The applicant DVT made a complaint under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (PPIPA) on 2 March 2020 to the Privacy Coordinator of the NSW Police Force.
The complaint concerned an affidavit filed by a solicitor acting for the Commissioner of Police in proceedings between the Commissioner and DVT in the Federal Circuit Court. According to the complaint, the affidavit was made in support of an application for substituted service of a Creditor's Petition and the affidavit contained the residential address of DVT. DVT complained that the respondent collected that address contrary to s 8(2) of the PPIPA.
The respondent undertook a review of the conduct pursuant to s 53 of the PPIPA in response to the complaint. In its findings on the review, dated 5 May 2020, the respondent determined that there had been no contravention of the PPIPA and decided to take no action.
On 7 May 2020 the applicant wrote to the respondent that the internal review did not comply with s 53(8)(a) of the PPIPA and continued:
"Pursuant to section 49(1) of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997, please provide me with a written statement of reasons which sets out the matters referred to in s 49(3) of that Act."
Section 53(8)(a) requires that the agency notify the applicant of the findings of the review and the reasons for those findings.
The respondent wrote to the applicant seeking clarification. The respondent replied that the internal review "fails to set out the findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based."
The respondent replied that in its view the internal review complied with s 49 of the ADRA.
DVT sought review of the 5 May 2020 decision in the Tribunal by way of an administrative review application filed on 12 May 2020.
On 5 June 2020 the respondent lodged material pursuant to s 58(1) and (1a) of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (ADRA). It also lodged an application under s 59(2) of the ADRA ("the Confidentiality Application") that a confidential bundle of material not be lodged as the documents were subject to client legal privilege for the purposes of s 67 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (CAT Act).
On 31 August 2020 DVT filed an application for miscellaneous matters ("the Reasons Application") seeking the following orders:
1. The respondent is directed to provide a statement of reasons that complies with s 49(3) of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997.
2. Direction number 6 made on 30 June 2020 is vacated.
On 22 September the Tribunal determined the Confidentiality Application in the respondent's favour and ordered that the publication of that material was prohibited.
On 25 September 2020, the respondent filed an application that the Reasons Application be dismissed under s 52(2) of the ADRA ("the Dismissal Application").
These reasons deal with the Dismissal Application.
[2]
The issues for determination
The respondent submits that the Reasons Application should be dismissed because:
1. It is misconceived and lacks utility and substance
2. The reasons already provided are adequate
3. Alternatively, any inadequacy in the reasons are a result of the confidentiality of underlying documents protected by the orders made on the Confidentiality Application, such that the Tribunal should not order the respondent to provide any further statement of reasons
4. The circumstances in which the application was filed amounts to an abuse of process.
The applicant submits that the statement of reasons is inadequate because:
1. It fails to set out findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based, in accordance with s 49(3) and s 52(3).
2. It fails to identify:
1. the name of the person or body from whom the respondent collected the personal information
2. Whether the receipt of the personal information was solicited
3. The date on which the personal information was collected
4. The means by which the personal information was collected.
1. These factors lead to the conclusion that the respondent has failed to set out the reasoning processes. This leads to the conclusion that it did not collect the information by unlawful means.
2. Client legal privilege is not available to the respondent in these circumstances.
The order made on 30 June referred to in the Application was an order that the applicant file and serve his evidence and material in respect of the substantive privacy review on or before 28 August 2020.
[3]
Relevant legislation
Sections 49 to 52 of the ADRA provide:
"49 Duty of administrator to give reasons on request
(1) If an administrator makes an administratively reviewable decision, an interested person may make a written request to the administrator for the reasons for the decision.
(2) As soon as practicable (and in any event within 28 days) after receiving such a request, the administrator is to prepare a written statement of reasons for the decision and provide it to the person who requested the reasons.
(3) The statement of reasons is to set out the following:
(a) the findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based,
(b) the administrator's understanding of the applicable law,
(c) the reasoning processes that led the administrator to the conclusions the administrator made.
(4) The regulations may:
(a) exclude any class of administratively reviewable decisions from the application of this section, or
(b) alter the period within which a statement of reasons under this section must be given.
