1. The decision of the respondent is affirmed.
2. Costs reserved.

1. In 1993, Ms Wendy Eccles was involved in a transport accident resulting in complete quadriplegia and other injuries. In 1994, she married her fiancé. The Eccles have three children, who are now all in high school. They run a dairy farm, 120 km from Warrnambool. Ms Eccles performs the business administration, for which she studied. All this is testament to Ms Eccles' determination to regain functioning and participate in life.
2. However, life is difficult. Ms Eccles must use a wheelchair and requires assistance with all transfers and is unable to access facilities where there is limited turning space or steps or stairs
3. Ms Eccles' occupational therapist advises her that there is great benefit, in terms of improving mental health and minimising disability, in getting out and about.
4. An aspect of Ms Eccles participating in life is family holidays twice a year when the farm schedule allows. Standard accommodation is unsuitable given her needs. Wheelchair suitable accommodation is sometimes more expensive and can be difficult or impossible to book on the dates and times dictated by the farm. Often, they need to book an extra room due to Ms Eccles' disability. Tents have proved impractical. Upmarket accommodation is beyond their means.
5. Travel over all but short distances is very difficult for Ms Eccles. In particular, it is vital for infection control reasons, that she access toilet facilities in a hygienic fashion. Relying on public toilets and toilets in cafes etc is not practical or safe. Toileting can take over an hour.
6. Also, Ms Eccles wants to return to camping and caravanning, which she and her husband did before the accident. About 12 years ago, they bought a caravan but had to sell it. They discovered it was impractical to use in a wheelchair. They have now discovered a wheelchair friendly caravan, called the Accessavan (the Caravan) ideal to their needs and have entered into a contract to buy one.
7. This will allow the family to holiday, returning to camping and facilitate travel with access to hygienic toilet facilities in caravan.
8. Since 1993, the Transport Accident Commission (TAC) has provided significant compensation to Ms Eccles under the Transport Accident Act 1986 (the Act). However, TAC declined to pay the difference ($51,350[1]) between the family purchasing a standard caravan and the cost of the wheelchair friendly caravan.
9. Ms Eccles asks VCAT to decide TAC should pay that amount.
10. On 19 December 2011, I heard Ms Eccles' application. Both parties were legally represented. They were content with me accepting the documents filed in the proceeding as the relevant evidence. I heard submissions and reserved my decision.
11. Counsel for Ms Eccles submitted that under section 60(2)(a) of the Act, VCAT should decide that TAC is to pay Ms Eccles compensation being the costs claimed with respect to the Caravan, because the Caravan is an "aid" as defined within the term "rehabilitation service", as defined by section 3 of the Act, in context of the authorities I discuss below.
12. TAC referred to much the same authorities submitting this claim was beyond what Parliament intends to be paid under the Act.

1. Ms Eccles submits TAC should pay the amount sought because the Caravan is an "aid" within the definition of "rehabilitation service" within the Act[2].
2. The Act establishes a scheme of compensation for those who are injured or die as a result of a transport accident (section 1). The objects of the Act include provide, in the most socially and economically appropriate manner, suitable and just compensation in respect of persons injured as a result of transport accidents (section 8). Division 2 of Part 3 of the Act sets out the provisions concerning entitlement to compensation and Division 3, the benefits available.
3. Section 3 defines "rehabilitation service" to mean,

the provision to or for a person for the purpose of rehabilitation of any aid, treatment, counselling, appliance, apparatus or other service (other than a disability service or a hospital service), the provision of which is an authorised service in accordance with section 23.

23 Commission may authorise persons or services

(a) services to be disability services or rehabilitation services; or

(aa) services to be approved services for the purposes of individual funding agreements; or

(ab) a person to provide services for the purposes of section 60A; or

(b) persons to provide services for the purposes of section 60(2)(c), 60(2)(ca), 60(2)(d) or 60(2A); or

(c) a person as a provider of vocational rehabilitation services.

(3) A person whose interests are affected by a decision of the Commission to refuse to authorise a person or service may apply to the Tribunal for review of the decision.

