THE COURT'S APPROACH TO THE PROPOSED PENALTIES
21 The approach which the Court should adopt, when dealing with joint submissions about penalties by the parties in cases such as the present, was recently considered by the High Court. In Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2015) 326 ALR 476 at 491 [58] ("the Queensland Construction Sites Case"), the plurality (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ) held that:
"Subject to the court being sufficiently persuaded of the accuracy of the parties' agreement as to facts and consequences, and that the penalty which the parties propose is an appropriate remedy in the circumstances thus revealed, it is consistent with principle and, for the reasons identified in Allied Mills, highly desirable in practice for the court to accept the parties' proposal and therefore impose the proposed penalty."
(Emphasis in original; citations removed.)
22 The reasons for adopting such an approach were earlier explained by their Honours at 489 [46] and 491 [57]:
"… there is an important public policy involved in promoting predictability of outcome in civil penalty proceedings and that the practice of receiving and, if appropriate, accepting agreed penalty submissions increases the predictability of outcomes for regulators and wrongdoers. As we recognised in Allied Mills and authoritatively determined in NW Frozen Foods, such predictability of outcome encourages corporations to acknowledge contraventions, which, in turn, assists in avoiding lengthy and complex litigation and thus tends to free the courts to deal with other matters and to free investigating officers to turn to other areas of investigation that await their attention.
… it is entirely consistent with the nature of civil proceedings for a court to make orders by consent and to approve a compromise of proceedings on terms proposed by the parties, provided the court is persuaded that what is proposed is appropriate."
The reference to NW Frozen Foods is to a decision of a Full Court of this Court: see NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1997) 71 FCR 285.
23 The principles which emerge from the joint judgment of Burchett and Kiefel JJ (Carr J agreeing) in NW Frozen Foods were summarised by Branson, Sackville and Gyles JJ in Minister for Industry, Tourism & Resources v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 72 at [51] as follows:
"(i) It is the responsibility of the Court to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed … .
(ii) Determining the quantum of a penalty is not an exact science. Within a permissible range, the courts have acknowledged that a particular figure cannot necessarily be said to be more appropriate than another.
(iii) There is a public interest in promoting settlement of litigation, particularly where it is likely to be lengthy. Accordingly, when the regulator and contravenor have reached agreement, they may present to the Court a statement of facts and opinions as to the effect of those facts, together with joint submissions as to the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
(iv) The view of the regulator, as a specialist body, is a relevant, but not determinative consideration on the question of penalty. In particular, the views of the regulator on matters within its expertise … will usually be given greater weight than its views on more "subjective" matters.
(v) In determining whether the proposed penalty is appropriate, the Court examines all the circumstances of the case. Where the parties have put forward an agreed statement of facts, the Court may act on that statement if it is appropriate to do so.
(vi) Where the parties have jointly proposed a penalty, it will not be useful to investigate whether the Court would have arrived at that precise figure in the absence of agreement. The question is whether that figure is, in the Court's view, appropriate in the circumstances of the case. In answering that question, the Court will not reject the agreed figure simply because it would have been disposed to select some other figure. It will be appropriate if within the permissible range."
24 The question which thus falls to be determined is whether the proposed penalties fall within the "permissible range". They will do so if they are neither manifestly inadequate nor manifestly excessive.
25 The starting point for identifying that range is the statutory provisions prescribing the maximum penalties available for particular contraventions. The maximum penalty payable by an individual for a contravention of s 349 of the Act is 60 penalty units. A contravention of s 349 by a body corporate attracts a maximum penalty of 300 units: see ss 539(2) and 546(2) of the Act. A "penalty unit" was, at relevant times, a sum of $170: see s 12 of the Act and s 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
26 As a result the maximum penalty which may be imposed on Arteam for each of the contraventions was $51,000 and for Mr Hanna $10,200.
27 I have recently had occasion to summarise the principles which guide the exercise of the Court's power to impose penalties for contravention of the Act: see Director of Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 1213 ("the Grocon case") at [12]-[26], [39]-[42]. I adhere to what I there said save that the Full Court's decision in Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2015) 229 FCR 331 has since been overruled in the Queensland Construction Sites Case with the result that the Court is no longer precluded from receiving joint submissions from parties as to the amount of a pecuniary penalty which they propose should be imposed under legislation providing for the imposition of civil penalties. I have had regard to these principles when forming my judgment as to whether or not the proposed penalties fall within the appropriate range.
