Dibb v Transport for NSW

Background

1. The Decision relates to the access request for information held by the TNSW concerning a number of properties in the Korora area of NSW affected by construction of the Coffs Harbour Bypass ("the Bypass").
2. I pause at this juncture to note that the Applicant has made previous related applications, which have been determined by the Tribunal, and the Appeal Panel in, Dibb v Transport for NSW [2021] NSWCATAD 340 and Dibb v Transport for NSW (No 2) [2022] NSWCATAP 89.
3. The Applicant provides the following grounds for review of the Decision: I allege that the respondent has an unwritten but determined policy to not disclose property reports relating to land acquisitions that are obtained during the 'acquisition by agreement' process that it administers prior to compulsory acquisition being taken over by the Valuer General. The acquisition by agreement process currently accounts for about 92% of acquisitions by the respondent. This is the third of such applications made for access to property reports that first commenced on 29 April 2021. The original application is now subject to appeal with the Appeals Panel (2021/186397). I allege that the respondent has constantly overreached in explaining the degree of difficulty in obtaining the requested information. The respondent does not operate in an analogue environment yet describes having a data management system that seems incapable of retrieving the most basic of information that the respondent itself would need to monitor. The information sought in this application for review is the kind of information that senior management would require to gauge spending against budget on a capital works program that has just recently commenced construction phase. The conduct by the respondent in its administration of land acquisition processes is currently under scrutiny by way of a Parliamentary Inquiry, and I allege that the fundamental issue is the lack of transparency adopted by the respondent in providing affected landowners with relevant information that would assist them to determine the integrity of the reports that the respondent acquires for the purpose of determining compensation amounts. It is my intention to provide a full summary of the access application process to the Parliamentary Inquiry. I reject all the barriers raised by the respondent that have the sole purpose of frustrating progress of the access application(s. The respondent is well aware of our impecuniosity, which it is wholly responsible for causing, and is using that to prevent this and the other applications from proceeding. This is absolutely a matter about seeking information that could reasonably be expected to reveal or substantiate that the respondent has engaged in misconduct or negligent, improper or unlawful conduct, which is a critical public interest consideration pursuant to s.12(2)(e) of the GIPA Act. It is for this reason that the respondent has been persistent in resisting access to the requested information. Provided I am granted latitude by the Tribunal to do so, I intend to provide examples of conduct by the respondent with the other applications that would illustrate its non-adherence to the object of the GIPA Act.
4. The Applicant agrees with TNSW's submissions that the ultimate issue for determination by me is the weight of the considerations under subsections (3A) and 3(B) of s 60 of the GIPA Act.
5. The Applicant contends for the Tribunal to make the following orders: 1. Access to all 3 categories of information requested in the access application. 2. Waiver of all fees and charges relating to the access application. 3. Reimbursement of costs for this review application.

The Applicant

1. The Applicant relies upon the following material in these proceedings:
2. Bundle filed 7 December 2021.

Evidence relied upon by TNSW

1. The following material is relied upon by TNSW in the proceedings:

• Affidavit Mr Whitbourn - 28 January 2022

1. Each party, and the Information Commissioner filed written submissions.
2. Mr Jarrod Whitbourn gave oral evidence and was cross-examined.

Legislation

1. The object of the GIPA Act as set out in s 3 is to open government to the public. This is done by authorising and encouraging the proactive release of information by agencies and by giving members of the public an enforceable right to access government information. Access to government information is to be restricted only when there is an overriding public interest against disclosure.
2. It was not disputed that the information the subject of this application is government information that is held by an agency: s 4(1) of the GIPA Act.
3. The Decision was made by the TNSW under s 58(1)(e) of the GIPA Act to refuse to deal with the access application, according to the discretion conferred by s 60(1)(a) that dealing with the application would require an unreasonable and substantial diversion of TFNSW's resources.
4. Relevantly, section 58(1)(e) of the GIPA Act provides: 58 HOW APPLICATIONS ARE DECIDED (1) An agency decides an access application for government information by-- … (e) deciding to refuse to deal with the application (see section 60), or
5. Section 60, relevant provides: 60 DECISION TO REFUSE TO DEAL WITH APPLICATION (1) An agency may refuse to deal with an access application (in whole or in part) for any of the following reasons (and for no other reason)-- (a) dealing with the application would require an unreasonable and substantial diversion of the agency's resources, (b) … (2) In deciding whether dealing with an application would require an unreasonable and substantial diversion of an agency's resources, the agency is not required to have regard to any extension by agreement between the applicant and the agency of the period within which the application is required to be decided. (3) ... (3A) In deciding whether dealing with an application would require an unreasonable and substantial diversion of an agency's resources, the agency may, without limitation, take into account the following considerations-- (a) the estimated volume of information involved in the request, (b) the agency's size and resources, (c) the decision period under section 57. (3B) Any consideration under subsection (3A) must, on balance, outweigh-- (a) the general public interest in favour of the disclosure of government information, and (b) the demonstrable importance of the information to the applicant, including whether the information-- (i) is personal information that relates to the applicant, or (ii) could assist the applicant in exercising any rights under any Act or law.
6. A decision to refuse to deal with an access application under s 59(1)(e) of the GIPA Act is a reviewable decision pursuant to s 80(c) of that Act.

