Grounds of appeal in this court - consideration
13 The appellant alleges in ground 1 that the primary judge erred by not providing sufficient or adequate reasons when rejecting the appellant's argument that the Authority "acted in an unreasonable illogical and inconsistent manner."
14 The appellant's case before the primary judge was that there was an inconsistency between: (i) the Authority's acceptance that the appellant had some "low-level" involvement with the TNA and experienced "some measure of targeting on account of his TNA involvement immediately subsequent to the September 2012 elections;" and (ii) its findings that the prospects of future harm were "remote" and that the appellant did not face a real chance of harm were he to return to Sri Lanka.
15 In his application in this court, the appellant put the point this way in his written submissions: "[The Authority] accepted that after the elections in 2012 the applicant [was] subjected [to] 'some measure of targeting', it thereafter accepted that the applicant may provide assistance to the TNA, but then concluded that [the prospect of] the applicant being harmed was remote." The appellant submitted that it was "inconsistent" for the Authority to make these concurrent findings, and that the primary judge neither dealt with, nor provided adequate reasons with respect to, this argument. But, as the reasons of the Authority and the primary judge make clear, that submission ignores the significance that the Authority attributed to the country information and the primary judge's recognition of that attribution of significance.
16 The primary judge referred in detail to the whole of the relevant findings of the Authority at [13]-[23] of his reasons. This included, relevantly, and among other things, the recent country information concerning the improved situation in Sri Lanka. As the Authority's reasons show, and the primary judge recognised, the Authority rejected the appellant's claims on the basis of his "low-level" involvement in the TNA and in light of the country information. See the primary judge's reasons at [30]-[31], where he referred to the "cogent reasons in support of the adverse findings made by the Authority, including the taking into account of country information." Once the primary judge had identified these aspects of the Authority's findings, it was sufficient for the primary judge then to conclude, in my view correctly, that there was no inconsistency in the reasoning of the Authority. Further, the primary judge's reasons at [30]-[31], and in particular his emphasis on the country information, the adverse findings regarding the appellant's wife and the finding regarding the appellant's low-level involvement is "sufficient to explain…the basis upon which" the Court proceeded and why the application for review was dismissed (see SZKLO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 247 ALR 582; 102 ALD 115; [2008] FCA 735 at [26]). It cannot be said, therefore, that the primary judge did not deal with the arguments regarding Ground 1, nor can it be said that the primary judge did not provide adequate reasons as to why that ground failed. His Honour's reasons were, in my view, sufficient and they do not reveal any appellable error.
17 The appellant has put Ground 2 along similar lines. Ground 2 alleges that the primary judge erred by failing to give sufficient reasons by failing "to deal with the particulars in Ground 2."
18 Those particulars, which it is said the primary judge did not deal with, are as follows:
PARTICULARS
(i) The IAA accepted at [30] "... that the applicant experienced some measure of targeting on account of his TNA involvement immediately subsequent to the September 2012 elections."
(ii) The IAA failed to consider the applicant's claim and evidence that three days after the 2012 election, members of the SLA and anti-TNA groups came to his home armed with guns, threatened his wife, asked for his whereabouts, and stated that they would harm him and kill him ([7]).
(iii) The applicant's evidence was that several similar incidents occurred ([7]).
(iv) The IAA did not indicate whether it considered these relatively serious incidents as constituting 'some measure of targeting' which the applicant experienced, as the IAA did not refer to these specific incidents at all, which are critical to the applicant's claims.
(v) The IAA thus failed to take account of the possibility that those incidents occurred:
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220
[66] Again, if an applicant relies on the possibility that a particular event occurred as supporting his or her claim to a well-founded fear of persecution, a failure by the RRT to make a finding as to that possibility might constitute non-compliance with s 430(1)(c) of the Migration Act
[67] Only if a fair reading of the reasons allows the conclusion that the RRT had a real doubt that its findings on material questions of fact were correct, might error be revealed by the RRT's failure to take account of the possibility that the alleged events might have occurred (or the possibility that an event said not to have occurred did not in fact occur). If the fair reading allows of such a conclusion, the failure to consider the possibilities might demonstrate that the RRT had not undertaken the required speculation about the chances of future persecution.
19 The primary judge rejected this ground of review at [33], reasoning that there was "no integer of the applicant's claims" that "was not properly addressed" or that was "not subsumed in the adverse findings made" and that there "was no failure by the Authority to consider the claims or evidence by the [appellant]." His Honour also said:
"… It was not necessary for the Authority to identify each of the incidents that the [appellant] alleged, given that the Authority's reasons explained the acceptance of the [appellant's] involvement and the level of activity which the [appellant] had in the elections, and the Authority clearly took into account the potential involvement of the [appellant] in similar activities in the future."
20 Contrary to the suggestion in the appellant's ground of appeal (particularly at (4)), the primary judge's reasons are not "generalised". But in any event, the fact that reasons are "general" is not, in and of itself, a reason to hold that the reasons are insufficient. Reasons do not have to be elaborate or excessively detailed, they need only be sufficient to explain why the decision was made: see SZKLO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 247 ALR 582; 102 ALD 115; [2008] FCA 735 at [21].
21 This is not a case like DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2, discussed above, where the reasons of the primary judge merely asserted a conclusion at a high level of generality. In this case, the primary judge's reasons were sufficient, and they do not reveal any appellable error, because they are tied to, among other things, the Authority's (unchallenged) and detailed findings about the incidents upon which the appellant relied, as well as the appellant's low-level connection with the TNA, the improved political situation in Sri Lanka (including that the TNA is now leads the opposition to the 'national unity government' and has 16 members of parliament and holds the majority of seats in the Northern Provincial Council) and the absence of any recent incidents of politically motivated violence against persons with low level TNA connections. There was no need for the primary judge to recite or repeat in detail all the factors considered by the Tribunal. It was, in light of the Authority's detailed reasons, sufficient for the primary judge to reason that "there was no integer of the applicant's claims that was not properly addressed"; that "the Authority made findings dispositive of the applicant's claims"; that "[i]t was not necessary for the Authority to identify each of the incidents that the applicant alleged, given that the Authority's reasons explained the acceptance of the applicant's involvement and the level of activity which the applicant had in the elections"; that "the Authority clearly took into account the potential involvement of the applicant in similar activities in the future"; that "[t]here was no failure by the Authority to consider the claims or evidence by the applicant"; that "[t]here was no integer of the applicant's claims that [was] not subsumed in the adverse findings made"; and that "[t]he Authority properly identified the relevant law and on a fair reading properly applied the relevant tests".
22 Those reasons are "sufficient to explain to both the [appellant] and others the basis upon which [the primary judge] proceeded and the reasons why the application to review the decision of the tribunal is either to be dismissed" and no one "is left to speculate as to what it was that the [primary judge] had in mind when he reached the conclusions that formed the final decision": SZKLO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 247 ALR 582; 102 ALD 115; [2008] FCA 735 at [26].
23 The appeal will accordingly be dismissed, with costs.
I certify that the preceding twenty-three (23) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice O'Callaghan.