EX-TEMPORE JUDGMENT
1 HER HONOUR: These proceedings were commenced in June 2005. An amended statement of claim was filed in February 2006 and a defence in May 2006. There were attempts at mediation and on 3 March 2009 a motion was filed by the plaintiff, seeking leave to file a further amended statement of claim. On the first day of the hearing, 10 March, after discussions between the parties, there was an adjournment, it appearing that even further amendments were necessary to the pleadings. On resumption of the hearing on Wednesday 11 March, those further amendments were not pursued and, there being no objection, leave to proceed on the further amended summons was given and the hearing proceeded, with a direction that the defendant file an amended defence, before Mr Palmieri's evidence was completed. Mr Palmieri is a director of the plaintiff and its controlling mind.
2 Mr Palmieri's cross examination continued throughout Wednesday. On commencement on Thursday, senior counsel for the plaintiff Mr McGovern announced that an amended defence had just been served, which had caught the plaintiff by surprise and which it believed went considerably beyond answering the amendments made the previous day in the further amended statement of claim. The new defence raised the possibility that both he and his instructing solicitors, Giles Payne & Co could no longer act and that the further amended statement of claim would have to be even further amended.
3 By consent, I granted an adjournment so that what was raised by the amended defence could be considered and granted leave for instructions to be sought from Mr Palmieri, while he was part way through his cross examination.
4 On resumption at 2pm, Mr McGovern appeared as a courtesy to the Court to announce that he vehemently denied certain allegations made, but that as a matter of professional responsibility, he had returned his brief. Thereupon Mr McGovern was granted leave to withdraw. Junior counsel, Mr Cleary, continued his appearance for the plaintiff.
5 Mr McInerny of counsel, appearing for the defendant, then filed in court the defence to the further amended statement of claim. There was a contest between the parties as to whether leave to rely on this defence was required and whether, in any event, the defendant ought to be permitted to rely upon it, having regard to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act 2005.
6 It is convenient to observe, at this point, that the plaintiff's claims in these proceedings relate to alleged professional negligence on the part of the defendant, Mr Pritchard, the plaintiff's former solicitor. Two broad complaints have been advanced. The first in relation to advice given by Mr Pritchard in 1999 about the terms of a July 1999 Deed, under which the plaintiff invested in a real estate business, known as Chris Burke Real Estate, by acquiring units in a unit trust known as the Surf Road Unit Trust and shares in the trustee company, of which Mr Palmieri became a director.
7 The second complaint related to advice given by Mr Pritchard as to the basis upon which the plaintiff sold its interest in the business in 2003 and settled certain disputes with the purchasers and related entities. The second claim raised what had transpired in proceedings brought by the plaintiff in the Supreme Court. These claims were decided in favour of the plaintiff by Justice Einstein in Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd & Ors v Tass James & Ors [2004] NSWSC 61. There was, however, a successful appeal brought from that decision, decided by the Court of Appeal in James & Ors v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd & Ors [2004] NSWCA 475. The plaintiff's complaint was that the result of Mr Pritchard's negligence was that it lost the opportunity to sue a Mr and Mrs James (both defendants in the Supreme Court proceedings), on certain guarantees which they had given under the July 1999 Deed.
8 What the amendments made in the further amended statement of claim did, was to introduce particulars of loss and damage of a sum of $419,850, being the costs which the plaintiff paid Mr and Mrs James in respect of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court proceedings and, in addition, the costs which the plaintiff had itself incurred in those proceedings. While the plaintiff argued that this part of the amended statement of claim was merely a particularisation of a claim earlier made, in my view a fair reading of the pleadings and the particulars of the claim sought and provided, does not lead to that conclusion.
9 By way of defence to this claim, as well as some of the other claims of loss and damage advanced by the plaintiff, including lost preferential distributions from the real estate business of $120,888.60 and repayment of bank loans of $203,116.62, the defendant claimed in the amended defence, that no loss had flowed to the plaintiff in 2003 from the sale agreement. This was because there had been an earlier breach of an implied covenant to maintain certain securities, by reason of a deed entered by the plaintiff in February 2001.
10 This February 2001 deed had been dealt with by the Court of Appeal in its judgement. It was a proposal to amend the plaintiff's statement of claim, which sought to make a complaint about this deed, which had led to the adjournment of the hearing on Tuesday. That amendment had finally not been pursued by the plaintiff, but the deed still came to feature in the pleadings, when the defendant filed its amended defence.
11 The amended defence also raised a similar claim in relation to another deed, entered by the plaintiff in August 2003.
12 In addition, the new defence alleged that Gyles Payne & Co and Mr McGovern had advised the plaintiff at the same time as the defendant was acting for it, in relation to these deeds and the proceedings in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. It was claimed that their advice had been to similar effect to the advice which the defendant had given the plaintiff and that they too, had not advised the plaintiff that the proceedings in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal would fail, for the reasons upon which the Court of Appeal came to uphold the appeal. It was also claimed that the plaintiff had acted on the advice given by Gyles Payne & Co and not that of the defendant.