Judicial review of the Tribunal's decision
27 The second ground of appeal raised in the appellants' notice of appeal contends that the Tribunal's decision is "is affected by a judicial error, as the Tribunal did not provide procedural fairness or consider the medical situation faced by us, which played an important part in the decisions of the Tribunal".
28 At the hearing, the first appellant expressed, broadly, that the Tribunal had failed to take into account the health conditions of the first and second appellant in reaching its decision. According to the first appellant, some of the answers he gave at the Tribunal hearing may have been wrong or mistaken because of his mental condition.
29 I am not persuaded, however, that the Tribunal's reasons for decision disclose any jurisdictional error in this respect. The AAT Reasons provide a detailed consideration of the evidence before the Tribunal. A reading of those reasons (particularly those paragraphs extracted above at [8]), demonstrates that the Tribunal plainly considered and took into account the first and second appellants' memory, mental and physical conditions. I do not detect any error in the Tribunal's approach to these issues.
30 The appellants moreover complain that they were denied procedural fairness by the Tribunal. To the extent that this allegation deviates from their argument regarding the first and second appellants' health conditions, this allegation is unparticularised, and the failure to particularise a ground of appeal is a basis upon which that ground may be dismissed: see, for example, SZNXA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 775 at [21] per Reeves J.
31 In any event, there is no evident breach of the Tribunal's obligations under Pt 7, Div 4 of the Migration Act 1959 (Cth) (Act). By letter dated 2 March 2016, sent to the appellants' email address, the Tribunal invited the appellants to appear before it and a hearing was scheduled on 19 April 2016 in accordance with ss 425 and 425A of the Act. The appellants attended with the assistance of a Sinhalese interpreter. The appellants were aware that the credibility of their claims was the determinative issue on review from the delegate's decision and the Tribunal's questioning at the hearing.
32 The Tribunal, in reaching its decision, relied on the appellants' written evidence provided to the Department, the appellants' oral evidence provided to the Tribunal and relevant country information, all of which fell within the exceptions to information in s 424A(3)(ba), s 424A(3)(b) and s 424A(3)(a) of the Act respectively.
33 Finally, I do not accept the appellants' residual complaint, as advanced in their written and oral reasons, that the Tribunal failed to assess their claims for protection under the refugee and complementary protection criteria. The Tribunal clearly considered the appellants' claims, including those provided in the visa application forms. However, the Tribunal found on the evidence before it, and taking into account the Tribunal's credibility concerns, that the appellants did not satisfy either the refugee or complementary protection criteria. These findings were open to the Tribunal to make.
34 In particular, Mr Miranda appeared to contend at the hearing in this Court that, because the first appellant subjectively feared persecution if he returned to Sri Lanka, it followed that a well-founded fear of persecution was established in the present case. Mr Miranda cited Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62; 169 CLR 379 (Chan) for that proposition. However, in short, what Chan established is that the determination of whether a person has a well-founded fear of persecution involves a mixed subjective and objective test: see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259 at 263 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. As Toohey J observed in Chan at 406, "[i]f the test were entirely subjective, the expression "well-founded" would serve no useful purpose". In the present case, regardless of whether the appellants subjectively held a genuine fear of returning to Sri Lanka, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellants possessed a well-founded fear of persecution, or that there was a real risk that they would suffer significant harm if they returned to Sri Lanka.
35 Accordingly, in my view, no jurisdictional error as alleged was committed by the Tribunal.