Mr Kirner
30 In November 2013, Mr Kirner was the District Secretary of the Forestry and Furnishing Products Division of the CFMEU in South Australia.
31 Mr Kirner's contravening conduct is described at [40]-[58] and [175]-[179] of the principal judgment. Essentially, Mr Kirner entered the construction area of the SAHMRI site at about 11 am on 22 November. Having been told (in effect) that Mr Bickerdike was coming, he waited for about five minutes in a position some 8 m or so inside the perimeter fence. Initially Mr Kirner refused Mr Bickerdike's request that he leave and an unpleasant exchange between Mr Bickerdike and him then occurred. Mr Kirner then decided to leave, but did not give Mr Bickerdike an indication that he was doing so. Instead, he walked further into the site to ask a Hindmarsh employee to let the Ausrise employees know that the Enterprise Bargaining Agreement ballot would now take place on the North Terrace footpath. All in all, it is likely that Mr Kirner was on the site at this stage for about 10-15 minutes.
32 In the principal judgment, I rejected Mr Kirner's claims that he had been entitled to enter the site pursuant to a standing invitation issued to him by Hindmarsh; that he had been entitled to enter by reason of the request by Ausrise that he conduct the EBA ballot; and that he had been entitled to enter pursuant to s 117 of the Work Health and Safety Act 2012 (SA). I was satisfied that Mr Kirner knew that a notice of entry was required but thought that he could get away without providing such a notice on this occasion. His belief in that respect was, in part, informed by the circumstance that he had also been able to do so on several previous occasions. Mr Kirner's knowledge that notices of entry were required arose from Mr Bickerdike's statements to him earlier in 2013 and, as found in the principal judgment at [100], Mr Kirner had previously provided such notices.
33 I found that Mr Kirner's conduct was improper because he had entered the site without providing a notice of entry, without completing all the details required in the Visitors' Book and because he had not complied immediately with Mr Bickerdike's request that he leave. In assessing the significance of Mr Kirner's conduct, I think it reasonable to infer that he was aware at the time that proceedings had been taken against the CFMEU and other of its officials for contraventions of s 500. Accordingly, Mr Kirner can be taken to have been aware of the need to comply with the requirements of the FW Act.
34 The Director does not allege that Mr Kirner's contravention caused any quantifiable loss or damage to Hindmarsh. There was, on my findings at [56], a short pause in the work on a structural plenum by reason of Mr Kirner walking between a parked concrete truck and a concrete pump and because those in the vicinity paused to look at the confrontation between Mr Bickerdike and Mr Kirner. However, these disruptions for work can have been for only a few minutes and there is no suggestion that they had a practical consequence. It is appropriate however, to take into account that Mr Bickerdike was distracted from the performance of his usual work while addressing Mr Kirner's unlawful entry.
35 I found that Mr Kirner had been the cause of an unpleasant interchange at the site: at [178]. Some of the submissions of the respondents' counsel on the penalty hearing sought, inappropriately, to undermine that finding by attributing responsibility to Mr Bickerdike. I consider that it is appropriate to proceed on the basis that, had Mr Kirner not entered without providing a notice of entry, and had he complied immediately with Mr Bickerdike's request, the unpleasant interchange which followed would not have occurred.
36 I agree with the submission of counsel for the respondents that Mr Kirner's failure to enter all the required details in the Visitors' Book is not, by itself, of much moment. First, it appears to have been inadvertent omission. Secondly, a review of the Visitors' Book indicates numerous other instances in which visitors have not completed all the details and Mr Bickerdike acknowledged Hindmarsh had not taken action to enforce compliance.
37 It is to Mr Kirner's credit that, although having worked for the CFMEU and a predecessor union from 1987 to 1991 and again from 1994 until the present time, and having held an entry permit throughout, he has no record of any contraventions of the FW Act or its predecessors. In addition, the Director acknowledged that there are no pending allegations of unlawful conduct by Mr Kirner which are yet to be determined by a court.
38 It is also to Mr Kirner's credit that, having been alerted on 22 November 2013 to Mr Bickerdike's interest in his presence, he had waited near the entrance gate for Mr Bickerdike to arrive. He did not attempt to evade Mr Bickerdike or simply to carry on regardless. On the other hand, Mr Kirner has made no expressions of regret or contrition, nor has he expressed a determination to ensure that he complies with s 500 in the future.
