(d) if the alleged agreement was in writing, please provide us with a copy.
(e) if the alleged agreement was oral, please specify precisely the details of the oral agreement and please specify who on behalf of the first defendant and who on behalf of the second defendant allegedly participated in the oral agreement and the substance of what was said.
(f) if the alleged agreement was partly written and partly oral, please provide the particulars requested in paragraphs (d) and (e) above in respect of that part which was in writing and that part which was oral.
7 The letter further noted that the matter had been adjourned to 23 August 2006 and sought a response to the particulars by 18 August 2006.
8 The second defendant did not receive answers to the above particulars. A copy of the Notice of Motion was served upon the plaintiffs by way of letter dated 30 August 2006 (Exhibit A on the hearing of the Notice of Motion). The letter drew to the plaintiffs' attention a decision of the Court of Appeal on the issue of costs in Markisic v Department of Community Services NSW and Ors. [2006] NSWCA 106. The plaintiffs were thereby put on notice that should the second defendant be successful on the hearing of the Notice of Motion and if a costs order be made as sought by the Notice of Motion, a possible consequence would be a stay of the proceedings pending a reply to those particulars and payment of the second defendant's costs.
9 Before turning to the submissions advanced by the plaintiffs in response to the second defendant's Notice of Motion, it is necessary to deal with two preliminary applications made by the plaintiffs. First, the plaintiffs sought an adjournment of the hearing of the notice of motion to allow an appeal to be brought from the decision of Registrar Howe this morning to refer the notice of motion to the list judge for hearing, in isolation from the notices of motion filed on behalf of the plaintiffs. Second, the plaintiffs made an application that the Notice of Motion be struck out, essentially as an abuse of process, in that the second defendant was seeking by the notice of motion to collaterally advance the interests of the first defendant. This latter argument was premised upon a submission that the first defendant was not entitled to particulars.
10 I refused the application to adjourn the Notice of Motion on the basis that it is undesirable to fragment the proceedings and that if the second defendant was successful on the Notice of Motion, any application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from my decision could include an appeal from my decision to refuse the application for adjournment. In the course of argument, I expressed the tentative view that an appeal from the decision of Registrar Howe appeared to me to have little prospects of success, given that the orderly, efficient and just resolution of the issues in the substantive matter was more likely to be achieved by compliance with the directions made on 8 August 2006, in advance of the hearing of the Notices of Motion filed by the plaintiffs. Compliance with those directions appears to me to be necessary to inform the second defendant of the case it is required to meet.
11 I remain of that view. Whilst the plaintiffs' Notices of Motion were not strictly speaking before me, I have had regard to them in view of the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs in these proceedings. The Notice of Motion filed on 27 July 2006 primarily seeks orders for discovery of documents or leave to issue subpoenas for production of those documents and for attendance to give oral evidence, directed to the former Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Australia and the four persons making up the Australian delegation to the conference in Washington. The Notice of Motion filed on 8 August 2006 seeks an order setting aside the order of McClellan CJ at CL made on 3 August 2006.
12 As to the former Notice of Motion, orders for discovery and/or the issue of subpoenas for production and for attendance to give oral evidence would only be made or leave granted upon satisfaction by the Court that those orders were necessary for the purposes of resolving the issues in the substantive proceedings. That is an exercise which cannot be undertaken until and unless the scope of the Statement of Claim has been ascertained. A reply to the particulars sought by the second defendant would substantially assist in that process.
13 As to the latter Notice of Motion, the appropriate course for the plaintiffs to adopt is to seek to appeal the order of McClellan CJ at CL. The decision made by his Honour on 3 August 2006 related to the means by which a proposed witness, a resident of the United States of America, was to be cross-examined. There is no necessary connection between that decision and the request for particulars by the second defendant. The request for particulars is capable of resolution independently of the plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the decision of 3 August 2006.
14 Equally, I am unpersuaded that there is any substance to the argument that the second defendant's notice of motion is an abuse of process. The plaintiffs have already provided a response to a request for particulars by the first defendant, a course which is inconsistent with an assertion that the first defendant is not entitled to particulars. I note that a directions hearing on 20 March 2006 resulted in a direction that the plaintiffs respond to a request for particulars made by the first defendant on or before 17 April 2006 and that the plaintiffs did respond on 26 April 2006.
15 I turn then to the resolution of the matters raised by the second defendant's Notice of Motion.