Issues

1. In determining this application, the Tribunal is required to: 1. Consider the factors relevant to the review of the Decision made under s 58(1)(e). 2. Consider the general principles for the exercise of the discretions in the s 60 statutory test under s 60(1)(a), s 60(3A) and s 60(3B) of the GIPA Act. 3. Consider what is the correct and preferable decision in accordance with s 63 of the ADR Act.

Factors relevant to the review of a decision made under s 58(1)(e) of the GIPA Act

1. The burden is upon TNSW of establishing the Decision is justified s 105(1) of the GIPA Act.
2. In Commission of Police v Danis [2017] NSWCATAP 7, the Tribunal said: [49] In our view, the Tribunal when reviewing decision to invoke a s 60(1) should examine the matter, at least in part, by reference to systemic considerations such as the role provisions of this kind play in promoting the efficient administration of the GIPA Act, and the avoidance of wasteful deployment of limited resources. In the case of decisions founded on s 60(1)(d), the restrictions that apply to party use of subpoenaed material might be relevant, as well agency considerations in relation to respect for court orders. This is not intended to be an exhaustive statement of the matters to be taken into account in any particular case. We accept that there may be factors of a personal kind, related to the particular application and the access applicant's personal circumstances, that may also be relevant.
3. In Feeney v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2020] NSWCATAD 269, the Tribunal said: [95] There are many provisions of the GIPA Act which seek to limit access to government information, and whilst s 3(1)(c) provides an out for withholding information on the basis of its content, s 3(2) uses the language 'as far as possible' when referring to the exercise of discretions under the GIPA Act. [96] As I have previously observed the purpose of the statute was to progress the matter beyond the limitations of the former Freedom of Information Act but not in every instance. Whilst the discretion remains with the agency, it must exercise the discretion consistent with the objects and the purpose of the statute as a whole, as well as the specific provision. This includes having regard to the available evidence when deciding to exercise a discretion.
4. While the systemic consideration is Danis continue to be relevant to s 60(1)(a) of the GIPA Act, the discretion is to be exercised according to the statutory tests in ss 60(3A) and 60(3B).
5. As submitted by the Information Commission, which I accept "The discretion in s 60(1)(a) may only be claimed on the basis of the s 58(1)(e) decision, and justified on review under s 105(1) of the GIPA Act, if the considerations are demonstrated to outweigh the consideration in s 60(3B)."
6. In Ruyters v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAD 223 at [24], SM Ransome said, which I also adopt: 34 The tasks to be undertaken in considering whether dealing with an application would require an unreasonable and substantial diversion of the agency's resources are to identify and take into account any matters falling within s 60(3A) and then to determine whether, on balance, those matters outweigh the factors set out in s 60(3B). It is only where the matters in s 60(3A) outweigh those in s 60(3B) that an agency can refuse to deal with an access application on the basis that it would require an unreasonable and substantial diversion of an agency's resources.

Consideration of the s 60(3A) factors

1. TFNSW is required to first identify and take into account the estimated volume of information involved in the applicant's request, the agency's size and resources, and the decision period under section 57 of the GIPA Act.