28 It is common ground that separate contraventions had occurred on 11 March and 27 March 2014.
29 The proposed penalties were at the lower end of the appropriate range. The aggregate penalty proposed for Arteam was, for each contravention, about 17 per cent of the maximum available penalty. The aggregate penalty proposed for Mr Hanna was, again in each case, around 12 per cent of the maximum applicable to an individual.
30 The leniency is explicable for a number of reasons. The contraventions were reckless rather than deliberate. Mr Hanna had become immersed in the culture of at least some commercial construction sites on which compulsory union membership was accepted by both employers and employees. Mr Hanna had not familiarised himself with the relevant provisions of the Act. It is, perhaps, surprising that, despite working in the construction industry for some 11 years at the time of the contraventions, Mr Hanna had remained ignorant about the laws protecting freedom of association and had not made enquiries when Mr Matic told him that he was not obliged to be a member of the CFMEU. Arteam was a small company with a transient workforce and a limited capacity to pay monetary penalties. It was accepted that some difficulty would be occasioned by the need to assemble funds necessary to pay the proposed penalties. There was no suggestion that either Arteam or Mr Hanna had, on any previous occasion, contravened the Act. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Mr Matic (or anyone else) had suffered any economic loss as a result of the contraventions. Once the proceeding had commenced Arteam and Mr Hanna were co-operative. They made an early admission of liability and became parties to an agreed statement of facts. These steps obviated the need for a trial of contested issues.
31 I should add that I accept that Mr Hanna (and, through him, Arteam) have, by making a public apology, exhibited contrition for the contraventions. I am also mindful of their undertaking to ensure that, in future, they understand their legal obligations and comply with them.
32 It is necessary, in cases such as the present, to recall that one of the purposes served by s 349 of the Act is to uphold the principle of freedom of association. That principle is recognised in general object (e) in s 3 of the Act and in the objects of Part 3-1 in which s 349 appears: see s 336(1)(b).
33 It must, also, be borne in mind that deterrence, both specific and general, has the potential to assume great importance in pecuniary penalty cases. In the Queensland Construction Sites Case, the High Court identified civil penalties regimes as being "primarily if not wholly protective in promoting the public interest in compliance" (at 490 [55]). Their Honours quoted with approval the observation of French J in this Court that:
"The principal, and I think probably the only, object of the penalties imposed by s 76 [of the Trade Practices Act] is to attempt to put a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravenor and by others who might be tempted to contravene the Act": Trade Practices Commission v CSR Limited (1991) ATPR 41-076 at 52,152.
34 The importance of deterrence in this context has been emphasised repeatedly by judges in this Court: see, for example, Fair Work Ombudsman v Skilled Offshore (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 275 at [59]-[62] (Gilmour J) and, on appeal, Maritime Union of Australia v Fair Work Ombudsman [2015] FCAFC 120 at [32] (Allsop CJ, Mansfield and Siopis JJ); Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association v International Aviation Service Assistance Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 394 at [19] (Barker J); Fair Work Ombudsman v Kentwood Industries Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] FCA 579 at [36] (McKerracher J) and Fair Work Ombudsman v Offshore Marine Services Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 498 at [39] (Gilmour J).
35 I accept the respondents' submission that specific deterrence does not weigh heavily in the circumstances of this case. Mr Hanna is now well aware of the need for him to understand and comply with the legal obligations which fall on him and his company. The proposed penalties will impose a meaningful and salutary reminder to them of the consequences of contraventions of the Act. The penalties will constitute a significant burden on the finances of both Mr Hanna and his company.
36 General deterrence, however, looms as a far more significant consideration.
37 There are thousands of small contractors involved in the construction industry. Many are, potentially, susceptible to pressure to require employees to join a union, fearing that if they do not do so they will not be engaged to work on commercial construction sites. Any penalties must, therefore, be fixed at a level which may operate to deter other contractors from succumbing to such pressure.
38 Having had regard to all these considerations I have come to the conclusion that the proposed penalties fall within the permissible range.