Should the Court Grant an Extension of Time in this Case?
60If the present application had been brought in time then, once error had been demonstrated, it would be necessary for the Court to consider whether the error was material and, if it was, whether some lesser sentence is warranted in law under s.6(3) Criminal Appeal Act 1912, in accordance with the principles in Baxter v R [2007] NSWCCA 237; 173 A Crim R 284.
61The Court re-exercises the sentencing discretion taking into account all relevant statutory requirements and sentencing principles, with a view to formulating the positive opinion for which s.6(3) provides, by reference to evidence placed before this Court on appeal: Douar v R [2005] NSWCCA 455; 159 A Crim R 154 at 176-178 [119]-[124]; Baxter v R at 287 [17]-[19].
62An affidavit of the Applicant affirmed 19 September 2013 was read in the Applicant's case. Given the point that has been reached on this application, it is appropriate to have regard to it. In that affidavit, the Applicant recounts his custodial experience and progress which has reached the point where he is allowed weekend leave. No doubt this is related to the fact that his non-parole period will expire in the not-too-distant future, on 29 March 2014. It is fair to observe that the Applicant has progressed in a satisfactory way whilst in custody.
63There is one aspect, however, which calls for specific comment. It will be recalled that the sentencing Judge (at [55] above) described the Applicant's prospects of rehabilitation and not reoffending as being moderate, depending on the outcome of custodial programs and any programs in which he was involved following his release on parole.
64The Applicant's affidavit contains the only evidence with respect to programs which he had undertaken in custody. The Applicant stated that he "had a few sessions with the resident psychologist, who taught me a really good relaxation exercise". He states that he also undertook the CALM program which he found "useful in parts". The Applicant observed that some of the exercises reminded him of the counselling he "had on the outside voluntarily before [he] was sentenced". I will return to this topic.
65The offence is a most disturbing one. The Applicant arranged for the victim, a sex worker, to attend unoccupied premises. When the victim did so, for no apparent reason, the Applicant attacked her from behind with an implement in a cowardly fashion. Several blows were struck to the victim's head and, from her injuries, to her shoulder and hand as well. The blows were struck with sufficient force to cause injuries which the jury found constituted grievous bodily harm. The jury was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Applicant struck the victim in this way with an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm.
66The observations made by the victim immediately after the attack suggest that the Applicant was in a state of rage, which subsided before he fled the scene.
67The Applicant did nothing to assist the victim, who remained obviously injured in unoccupied premises. The victim was left to her own devices to leave the premises and to reach the street where, fortunately, a stranger assisted by taking her to the hospital.
68The Applicant's immediate departure from the premises, leaving the clearly injured victim alone with no apparent means of assistance, may properly be regarded as circumstances of aggravation of the offence: Director of Public Prosecutions v England [1999] 2 VR 258 at 263-264 [18]; R v Wilkinson (No. 5) [2009] NSWSC 432 at [61].
69It was appropriate for the sentencing Judge to adopt a guarded and qualified approach to an assessment of the Applicant's prospects of rehabilitation and his risk of reoffending.
70This was a grave offence of violence committed against a woman whom the Applicant caused to be alone in the premises. An attack upon a sex worker who is vulnerable, as a result of attending a private dwelling at the request of the offender, constitutes a crime of very considerable gravity: Potts v R [2012] NSWCCA 229 at [8], [155]-[169].
71There was no medical evidence to support the Applicant's claim of blackouts, and this continues to be the case. The only medical evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing was the report of Dr Allnutt dated 30 April 2008, to which reference has been made. Dr Allnutt wished to see the Applicant again to allow a complete assessment of him at a time well in advance of trial, but the Applicant failed to attend the appointment.
72The Applicant informed Dr Allnutt that there was a conspiracy on the part of the police to charge him with this offence, a further disturbing scenario in assessing the reliability of the Applicant and the safety of the community, in particular with respect to women. In considering the risk of reoffending, and the question of future dangerousness, a sentencing court may have regard to the circumstances of the offence itself, and what the offence may indicate concerning future conduct of the offender: Potts v R at [168].
73It is the case that the Applicant has no significant criminal history. It is also the position that he was on conditional bail for an extended period between 2006 and 2009, without any apparent problem manifesting itself. The character evidence from Mr McWolfe provided some general support, as well, for the Applicant with respect to his conduct in the community. In addition, it seems that the Applicant's conduct in custody has not manifested any signs of violence. Of course, to the extent that this offence suggests that the Applicant has a problem with women, then his interaction with women whilst in custody has been limited for obvious reasons.
74The counselling and programs undertaken by the Applicant in custody appear to have been quite limited. It would be hoped, given the circumstances of the offence, that some custodial program may yet be utilised, as well as post-release counselling and assistance being made available to the Applicant to assist the protection of the community upon his release.
75As the sentencing Judge found, there have been significant adverse consequences for the victim in this case in both a physical and psychological sense. The evidence before the sentencing court indicated that the attack had undermined her confidence in many aspects of life.
76Given the nature of the offence, considerations of personal deterrence and general deterrence remain very significant on sentence.
77The Applicant had a very limited criminal history which was taken into account appropriately by the sentencing Judge. However, the offence is a serious one, committed in disturbing circumstances, where there are significant outstanding issues with respect to the Applicant's prospects of rehabilitation and his risk of reoffending when he returns to the community.
78I do not consider that the Applicant's reliance upon sentencing statistics for s.33 offences provides any real assistance on this application: Lang v R [2013] NSWCCA 29 at [25]-[27].
79In Duncombe v R [2013] NSWCCA 271 at [49]-[53], this Court noted the wide gap between the two guideposts constituted by the maximum penalty and the standard non-parole period for offences under s.33(1) Crimes Act 1900. The Court said at [53]:
"Despite that wide gap, it is, of course, necessary for a sentencing court to have regard, and give appropriate weight, to both periods. Undue focus on the standard non-parole period may serve to distract from the proper role of the maximum penalty on sentence."
80In my view, a sentence comprising a non-parole period of five years with a balance of term of three years for this offence remains appropriate, having regard to the objective circumstances of the offence and the subjective circumstances of the Applicant, and keeping in mind the relevant statutory guideposts and principles of sentencing, including the need for specific and general deterrence. This view has been reached having regard to all the evidence before this Court at the hearing of this application.
81I am not satisfied that a lesser sentence is warranted in law for the offence committed by the Applicant, having considered matters relevant to s.6(3) Criminal Appeal Act 1912.