Time to process the application

1. Based on the sample search that was conducted by TNSW on 26 October 2021, Mr Jarrod Whitbourn, who is TNSW's Director of the Information Access unit said the number of such searches that would be required to complete the process, is likely to take more than 50 hours. His estimate incorporates an economy of scale, which may be achieved through a practice of identifying the relevant documents, drafting consultation letters and reviewing the information which has been located.
2. Mr Whitbourn deposes that a search for one Coffs harbour by-pass property took one officer 50 minutes. Once the information is found, further assessment, redactions and processing is required. I accept his evidence. When this is extrapolated, to searching over 22 properties, the time taken to do so is excessive.
3. Based on this sample review considered by Mr Whitbourn, TNSW submits that the information will contain the personal information of third parties. I accept his evidence. Because of this, TNSW anticipates that at least an additional 15 minutes would be required to consult with each of the third parties to whom the information relates. This could amount to in excess of 82 people. This includes drafting the letter of correspondence and responding to any concerns raised by these individuals. Section 54 of the GIPA Act provides: 54 Consultation on public interest considerations (1) An agency must take such steps (if any) as are reasonably practicable to consult with a person before providing access to information relating to the person in response to an access application if it appears that- (a) the information is of a kind that requires consultation under this section, and (b) the person may reasonably be expected to have concerns about the disclosure of the information, and (c) those concerns may reasonably be expected to be relevant to the question of whether there is a public interest consideration against disclosure of the information. (2) Information relating to a person is of a kind that requires consultation under this section if the information- (a) includes personal information about the person, or (b) concerns the person's business, commercial, professional or (c) financial interests, or...
4. In an email dated 1 November 2021, TNSW told the Applicant it would be required to consult with each of the (current and previous) landowners before releasing information relating to them. This was notwithstanding the Applicant's contention that he was not requesting access to personal information. Therefore, consultation would also be necessary with the authors of the reports to determine if there were any concerns in relation to its release.
5. TNSW's comments in this regard are correct and I accept them. This is because of the definition of 'personal information' in Clause 4 of Schedule 4 of the GIPA Act.
6. As has been found in similar cases determining the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998, the phrase 'whose identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained' which is contained of personal information, has extended to information that need not contain a name but any other information that might generally be considered to be 'personal' of the person to whom it relates, so long as the identity of the person can be ascertained from that information - (see WL v Randwick City Council [2007] NSWADTAP 58 in which photographs of a property were found to be personal information as it was possible to identify the person to whom the information related.)
7. I find it reasonable to conclude that a lot of the information that the Applicant has requested could, therefore, personal information. This is because he seeks access to valuation and town planning reports, which will no doubt include photographs of properties and the acquisition price and personal financial information about the sale of properties. I reject the Applicant's contention that this is not a reasonable consideration because he is not requesting personal information. In these circumstances, it is reasonable, and necessary for TNSW to consult with each of those persons who will be affected. In terms of the Applicant's request, that may involve consultation with up to 82 property owners.
8. I accept Mr Whitbourn's 'conservative' estimate of the number of pages of information that may be relevant to the Applicant's application may be 3,200. This calculation is based upon on an average of 40 pages for each of the 82 property files. This estimate was not challenged in cross-examination. I accept Mr Whitbourn's evidence that even where the decision-maker attributes a modest period of time to review each page to consider all of the relevant information and that the relevant public interest considerations, both in favour and against release, be considered, that may amount to ten seconds per page, requiring an additional 9 hours to deal with the information request.
9. I also accept Mr Whitbourn's evidence that following consultation TNSW will be required to spend time to consider which parts of the documents will require review and redacting personal information of third parties, which is required to respond to the Applicant's request.
10. The Applicant, in cross-examination, tested Mr Whitburn's evidence particularly with regard to the time in which TFNSW's system is operated to access information and redacting personal information. Despite the cross-examination, I accept Mr Whitbourn's evidence.

The agency's size and resources

1. It is reasonable to state that, generally, TNSW is well-equipped to deal with requests for a large volume of information. However, Mr Whitbourne deposes that TNSW determined 698 access applications in the financial year to 27 January 2022, It follows that TNSW must ensure that it is able to fairly allocate time to dealing with each application.
2. TNSW submits that spending a large amount of time on any one application, as in the current matter, would prejudice its ability to meet its obligations under the GIPA Act and respond to the public interest identified in the applications received from other members of the public.
3. Despite improvements in technology, I accept TNSW's submission that dealing with applications which require high numbers of documents constituting thousands of pages can require weeks to complete. Mr Whitbourne said TNSW stores both paper and electronic records, which all have to be searched in responding to the Applicant's request. I accept that even with minimal search time, a significant amount of time (in excess of 50 hours) will still be required to review and assess the information for release.

