Pecuniary Penalty
19 The Court's power to make an order that a person pay a pecuniary penalty in respect of a contravention of a civil penalty provision is contained in s 546(1) of the FW Act. Sections 539(2) and 546(2)(a) of the FW Act prescribe a maximum penalty of 60 penalty units for a contravention of s 417(1) of the Act by an individual. Section 12 of the Act provides that a "penalty unit" has the meaning given by s 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), which defines a penalty unit to mean $170.00. It follows that the maximum penalty the Court can therefore impose on each respondent is $10,200.00.
20 The approach to be taken by the Court in considering an "agreed" penalty proposed by the parties is that laid down by the Full Court of this Court in NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1997) 71 FCR 285, and subsequently in Minister for Industry, Tourism and Resources v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd (2004) ATPR 41-993. Again, I refer to, without repeating, what I said in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Actrol Parts at [26]-[27].
21 The considerations relevant to a determination of the appropriate penalty are well established. In their written submissions, the parties referred me to the decision of Branson and Lander JJ in Plancor Pty Ltd v Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (2008) 171 FCR 357 ("Plancor") at 374-375, which endorsed the list of considerations identified by Tracey J in Kelly v Fitzpatrick [2007] FCA 1080, which, although decided in the context of a dispute under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), remains relevant. Those considerations were as follows:
The nature and extent of the conduct which led to the breaches;
The circumstances in which that relevant conduct took place;
The nature and extent of any loss or damage sustained as a result of the breaches;
Whether there had been similar previous conduct by the respondent;
Whether the breaches were properly distinct or arose out of the one course of conduct;
The size of the business enterprise involved;
Whether or not the breaches were deliberate;
Whether senior management was involved in the breaches;
Whether the party committing the breach had exhibited contrition;
Whether the party committing the breach had taken corrective action;
Whether the party committing the breach had cooperated with the enforcement authorities;
The need to ensure compliance with minimum standards by provision of an effective means for investigation and enforcement of employee entitlements; and
The need for specific and general deterrence.
22 The decision in Plancor emphasised that this is a non-exhaustive list of considerations that may, but may not, be relevant and applicable in any particular case (at [58]). I turn now to the application of these considerations as relevant and applicable to the facts of this case.
23 As discussed in paragraph [11] above, the conduct of the respondents in leaving the Site occurred in the context of a reasonable concern for the health of the respondents resulting from the water pressure issue, albeit a concern that did not amount to a reasonable concern about an imminent risk to the respondents' health or safety within the meaning of s 19(2)(c)(i) of the FW Act.
24 There is no evidence before me as to the nature and extent of any loss or damage sustained as a result of the contraventions. The applicant, in his supplementary submissions on penalty, referred me to the High Court decision in R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270 at 278, [15]-[16] and 280-282, [24]-[28], which established that a Court may fix a sentence in the absence of evidence establishing a particular fact relevant to the appropriate sentence on the basis that the prosecution has not established the fact beyond reasonable doubt, and the defendant has not negatived the fact. The applicant asks that I follow this approach, and determine the penalty on the basis that the applicant has not established that the contraventions led to any loss or damage, while, equally, the respondents have not established, as a mitigating factor, that the contravention caused no loss or damage. I note that this approach has previously been adopted by this Court in fixing civil penalties: Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v McDonald [2013] FCA 1431 at [62] per Barker J.
25 The applicant does not allege any previous similar conduct by any of the respondents, or that the breach was part of a broader course of conduct. As each respondent is an individual employee, and acted on their own initiative, the size of the contracting companies, Hansen Yuncken and Leighton Contractors, is not a relevant consideration.
26 The conduct that gave rise to the contraventions was initiated by a vote in which the crane crew and labourers, including the respondents, took part, and was therefore deliberate.
27 In terms of whether the respondents exhibited contrition, took corrective action, or cooperated with the enforcement authorities, the respondents admitted the contraventions at an early stage in the SOAF, thereby avoiding the need for a more comprehensive trial. This is a factor relevant to mitigating the applicable penalty. There is no other evidence before me in regards to contrition or any other corrective action taken by the respondents.
28 The need to deter unregulated industrial action is an important consideration given the disruptive potential of unregulated industrial activity. However, in this case, the conduct arose from a unique set of circumstances that are unlikely to reoccur. The parties submit that, in these circumstances, the need to consider general deterrence in fixing the appropriate penalty is less prominent. It is also submitted that the consideration of personal deterrence should assume less weight in this case, as the gravity of the conduct has been pressed on the respondents through the bringing of the proceedings and the associated threat of pecuniary penalty, and the respondents have not previously been found to have contravened any industrial legislation. In general terms, I accept those submissions.
29 Having regard to all the considerations that are relevant and applicable to this case, I am satisfied that the proposed pecuniary penalty of $1,000 in respect of each respondent is appropriate.