NOTICE AND RECOVERY OF RENT
21 Mr. Conomy for the claimant submitted that nothing in cl.8.2 required notice by the tenant, and that the necessary conditions for the implication of a term requiring notice were not satisfied. Certainly, he submitted, there was no requirement that the tenant give notice in writing under cl.8.2.4, and indeed the express reference to notice here and in cl.8.2.3 confirmed that no notice was required in relation to cl.8.2.2. As regards rent actually paid, it was paid under a mistake as to the tenant's rights under the lease, and was accordingly recoverable.
22 Mr. Parker submitted that cl.8.2.2 was not pleaded as a defence in relation to the claim for unpaid rent and outgoings; but he accepted that the case below had been fought partially on that basis, and took no pleading point. He submitted that the position was analogous to that of a covenant to repair, in relation to which it was established that a landlord was not in breach of a covenant to repair unless the landlord had notice of the relevant need for repair: Makin v. Watkinson (1870) LR 6 Ex. 25 at 28-29; Morgan v. Liverpool Corporation [1927] 2 KB 131; McCarrick v. Liverpool Corporation [1947] AC 219; and O'Brien v. Robinson [1973] AC 912. Otherwise, he submitted, the landlord could be subject to loss of rent, even though it had been given no opportunity to repair or to give notice under cl.8.2.3 - and clearly, the clause contemplated that the landlord would have those options. The landlord could therefore be subject to a very substantial loss of rent in relation to something that could have been easily and cheaply repaired. Accordingly, there should be implied in cl.8.2 a term that abatement was conditional on the landlord being notified of the relevant damage within a reasonable time of the damage having arisen.
23 In any event, Mr. Parker submitted, there should be no refund of rent and outgoings actually paid, since they were voluntary payments and not fairly regarded as induced by mistake: see J & S Holdings Pty. Ltd. v. NRMA Insurance Ltd. (1982) 61 FLR 108 at 124; David Securities Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353 at 373-4.
24 In my opinion, it is convenient to consider the matter separately in relation to a claim for abatement in respect of rent and outgoings already paid, and a claim in respect of rent and outgoings that have not been paid.
25 Dealing first with the case of rent that has already been paid in full, in discharge of a liability for rent that has actually arisen, it would in my opinion be a most unreasonable result if the tenant could claim a refund of that rent or part of it, at least unless the tenant had made a claim for abatement of the rent and had paid the rent under protest or otherwise provisionally pending resolution of that claim. Otherwise, a landlord having no reason to suppose that anything was wrong would be deprived of the option of repairing the damage or terminating the lease under cl.8.2.4, and may be liable to make very substantial refunds of rent. I think it most unlikely that that result could have been intended.
26 There are at least three possible ways in which that result could be avoided.
27 First, it could be avoided by way of implication from the actual language used in cl.8.2. Clause 8.2 relates to adjustment of liability to pay rent or outgoings, and it is implicit in the wording of the clause that some claim for that abatement must be made. Since the adjustment is to liability, it could be understood that the claim for abatement has to be made at a time when the liability exists, or before it arises; so that when there is no liability because the liability has arisen and been discharged, there is nothing to which a claim for abatement can relate.
28 A second way in which the result might be avoided is in terms of non-availability of restitutionary relief, where a payment has been made voluntarily and, by reason of the payment and lack of notification of a claim for abatement, the landlord has lost the opportunity to either repair or terminate the lease. It could well be that in such situation the change in position of the landlord would be enough to deny a restitutionary remedy, even if it could be said that the tenant's payment was relevantly induced by a mistake.
29 The third possible way in which the result could be avoided would be the implication of a term on the basis of business efficacy. If it be the case that neither of the first two alternatives were considered valid, the requirements for implication of a term for business efficacy set out in BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty. Ltd. v. Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266 at 283 could be satisfied. The implication would in those circumstances be reasonable and equitable; it would be necessary to give business efficacy, in the sense of avoiding a wholly unreasonable result, and would I think go without saying; it would be capable of clear expression and would not be contradicted by express terms of the contract.
30 It is not necessary to express a final view on which of these three approaches is correct. I propose that leave to appeal be refused in relation to the claim for a refund.
31 Turning to the case of rent and outgoings that have not yet been paid, in my opinion the situation is different. It is by no means obvious that it would be unreasonable for an abatement to occur, even if the landlord does not know about the damage and even if the claim for abatement is not made until proceedings are brought for the rent. For example, if a tenant dies, the property is shortly afterwards destroyed by fire, and for some reason the landlord does not find out about this for some time, it is by no means clear that it would be unreasonable that the estate of deceased tenant should be entitled to an abatement of rent, even in respect of a period before the landlord had notice. I do not think any of the three bases of denying relief to the tenant in relation to rent and outgoings already paid apply here. In particular, I do not think that the implication of a term requiring notice in these circumstances is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract. If in any particular case a landlord is disadvantaged because of some failure by the tenant to communicate the damage to the landlord, in circumstances where such communication should have been made, the landlord may be able to rely on an estoppel.
32 In these circumstances, I do not think there is a ground made out for not applying the literal terms of cl.8.2.2, unaffected by any implication, in relation to rent and outgoings not yet paid.