1. Section 60 is headed, "Medical and like benefits". It specifies amounts the TAC is liable to pay as compensation in addition to any other compensation paid under the Act (see s 60(1)).
2. Section s 60(2)(a) says:

(2) The Commission is liable to pay as compensation to a person who is injured or in respect of a person who dies as a result of a transport accident -

(a) the reasonable costs of ... disability services, rehabilitation services, transportation costs ... received in Australia because of the transport accident; and

1. The starting point in deciding whether Ms Eccles will succeed in her claim is G.C Wood (Aust) Pty Ltd v Cullen [1991] 2VR 214. The Appeal Division of the Full Court (Young C.J, O'Bryan and Vincent JJ) were in part, considering whether an electric wheelchair was within the definition of "medical service". They decided it was. O'Bryan J (with whom the other judges agreed) referred to the definition of "medical service" in the Accident Compensation Act 1985. Section 26 concerned employers' liability to pay as compensation reasonable costs of medical services incurred due to injury. The term "medical services" was defined to include,

the provision to or for the worker otherwise than as a patient in a hospital of medical or surgical aids to rehabilitation for treatment or assistance for all with respect to his industrial rehabilitation or of curative appliances or apparatus.

In my opinion, the words [medical aids to rehabilitation or curative appliances or apparatus] should not be read too narrowly. The restrictive meaning should not be given to "rehabilitation" having regard to the nature of the legislation. The evidence showed it is medically desirable that the respondent should enjoy mobility by means of electric chair. The word "rehabilitation" comprehends not only restoration to a former health (the narrow meaning) but also to restore partially or completely to a better condition: the Oxford dictionary (1989), vol 13. Rehabilitative medicine in our community is not confined to persons who can or will be restored to former health but is available to assist persons whose health would otherwise deteriorate.

1. In Keler v TAC [2002] VCAT 445, Macnamara DP followed O'Bryan J's interpretation of the meaning of "rehabilitation" as adopted in GC Wood. He quoted the above passage and continued,

It seems to me there for that according to his honour's formulation, the general concept of rehabilitation covers a least three things. First, services that are intended to restore a subject to his former health, secondly, services which partially restore him or her and thirdly, services which prevent further deterioration.

1. However, he dismissed the application because the services in question were not part of a structured rehabilitation service.
2. In deciding McDonald v TAC [2006] VCAT 183, Coghlan DP interpreted the words, "rehabilitation service". She decided upgrading the driveway and installing ramps at Mr McDonald's parents' home was the providing of aids and should be funded as part of rehabilitation. At paragraph 66, Coghlan DP said the definition of "rehabilitation service" contemplates the provision of any aid for the purposes of rehabilitation and that such words should not be read down or confined. At paragraph 67, she considered that the correct approach is to consider if the "aid" requested, here the upgrade of the parents' driveway and ramps, would assist with Mr McDonald's rehabilitation. At paragraph 68 she agreed "rehabilitation" should be given a wide meaning, citing O'Bryan J in GC Wood. At paragraph 69, she said,

"rehabilitation" should not be confined to restoration to former health, but is wide enough to include partial restoration to a better condition and the provision of something that will assist persons whose health would otherwise deteriorate, where "health" ... is defined in the constitution of the world health organisation and is "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.

1. In Bekker v Transport Accident Commission (General) [2010] VCAT 1265 (5 August 2010), I rejected a claim for the funding of an engine rebuild, running costs including aircraft fuel, annual service and maintenance and periodic replacement propeller blades. Mr Bekker's claim was not frivolous. He was seriously disabled. Flying was an important freedom in his life.
2. In deciding Bekker, I saw O'Bryan J's words in GC Wood as relevant. However, I also saw Mr Bekker's application as quite different to McDonald. Mr Bekker sought the provision of a mix of goods and services. I concluded,

To decide that TAC should pay for the provision of the goods sought because they are an aid or apparatus is in my view an unsustainable interpretation of the definition of rehabilitation service. In my view a plain reading of the relevant sections do not show Parliament intended that the engine parts and/or fuel which would be required would fit within the definition as an aid, appliance or apparatus provided for the purpose of rehabilitation.

Such a decision would go well beyond that of Deputy President Coghlan in McDonald. She was dealing with the provision of a one off item, which is not the case here.

