"In the present case what had been initially
established was that the appellant was totally
incapacitated as, indeed, was the basis of her
original claim for compensation, and immediately
before the final determination of the delegate she held,
in effect, an avard establishing her entitlement to
compensation in accordance with par.i(b) of the First
Schedule to the Act. That award however, could survive
only so long as she remained totally incapacitated,
Apparently the delegate of the Commissioner was
satisfied that she did not so remain after 16th
November 1961 and upon the rehearing of the appeal to
the County Court it was found as a fact that she was
not totally incapacitated after that date. This finding
1s not challenged in this Court and indeed it could not
be challenged, for it was founded upon a certificate
of a medical board which s.19(4) makes conclusive
evidence of the matters certified. Accordingly, it
1s clear that the applicant has no further raght to
compensation under par.1(b). But it 21s contended on
her behalf that in order to secure the dismissal of
her appeal to the County Court it was incumbent upon
the Commonwealth not only to establish tht fact,
but also that after the date in question she was not '
partially incapacitated or, alternatively, that any
remaining residual incapacity did not diminish her
earning capacity. That is to say, that it was the
appellant's contention that the onus lay upon the
Commonwealth of proving facts showing, not only an
absence of liability on its part under par.i(b)
of the First Schedule, but also an absence of
liability under par.1(c). There 1s, we think, some
confusion in this contention. It may be that the issues
before the County Court were not precisely defined
but that the appeal had dual aspects is beyond question.
In the first place, there arose for determination the
question whether the liability of the Commonwealth
to pay compensation to the appellant as a totally
incapacitated employee should be brought to an end,