The s 57 GIPA Act time period for considering applications

1. Section 57 of the GIPA Act provides that an agency must decide an access application within 20 working days. The GIPA Act allows extensions of ten days s57(2), or by agreement with the applicant under s 57(4) of the GIPA Act. I agree with the information Commissioner that any agreement to extend the time would need to align with the objects found in ss 3 and s 60(4) of the GIPA Act. However, I find that s 60(2) operates to displace the extension of time period for a decision pursuant to s 60(1)(a) of the GIPA Act. I accept TNSW's submission, for the reasons set out above, that the required time to process the application would exceed the 20 day timeframe. This is because, in part, one GIPA Officer is likely to spend over 8 working days dedicated to processing the access application. TNSW would then need to consult with third parties and make decisions about redacting documents or otherwise. I give moderate to significant weight to this consideration.
2. In the decision of Hickey v Secretary, Department of Education [2021] SWADTAP 306 (Hickey) the Tribunal applied a weight classification to each item of evidence in applying and balancing the s. 60(3A) and s 60(3B) factors. The Tribunal applied and designated a weighting amount of strong, moderate or little weight to the evidence in the balancing exercise.
3. The Tribunal in Hickey also referenced at [23] the matter of Danis at [43]: In Commissioner of Police v Danis [2017] NSWCATAP 7 the Appeal Panel said at [43]: Section 60 is clearly designed to give agencies some flexibility in the administration and processing of access-to-information requests. Each of the grounds has at its core the sensible and efficient of (sic) deployment of agency resources. Access applicants generally are assisted if agencies are not tied down by voluminous applications (see (a) or by having to reprocess applications that have already received attention either through previous determinations (the focus of (b) and (61)). Read together it can be seen that the grounds listed in s 60(1) have as an aim the avoidance of wasteful use of administrative resources (see especially (a)) or situations where the applicant has already obtained a practical result (b), (b1)…
4. In considering the Applicant's request for information, TFNSW has apportioned moderate weight, to the factors set out in section 60(3A) of the GIPA Act for the following reasons: (a) The volume of information sought is significant and requires the business unit tasked with the search of electronic and paper records to divert time and resource from their core tasks which would interfere with the progress of other core priorities. (b) Dealing with an access application of this size would divert significant resources within the lAU team towards responding to a single application for access making it difficult to respond to the other access applications within the statutory timeframe. (c) It would take one IAU Office offline for at least 8 days to respond to this one access application. Given the current circumstances, staff absences due to illness must also be factored into the allocation of work within the team. (d) The lAU unit could seek a number of extensions to deal with the access application outside the statutory timeframe however this would not in keeping with the objects of the GIPA Act as set out in section 3.
5. I find in relation to the access request to seek valuation and town planning reports for 22 properties, and the documents and settlement sheets for 82 properties, that moderate to significant weight should be given. The time estimate for locating and processing the request is likely in my view to exceed 50 hours based upon the evidence of Mr Whitbourn. It is very unlikely that the application could be proceeded within the prescribed time, particularly considering the matters in the preceding paragraph, which I accept.
6. In relation to the town planning reports, I give moderate weight. This is because there is likely to be less time taken to search for the report, and, less time deciding which parts of the report a public interest against disclosure may apply.
7. Generally, given the large scope of the request, that being up 82 properties, I give moderate to significant weight to this consideration and find it would be unlikely that the statutory time period could be complied with.