50 Administrator may refuse reasons in certain cases
(1) An administrator may refuse to prepare and provide a statement of reasons requested by a person under this Division if:
(a) the administrator is of the opinion that the person is not entitled to be given the statement, or
(b) in the case of a decision the terms of which were recorded in writing and set out in a document that was provided to the person - the request was not made within 28 days after the person was provided with the document, or
(c) in any other case - the request was not made within a reasonable time after the decision was made.
(2) An administrator who refuses under subsection (1) to prepare and provide a statement of reasons must notify the person requesting the statement, in writing, of the administrator's refusal and the reasons for the refusal as soon as practicable (and in any event within 28 days) after the request.
(3) The administrator is not to refuse to prepare and provide a statement of reasons if:
(a) in the case of a refusal based on subsection (1) (a) - the Tribunal declares, on an application made under section 51 (1), that the person who made the request was entitled to make the request, or
(b) in the case of a refusal based on subsection (1) (c) - the Tribunal declares, on an application made under section 51 (2), that the person who made the request did so within a reasonable time.
(4) If an administrator cannot refuse to comply with a request for a statement of reasons because of a decision of the Tribunal referred to in subsection (3), the administrator must prepare the written statement of reasons that was originally requested and provide it to the person who requested it as soon as practicable (and in any event within 28 days) after the Tribunal's decision.
51 Tribunal may determine whether person entitled to reasons or made request within reasonable time
(1) The Tribunal may, on the application of a person who has been refused a statement of reasons under section 50 (1) (a), make an order declaring that the person was, or was not, entitled to make the request to which the notice relates.
(2) The Tribunal may, on the application of a person who has been refused a statement of reasons under section 50 (1) (c) on the basis that the person did not make the request within a reasonable time, make an order declaring that the person did make the request within a reasonable time.
52 Tribunal may order administrator to provide a statement of reasons or an adequate statement of reasons
(1) If an interested person has requested a statement of reasons under section 49 but has not received it within the period specified by or under that section, the Tribunal may (on the application of the person) order the administrator concerned to provide the statement of reasons within such time as may be specified in the order.
(2) If an interested person who requested a statement of reasons under section 49 is given an inadequate statement of reasons, the Tribunal may (on the application of the person) order the administrator concerned to provide an adequate statement of reasons within such time as may be specified in the order.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a statement of reasons is an adequate statement of reasons only if it sets out the matters referred to in section 49 (3)."
Section 58 and 59 provide:
"58 Duty of administrator to lodge material documents with Tribunal where decision reviewed
(1) An administrator whose administratively reviewable decision is the subject of an application for review to the Tribunal must, within 28 days after receiving notice of the application, lodge with the Tribunal:
(a) a copy of any statement of reasons given to the applicant under section 49 (or, if no such statement was given to the applicant, a statement of reasons setting out the matters referred to in section 49 (3)), and
(a1) a copy of any statement of reasons for a decision in an internal review conducted in respect of the administratively reviewable decision, and
(b) a copy of every document or part of a document that is in the possession, or under the control, of the administrator that the administrator considers to be relevant to the determination of the application by the Tribunal.
(2) If the applicant has not been given a statement of reasons under section 49, the Tribunal may direct that a copy of the statement of reasons lodged with the Tribunal under subsection (1) (a) be given to the applicant within such period or periods as the Tribunal directs.
(3) If the Tribunal or President considers that a party to the proceedings would or might suffer hardship if the period of 28 days provided by subsection (1) is not shortened or extended, the Tribunal or President may, at the request of the party, make an order directing that the copies referred to in that subsection be lodged with the Tribunal within such shorter or extended period as is specified in the order.
(4) If the Tribunal or President considers that other particular documents (or that other documents included in a particular class of documents) may be relevant to the determination of the application, it may cause a notice in writing to be served on the administrator:
(a) stating that the Tribunal or President is of that opinion, and
(b) directing the administrator concerned to lodge with the Tribunal, before a date specified in the notice, a copy of each of those other documents that is in the possession, or under the control, of the administrator.
