It is true that Young J went on to say that in some cases where the requisition fell far short of the requirements of the Corporations Law and was a package of matters containing a significant number of items which the meeting would not be able to pass, then the directors could be justified in refusing to call the meeting to put any other matters before it. That is certainly not the position here.
Offence claims
15 It is an offence for a public company to have fewer than three directors. The plaintiff says that the company is not bound to call a meeting for the purpose of passing resolutions which would reduce the number of directors to one thereby making the company liable to a penalty.
16 Reliance is placed on Corpique (No. 20) Pty Ltd & Ors v Eastcourt Ltd & Ors (1989) 7 ACLC 794. In that case Cohen J said, at page 801:
The next question raised was whether the chairman, having decided that the resolutions for the appointment for new directors could not be put, was obliged to continue the meeting and to put the rest of the resolutions. This in fact would relate only to the second and fourth proposed resolutions. The effect of their being passed would have been that there would have been one director left on the board. This would have put the company in breach not only of art 69 but also of s219(1) of the Code. In Claremont Petroleum NL v Indosuez Nominees Pty Ltd (1986) 4 ACLC 315 the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland had to consider proposed resolutions removing existing directors and appointing three named persons in their place. It had been submitted that this would have left a gap for a short period between the removal of one lot of directors and their replacement and that for this short period there would have been a breach of s219(1). The court declined to take such a narrow construction of the section because of the fact that the directors would have been instantly replaced by the resolutions which followed. It was not however suggested that had those subsequent resolutions not been able to be put that the argument would have been unsuccessful.
Had the meeting continued and had the second and fourth resolution been carried then the company would have been left with one director. There is no suggestion, as in the Claremont Petroleum case, that the defect would have been instantly remedied. Section 225(5) provides that a vacancy created by the removal of a director under the section, if not filed at the meeting at which he is removed, may be filled as a casual vacancy. This means that Mr Clavarino, as the only remaining director, could have appointed two other persons to join him but it would have meant that until he exercised that power then Eastcourt, a public listed company, would have fewer than the prescribed number of directors for an indefinite period. Until new directors were appointed the remaining director, by art 75 could only act in an emergency. In my opinion it would not be a proper exercise of the company's powers under s225 or art 85 to pass resolutions removing directors and not replacing them so that the company and its remaining director would become subject to a penalty under s219.
17 I have some difficulties with this decision. Each of the removal resolutions is intended to be put separately. It may turn out that none is passed, that one is passed or that two are passed or that three are passed. In cases 1 and 2 there would remain three directors. The resolution with which the court was concerned in Claremont Petroleum NL v Indosuez Nominees Pty Ltd & Anor (1986) 10 ACLR 520 was one for the removal of all directors to be followed by three separate resolutions for the appointment of three new directors. In short the court held that for a company to be without the required number of directors for a short period of time when it was envisaged that new directors would be appointed almost immediately, was not a sufficient reason to refuse to summon the meeting required by the requisitionists. In the present case Mr Jurg Walker, the director who, on the evidence, lives in Switzerland will remain a director of the company. He will have notice of the meeting and one would expect that he might attend it. He will be aware that if the resolutions for removal are passed, or if two of them are passed, then the company will remain with fewer directors than is required by the Act. In those circumstances he would have power to take immediate action to appoint the number of directors required to make up the minimum number. I do not think that the court should assume that he would not do so and would not do so immediately. The power to remove directors in general meeting is one given by the Act and cannot be altered by the constitution. It is therefore difficult to think that the legislature intended to make it impossible in a particular case to exercise that power, it being said to be made impossible as a result of a company by its constitution having deleted a replaceable rule and replaced that rule with one limiting the powers of the company in general meeting to appoint directors. In those circumstances I consider that a court should be very careful before coming to a view that resolutions for removal of directors cannot be validly passed if this would result in the company having fewer than the required number, at least for a short period. Although I do not think it is necessary to decide this for the purpose of this case, it is also possible that notwithstanding the provisions of Clause 14 of the constitution there may be some residual power in the members in a case of necessity to appoint new directors in general meeting. I would be more inclined to consider this a residual power rather than some inherent power. I do not consider that a company is necessarily stultified and unable to act at all if the number of its directors is reduced below the statutory number and if any remaining director refuses to act to fill any casual vacancy. This was the subject of some discussion by Barrett J in CIC Insurance Ltd v Hannan & Co Pty Ltd (2001) 38 ACSR 245 at 247 where he said:
There are statements in the cases which call in question the propriety of actions which cause the number of directors of a company to be reduced below the statutory minimum (today, of course, one only in the case of a proprietary company). In Claremont Petroleum NL v Indosuez Nominees Pty Ltd [1987] 1QdR 1; objection was taken to a procedure whereby, if a members' resolution was passed, all directors would be removed. But the point was labelled "highly artificial" because the immediately following items on the agenda of the same meeting were motions to fill any resulting vacancies. Subsequently in Corpique (No 20) Pty Ltd v Eastcourt Ltd Cohen J observed that it would not be a proper exercise of a company's powers, either under statute or under its constitution, to pass resolutions removing directors and not replacing them so that the minimum number required by law was not maintained.
It may be doubted whether these concerns are well founded, at least in so far as they relate to removal of directors by members. It is not as if disappearance of the whole board leaves a company without the means to continue. There is a residual common law power for the members in general meeting to appoint directors. This has been recognised most recently by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Link Agricultural Pty Ltd v Shanahan, McCallum & Pivot Ltd [1999] 1 VR 466. Where members act to remove all directors, they have it in their own hands to rectify the resultant breach of the statutory requirement and clearly should do so.
18 As I have said it is not necessary to decide this in this case because I think the court should assume that the director who would remain in office if all the removal resolutions succeeded would carry out his statutory obligations. It follows from this that the plaintiff's claims for declarations and orders in the amended statement of claim should be dismissed but appropriate declarations should reflect the issues upon which the case was fought. There should be a declaration that the proposed removal resolutions are valid and that the proposed appointment resolutions are invalid. The parties can discuss the precise form of order and I will hear any submissions on costs.