Section 60(3B) considerations

1. The GIPA Act's objective of public access requires the s 60(1)(a) discretion to consider matters directly concerned with the nature of the information sought. This is both generally, according to the "general public interest in favour of the disclosure of government information" (s 60(3A)(a)); and specifically, according to the "demonstrable importance of the information to the applicant" (s. 60(3B)(b)).
2. The Tribunal in Ruyters at [47] interpreted the term, "general public interest" in s 60(3B) according to the meaning of s 12(1) and stated that the "general public interest refers to the inherent public interest in the disclosure of government information rather than public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of the particular information sought. This approach was affirmed by the Tribunal in Hickey at [112]. Therefore, in each case where s 60(1)(a) is claimed, the s 60(3B)(a) "general public interest in favour of the disclosure of government information" applies - see Ruyters at [55].
3. Section 60(3)(b) discloses a "demonstrable importance' consideration, which permits considerations of a private or personal nature particular to the access applicant with respect to the information captured by the general public interest in public disclosure. Only one consideration in (i) or (ii) of the provision is required to establish the demonstrable importance of the information sought.
4. There is no personal information of the Applicant being sought in his access request. Section 60(3B)(b)(i) is, therefore, not relevant.
5. When examining s60(3B)(b)(ii), the information may also be of "demonstrable importance" to the Applicant if it could assist him in exercising rights under an Act or law. However, the Tribunal has found that a mere assertion that the information might assist to exercise legal rights does not meet the evidentiary threshold for establishing the purpose of the information and its "demonstrable importance" under s. 60(3B)(b)(i): see, Ruyters at [56].
6. In Ruyters at [54], the Tribunal held that in evidencing the "demonstrable importance of the information to the applicant" under s. 60(3B): … it is necessary for an applicant to put forward some material to indicate the importance of the information sought rather than engaging in mere speculation or conjecture.
7. Therefore, the demonstrable importance consideration may be given no weight in the balancing test, despite evidence for the general public interest in favour of the information.
8. However, while evidence for s. 60(3B)(b) may need to be provided by an applicant's material in review proceedings, the burden of demonstrating the legal test is always on the decision-maker to show how the demonstrable importance is identified and then weighed in balancing the competing factors in s 60(3B) and s 60(3B). The Tribunal in Ruyters at [54] also commented that the s 60(3B)(b) requirement on the applicant should also recognise the "difficulties of applicants in identifying the relevant material".
9. The Applicant submits the access application is "solely for the purpose of determining the integrity of the compensation process adopted by Transport for NSW in the acquisition of land for the Coffs Harbor Bypass". He identifies the various public interest considerations, in favour of disclosure of the information pursuant to s 12(2) of the GIPA Act, as set out in his letter of 1 November 2021 to TFNSW, as revealing the matters in s 12(2)(e) (Disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to reveal or substantiate that an agency (or a member of an agency) has engaged in misconduct or negligent, improper or unlawful conduct.)
10. However, s 12(2) public interest considerations relevant to the s 13 test, are not to be imported into the balancing exercise test for s 60(1)(a). This is because the "general public interest" in s 60(3B) refers to inherent public interest in the disclosure of information as in s 12(1), and not to the other public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of the particular information sought as set out in the note to s12(2) of the GIPA Act (see Ruyters at [47]). Therefore, only the general public interest consideration (s12(1)) is to be imported into the weighing exercise. Therefore, the Applicant's reliance on s 12(2)(e) of the GIPA Act in the weighing exercise in s 60(3B) is misconceived.
11. In Ruyters, the Tribunal said at [44]-[45], which I adopt: 44 The term "general public interest", as noted above, occurs elsewhere in the GIPA Act most notably in s 12(1). The courts have long held that where a word is used consistently in legislation it should be given the same meaning. As was stated in Craig Williamson Pty Ltd v Barrowcliff [1915] VLR 450 at 452 "it is a fundamental rule of construction that any document should be construed as far as possible so as to give the same meaning to the same words wherever those words occur in that document, and that that applies especially to an Act of Parliament". Consistent with the principal set out in Craig Williamson and other cases the same meaning should be given to the phrase "general public interest" in both s 12(1) and s 60(3B). 45 I agree with the submissions of the Commissioner that the use of the word "general" in the phrase "general public interest" should be given its ordinary meaning of "common to many or most of the community" and "non-specific or special" (Macquarie Dictionary). In that sense the phrase "general public interest" indicates that it is the inherent public interest in the disclosure of government information that is to be given consideration for the purposes of s 60(3B) as it is in s 12(1).
12. Subsection 60(3B) provides that the information sought must be of demonstrable importance to the Applicant. The term "demonstrable" requires an Applicant to provide sufficient cogent material to make evident the importance of the information to him.
13. I reject the Applicant's submissions at [56] that the integrity and use of town planning reports sought will evidence some form of price manipulation in land acquisition by TFNSW. I am also not satisfied that the purported use of valuation report or settlement documentation for the sale of properties will evidence some sort of price manipulation by TNSW. The Applicant also submits that paragraphs in his appeal in other proceedings are apposite. That material has been filed in other proceedings and is not relevant for me to consider in this application.
14. I am not satisfied that anything has been put in these proceedings, even in a relatively broad sense as to the nature of the information contained in the documents sought, to substantiate any claim that TNSW may have engaged in an exercise of manipulating the compensation assessments for land acquisition.
15. The Applicant has put nothing before the Tribunal to substantiate any claim that the land acquisition process may have been manipulated, which is necessary to indicate the importance of the information sought rather than engaging in mere speculation or conjecture.
16. I am not satisfied that the information sought by the Applicant is his personal information nor would it appear to relate to him exercising his rights under the law.

