DFO's submissions
8 DFO opposes the application because the Applicants for joinder have already had the opportunity as objectors to the development to put their views. Condition 11 is not relevant to these Class 1 proceedings. The Applicants for joinder have delayed in seeking to be joined as parties and there is no explanation for that delay. DFO also opposed the joinder, relying on Pro-Vision v Ku-ring-gai Municipal Council (2003) 131 LGERA 108 at [4], where it was held a court could have regard to delay and the strength of the issues sought to be raised when deciding an application for joinder. In this case, the Applicants for joinder are not raising anything that is not already, or cannot easily be covered by the Council. The Council is an experienced public body with the relevant expertise to know which issues are necessary to be raised in these proceedings without the joinder of the Applicants.
9 DFO also argued that the Court must have regard to considerations of justice and public interest when deciding a joinder application. Here, relevant considerations include the public participation process already provided for under the EP&A Act in which the Applicants for joinder participated; the fact that the parties seeking application for joinder are the commercial competitors of DFO; and the need for the expeditious disposition of proceedings. Economic competition between traders is not a matter for consideration of a development application under s79C of the EP&A Act. The Council has not yet provided draft conditions of consent and hence the joinder of the Applicants cannot assist the Court any further with this process.
Finding
10 Kavia Holdings v Sydney City Council (2003) 127 LGERA 293 and Mahogany Ridge Developments Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (2004) 135 LGERA 60 recognise that s 39A provides the Court with broad discretion to allow the joinder of parties given its terms.
11 The Council's solicitor was instructed to neither oppose nor support the application. The Court asked him to attend in order to clarify the issues the Council intends to argue at the hearing. The first issue raised in the statement of issues at par 4 is that "such shops" are prohibited because of the provisions of cl 22 of the SPSO. The second issue raised is that the Court cannot be satisfied of matters in cl 61GB(3) of the SPSO.
12 In terms of whether additional issues should be raised, it is clear that the issue of how the development should be characterised for the purposes of the SPSO needs clarification in terms of the statement of issues filed, or at least as between the parties. The Council will be seeking to argue that the development application is for shops which, either individually or collectively, are prohibited development under cl 22 of the SPSO. DFO will be arguing that the whole of levels 1 and 2 of the Homebush premises should be considered as a factory outlets centre, in which a number of shops operate, which satisfies cl 22 of the SPSO. It is not completely clear to me how these arguments relate to the particular definition of "shop" and the provisions of cl 22 in the SPSO, particularly in terms of how DFO intends to characterise its proposed development. If DFO continues to state only that it wishes to replicate what is occurring on level 3, that is likely to raise a number of issues because that activity is regulated by condition 11 of the existing development consent conditions. That condition is not open to easy interpretation or application as I am aware from hearing the initial stages of the Class 4 proceedings and as noted by Hodgson JA in the Court of Appeal in Westfield Management Ltd v Direct Factory Outlets Homebush Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 403. I note that the parties are to further discuss and reduce to writing the issues in this regard and consider amendment of the statement of issues.