Competing arguments
Plaintiff's submission
12 It was common ground that subs 2(1)(b) had no application. What was in issue was the meaning to be given to subs 2(1)(a).
13 Counsel for the plaintiff helpfully set out the legislative history of s2 leading up to the form in which it was considered by the learned magistrate. The Act was originally passed in 1967. As originally enacted s2 relevantly provided:
"The court or judge or justice in any proceedings relating to any offence, whether punishable summarily or upon indictment may -
(a) where a defendant, after a hearing on the merits is acquitted or discharged as to the information then under inquiry …
(b) …
grant to that defendant a certificate under this Act specifying the matters referred to in s3 …"
14 By Act 85 of 2001 s2 CCC Act was amended to relevantly provide:
"(1)(a) Where, after the commencement of a trial in the proceedings, a defendant is acquitted or discharged in relation to the offence concerned, or …
(b) …
(2) For the avoidance of doubt, a certificate may be granted in accordance with subsection (1)(a) following an acquittal or discharge … at any time during a trial, whether a hearing on the merits of the proceedings has occurred or not.
(3) In this section trial, in relation to proceedings includes preliminary proceedings that form part of the trial, for example, a voir dire."
15 In 2002 s2 CCC Act was further amended to include in subs 2(1)(a) "or a direction is given by the DPP that no further proceedings be taken" (Act 99 of 2002). In 2004 s2 CCC Act was further amended to include in subs 2(3) "a special hearing conducted under s19 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 and also includes … (Crimes Legislation Act - No 11 of 2004)".
16 The plaintiff submitted that the amendment in 2001 brought about a change to the operation of s2 CCC Act. Under the old formulation a certificate could be granted when a person was discharged after committal proceedings. Under the new formulation the granting of a certificate was governed by the precondition "after the commencement of a trial". For the approach of the learned magistrate to be correct, the word "trial" as used in the section would have to include committal proceedings.
17 The plaintiff submitted that even though subs 2(3) expanded the conventional concept of a trial to include a special hearing under s19 of the Mental Health Act and to include preliminary proceedings such as a voir dire, no mention was made of committal proceedings. Even accepting that the word "includes" meant that this was not an exhaustive definition, the traditional distinction between the concept of a trial and that of committal proceedings was such that there would need to be a clear indication in the section that the word "trial" was to include committal proceedings if that were the correct interpretation. There was no such clear indication.
18 In supporting the distinction between proceedings which were ordinarily regarded as a "trial" and committal proceedings which ordinarily involved the exercise of an executive or administrative function, the plaintiff relied on Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1:
"Committal for trial does not in New South Wales determine, as it now effectively does in the United Kingdom, whether a person charged with an offence shall be indicted. He will, of course, ordinarily stand trial if committed, although not necessarily so, and a person discharged may nevertheless be indicted. The powers of a magistrate in committal proceedings are thus, strictly speaking, still confined to determining whether the person charged shall be discharged, committed to prison to await trial or admitted to bail and do not involve the exercise of a judicial function." (Dawson J, 14-15.)
19 Reliance was also placed upon that which the Court of Criminal Appeal said in Attorney General for NSW v Stuart (1994) 34 NSWLR 667:
"It is, in any event, no part of the magistrate's function in committal proceedings to concern himself or herself with issues which would normally fall within the discretionary powers of a trial judge or to pre-empt any exercise of the trial judge's discretion: R v Grassby (1998) 15 NSWLR 109 at 118-19; Barron v Attorney-General (1987) 10 NSWLR 215 at 216-18; Moss v Brown (1979) 1 NSWLR 114 at 125. All three cases make the point that committal proceedings do not constitute (and they should not be allowed to develop into) a mini trial in advance of the trial upon indictment". (Hunt CJ at CL, 683.)
20 The plaintiff relied upon the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW). That Act does not define "trial" but s21 defines "committal proceedings" in such a way as to make a clear distinction between those proceedings and a "trial".
"21(1) In any Act or instrument …
"committal proceedings" means proceedings for the purpose of deciding whether a person charged with an offence should be committed for trial or sentence."
21 The plaintiff submitted that committal proceedings did not come within the expanded definition of "trial" in subs(3) which refers to "preliminary proceedings that form part of the trial". This was so because firstly, a trial is not dependent upon the conduct of committal proceedings in that an accused can be put on trial without the holding of such proceedings. Secondly, although most trials are preceded by committal proceedings, the fact of that committal, the evidence called in it, and any findings made in it are given no weight in the conduct of the trial and normally receive no mention.