1. In deciding D v Transport Accident Commission (General) [2010] VCAT 1434 (2 September 2010), Macnamara DP rejected,

... the contention that the wide concept of rehabilitation espoused by O'Bryan J in GC Wood and Son (Aust) Pty Ltd v Cullen [1991] VicRp 62; [1991] 2 VR 214 could not or should not be applied under the Transport Accident Act. The Workers Compensation Act 1958 was beneficial legislation whilst the Transport Accident Act 1986 constitutes a mixture of provisions some of which limit entitlements which a plaintiff injured in a transport accident might otherwise have a Common Law. Section 60 of the Act which is the provision under which the present compensation would be payable if other things were equal is available alike to those entitled to Common Law damages such as D and those who are not. Section 60 is to be regarded as 'beneficial' legislation at least as 'beneficial' as the corresponding provisions in the Workers Compensation Act 1958.

1. I affirm TAC's decision not to pay the compensation Ms Eccles seeks.
2. I accept Ms Eccles has good reasons for making her application in terms of the benefit she would derive from buying the Caravan. However, I do not accept the provision of the Caravan, or a substantial contribution to its purchase price can be described as an "aid" as described above.
3. The submission put on Ms Eccles' behalf is on first impression arguable.
4. The word "aid" is defined in the Australian Oxford Dictionary (Second Edition) as, "a material source of help".
5. It is arguable that:

1. In O'Bryan J's words in GC Wood, that the evidence shows it is medically desirable that Ms Eccles should enjoy mobility by means of the Caravan to restore her partially or completely to a better condition where her health may otherwise deteriorate if she travels in less than optimum conditions in terms of hygiene. 2. In Macnamara DP's words in Keler, providing the Caravan is intended to partially restore Ms Eccles to her former health and prevent further deterioration.

1. In McDonald, Coghlan DP saw ramps and doorway widening as a 'material source of help' (my words) for Mr McDonald in providing safe access to his parent's home as an aid to rehabilitation. As she said, such words, "should not be read down or confined".
2. Also, as Macnamara DP said in D, section 60 of the TAC Act is to be regarded as 'beneficial' legislation at least as 'beneficial' as the corresponding provisions in the Workers Compensation Act 1958.
3. I agree the nature of this application is different from the application I decided in Bekker. Ms Eccles seeks a financial contribution for a one off purchase, a physical item, not a mixture of goods and services with ongoing contributions concerning an aeroplane.
4. However, in my view the argument fails the following reasons.
5. In its letter of 8 March 2011, where TAC advised Ms Eccles it refused her application, it said,

I note that the provision of caravan is not covered by any service currently authorised under [section 23 of] the Act. The TAC, after careful consideration is not satisfied that the provision of caravan meets the criteria for authorisation as a rehabilitation service under the Act. The TAC is not satisfied that the provision of caravan is the purpose of rehabilitation or does not form part of a rehabilitation program, and these criteria must be met in order for the TAC to consider authorisation of the service under section 23 of the Act. In arriving at this conclusion the TAC has considered whether the provision of a caravan can be said to be an aid or apparatus the purpose of rehabilitation. We have concluded that a caravan is a capital cost and is therefore not capable of authorisation as a rehabilitation service under the Act.

I regret that the TAC has concluded that paying for a caravan is not currently allowed by the Act and that there is no capacity to authorise the provision under the Transport Accident Act 1986.

1. I agree with TAC that Parliament did not intend the definition of "aid" to include the provision of modified caravans and so potentially the contribution of the cost of such modification.
2. While the word "aid" has a broad dictionary definition, here it must be read in the context of the section 3 definition of "rehabilitation service",

the provision to or for a person for the purpose of rehabilitation of any aid, treatment, counselling, appliance, apparatus or other service (other than a disability service or a hospital service), the provision of which is an authorised service in accordance with section 23.

1. I readily follow the words of Macnamara DP in Keler and Coghlan DP in McDonald quoted at paragraphs 21 and 23 above.
2. However, the request here is for a much more substantial and much more expensive physical item than either O'Bryan J or Coghlan DP (assuming the driveway and ramp cost would not in 2006 cost $50,000) were considering.
3. A natural reading of the definition does not bring to my mind an expectation that a modified caravan may be funded under the term "aid", either on first reading or once the suggestion is made. To reach that conclusion would, in my opinion, stretch the definition of "aid" in this context beyond the limits of permissible statutory construction.
4. The central issue of interpretation is "aid" must be read in the context of the entire Act and in the context of the paragraph in which it appears.
5. In Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 5th ed D.C. Pearce and R.S. Geddes address this issue and say (pg 102);

Noscitur a sociis: the meaning of a word or phrase is to be derived from its context

Although usually stated separately, the noscitur a sociis rule reflects the same philosophy as the general approach of reading and Act as a whole. When writing, a person assumes the reader will not read the document word by word but will look at whole phrases or sections. ...

