Tuesday 5 June 2007
Bill Dimitrelos v 14 Martin Place Pty Limited & 3 Ors
Judgment
1 HODGSON JA: I agree with Bell J.
2 YOUNG CJ in EQ: I have read in draft the judgment of Bell J in this matter and I agree with what her Honour says, but wish to make some additional comments of my own.
3 The case is unusual in that her Honour, the trial judge, accepted that the accident happened in the way that the plaintiff said it happened, that is, he was in lift No 6 in the first defendant's building, the lift ascended to level 19 but the doors failed to open. He then heard noises above him which sounded like loud whipping, the lift started to moan and jolt and then jerk. He heard a sound which he said was like cables hitting the lift, the lift then moved downwards swiftly. It went to the lower ground floor, moved to the ground floor and came to an abrupt stop. The plaintiff also said that as the lift was moving downwards his feet went up towards the ceiling and when he came to rest he landed against the side of the lift on the left side of his neck and left shoulder.
4 However, her Honour also accepted the only expert evidence given by Mr Thompson on behalf of the third respondent. He could not explain the plaintiff's description of the lift movements nor the noises the plaintiff heard. He suggested that the probable scenario was that the lift lost its position in the shaft, that it programmed to reset itself by travelling to the lower ground floor, that it levelled out at the ground floor, and that, in the heat of the moment, the plaintiff believed the lift was travelling at a higher speed than normal.
5 Of course, this does not explain why, as the lift descended, the floor indicator continued to operate, nor does it explain how the plaintiff came to be injured as he was.
6 Indeed, this case has a number of peculiarities. The first is that although her Honour accepted that the lift descended swiftly and caused the injuries about which the plaintiff complained, she also accepted Mr Thompson's evidence that it could not have been travelling at a higher speed than normal. Secondly, she accepted the plaintiff's evidence even though she also accepted Mr Thompson's evidence that lifts do not have recuperative powers. Third, her Honour seemed to accept that the probabilities were that when lift malfunctions were suggested to the third respondent and its engineer called at the premises and found nothing wrong, that therefore there was nothing wrong.
7 However, in a lot of litigation, a judge has to make up his or her mind as to the probabilities even though there appear to be some inexplicable facts pointing the other way. A judge just has to do the best with the available evidence.
8 A prime thrust of the argument of Ms Norton SC for the appellant, was that her Honour should have applied a notion in the nature of res ipsa loquitur.
9 I have some sympathy with this. I do not consider, with respect, that it is correct to say that merely because what is involved is a complex piece of machinery that res ipsa loquitur or principles akin to res ipsa loquitur are ruled out, and I do not consider that cases such as Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121 are authority for that proposition.
10 If there is a situation where one can say that what has occurred does not ordinarily occur without negligence, then if it is unexplained it is possible to infer negligence. This is merely an aspect of the inferential reasoning processes of a tribunal of fact; see Schellenberg at 133.
11 It is possible that one can have a case of res ipsa loquitur or a situation akin to res ipsa loquitur even though the injury happened as a result of complex machinery. Thus, in Swan v Salisbury Construction Company Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 204, the Privy Council held that the doctrine applied in the case of the collapse of a crane which was being used to drive piles for the foundation of a building.
12 However, in the instant case, her Honour said at [18]:
"I am not persuaded that this accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily happen without negligence."