DPP v Parsons [2000] VSC 327

For the reasons I have stated, I find that each of the applicants, Joanna, Jessica and Michael, has proved that each is a victim who has suffered pain and suffering as the result of the murder of the deceased and that an order for compensation in each case should be made. I compensate them for pain and suffering, but not for any financial consequences of it. I put completely aside in the compensation I order, any financial burden that falls upon them, including any psychiatric or other medical expenses which may be the consequence of the trauma they have suffered. Further, the pain and suffering is the pain and suffering as the result of the offence, not any pain and suffering which might come from, for example, concern about Family Court proceedings or any other apprehension they presently have about the offender. Further, I do not compensate the victims for the disruption, dislocation and difficulty imposed upon them by the present reordering of their lives (Jessica and Michael now residing with the Collins family). That disruption is substantial and doubtless involves significant expense particularly for Mrs Collins. No award is now made by me for any of that. The awards I make are purely for pain and suffering. Their pain and suffering is amply made out in each case, in their different ways - a loyal sister and innocent children - and no psychiatrist or affidavit is needed for it to be crystal clear - the knowledge, the burden, the anguish and the pain they have suffered and will continue to suffer.

Next, it was submitted that the applicants, the sister of the deceased and the two children of the deceased, were not "persons suffering as a result of the offence" within the meaning of s.86(1) Sentencing Act 1991. When pressed to its logical conclusion, counsel submitted that under the provisions of s.86(1) the only victim of the crime was the deceased, who could not make a claim, and that her estate was not entitled to make a claim. Thus, as I said to counsel, in homicides s.86 may as well be written out of the statute book. The "persons suffering as a result of the offence" as contemplated by s.86(1) are the three persons before me, Mrs Collins, Jessica and Michael. Nothing in life could be more direct than the suffering of those persons as a result of the offence, the murder of their mother (and sister). The law of tortious liability has come a long way since the dissent of Evatt J. in Chester v Waverley Corporation [1939] HCA 25; (1939) 62 C.L.R. 1 at 14. This statute expresses itself in plain terms. This point fails.

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