(5) The principal registrar of the Tribunal is to grant reasonable access to the applicant in the proceedings to any copy of a document lodged under this section by an administrator. Reasonable access includes, but is not limited to, enabling the applicant to make a photocopy of a document during ordinary business hours.
(6) If a party to proceedings before the Tribunal seeks a summons under the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 against an administrator for the production of any document and a copy of that document has been lodged with the Tribunal under subsection (1) or (4), the Tribunal may (on such conditions as it considers appropriate) direct the principal registrar of the Tribunal to grant the party access to its copy of the document instead of issuing a summons if access to the document could lawfully be required by the issue of a summons.
(7) Nothing in this section requires the disclosure of, or the granting of access to, any document (or a copy of a document) in contravention of any of the following:
(a) an order made under section 59 (Objections to lodgment),
(b) an order made under section 64 (Tribunal may restrict disclosures concerning procedures) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013,
(c) section 66 (Effect of Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009) or section 67 (Privileged documents) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (as applied by section 67 of this Act).
(8) For the purposes of this section, a reference to a document in the possession of an administrator includes a reference to a document to which the administrator has an immediate right of access.
59 Objections to lodgment
(1) An administrator may apply to the Tribunal before the expiry of the period referred to in section 58 (1) for an order that the administrator not be required to lodge a copy of a document under section 58.
(2) On any such application, the Tribunal may make an order that a copy of a document not be lodged with the Tribunal if:
(a) it is satisfied that section 67 (Privileged documents) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (as applied by section 67 of this Act) operates so as not to require the disclosure of the document, or
(b) it considers that, if an application were made under section 64 (Tribunal may restrict disclosures concerning procedures) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, it would be appropriate to make an order under that section prohibiting or restricting the publication or disclosure of evidence of the document."
Section 53 and 55 of the PPIPA provide:
"53 Internal review by public sector agencies
(1) A person (the applicant) who is aggrieved by the conduct of a public sector agency is entitled to a review of that conduct.
(1A) There is no entitlement under this section to the review of the conduct of a Minister (or a Minister's personal staff) in respect of a contravention of section 15 (Alteration of personal information).
Note -
Any such conduct can still be administratively reviewed by the Tribunal. See section 55 (1A).
(2) The review is to be undertaken by the public sector agency concerned.
(3) An application for such a review must -
(a) be in writing, and
(b) be addressed to the public sector agency concerned, and
(c) specify an address in Australia to which a notice under subsection (8) may be sent, and
(d) be lodged at an office of the public sector agency within 6 months (or such later date as the agency may allow) from the time the applicant first became aware of the conduct the subject of the application, and
(e) comply with such other requirements as may be prescribed by the regulations.
(4) Except as provided by section 54 (3), the application must be dealt with by an individual within the public sector agency who is directed by the agency to deal with the application. That individual must be, as far as is practicable, a person -
(a) who was not substantially involved in any matter relating to the conduct the subject of the application, and
(b) who is an employee or officer of the agency, and
(c) who is otherwise suitably qualified to deal with the matters raised by the application.
(5) In reviewing the conduct the subject of the application, the individual dealing with the application must consider any relevant material submitted by -
(a) the applicant, and
(b) the Privacy Commissioner.
(6) The review must be completed as soon as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances. However, if the review is not completed within 60 days from the day on which the application was received, the applicant is entitled to make an application under section 55 to the Tribunal for an administrative review of the conduct concerned.
(7) Following the completion of the review, the public sector agency whose conduct was the subject of the application may do any one or more of the following -
(a) take no further action on the matter,
(b) make a formal apology to the applicant,
(c) take such remedial action as it thinks appropriate (eg the payment of monetary compensation to the applicant),
(d) provide undertakings that the conduct will not occur again,
(e) implement administrative measures to ensure that the conduct will not occur again.
