The relevant legislation - particulars
Part 15.10 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) relevantly reads:
"15. 10 Order for particulars
(cf SCR Part 16, rule 7; DCR Part 9, rule 26; LCR Part 8, rule 8)
(1) The court may order a party to file:
(a) particulars of any claim, defence or other matter stated in the party's pleading or in any affidavit relevant to the proceedings, or
(b) a statement of the nature of the case on which the party relies, or
…
(2) Without limiting subrule (1), if a pleading alleges that a person had knowledge or notice of some fact, matter or thing, the court may order that party to file:
(a) if the pleading alleges knowledge, particulars of the facts on which that party relies, and
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- Counsel for Project Control referred to a number of authorities on particulars, Gangi v Boral Resources (NSW) Pty Limited [2012] NSWSC 398 ("Gangi"), Al-Shennag v Statewide Roads Limited [2010] NSWSC 76 ("Al-Shennag"), Turner v State of New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 1081 and Garzo v Liverpool/Campbelltown Christian School Limited [2011] NSWSC 292 ("Garzo"). I shall refer to only two of these authorities.
- In Al-Shennag, McCallum J set out the obligation to give all necessary particulars. Her Honour stated at [9] to [11]:
"9 Mr Al-Shennag's third request invokes rules 14.14(2), 14.31(1) and 15.1(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005. The relevant obligation is that contained in rule 15.1(1), which provides "a pleading must give such particulars of any claim, defence or other matter pleaded by the party as are necessary to enable the opposite party to identify the case that the pleading requires him or her to meet".
10 The content of that obligation must be determined having mandatory regard to the overriding purpose of the rules to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings: s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005.
11 It is well recognised that there are restrictions on the detail that can properly be required by way of particulars. The critical task is to identify what is reasonably necessary to protect the other party against surprise: Sims v Wran [1984] 1 NSWLR 317 at 321G."
- In Garzo, Garling J set out the requirements to supply particulars pursuant to the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). His Honour stated at [59] to [64]:
"59 But in a claim in negligence to which the Civil Liability Act applies, it is necessary that the pleading identifies and articulates the material facts upon which the plaintiff relies to establish each of the elements required by s 5B(1).
60 As a starting point, a proper pleading of a claim requires the plaintiff to identify, and articulate clearly the "risk of harm" in respect of which, it is alleged, the defendant was obliged to take precautions. This puts a Court in a position to determine the defendant's knowledge of a specified risk of harm, to assess the probability of that risk occurring, and to evaluate the reasonableness of the defendant's response, or lack of response, to that risk, thereby avoiding the type of error discussed by Gummow J in RTA v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330 at [59]-[61].
61 A proper pleading will also need to plead whether it is part of the plaintiff's case that the defendant had actual knowledge of the risk of harm, and that the risk was thereby foreseeable (s 5B(1)(a)), or whether the plaintiff only contends that the defendant ought to have known of the risk of harm. Particulars of such a pleading would then ordinarily be provided. A defendant would then be in a position to fully plead to such allegation.
62 Authorities suggest that there may be cases where, at least arguably, s 5B may not apply: see Drinkwater v Howarth [2006] NSWCA 222 at [11]- [13]; Refrigerated Roadways at [173]. It is unnecessary for me to express any view in this case as to a resolution of the apparent tension between these remarks and the judgment of the High Court of Australia in Adeels Palace at [27], because this case is one to which s 5B clearly applies, as all the parties accepted.
Identifying the Relevant Risk of Harm
63 A central concept and one with which the analysis commences is the identification of "a risk of harm" against which the plaintiff, here Mrs Garzo, alleges a defendant would be negligent for failing to take precautions. Harm in this expression includes personal injury. Gummow J, in Dederer at [59]-[61] clearly demonstrates that it is only through the correct identification of the risk of harm that an assessment of the reasonable response can be made.
64 As a real and practical matter, where a Court is considering any of the essential steps in s 5B(1), it must do so against the identified risk of harm. It is a matter of common experience in common law claims, that in any given set of factual circumstances, there are a number of risks of harm which can be identified. Unless the risk of harm being relied upon is clearly identified then it will not be possible to identify what steps ought reasonably to have been taken by a defendant to address the risk. Nor will it be possible for a Court to determine what the application of reasonable care required."