46 The proviso is ordinarily considered in appeals against convictions. In the present context, we could conclude that "no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred" only if we were satisfied that, had the photo identification evidence been admitted, the jury would or should have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the respondent. The question for us is therefore the same sort of question as was considered by the High Court in such cases as Chidiac v R [1991] HCA 4; (1991) 171 CLR 432 and M v R [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 CLR 487. The difference is that we have to consider together the evidence that was heard on the voir dire but rejected, and the evidence that was adduced before the jury. To some degree the photo identification evidence lacks probative force in various respects that I have already discussed. However the evidence relied on by the Crown would need to be substantially weaker or substantially less reliable before an appellate court could properly conclude that a jury ought to have entertained a reasonable doubt. For example, in Carr v R [1988] HCA 47; (1988) 165 CLR 314, guilt depended almost entirely on an unsigned but disputed admission to the police. In R v Ralph and George (1988) 37 A Crim R 202, the only evidence against the accused was the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice who was a convicted criminal, an admitted liar and perjurer, and someone capable of clever deception. In M v R (supra), the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant was inconsistent with medical evidence, there was a lengthy delay in the making of her complaint, and there were a number of inconsistencies with circumstances clearly established by the remaining evidence. If the jury had received the impugned evidence and convicted the respondent on each of the relevant counts, those matters would not have led me to conclude, after making full allowance for the advantages enjoyed by the jury, that there was a significant possibility that an innocent person had been convicted. It follows that I do not consider that this is a case in which, the respondent having been acquitted on both counts, no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.