(7A) A public sector agency may not pay monetary compensation under subsection (7) if -
(a) the applicant is a convicted inmate or former convicted inmate or a spouse, partner (whether of the same or the opposite sex), relative, friend or an associate of a convicted inmate or former convicted inmate, and
(b) the application relates to conduct of a public sector agency in relation to the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate, and
(c) the conduct occurred while the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate was a convicted inmate, or relates to any period during which the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate was a convicted inmate.
(8) As soon as practicable (or in any event within 14 days) after the completion of the review, the public sector agency must notify the applicant in writing of -
(a) the findings of the review (and the reasons for those findings), and
(b) the action proposed to be taken by the agency (and the reasons for taking that action), and
(c) the right of the person to have those findings, and the agency's proposed action, administratively reviewed by the Tribunal.
55 Administrative review of conduct by Tribunal
(1) If a person who has made an application for internal review under section 53 is not satisfied with -
(a) the findings of the review, or
(b) the action taken by the public sector agency in relation to the application,
the person may apply to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of the conduct that was the subject of the application under section 53.
(1A) A person (the applicant) who is aggrieved by the conduct of a Minister (or a Minister's personal staff) constituting a contravention of section 15 (Alteration of personal information) may apply to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of the conduct.
(2) On reviewing the conduct of the public sector agency concerned, the Tribunal may decide not to take any action on the matter, or it may make any one or more of the following orders -
(a) subject to subsections (4) and (4A), an order requiring the public sector agency to pay to the applicant damages not exceeding $40,000 by way of compensation for any loss or damage suffered because of the conduct,
(b) an order requiring the public sector agency to refrain from any conduct or action in contravention of an information protection principle or a privacy code of practice,
(c) an order requiring the performance of an information protection principle or a privacy code of practice,
(d) an order requiring personal information that has been disclosed to be corrected by the public sector agency,
(e) an order requiring the public sector agency to take specified steps to remedy any loss or damage suffered by the applicant,
(f) an order requiring the public sector agency not to disclose personal information contained in a public register,
(g) such ancillary orders as the Tribunal thinks appropriate.
(3) Nothing in this section limits any other powers that the Tribunal has under Division 3 of Part 3 of Chapter 3 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997.
(4) The Tribunal may make an order under subsection (2) (a) only if -
(a) the application relates to conduct that occurs after the end of the 12 month period following the date on which Division 1 of Part 2 commences, and
(b) the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has suffered financial loss, or psychological or physical harm, because of the conduct of the public sector agency.
(4A) The Tribunal may not make an order under subsection (2) (a) if -
(a) the applicant is a convicted inmate or former convicted inmate or a spouse, partner (whether of the same or the opposite sex), relative, friend or an associate of a convicted inmate or former convicted inmate, and
(b) the application relates to conduct of a public sector agency in relation to the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate, and
(c) the conduct occurred while the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate was a convicted inmate, or relates to any period during which the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate was a convicted inmate.
(5) If, in the course of an administrative review, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the chief executive officer or an employee of the public sector agency concerned has failed to exercise in good faith a function conferred or imposed on the officer or employee by or under this Act (including by or under a privacy code of practice), the Tribunal may take such measures as it considers appropriate to bring the matter to the attention of the responsible Minister (if any) for the public sector agency.
(6) The Privacy Commissioner is to be notified by the Tribunal of any application for an administrative review. The Privacy Commissioner has a right to appear and be heard in any proceedings before the Tribunal in relation to an administrative review.
(7) The Information Commissioner is to be notified by the Tribunal of any application for a review under this section that concerns the provision of government information by an agency (within the meaning of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009). The Information Commissioner has a right to appear and be heard in any proceedings before the Tribunal in relation to such a review."
[4]
Whether the application is misconceived and lacks utility
There are two main grounds on which this submission is based.
Firstly, the respondent submits that its obligation to give an adequate statement of reasons under s 49 of the ADRA, as sought by the application, has been superseded by its obligation under s 58(1)(a) now that the administratively reviewable decision is the subject of an application for review in the Tribunal.