39 As Mr Kirner contested the Director's allegations at trial, he is not entitled to any credit for an acknowledgement of his contraventions and the associated willingness to facilitate the course of justice.
40 Counsel for the respondents submitted that it was a circumstance of mitigation that Mr Kirner had attended the site for proper (and otherwise lawful) purposes, namely, to conduct an EBA ballot and to discuss with employees of Construction Glazing the circumstances of their workmate and the Mates In Construction program. I accept that these were in themselves proper purposes for which Mr Kirner was entitled to exercise his right of entry. However, I do not regard them as mitigatory presently as they constitute the kind of purposes authorised by s 484 and in respect of which s 500 operates. If Mr Kirner had not entered for a s 484 purpose, there would not have been a contravention of s 500, although his conduct may have been unlawful for other reasons.
41 Counsel for Mr Kirner submitted (correctly) that s 546 does not oblige the Court to impose a pecuniary penalty in every case: instead it vests a discretionary power in the Court. Counsel submitted that the discretion should be exercised against the imposition of a penalty in Mr Kirner's case. He emphasised the proper purposes for which Mr Kirner had entered the SAHMRI site, the fact that he had been on the site for no more than 15 minutes, that his entrance had not caused any material loss or damage, and Mr Kirner's good record.
42 Counsel also drew attention to s 510(1) of the FW Act which has the effect that, on the imposition of a penalty for a contravention of s 500, the FWC must consider the revocation or suspension of Mr Kirner's permit. Section 510 provides (relevantly):
When the FWC must revoke or suspend entry permits
When the FWC must revoke or suspend entry permits
(1) The FWC must, under this subsection, revoke or suspend each entry permit held by a permit holder if it is satisfied that any of the following has happened since the first of those permits was issued:
…
(d) the permit holder, or another person, was ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty under this Act in relation to a contravention of this Part by the permit holder;
…
(2) Despite subsection (1), the FWC is not required to suspend or revoke an entry permit under paragraph (1)(d) or (f) if the FWC is satisfied that the suspension or revocation would be harsh or unreasonable in the circumstances.
…
Minimum suspension period
(4) A suspension under subsection (1) must be for a period that is at least as long as the period (the minimum suspension period) specified in whichever of the following paragraphs applies:
(a) if the FWC has not previously taken action under subsection (1) against the permit holder - 3 months;
(b) if the FWC has taken action under subsection (1) against the permit holder on only one occasion - 12 months;
(c) if the FWC has taken action under subsection (1) against the permit holder on more than one occasion - 5 years.
…
43 Counsel accepted that the imposition of a pecuniary penalty for Mr Kirner's contravention of s 500 will satisfy the circumstance listed in s 510(1)(d) and that, subject to one qualification, the FWC will be obliged to revoke or suspend his entry permit. Given Mr Kirner's continued role with the CFMEU, such a revocation or suspension would be a significant impediment to the continued performance by him of all his duties.
44 The qualification to which I referred arises from subs (2). The FWC is not required to suspend or revoke an entry permit if satisfied that the suspension or revocation would be "harsh or unreasonable" in the circumstances.
45 I accept that the potential for a revocation or suspension of Mr Kirner's entry permit is a matter to which the Court may presently have regard. However, at the same time, I do not consider that it is a matter to which the Court should attach significant weight. That is because s 510 should be understood as the provision by the legislature of an additional consequence in those cases in which the Court has considered it appropriate for independent reasons that a penalty be imposed. It would subvert that legislative intention if the potential for revocation or suspension became a reason for the Court not to impose a penalty.
46 Although I found in the principal judgment that Mr Kirner's conduct was far from being the most egregious conduct of its kind, at [178], I do not accept the respondents' submission that it represents the least serious, on a scale of seriousness, of s 500 contraventions. Mr Kirner's conduct was deliberate and not unintentional or accidental. He thought that he could "get away" with not providing a notice and, having been confronted by Mr Bickerdike, did not accede immediately to his request that he leave the site. In my opinion, a pecuniary penalty should be imposed.
47 The Director contended for a penalty in the range of $1,000-$2,000. In my opinion, a penalty in that range is inappropriate. A penalty of $700 will be imposed.