The ... approach can lead to the delimitation of the scope of the word ... a word of wider possible connotation will be limited by the context in which it appears. Thus in Prior v Sherwood [1906] ArgusLawRp 57; (1906) 3 CLR 1054 the court held that a prohibition against bookmaking in any 'house, office, room or place' did not extend to a public lane. The wide possible meaning that could have been attributed to the word 'place' was limited by its use in conjunction with 'house', 'office' and 'room' which the court considered denoted an enclosed or definable area. Similarly, the word 'qualifications' in a section relating to the registration of medical practitioners was held to refer to academic qualifications and not the wider meaning of personal qualities or accomplishments: R v Refshauge (1976) 11 ALR 471 at 475. See also Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 94 ALR 11 at 53 per Toohey and Gaudron JJ. Where a word has many shades of meaning, the context in which it appears will be of the greatest significance: FCT v Applegate [1920] ArgusLawRp 104; (1979) 27 ALR 114 ('permanent').

1. Here the relevant 'limiting' words in my view are "equipment" and "apparatus". The Australian Oxford Dictionary (Second Edition) defines
   1. "equipment as, "the necessary articles, clothing etc for a purpose"; and
   2. "apparatus" as, "the equipment needed for a particular purpose or function, especially scientific or technical".
2. This context serves to limit the class of items which fall within the terms of "aid" in this context. In my view, a caravan (or the cost of modification) is an item beyond the class of physical items which Parliament intended be funded under the term "aid" within the term, "rehabilitation services".
3. I am reinforced in my view by there being two examples of the provision of contributions to major capital items (my term) under section 60 of the Act. They are contributions towards motor vehicles (section 60(3A) and (3B) and homes (section 60(4), (4A) and (4B). I take this as an indication that if Parliament intended to in appropriate cases to fund or partially fund the buying of a modified caravan, it would have clearly said so in the Act and could do so by legislative amendment if it chose.
4. Further, I note the words of the High Court in Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Brown [2003] HCA 54; (2003) 201 ALR 260; (2003) 77 ALJR 1797 (30 September 2003), to which TAC drew my attention. Clause 5 of Schedule 1 to the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW) provided:

"The following applies to the compensable injury of shock:

(a) Compensation is payable only if the symptoms and disability persist for more than 6 weeks.

(b) The injury comprises conditions attributed to post traumatic stress disorder, depression and similar conditions.

(c) The psychological symptoms include anxiety, tension, insomnia, irritability, loss of confidence, agoraphobia and pre-occupation with thoughts of self-harm or guilt.

(d) The physical symptoms include alopecia, asthma, eczema, enuresis and psoriasis.

(e) Relevant disabilities include impaired work or school or other educational performance, significant adverse effects on social relationships and sexual dysfunction."

To begin consideration of issues of construction by positing that a "liberal", "broad", or "narrow" construction will be given tends to obscure the essential question, that of determining the meaning the relevant words used require. Although the purpose of the Act is beneficial, it does not follow that recovery is contemplated for every act of violence or every consequence that could be described as an injury. The numerous injuries set out in the Table to Sched 1 (which extends over twelve pages) are identified with considerable precision. The clauses in Sched 1 which precede the Table, too, are drafted with some attempt at precision. The legislation confers benefits, and no doubt it should not be construed restrictively, but in dealing with specific limited words like those of cl 5, it is not open to apply much liberality of construction. It is difficult to state the legislative purpose except at such extreme levels of generality that it is not useful in construing particular parts of the legislative language. As Spigelman CJ said "The issue before the Court is the determination of the circumstances in which compensation is payable." The legislation has endeavoured to define these circumstances in precise language which does not permit universal recovery; and hence "[t]he Court is not required to give the most expansive possible interpretation of such circumstances". (citations omitted)

1. Similar to my decision in Bekker, I conclude that to decide that TAC should pay for the provision of the Caravan as an "aid", within the definition of "rehabilitation service" is an unsustainable interpretation of the definition of rehabilitation service.
2. Finally, given my view I do not address the role of section 23 of the Act concerning authorisation with respect to the provision of aids, appliances and apparatus.

[1] Claim for the full cost of the caravan abandoned at hearing.

[2] Other legal contentions to support the claim were abandoned at the hearing.