Parts 2 and 3 of the ADRA deal with separate stages of the administrative review process. Part 2 deals with the role of administrators. Within Part 2, s 49 deals with the entitlement to a statement of reasons within 28 days after the decision has been made by the administrator. Section 49(3) sets out what the statement of reasons must contain. Section 52(2) provides that if a person who requested a statement of reasons under s 49 is given an inadequate statement of reasons, the Tribunal may (on the application of the person) order the administrator to provide an adequate statement of reasons.
Part 3 of the ADRA deals with the role of the Tribunal. Section 55 deals with the making of applications for an administrative review. Section 58(1)(a) deals with the requirement for the respondent in administrative review proceedings to provide a copy of any statement of reasons given to the applicant under section 49 (or, if no such statement was given to the applicant, a statement of reasons setting out the matters referred to in section 49) once the matter is the subject of review proceedings in the Tribunal.
Section 58(2) states that if the applicant has not been given a statement of reasons under s 49 the Tribunal may direct that a copy of the statement lodged with the Tribunal be given to the applicant.
In AVS Group of Companies Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police [2009] NSWSC 1391 Davies J said of the relationship between s 49 and s 58:
64 In my opinion s 49 has been superseded by the Commissioner's obligations under s 58. In her reasons for decision of 21 August 2009 Deputy President Hennessy held (at [9]) that any request under s 49 for a statement of reasons is overtaken by the administrator's obligation to provide a statement of reasons under s 58(1)(a). She held further that since the Commissioner had purported to provide a statement of reasons in accordance with s 58(1)(a) there was no utility in AVS requesting a statement of reasons under s 52 or in the Tribunal directing that such a statement be provided pursuant to the provision.
65 … in my opinion Deputy President Hennessy was correct. On a proper construction of s 58(1)(a) the obligation to provide reasons under s 49 is superseded. That is because s 58(1)(a) provides that where an application for review is made either a copy of any statement of reasons given under s 49 must be lodged with the Tribunal or if there is no such statement "a statement of reasons setting out the matters referred to in s 49(3)". Since in the alternative case there is a fresh obligation to provide reasons there can be no point at all in the Commissioner's continuing to have an earlier, independent but identical duty under s 49 to provide the same reasons. This view is strengthened by sub-s (2) which enables the Tribunal to direct that a copy of the reasons lodged under sub-s (1)(a) be given to the Applicant but does not mention reasons under s 49.
66 In my opinion, therefore, the Commissioner was under no continuing obligation to provide reasons under s 49.
The applicant submits in reply that even though there may be no utility in making such an order, the Tribunal retains the power to make it. He relies on the statement of Deputy President Hennessy (as she then was) in AVS Group of Companies Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police [2009] NSWADT 223
"9 Reading Chapter 5 of the ADT Act (Process for Reviewing Reviewable Decisions) as a whole, it is apparent that any request under s 49 for a statement of reasons is overtaken by the administrator's obligation to provide a statement of reasons that complies with s 49(3) within 28 days after receiving notice of the application: ADT Act, s 58(1)(a). Since the respondent has purported to provide a statement of reasons in accordance with s 58(1)(a), there is no utility in the applicants requesting a statement of reasons under s 52 or in the Tribunal directing that such a statement be provided pursuant to that provision.
…
13 Even though there is no utility in the Tribunal making a direction to provide a statement of reasons under either s 52(2) or s 58(2), it is my view that the Tribunal nevertheless has power to make a direction that the respondent provide a statement of reasons that complies with s 49(3) if it forms the view that it has not done so. It is apparent from the terms of s 49, 52 and 58 that an applicant is entitled to have a statement of reasons that complies with s 49 before the Tribunal reviews the decision. While s 58 does not expressly empower the Tribunal to do so, the Tribunal has such a power because it is able to determine its own procedure and give directions as to the steps to be taken in the proceedings: ADT Act: s 73(1), ADT Rules 1998, cl 19."
There are two objections to this submission. Firstly, if the Deputy President's words are interpreted in the manner argued for by the applicant and accepted as correct law, this would require the Tribunal to depart from the findings of Davies J on this point, which is the decision of a judge of a superior court.
