16 At the commencement of this trial an application was made on behalf of the accused for a permanent stay of proceedings. The application was premised on two grounds: a suggested incapacity to receive a fair jury trial because of the accused's notoriety, and a suggested lack of utility because the accused was already serving two life sentences with no minimum terms. I refused the application. The jury, by its care and conscientious application to its task, and its intelligent address as demonstrated by its questions during deliberation, undoubtedly gave the accused a fair trial. That fairness is a commendable Australian characteristic and the jury demonstrated it. As to the second ground, utility, the answer is that victims matter. Ms Halvagis matters. Every victim matters. I would like to say something further about Ms Halvagis and other victims of crime. The law has always given, and rightly so, scrupulous attention to proper process to ensure accused persons receive fair trials. That process should never be deflected or diluted or diminished. Further, the criminal law is founded upon the protection of society as a whole. It is a public, not a private, matter. Thus proceedings are brought by the State, not by the victim. Even so, I do not think the law has given sufficient attention to the rights of victims. Because Mr Dupas could not be sentenced to any further term of actual imprisonment beyond that which he already was serving, this trial was a vindication of the rights of Ms Halvagis - the bringing to justice of her killer - and of all victims of crime. I think it would be appropriate for consideration to be given to the provision of the Sentencing Act 1991 which governs the purposes of sentencing, s.5(1), to be amended to state specifically that a purpose for which sentences may be imposed is the vindication of the rights of victims. Likewise with s.5(2), the statement of relevant factors in sentencing. There should be a fairer balance between the rights of offenders and the rights of victims.