Additional factors

1. I have considered the relevant factors which are set out in Colefax v Department of Education and Communities (NSW) (No 2) [2013] NSWADT 130 at [24] and Cianfrano v Director General, Premier's Department [2006] NSWADT 137 at [62], which are apposite to the disposition of the proceedings. They are relevantly addressed in my discussion concerning the application of ss 60(3A) and 60(3B) of the GIPA Act.
2. I am satisfied that TFNSW complied with s 60(4) of the GIPA Act in reasonably inviting the Applicant to narrow the scope of his request, by, limiting the number of properties for which he was seeking information. He refused too so do.

Conclusion

1. Subsection 60(3B) provides that any consideration under s 60(3A) must, on balance, outweigh the general public interest in favour of the disclosure of government information and the demonstrable importance of the information to the Applicant. I am satisfied that the general public interest in favour of the disclosure of government information is relevant in this case, as it is in every case. As set out above, I am not satisfied that the information is the Applicant's personal information and as such that cannot weigh in the balance.
2. The Applicant submits that the public interest in obtaining the information to establish the matters in s12(2)(e) of the GIPA Act overwhelmingly outweighs TFNSW's case that dealing with the application will be an unreasonable and substantial diversion of resources. As I have set out above, the s 12(2)(e) factors are not to be considered in the weighing exercise in s 60(3B) of the GIPA Act. Further, other than an assertion that the material might assist, nothing has been put before the Tribunal that would put the case any higher than that. Nothing was put which would indicate that release of the information could assist the Applicant in exercising his rights.
3. On the other hand, I am satisfied that the volume of information involved in the request, being some 200 emails and more than 3000 pages of material, is considerable. There is no doubt that the time required to deal adequately with the access application would far exceed 50 hours. TNSW would be unable to comply with the decision period of 20 working days under s 57 of the GIPA Act to any degree. This is mainly due to the large scope of the request and the sheer number of properties about which the Applicant seeks to access information.
4. I accept that TNSW is a large agency and, as can be seen from the evidence given by Mr Whitbourn. He deposes considerable resources are devoted to dealing with the many requests to the agency for access to information. I am satisfied that in dealing with this request would require an officer to be taken off-line for a lengthy period, more than eight days, and would have a consequential effect upon the agency's ability to deal with other access applications. I accept that considerable time would be required to contact third parties whose personal information would likely be affected by the application. I accept that, even though the agency is large, its resources are not unlimited and responding to this application would consume a substantial proportion of the agency's resources to deal with all access applications received by it. As was noted by the Appeal Panel in Danis, "[a]ccess applicants generally are assisted if agencies are not tied down by voluminous applications" (at [43]).
5. I am satisfied that dealing with the application, which seeks a voluminous amount of information and documentation, would require an unreasonable and substantial diversion of TNSW's resources. I am further satisfied there is a general public interest in favour of the disclosure of government information. However, the Applicant has failed to establish the demonstrable importance of the information to him. I am therefore satisfied that, having regard to the volume of the information involved, the time needed to deal adequately with the request and the cost of doing so and other relevant matters referred to above that these matters outweigh the matters referred to in s 60(3B).
6. I am therefore satisfied that dealing with the application would require an unreasonable and substantial diversion of TNSW's resources and that the correct preferable decision is to refuse to deal with the application pursuant to s 60(1)(a) of the GIPA Act.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 15 December 2022