Secondly, the power discussed by the Deputy President to order that the applicant be provided with a statement of reasons was contained in the (now repealed) Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997. If such a power is to be found today it must be in the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013. While s 38(1) provides that the Tribunal may determine its own procedure in relation to any matter for which that Act or the procedural rules do not otherwise make provision; s 36 of that Act also provides:
"(1) The guiding principle for this Act and the procedural rules, in their application to proceedings in the Tribunal, is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.
(2) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the guiding principle when it -
(a) exercises any power given to it by this Act or the procedural rules, or
(b) interprets any provision of this Act or the procedural rules. …
(4) In addition, the practice and procedure of the Tribunal should be implemented so as to facilitate the resolution of the issues between the parties in such a way that the cost to the parties and the Tribunal is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject-matter of the proceedings.
…"
The real issue in these proceedings is whether the respondent has contravened s 8(2) of the PPIPA. It would not facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issue to make an order which lacks utility, is contrary to the scheme of the ADRA, and which does not enforce an identifiable obligation or further the interests of justice.
As Davies J said "there is a fresh obligation to provide reasons" under s 58. Therefore it follows that an application seeking reasons under s 49, once an application for administrative review has been made in the Tribunal, will be redundant and futile.
This may be perceived as a matter of form rather than substance concerning how the applicant has framed his interlocutory application, but that is not the case. Section 52 contains a provision which empowers the Tribunal to order the administrator to provide an adequate statement of reasons if the statement of reasons given under s 49 is inadequate. There is no such power in respect of a statement of reasons given under s58(1). There is only a power to direct a statement of reasons be given if no statement of reasons was given under s 49.
The applicant has not claimed no statement of reasons was given, only that it was inadequate. There is no reason, therefore, for the Tribunal to consider whether the statement of reasons filed in the Tribunal on 5 June complies with s 52(3). That section only applies to a request for reasons made to the administrator. The adequacy or otherwise of the statement of reasons is not a matter which gives rise to any issue now in these proceedings.
This interpretation is consistent with the purposes and scheme of the Act, as once a matter is before the Tribunal, the focus moves to the determination of the administrative review of the decision by the Tribunal.
[5]
Abuse of process
The respondent also submits that it is open to the Tribunal to conclude that the Reasons Application has a collateral purpose of subverting the client legal privilege in Federal Circuit Court proceedings brought against the applicant by the respondent to recover a judgment debt owed to the respondent (Statement of Sara Criticos 28 July 2020).
The test to be applied is whether a collateral purpose, determined objectively, is the predominant purpose of bringing the proceedings and not the purpose of having the court adjudicate on the issues to which they give rise (Roden J in Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 at 491). In Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34; 174 CLR 509 the majority of the High Court (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ) held that an abuse of process will be present when:
"…the purpose of bringing the proceedings is not to prosecute them to a conclusion but to use them as a means of obtaining some advantage for which they are not designed … or some collateral advantage beyond what the law offers"'. [36]
The respondent submits that by filing the related Application and the Reasons Application the applicant is effectively attempting to relitigate the Confidentiality Application, which has been resolved against him. It also submits that there is an extensive history of litigation brought by the applicant against the respondent and refers to six proceedings since 2010. I do not think this evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the applicant's collateral purpose is to subvert client legal privilege.
[6]
Conclusion
The applicant submits that summary dismissal is not appropriate where there is a real question of fact or law (Clonda v NSW Squash Ltd [2020] NSWCATAD 246). The facts are not in dispute in this case. The issue is a legal one. Moreover dismissing the application will not dismiss the entire proceedings. The applicant will still be able to pursue whether there has been a contravention of the PPIPA.
Given what I have said above, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to consider the adequacy or otherwise of the statement of reasons. The application must be dismissed as it is futile and cannot succeed.
[7]
Orders
1. The application for miscellaneous matters dated 31 August 2020 is dismissed.
[8]
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.
Registrar
[9]
Amendments
15 January 2021 - Federal Circuit Court file number removed
01 November 2021 - Citation delimiter included
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Decision last updated: 01 November 2021