Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (Receivers Appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 at 694 and Re Middle Harbour Investments Ltd (In liq) (unreported), Court of Appeal NSW, 15 December 1976. Such authorities refer to the necessity for an applicant for a stay to demonstrate a reason or an appropriate case to warrant the exercise of the Court's discretion in his favour. 19 In Cambridge Credit Corporation, the New South Wales Court of Appeal at 694 quoted an extract from the decision of Mahoney JA in Middle Harbour Investments Ltd as follows: Where an application is made for a stay of proceedings, it is necessary that the applicant demonstrate an appropriate case. Prima facie, a successful party is entitled to the benefit of the judgment obtained by him and is entitled to commence with the presumption that the judgment is correct. These are not matters of rigid principle and a court asked to grant a stay will consider each case upon its merits, but where an applicant for a stay has not demonstrated an appropriate case but has left the situation in the state of speculation or of mere argument, weight must be given to the fact that the judgment below has been in favour of the other party. 20 In Henderson and Ors v Amadio Pty Ltd and Ors (No 3) (1996) 65 FCR 66, Heerey J adopted such test in respect of an application made under O 52 r 17(1) of the Rules, and said at 69: 'I do not think however the circumstances need to be "special" or "exceptional" in the sense of being unusual or rare'. 21 Prima facie, the subject matter of QBE's District Court proceedings is the same as that for which QBE sought to be included as a creditor of the applicant. Whether QBE was entitled to take any 'fresh step' in the District Court proceedings in view of the compromise agreement clearly raises an important question and justifies the granting of a stay. 22 The Court is satisfied that unless a stay is granted the applicant's claim for relief would be rendered nugatory. 23 For the above reasons the Court ordered on 14 February 2011 that a stay be granted, subject to conditions. I certify that the preceding twenty-three (23) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Cowdroy.

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